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

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THE BIOLOGICAL BASES OF BEHAVIOR AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

By PETER A. CORNING*

I. Introduction

IN what must surely rank as one of the strangest episodes in the entire history of science, two generations of our immediate forebears in the social sciences managed virtually to ignore the "Darwinian" theory of biological evolution[1] and to exclude from their purview any sustained consideration of the role of biological factors in the shaping of human behavior.[2]

Without an understanding of the evolutionary origins and genetic bases of behavior, we cannot hope to grasp the inner principles by which human life is organized; a full explanation of human behavior must include not only biological variables but, equally important, an understanding of the evolutionary functions and survival consequences of behavior. Yet our immediate heritage in the social sciences has been one of environmental (cultural) determinism and of functionalism without a theory—that is, a functionalism that somehow became disconnected from the only scientifically acceptable explanation of the origin, nature, and "purpose" of human life. As a result, our con-

* This is a revised and greatly abridged version of a paper presented at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1969 (reproduced by University Microfilms), and is the nucleus of a larger work, *Politics and Survival*, scheduled for publication in 1971. The author wishes to acknowledge the material assistance of the Office of Research Services of Fordham University and the Institute for Behavioral Genetics at the University of Colorado. The author is also indebted for their encouragement, comments, and suggestions to Alice Adams, Alexander Alland, Jr., Christian Bay, Richard Blumenthal, Steven J. Brams, James T. Crown, James C. Davies, William G. Fleming, D. O. Hebb, Ralph P. Hummel, Henry S. Kariel, Robert E. Lane, Konrad Lorenz, Gerald E. McClearn, Kenneth E. Moyer, and Melvin Richter. My appreciation goes also to my collaborator and wife, Constance Hellyer Corning. Any errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, my own.

[1] Biologists currently seem to prefer the term "synthetic" theory of evolution, to connote that our present understanding of evolutionary history and its processes is a far cry from that of Darwin and his contemporaries. Rather, the "modern" theory of evolution represents a true synthesis of data and theory from a number of related disciplines, including population genetics, Mendelian genetics, paleontology, taxonomy, and ethology, among others. The term "synthetic" should also be taken as suggestive of the *ideological* dissimilarities between early "Darwinism" and present-day evolutionary theory. (See below, fn. 22).

[2] Fortunately, however, this situation has been changing rapidly during the past few years. (See below.)

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ceptual frameworks have often been one-dimensional and curiously disembodied.

There are, of course, many reasons for this dubious legacy. One major factor was the pernicious influence of social Darwinism. By seriously misrepresenting the actual workings of biological evolution (often in furtherance of immediate political goals), social Darwinists and other apologists for *laissez-faire* capitalism provoked a reaction that sought to put as much distance as possible between cultural man and his animal cousins.[3]

Another factor was the reductionist, and now largely outmoded, stimulus-response model of behavior that long dominated behaviorist psychology.[4] Though behaviorism was never more than a working hypothesis, an uncritical suspension of disbelief enabled many social scientists to take the position that culture is a closed system—completely self-contained and self-explanatory. Thus, in anthropology, the search for "human nature" in the form of cultural universals became sidetracked in recent decades by a fascination with cultural differences; many anthropologists tended to ignore the far more fundamental similarities among cultures.[5] By the same token, sociologists became chained to Durkheim's doctrine that sociology must be autonomous—social facts could be explained only in terms of other social facts.[6] Political science, on the other hand, was marked by diversity—with behaviorist psychology tending to reinforce environmentalist approaches, both behavioralist and traditional.[7]

In addition, there was the understandable reaction to a xenophobic and racist-tinged perversion of the "eugenics" movement in biology, as well as the intellectual constraints of a narrowly positivistic social

[3] Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston 1955); "Editor's Introduction" in Robert L. Carneiro, ed., *The Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology* (Chicago 1967), ix-lvii.

[4] The current Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model in psychology, which has all but replaced the old S-R model, reflects the growing recognition that the "organism" must be considered, at the very least, as a mediating influence on behavior. See Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (2nd ed., Reading, Mass. 1968), I, 97. On the consequences of the S-R model, see Jerry Hirsch, "Epilog," in Hirsch, ed., *Behavior-Genetic Analysis* (New York 1967), 420-21.

[5] This point was stressed by Clyde Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior," in Lindzey (fn. 4), II (1959 ed.). See also Leslie White, "Culturology," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968), III, 547-50.

[6] See Emile Durkheim, "Social Facts," in May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968), 245-54.

[7] In general, though, the issue has been skirted in recent decades; many political scientists have failed to make their underlying assumptions explicit, and there has been no rigorous examination of the biological premises about man held in various quarters of our discipline.

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science methodology, a generous measure of social and political idealism, disciplinary specialization and consequent insularity, not a little theoretical myopia about some self-evident and intuitively recognized truths about man and society, and, in fairness, a relative paucity until recently of convincing empirical evidence for the role of biological variables in human behavior, despite such signposts as Charles Darwin's classic, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1873).[8]

The predominant view of "human nature" that resulted from all of this was epitomized in two statements by anthropologist M. F. Ashley Montagu: "Man is man because he has no instincts, because everything he is and has become he has learned, acquired, from his culture, from the man-made part of his environment, from other human beings. . . . If there remain any residues of instincts in man, they are, possibly, the automatic reaction to a sudden loud noise, and, in the remaining instance, to a sudden withdrawal of support; for the rest, man has no instincts."[9] In a similar vein, anthropologist Leslie A. White has stated that "instinct can probably be dismissed at the outset; no one, we dare say, would want to argue that any cultural form is *determined* by genes and chromosomes."[10]

Of course, it is one thing to say that behavior is "determined" by "instincts" and quite another to say that it is "shaped" and "organized" in part by genetic or neurophysiological components as well as by environmental factors. As should become apparent, this distinction is a crucial one. For, in the past decade or so, a sophisticated "interactional approach" to the study of behavior has been emerging in biology, an approach that is rapidly spreading to the social sciences as well. It was summed up by psychologist David C. Glass in his preface to the published proceedings of a landmark interdisciplinary conference on genetics and behavior: "Contemporary social scientists no longer adhere to a simplistic environmental determinism, just as contemporary biologists no longer embrace a genetic determinism. In both fields there is increasing recognition of the importance of interaction between the organism and the environment. Neither the genetic parameter nor the environmental parameter alone can account for more than a portion of behavioral variability. With the development of this interactional

[8] Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (reprinted Chicago 1965). It is also true, however, that social biology languished for lack of interest in pursuing research of this kind.

[9] M. F. Ashley Montagu, "The New Litany of 'Innate Depravity,' or Original Sin Revisited," in Ashley Montagu, ed., *Man and Aggression* (New York 1968), 9; and Ashley Montagu, ed., *Culture and the Evolution of Man* (New York 1962), ix.

[10] Leslie A. White, *The Evolution of Culture* (New York 1959), 22, italics added.

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approach, a revitalized interest in the genetic basis of social behavior has been witnessed."[11]

For all their flaws, several recent best-selling popularizations[12] have gone far to stimulate interest in biological aspects of behavior. But more important, recent research and theoretical work in the social sciences themselves have begun to reflect an evolutionary and biological focus.[13] In fact, the biological and social sciences are becoming increasingly convergent and interdisciplinary. One reflection of this movement has been the establishment by the Social Science Research Council of a committee on the biological bases of behavior. Another has been the appearance in recent years of several interstitial sub-specialties, such as neuroethology, psychobiology, biocybernetics and behavior genetics. Interdisciplinary research institutes have also been established at a number of universities.

Nor has political science remained untouched. James C. Davies made a notable attempt several years ago[14] to utilize psychologist Abraham Maslow's constructive but insufficient theory of "human needs" as a point of departure. Davies sought "behavioral tendencies whose origin is in the organism and which, through a long chain of causation, end up among the host of forces determining political behavior in individual human beings."[15] He extracted from a vast reservoir of historical and contemporary experience evidence of individual psychological motivation-states. It was an impressive effort, and it illuminated many

[11] David C. Glass, ed., *Genetics* (New York 1968), Preface.

[12] Notably: Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York 1966); Robert Ardrey, *African Genesis* (New York 1961), *The Territorial Imperative* (New York 1966), and *The Social Contract* (New York 1970); Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape* (New York 1967) and *The Human Zoo* (New York 1969); and Lionel Tiger, *Men in Groups* (New York 1969).

[13] See, for example, psychologists Donald O. Hebb, *A Textbook of Psychology* (2nd ed., Philadelphia 1966); Daniel G. Freedman, "A Biological View of Man's Social Behavior," in William Etkin, *Social Behavior from Fish to Man* (Chicago 1967), 152-88; David C. Glass, ed., *Genetics* (New York 1968); Gerald E. McClearn, "The Inheritance of Behavior" in Leo Postman, ed., *Psychology in the Making* (New York 1962); Jerry Hirsch (fn. 4); and Martin Manosevitz, Gardner Lindzey, and Delbert D. Thiessen, eds., *Behavior Genetics, Method and Research* (New York 1969); anthropologists Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service, *Evolution and Culture* (Ann Arbor 1960); Alexander Alland, Jr., *Evolution and Human Behavior* (Garden City 1967); S. L. Washburn and Phyllis C. Jay, eds., *Perspectives on Human Evolution* (New York 1968); Andrew P. Vayda, ed., *Environment and Cultural Behavior: Ecological Studies in Cultural Anthropology* (Garden City 1969); and Earl Count, "The Biological Basis of Human Sociality," *American Anthropologist*, LX (December 1958), 1049-85; and sociologists Richard L. Means, "Sociology, Biology, and the Analysis of Social Problems," *Social Problems*, XV (Fall 1967), 200-12; Bruce K. Eckland, "Genetics and Sociology: A Reconsideration," *American Sociological Review*, XXXII (April 1967), 173-94; and Dennis H. Wrong and Harry L. Gracy, *Readings in Introductory Sociology* (New York 1967), 1-61.

[14] James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York 1963).

[15] *Ibid.*, 3.

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of the deep personal motivations that are woven into the fabric of our social and political life. The book's limitation, however, was that it was not cast within an evolutionary mold, but was instead based upon an inadequate "psychological" formulation of human needs that had become detached from their evolutionary functions. It should be borne in mind, though, that Davies' book was written before the current upsurge of research and interest in biological aspects of behavior from a specifically evolutionary orientation.

More recently, Davies has incorporated some of the new research data (with particular focus on psychobiology) in a 1969 paper.[16] Likewise, Albert Somit has described and briefly discussed the relevance to political science of data from ethology and psychopharmacology,[17] and Charles Adrian has contributed a discussion of some implications for political science of contemporary ethological research.[18]

Arthur L. Kalleberg also performed a valuable service, in a recent article, by clearing away some of the theoretical underbrush in our discipline.[19] In particular, Kalleberg presented the case against radical behaviorism and discussed the role of the "organism" or "black box" (an expression borrowed from electronics) in contemporary psychological research and theory.

In developing his causal model of violence, Ted Gurr also took note of biological factors. "The underlying causal mechanism," Gurr declared, "is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one *innate response* to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an *inherently* satisfying response."[20]

Thus far, however, there has been no systematic attempt to incorporate into the thinking of the discipline the perspective of modern evolutionary biology and current knowledge about biological components of behavior.[21] Accordingly, in this paper I will attempt to

[16] James C. Davies, "The Psychobiology of Political Behavior: Some Provocative Developments," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Honolulu, 3-5 April 1969.

[17] Albert Somit, "Toward a More Biologically-Oriented Political Science: Ethology and Psychopharmacology," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (November 1968).

[18] Charles R. Adrian, "Implications for Political Science and Public Policy of Recent Ethological Research," paper presented at the 2nd International Sinological Conference, The China Academy, Taipei, August 1969.

[19] Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March 1969), 26-39.

[20] Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), 1104, italics added.

[21] Since this paper was completed, a searching philosophical treatise on the subject has appeared: Thomas Landon Thorson, *Biopolitics* (New York 1970). Although Thorson

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outline relevant aspects of the modern, "synthetic" theory of evolution and will describe some of the current research on behavior from a biological and evolutionary point of view. I will then discuss some possible implications for political theory and political research. Because this is a recent and rapidly expanding area of investigation, conclusions about the bases of human behavior must be tentative. Certain facets—especially on such politically charged subjects as the causes of aggression or the heritability of intelligence—are highly controversial. Taken as a whole, however, this approach should provide us with many new insights on a number of social and political problems. Moreover, the evolutionary approach has a compelling unity and theoretical richness that may help us resolve some of our most difficult theoretical dilemmas.

II. The Evolutionary Model of Society

In the century since Darwin published *On the Origin of Species*, scientific evidence drawn from a number of different disciplines has overwhelmingly confirmed the theory of evolution. And if its actual workings are far more complicated than even Darwin imagined, his was nonetheless a monumental insight, a causal explanation of the history of life on this planet including the development of *homo sapiens*.

The basic principles of evolutionary theory have been described comprehensively in several available works.[22] But, in brief, evolution is a process through which a population of organisms enhances its survival potential by successive genetic changes, or adaptations. Random muta-

covers some of the same points and is generally compatible in his approach, his focus is quite different from that of this paper. Further, two panels on biology and politics were held at the 1970 World Congress of the International Political Science Association and at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting (1970) of the American Political Science Association. Among those papers that had become available as of this writing, some of the more notable were the following: Henry Beck, "Politics and the Life Sciences: Notes Toward a Theory of Biobehavioral Ecology" (IPSA); James C. Davies, "Violence and Aggression: Innate or Not?" (IPSA); Ralph P. Hummel, "A Case for a Bio-Social Model of Charisma" (IPSA); Dean Jaros, "Biochemical Desocialization: Depressants and Political Behavior" (APSA); David C. Schwartz, "Perceptions of Personal Energy and the Adoption of Basic Behavioral Orientations to Politics" (APSA); Robert B. Stauffer, "The Role of Drugs in Political Change" (IPSA); Thomas Landon Thorson, "The Biological Foundations of Political Science: Reflections on the Post-Behavioral Era" (IPSA); and Manfred W. Wenner, "Symbiosis and Politics" (IPSA). See also Corning, "The Problem of Applying Darwinian Evolution to Political Science" (IPSA); and Corning, "The Theory of Evolution as a Paradigm for the Analysis of Political Phenomena" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1971).

[22] For example: Julian Huxley, *Evolution in Action* (New York 1966); George Gaylord Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution* (2nd ed., New Haven 1967); Garrett Hardin, *Nature and Man's Fate* (New York 1961); Theodosius Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (New Haven 1962) and *Heredity and the Nature of Man* (New York 1964); and I. Michael Lerner, *Heredity, Evolution, and Society* (San Francisco 1968).

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tions, genetic recombination (or reshuffling), and behavioral variation provide the raw material for adaptation. This raw material is then tested in the environment for its survival value, or relative fitness, and the "editing" process is called natural selection.

Of course, in operation this apparently simple process is extremely subtle and complex. It would be impossible to present an adequate account of it here, but because the interactional approach to the study of behavior is anchored in the contemporary understanding of biological evolution, some of the more salient points for our purposes may be summarized.

The first, and perhaps most important, point is that in the modern view the basic survival unit is not the isolated individual, as is commonly supposed, but rather the gene pool, or breeding population. The collective nature of the survival enterprise applies both at the level of the genes (the basic unit of heredity) and at the behavioral level.[23] The survival (or long-run reproductive success) of a gene pool is, then, dependent upon its collective "fitness."

Furthermore, a great many species, including most higher animals, exhibit as part of their survival-serving behavioral repertoire a highly organized group life. As biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky points out, "a really solitary animal is a rare phenomenon. Individuals of the same and of different species are interdependent in various degrees. . . . Nature's stern discipline enjoins mutual help at least as often as warfare. The fittest may also be the gentlest."[24]

Group life provides many evolutionary advantages. It facilitates reproduction in various ways; it permits a division of labor, particularly with respect to food-gathering and the nurture of the young; group-living animals are also much less subject to predation and frequently display coordinated action against a predator. In fact, the phenomenon of group members' closing ranks against an external threat—a behavior often noted in human beings[25]—is also widespread in the rest of the animal world.

In sum, group life is essentially a biological phenomenon with specific survival value. Whatever else may be involved in the social

[23] George Gaylord Simpson, *Biology and Man* (New York 1969), 28. Of course, Darwin was not the only nineteenth-century thinker to recognize the evolutionary significance of the group. Perhaps the most notable was the Russian naturalist (and anarchist) Petr Kropotkin, who published a remarkable book called *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* in 1888 (reprinted, Boston 1955).

[24] Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 134.

[25] See especially Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (reprinted, Chicago 1965), and Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York 1956).

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behavior of human beings, it is clear that altruism, cooperation, and group loyalty also have genetic support; genes that make for group-serving behavior, along with genes for self-serving behavior, would have been favored by natural selection, Thomas Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding.[26]

A second general observation is implicit in the above. The modern view of evolution is that natural selection does not ordinarily involve a "tooth-and-claw" struggle. As one of the leading authorities on evolution, George Gaylord Simpson, put it in his classic, *The Meaning of Evolution*, "[natural selection] more often involves such things as better integration into the ecological situation [or 'goodness of fit' in the current parlance], maintenance of a balance of nature, more efficient utilization of available food, better care of the young, elimination of intra-group discords (struggles) that might hamper reproduction, exploitation of environmental possibilities that are not the objects of competition or are less effectively exploited by others."[27] In essence, then, the word "survival" refers to an on-going enterprise encompassing a constellation of behaviors—both individual and collective. And when geneticists speak of collective "fitness," they mean something akin to the "general welfare." (Indeed, many *qualitative* considerations are crucial to the survival of almost any species.)

In emphasizing the group basis of survival, however, we cannot deny the role of competition. Recent studies, in particular, have tended to give somewhat more weight to the role of direct, individual competition (primarily among males) in intra-group selection, but such competition is normally contained and limited by the overriding needs of the group. Moreover, it is apt to be nonviolent (threat displays, ritualized fighting, and other "conventional" forms of competition are more the rule). Only under exceptional circumstances (such as extreme overcrowding or a sudden and drastic increase in environmental pressures) is competition likely to break into mortal combat. And in most group-living species, competitive behaviors are counterbalanced and checked by a variety of group, mate, or progeny-serving behaviors. Cooperative behavior is at least as important to the survival of a great many species, including man, as is conflict.[28]

In the philosophical literature, one of the most consistent themes

[26] William Etkin, *Social Behavior from Fish to Man* (Chicago 1967), 6. See also W. C. Allee, *The Social Life of Animals* (Rev. ed., Boston 1958); Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 129-36; Peter H. Klopfer and Jack P. Hailman, *An Introduction to Animal Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs 1967), chap. 7; and F. Fraser Darling, "Social Behavior and Survival," *The Auk*, LXIX (April 1952), 183-91.

[27] Simpson (fn. 22), 222.

[28] Etkin (fn. 26), 33.

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has been the puzzling ethical "duality" of the human species. We now know that this sort of paradox is far from unique to man. As biologist William Etkin notes, "there are many contradictory and conflicting forces acting upon any organism, and the behavior system achieved in its evolution represents a compromise or resolution of these forces—or perhaps, better said, a dynamic equilibrium between them. . . ."[29]

Competition also goes on among *groups* (or populations), of course. But as Simpson points out, this competition is often of a fairly benign and passive nature and may well occur without the competing forms being in contact or even aware of their competition with one another. Furthermore, says Simpson, "selection is not primarily a process of elimination. It is a process of differential reproduction."[30]

This brings us to a third major point about evolution: Natural selection operates mainly in terms of the reproductive efficacy of breeding populations.[31] The geneticists' measure of the overall "adaptiveness" of a deme (or Mendelian breeding population) is its long-run reproductive success, and biologists from Darwin on have traditionally considered success to be largely a matter of sheer numbers, the population with the greatest number being the most successful.

However, recent research has called this assumption into question. It seems that many species are able to regulate their numbers in relation to the resources available in a particular environment, so that they are able to maintain a fairly stable homeostatic fit with their ecological niches. Zoologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards, in particular, contends that the potential fecundity of a species is usually far greater than is normally utilized, the excess being regulated most often by "social conventions" of various kinds—such as restrictions on the number of males and/or females who are permitted to breed, limits on the number of eggs allowed to hatch, or even, as in some insect species, the creation of castes of sterile individuals. Social (i.e., nonlethal) competition among the males (often for rights to suitable breeding territories) is a particularly common device. Very few species employ such dramatic mechanisms as do the lemmings.[32] (Indeed, man seems to be a notable exception to the rule. As a relatively recent arrival on the scene, *homo sapiens* started with a rather small population that has been growing

[29] *Ibid.*, 116.

[30] Simpson (fn. 22), 224.

[31] Simpson, *This View of Life: The World of an Evolutionist* (New York 1964), 76-79; Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 129, 159; and Robert Rosen, *Optimality Principles in Biology* (London 1967), 6.

[32] V. C. Wynne-Edwards, *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior* (Edinburgh 1962); Wynne-Edwards, "Population Control and Social Selection in Animals," in Glass (fn. 13), 143-63.

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explosively in recent times.[33] Only now is he reaching—or possibly exceeding—the "carrying capacity" of the ecological niches available to him, and he has just begun to face up to the profound change this must ultimately require in his relationship to the environment.)

Accordingly, a number of biologists have recently espoused the hypothesis that the ability of a population to maintain a situation-specific "optimum number"[34] might provide a better measure of its long-run survival chances. (This complex issue has been discussed at length in a recent paper by this writer.)[35]

Now, if reproductive success is the basic criterion of evolutionary adaptiveness, it should be obvious that adaptiveness is very much dependent upon behavior. A fourth point, therefore, is that, in the current view, those behavioral traits that have consequences for the survival and reproductive efficacy of an individual or a deme are products of evolution and are subject to natural selection. "When we refer to evolved or phylogenetically adaptive behavior," explains Daniel G. Freedman, "we are designating a behavioral unit which has been produced by the evolutionary process in much the same way that physical or biochemical characteristics of the species have been produced."[36]

Behaviors that contribute to reproductive success will be favored by natural selection, and the genetic basis for those successful behaviors will be incorporated into a population's gene pool. There is thus a feedback process at work between behavior and its biological base.[37] Or, in other words, behavior and morphology evolve together in an integrated and mutually supportive manner. Even where behavior is not so much genetically based as learned, it is subject to the so-called "Baldwin effect." That is, if an animal society adopts a new adaptive behavior, any genetic character compatible with that acquired behavior will tend to become fixed in subsequent generations, or at least will not be selected out.[38]

By the same token, the total behavioral repertoire of any species forms a distinctive and interrelated system. The social organization

[33] David M. Heer, *Society and Population* (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 1-4.

[34] The principle was originally developed in economics in relation to the costs of production. It was reformulated and applied to ecological considerations in 1922 by Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders and was revived most recently by Wynne-Edwards (fn. 32).

[35] Corning, "The Problem of Applying Darwinian Evolution to Political Science" (fn. 21), 34-42.

[36] Freedman (fn. 13), 156.

[37] Sherwood L. Washburn and Judith Shirek, "Human Evolution," in Hirsch (fn. 4), 10.

[38] John A. King, "Behavioral Modification of the Gene Pool," in Hirsch (*ibid.*), 42. The Baldwin effect should not be confused with Lysenkoism, however. Acquired traits do not cause genetic changes in the germ cells of the individual. Lerner (fn. 22), 277-86.

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of any group-living species involves multiple interadjustments to the possibly conflicting demands of nature, and the manner in which a species integrates behaviors may be just as significant as the characteristics of any particular behavior considered in isolation.[39]

Furthermore, the fact that the behavior system of each species has its own unique configuration does not mean that resemblances among the behaviors of different species are purely coincidental. On the contrary. Species with the same basic biological needs and pursuing the same general survival strategy will tend to develop convergent behavioral repertoires. Moreover, evolved behaviors that have proven to be adaptive at an earlier stage of evolution are often retained in their general effect and may be further elaborated upon as new species evolve. As psychologist Gerald E. McClearn, a leading authority in behavior genetics, has pointed out, "if species were not related, but were each the result of special creation, then there would be no reason to expect any common principles. But, in terms of evolutionary theory we understand that different species are variations on themes within themes."[40]

Thus, though it would be fallacious to make an unqualified identification between any given human behavior and apparently similar behaviors in lower animals, broad functional analogies may nonetheless be appropriate.[41] Territoriality, for example, may well perform some of the same functions in lower animals and in man. On the other hand, the converse may be true. Similar behaviors exhibited by different species might be adaptive in quite different ways, reflecting the differing behavioral matrices or survival needs of the two species.

Another general point about adaptiveness is that, just as behavioral traits that prove to be adaptive for survival are likely to be retained in the repertoire of the species, sooner or later maladaptive behaviors are likely to be selected out. As Etkin explained it, "in the large view the characteristics of organisms *must* be expected to be adaptive in the sense of contributing to the long-run reproductive efficacy of the species as it lives in its own particular ecological niche."[42] This is not to say that, at any given time, all of the behaviors of individuals or species must be

[39] Etkin (fn. 26), 113.

[40] Gerald E. McClearn, "Biological Bases of Social Behavior with Specific Reference to Violent Behavior," *Crimes of Violence*, XIII, a staff report to the National Committee on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington 1969). "The development of modern medicine has depended to a very great extent on animal research, and its present status is testimony to the fact that many anatomical, physiological, biochemical and pharmacological processes are indeed generalizable, at least to a useful degree."

[41] Klopfer and Hailman (fn. 26), 178; Count (fn. 13).

[42] Etkin (fn. 26), 3.

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adaptive. In light of the fact that variation is the rule with organic systems, this seems most unlikely. Indeed, variation provides the raw material for evolutionary selection; it is estimated, for example, that more than ten percent of all human zygotes carry a new mutation.[43] Moreover, a deme and its environment are involved in an ongoing feedback relationship; as the environment changes, once-adaptive behaviors and morphologies may well become maladaptive. In some cases an animal may become so specialized in its adaptations that it is vulnerable to the slightest change in its accustomed environment. The fossil record, after all, is replete with examples of once adapted species now extinct.[44]

As a rule, a successful population may be expected to adopt behaviors designed to maximize its survival potential, and to minimize the risk of losses, with respect to its particular ecological niche.[45] This is true precisely because evolution is a functionally oriented process. Natural selection operates so as to reward eufunctional (adaptive) behaviors and penalize dysfunctional (maladaptive) behaviors. By definition, then, any species that is "successful" in evolutionary terms will be one whose behaviors are (or at least were in the immediate past) on balance adaptive.[46] An excellent illustration of this point is described in a recent study of the Karimojong tribe in Uganda.[47] In contrast to the efficient, market-oriented—and supposedly more "rational"—Western system of cattle ranching, in which a small number of people raise a large number of animals and market their products (meat and milk), the Karimojong practice subsistence herding. No effort is made to produce a surplus for marketing, and cattle are rarely slaughtered. Instead, the tribesmen subsist on milk and blood, which is drawn from the animals with great care. In this way, the cattle are conserved in order to support the maximum number of tribesmen.

[43] Lerner (fn. 22), 188.

[44] "It is a fact demonstrated by paleontology that through the ages and for one reason or another the vast majority of species have become extinct." Simpson (fn. 31), 79.

[45] The relationship between a society and its environment may be conceptualized as a two-person game, with the entries in the pay-off matrix being the different population levels that the environment can be induced to support, given various alternative survival strategies. For a discussion of the application of game-theory to survival problems, see Peter R. Gould, "Man Against His Environment: A Game Theoretic Framework," in Vayda (fn. 13), 234-51.

[46] "Man is a product of evolutionary development, and evolution is utilitarian. No theory of human evolution that ignores its pragmatic aspect can be valid." Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 213. See also Bruce Wallace and Adrian Srb, *Adaptation* (Englewood Cliffs 1964), 1-3; and Klopfer and Hailman (fn. 26), 176-81.

[47] Rada and Neville Dyson-Hudson, "Subsistence Herding in Uganda," *Scientific American*, ccxx (February 1969), 76-89.

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The explanation for this system lies in the fact that rainfall and forage in the Karimojong tribal area are erratic and scarce. Resources are extremely limited and reliance on agriculture would be perilous. Cattle are the prime food resource, yet frequent unpredictable dry spells can decimate all but the largest cattle herds. The Karimojong report concluded: "Karimojong herding operations . . . exhibit a rational solution to the problem of supporting a substantial population in a variable environment."[48]

Certainly, modern man's forebears must generally have behaved in an adaptive manner. Behaviors that required much positive selection would not have become generalized in the species had they been maladaptive at the time of their selection.

Of course, it does not necessarily follow that man's behavior is adaptive today. In the past few thousand years, his environment has been changing so rapidly (largely through his own efforts) that once adaptive behaviors may no longer be so. Man's unique behavioral flexibility, his extraordinary learning capacity, inquisitiveness, and manipulative and imitative abilities endow him with a far greater potential for behavorial variation (including neutral or maladaptive behaviors) than any other species is capable of.[49] These capacities have enabled him to evolve on two levels, biologically and culturally, but they also impose additional responsibilities upon hominids that other species do not have. It is by no means certain that men will use their opportunity for choice in an adaptive manner. For example, modern technology is only about two centuries old, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will ultimately prove to be adaptive. In the short run, it has appeared to enhance our survival chances, but the long run is more problematical.[50]

This brings us to another point about the nature of evolution—the roles of "instinct" and "learning" in shaping behavior.[51] As I indicated above, every living organism must interact with its environment (in-

[48] *Ibid.*, 89.

[49] Another possible source of variation in human populations may be non-Darwinian or "neutral" changes in the gene pool. See Jack Lester King and Thomas H. Jukes, "Non-Darwinian Evolution," *Science*, CLXIV (16 May 1969), 788-98; and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, "'Genetic Drift' in an Italian Population," *Scientific American*, CCXXI (August 1969), 30-37.

[50] However, the fact is that we do not really know because as social scientists we have not heretofore asked such questions about social and political phenomena.

[51] Partly because of their onerous or misleading past connotations, and partly because of their imprecision as ordinarily used even today, the terms "instinct" and "learning" seem to be in disfavor. At present, the preferred terms appear to be "genetically precoded" and "experiential." Accordingly, I will hereafter put the more familiar terms in quotation marks and favor the preferred terminology.

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cluding, usually, other members of its species) in some manner. And since the effectiveness of that interaction largely determines whether or not the organism will survive to reproduce itself, the question of how each species organizes its behavior is of crucial importance. A behavioral repertoire may be innate or learned or a combination of both. What the animal learns is a function of both its genetic potential and its life-situation, but the type of and capacity for learning is genetically controlled.[52]

In the modern view, no actual behavior can be said to be "instinctive" in the sense of being inevitable. Only the genetic program and the neural and sensorimotor structures can be said to be innate, for even the most rigidly pre-coded behavior may never be realized if the organism does not develop in a "normal" way or in the appropriate environment.[53]

However, it is legitimate to make a distinction between genetically pre-coded behavior patterns, which are usually quite stereotyped and inflexible, and behaviors that are shaped to a greater or lesser extent by the organism's experience in the environment. Pre-coded behaviors often play themselves out like a computer program. They have the advantage of predictability and continuity from one generation to the next, but they cannot readily be adapted to new circumstances. Such behaviors may vary from simple approach-avoidance reactions, or reflexes, to elaborate behavior "strings" or "chains" that are triggered by specific environmental "cues," or releasers, and that may or may not be influenced in their manner of execution by experiential factors.[54]

Some "learning" may only serve to complete the "program" for a fairly stereotyped behavior. Imprinting, for instance, is a mechanism by which a newborn animal, during a "critical" or "sensitive" period in its development, makes a powerful attachment to "practically any moving object it sees," normally its mother. Thereafter, the immature

[52] Alland (fn. 13), 152; Etkin (fn. 26), 74-111.

[53] See especially Jack P. Hailman, "How an Instinct is Learned," *Scientific American*, CCXXI (December 1969), 98-106. The manner in which genes affect various behavior traits is extremely complex. Most behaviors are polygenic—that is, they involve more than one gene. On the other hand, many genes are pleiotropic—they influence more than one trait.

[54] Bird songs (which play a vital role in avian mating behavior), run the gamut from complete pre-coding to completely "learned" behavior. In some species, if young birds are isolated from birth they are nonetheless able at the proper time to reproduce their characteristic songs perfectly, often on the first try. In other species, the young bird has the equipment and a general idea of what its normal song should be like, but it can produce only an approximation without hearing it first. Finally, there are cases in which the bird cannot sing any song without exposure to its conspecifics, or will learn an approximation of an alien species' song if so reared. Fernando Nottebohm, "Ontogeny of Bird Song," *Science*, CLXVII (13 February 1970), 950-56.

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animal will follow its "parent" dutifully, in accordance with a genetically pre-coded "fixed-action pattern."[55]

Most behavior in animals, though, especially the behavior of higher animals, represents an interaction between pre-coded and experiential factors. In fact, many animals have highly specialized learning abilities that are impressive by any standard. Rats, for example, can learn a maze about as well as a man can. In addition, they have a tremendous exploratory drive that is not dependent upon food rewards; in laboratory experiments this drive has been found to be intrinsically "self-satisfying" to the rats.[56] Psychologists have called this phenomenon "latent learning," but actually this is a misnomer. Although such exploration for its own sake may appear to be aimless behavior in a laboratory situation, in the wild it is highly functional. By exploring and learning every feature of its range, the rat is better able to take cover without hesitation whenever danger appears.[57] Learning frequently plays a role as well in the acquisition or perfection of adult skills, and some animals not only can learn from the environment but can pass on such knowledge from one generation to the next through social traditions.

Outside of such specialized mental skills, of course, other species usually have extremely limited intellectual abilities, by our standards. Yet the fact that such skills exist is theoretically significant. Indeed, the particular configuration of mental abilities in a species correlates better with ecological factors than with its rank on the evolutionary ladder. "It is clear, . . ." says Etkin, "that these 'mental' capacities are part of the adaptation of the animal to its particular mode of life. . . ."[58]

Learning is a mechanism of variation that is adaptive for the individual within its own lifetime. The ability to learn is a maximizing device in that it provides an organism with a highly effective feedback system by which information from the environment can be processed and used in the ongoing process of self-regulation. Learning abilities permit positive variations that can be expressed immediately.[59]

It is evident, therefore, that man's highly evolved intellectual skills are but an extension and further development of an adaptive principle that is widespread in the animal kingdom. But to say this about man—to put him in the proper context, so to speak—is not to degrade his achievements or his potential. Instead, it is a matter of redressing an

[55] Robert A. Hinde, *Animal Behavior: A Synthesis of Ethology and Comparative Psychology* (New York 1966), 365-71.

[56] Etkin (fn. 26), 92-93.

[57] *Ibid.*, 92. [58] *Ibid.*, 92-94. [59] Alland (fn. 13), 153.

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imbalance that has existed in much of the recent theoretical work of the social sciences. It is a matter of reintegrating biological and social man. Man has not "made himself." He has been endowed by evolution with intellectual capacities that he has greatly developed and utilized to gain greater—but by no means unlimited—power to remake his environment and himself.

What has been said about learning in general applies equally to the cumulative product of man's learning ability—culture. Culture has often been thought of as a uniquely human accomplishment that distinguishes us absolutely from other animals. Cultural anthropology, in particular, has been at pains to separate culture from man's biological nature and survival needs and to endow it with a "super-organic" life of its own, subject to its own laws of development.[60]

Yet some of the most distinguished anthropologists have recognized that culture can be understood only within the framework of man's biological needs.[61] Clyde Kluckhohn, for instance, argued that "each different culture deals with universal problems posed by human biology and the human situation. Cultural differences must be delineated against a common humanity. . . . The broad ground plan of all cultures arises out of the functional prerequisites of human societies as such. . . ."[62]

More recently, physical anthropologist Alexander Alland, Jr. proposed that evolution be employed "as a general theory to account for the operation of biological systems inclusive of behavior and culture."[63] For "to consider culture extrasomatic does not require us to abandon the biological model of evolution, since behavior based on culture must still solve basically biological problems."[64] In other words, an evolutionary model can embrace cultural as well as organic processes.

Viewed within the context of the evolutionary framework, culture

[60] White (fn. 5).

[61] In addition to those cited below, see Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Chapel Hill 1944); Sahlins and Service (fn. 13); and White (fn. 10), 9.

[62] Kluckhohn (fn. 5), 960, 968.

[63] Alland (fn. 13), 195, 198-99.

[64] *Ibid.*, 187. Geneticist Dobzhansky, in his prize-winning book, *Mankind Evolving*, also insists on the interrelationship of biology and culture: "The thesis to be set forth in this book is that man has both a nature and a 'history.' Human evolution has two components, the biological or organic, and the cultural or superorganic. These two components are neither mutually exclusive nor independent, but interrelated and interdependent. Human evolution cannot be understood as a purely biological process, nor can it be adequately described as a history of culture. It is the interaction of biology and culture. There exists a feedback between biological and cultural processes" (fn. 22), 18.

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operates as an adaptive mechanism of great effectiveness. Just as the genetic code enables animals to pass on accumulated biological adaptations from one generation to the next, culture permits groups of men to store up knowledge of the environment (as well as "inventions" and other solutions to various survival problems) and to pass such adaptations on to subsequent generations. In this way, adaptive behaviors may be acquired and diffused within the human species far more rapidly than if man were dependent upon the mechanisms of genetic adaptation alone.[65] Furthermore, culture enables man to adapt more readily to changes in his environment and to a greater range of environments.

Cultural variation is thus to be expected in an evolutionary model. In the process of adapting to widely varying ecological niches, human societies have been compelled to develop diverse strategies for meeting common human needs. In addition, the evolutionary model predicts variations arising from historical specificity and, even, elements of randomness.[66]

In short, if culture did not exist, we would have had to invent it. For culture performs a number of necessary species-preserving functions that in many other group-living species are carried out largely by pre-coded behavioral "programs." As anthropologist Robin Fox says, we are the "cultural animal." In fact, many basic patterns of social behavior, some of which have often been considered uniquely human, are common to other animal species as well—social hierarchies (usually based on male competition), affectional systems (including pair-bonding, parent-child relationships, and group loyalties), cooperation, food-sharing, a division of labor, territoriality and territorial defense, play, tool-use, social traditions, exploration, and various forms of communication.[67]

In man, of course, these "cultural" behaviors have been greatly

[65] Alland (fn. 13), 169.

[66] Mutations, of course, arise randomly. And though natural selection generally acts to impose order, chance factors do enter, as in "genetic drift" (fn. 49), fluctuations in gene frequencies, and the founder principle. See G. Ledyard Stebbins, *Processes of Organic Evolution* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 76-77. On the inappropriateness of unilinear theories, see Elman R. Service, "The Prime-Mover of Cultural Evolution," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, XXIV (Winter 1968), 396-409.

[67] For detailed descriptions of our increasing knowledge about the complex and sophisticated behavior of other animals, see especially: Etkin (fn. 26); Hinde (fn. 55); Irven DeVore, ed., *Primate Behavior* (New York 1965); Charles H. Southwick, ed., *Primate Social Behavior* (Princeton 1963); Desmond Morris, ed., *Primate Ethology* (Chicago 1967); Thomas E. McGill, ed., *Readings in Animal Behavior* (New York 1965); Niko Tinbergen, *Social Behavior in Animals* (London 1965); Klopfer and Hailman (fn. 26); and Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfelt, *Ethology: The Biology of Behavior* (New York 1970).

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elaborated. In addition, we have evolved a powerful new adaptive mechanism unknown to any of our animal relatives—symbolic language.[68] But from what we know of how evolution operates, our extraordinary capacities could have developed only very gradually, over a period of several million years. All the while, our ancestors were subject to repeated testing by natural selection. As Washburn and Shirek explain it, "the brain did not evolve first for some unknown reason and then make possible the discovery of the human way; the human way and the structural basis for it evolved at the same time and in a feedback relation to each other.[69]

In other words, our cultural capacities evolved because they enhanced the ability of our ancestors to survive in their highly dangerous (compared to the arboreal environment) new ecological niches. Culture has arisen as a gradual accretion that, at every step, has generally enhanced our survival chances as we interacted with our natural environment and our conspecifics; no other explanation of the origin and functions of culture is possible without contradicting well-established knowledge of how evolutionary changes occur.

The resulting "cultural animal" enjoys great—but not infinite—flexibility. As psychologist Gardner Murphy put it: "Men do not behave like cedars, earthworms, cats, or elephants; they behave like men. All cultures work with raw human material; in every culture the educative process fails when it stretches human nature too far. We are very flexible, but not putty for the window mender, nor clay for the potter."[70] In the same vein, Alland notes that "certain behavioral systems are more compatible with the total physiological and psychological structure of the human organism. . . . The cultural traits which develop develop against the background of biologically determined human nature."[71]

[68] See Bernard G. Campbell, *Human Evolution: An Introduction to Man's Adaptations* (Chicago 1966) and J. N. Spuhler, ed., *The Evolution of Man's Capacity for Culture* (Detroit 1959).

[69] Washburn and Shirek (fn. 37), 13. This viewpoint is supported both by the fossil record and by research among living primates. Significantly, such cultural practices as tool-making, shelter-building, hunting in organized groups, and treating animal skins were all performed by small-brained early hominids. By the same token, ethologists have observed fairly sophisticated tool-use among equally small-brained living primates, most notably the chimpanzee. Chimps throw stones, break off sticks and prepare them for digging termites out of holes, and chew leaves into pulpy "sponges" for use in obtaining drinking water from pools. Jane Goodall, "Tool-Using and Aimed Throwing in a Community of Free-Living Chimpanzees," *Nature*, CCI (March 1964), 1264-66.

[70] Gardner Murphy, "Social Motivation," in Lindzey, ed. (fn. 5), II, 629.

[71] Alland (fn. 13), 169-70.

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III. The Nature of "Human Nature"

If we grant that human societies can in general be fitted within a biological and evolutionary framework, the question still remains: What, specifically, do we know about the genetic foundations of "human nature," and to what extent are human "needs" and "wants" genetically based? Can we give substance to Christian Bay's assertion that a satisfactory political theory must be derived from an adequate understanding of the "basic human needs," as well as from man's overt and often variable preferences?[72]

Obviously, this is an immense and vastly complicated subject, and a perennial one. It has challenged the greatest thinkers of every age, and most of the major political theorists of the past based their prescriptions on various explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of man.

We still have very far to go, however, in trying to build a body of scientific knowledge about human behavior, and nowhere is this more true than with regard to its genetic wellsprings. In the first place, it has proven to be exceedingly difficult to distinguish between experiential and pre-coded factors in the behavior of any species, but the problem is greatly compounded in man by the very flexibility and diversity of human behavior. In addition, research has been hampered by ethical and practical limitations upon the kind of experimentation that can be conducted with human subjects and by the fact that it has been only within the past few years that social scientists have begun to take an interest in the evolutionary adaptiveness of various human behaviors. In the past, the social sciences simply were not oriented to the evolutionary approach. Thus, we cannot yet complete a psychological equivalent of the periodic table of elements (in Davies' phrase).[73] But the evolutionary approach does provide us with a *general outline* of what the table may look like when it has been completed. It is impossible, of course, to be exhaustive here, but certain observations are in order.

In the first place, the basic structure of every human society, including our own, is "determined" in a general way by a number of ongoing and species-specific *biological needs* (subject to some individual and geographical variation) that must continually be satisfied if the species, and the individuals who compose it, are to survive in the long run. These needs include a reasonably pure atmosphere, numerous nutritional requirements, fresh water, sleep (approximately one-third of all

[72] Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (March 1965), 39-51.

[73] Davies (fn. 14), 7.

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of our lives), shelter and clothing (or, more generally, maintenance of body temperature), health care[74] (including sanitation), physical security, procreation, and the nurture and training of the young.

There is nothing particularly startling about this list of needs, yet it is surprising how often our social theorists take them for granted—or worse, discount them. We can never "solve" the basic problem of our survival. The meeting of our species-preserving biological needs is a continuing enterprise, and the great preponderance, by far, of human activity the world over is devoted to various aspects of it.

Less obvious, though, are the numerous imperatives our biological needs impose upon our social organization and, equally important, the ways in which the basic psychological makeup of the species, or "human nature," evolved to direct the organism toward adaptive behaviors.[75] It is becoming clear that, in order to insure that human beings continue to meet their evolutionary needs, the species has been endowed with a repertoire of drives (or internal sources of motivation), genetically based capacities, and emotional response mechanisms that, interacting with experiential factors, tend to shape and organize behavior toward the fulfilment of basic survival and reproductive needs. Each genetically "normal" individual is so constituted that he is potentially capable of becoming an autonomous, or self-regulating (as opposed to totally "free"), organic system—inclusive of his behavior—so that he can function as a contributing member of the ongoing survival enterprise.[76] (In other words, our "higher" psychological needs must be understood in relation to the meeting of our biological needs.)[77]

[74] Frederick L. Dunn, "Epidemiological Factors: Health and Disease in Hunter-Gatherers," in Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, eds., *Man the Hunter* (Chicago 1968), 221-40; Sherwood L. Washburn and C. S. Lancaster, "The Evolution of Hunting," in *ibid.*, 297-98; and Alexander Alland, Jr., *Adaptation in Cultural Evolution: An Approach to Medical Anthropology* (New York 1970).

[75] The fundamental linkages between wants ("motives" or "drives") and biological needs are discussed by, among others, Gardner Murphy (fn. 70), 601 ff; Lawrence I. O'Kelly, "Motivation: The Concept," in Sills (fn. 5); C. J. Adcock, *Fundamentals of Psychology* (London 1964); and Robert W. White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," *Psychological Review*, LXVI (September 1959), 297-333.

[76] See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York 1966).

[77] Far from denying the reality or significance of social needs, "competence" or "effectance" motivations, curiosity, the need for stimulation and activity, and other human "needs," an evolutionary paradigm fully acknowledges these needs—but only as the products of natural selection. They are seen, in other words, as biologically based characteristics that evolved and became generalized in the species because they were instrumental to our survival and reproductive success. They could not have evolved as "ends" in themselves (though they may be ends from the viewpoint of the individual). Interpolating an ancient aphorism, we have social life, not because we are social animals, but because social life is adaptive for our survival as a species. (See the lengthy discussion of these and other basic human psychological characteristics in the original version of this paper.)

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The elemental structure of human society can be traced back to our evolutionary origins (the evolutionary equivalent of the philosophers' "state of nature") and to the particular survival strategy our ancestors evolved for meeting our "species needs." In taking the decisive steps from an arboreal, herbivorous, food-gathering existence to that of a plains-living predator, our ancestors were required, first, to adapt to a terrestrial environment, much as modern baboon troops have done, and then to develop a pack-hunting organization similar in some respects to that of the wolf-pack.[78] Critical to a successful adaptation to the human way was the development of a highly organized social life. Cooperation, planning, and foresight were necessary for success as pack-hunters, to provide the basic necessities, to care for the ill, the females in childbirth, and the young, and to defend the tribe against other predators and conspecifics.[79] Indeed, in the course of our evolution, the problem of reproduction and child-rearing became one of the most important determinants of our social life. The marked helplessness of the newborn and the extreme prolongation of childhood dependency (accompanied by the development of the cerebral cortex) were the principal sources of man's extraordinary openness to learning,[80] but this important evolutionary adaptation exacted a high price. It required a stable family group and physical support for a minimum of ten years per child. And because we have our children not in litters but one at a time, each family unit had to sustain a viable economic and social environment for the young for an average of perhaps twenty years or more.[81] In other words, a species-specific biological characteristic created a cultural imperative.[82]

[78] Several excellent discussions of man's early life-style have been produced in recent years. See, especially, Etkin (fn. 26), 138-51 and other references cited therein; also Lee and DeVore (fn. 74), especially chap. 32; John Pfeiffer, *The Emergence of Man* (New York 1969); Elman R. Service, *The Hunters* (Englewood Cliffs 1966); Campbell (fn. 68); and S. L. Washburn and P. C. Jay, eds., *Perspectives on Human Evolution* (New York 1968). For discussions of baboon life, see S. L. Washburn and Irven DeVore, "The Social Life of Baboons," in James L. McGaugh, Norman M. Weinberger, and Richard E. Whalen, eds., *Psychobiology: The Biological Bases of Behavior* (San Francisco 1966); and Sarel Eimerl and DeVore, *The Primates* (New York 1965). A discussion of the social organization of wolf-packs is contained in Etkin (fn. 26), 129-31.

[79] Service (fn. 78), 29-32; Etkin (fn. 26), 21-33; Pfeiffer (fn. 78); Spuhler, ed. (fn. 68); Lee and DeVore, eds. (fn. 74).

[80] Part of the process of neoteny, this phenomenon is discussed by Ashley Montagu, "Time, Morphology, and Neoteny in the Evolution of Man," in Ashley Montagu, ed., *Culture and the Evolution of Man* (fn. 9), 324-42.

[81] See Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior* (New York 1967), 122.

[82] Or, to be precise, the nuclear family ecology and prolongation of juvenile dependency probably evolved contemporaneously and very gradually, as Etkin has pointed out (fn. 26), 144.

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In addition, there is now considerable evidence that many specific behaviors have a biological basis (subject in all cases to individual variation and environmental molding): the nuclear family (including pair-bonding and parent-sibling affectional bonds), antipathy to strangers, self-motivated learning activities and exploratory behavior, at least some forms of territoriality, fear, ethical or authority-accepting capacities, play, the proclivity for forming peer-groups, aggressiveness, individual competitiveness, and the tendency to form fairly stable hierarchies. Each of these species-specific behavioral traits was discussed and documented in the original version of this paper,[83] but because space limitations preclude such a discussion here, I can develop only one major aspect—aggression—by way of illustration.

At the time *homo sapiens* was emerging, male aggressiveness would obviously have been of great adaptive value—particularly for hunting and for defending females and children against other predators and conspecifics. There can be little doubt that selection pressures operated to encourage and fix a biological foundation for such behaviors. But just as highly aggressive behavior was functional for certain survival purposes, pack-hunting and group and family life also required an unusually high degree of cooperation and subordination to the group. The result was a conflicting set of behavioral requirements that somehow had to be harmonized. The social structure our hominid ancestors developed for resolving this conflict proved to be strikingly similar to the social structure common throughout the animal world—particularly among other group-living vertebrates. Etkin calls this familiar social structure the "behavioral triad" (although there are apparently several other biologically supported pillars in the human social structure as well).

In order to contain male aggressiveness and subordinate it to the needs of the group, males tend to form fairly stable dominance-submission hierarchies. The pattern begins to emerge with the increase in rivalrous behavior on the part of juvenile males.[84] Competition of vari-

[83] Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Their Implications for Political Theory," paper presented at the 65th Annual Meeting (1969) of the American Political Science Association (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms), 36-52.

[84] Freedman (fn. 13), 173, 175. This behavioral artifact correlates with a marked increase in the androgen (or male hormone) levels found in the bloodstreams of juvenile males, and there is good evidence of a linkage between androgens and aggressive behavior. See Kenneth E. Moyer, "Internal Impulses to Aggression," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, xxxi (1969), 104-14; David A. Hamburg, "Recent Research on Hormonal Regulation of Aggressive Behavior," paper for the UNESCO Interdisciplinary Expert Meeting on the Implications of Recent Scientific Research on the Understanding of Human Aggressiveness, Paris, 19-23 May 1969; and R. Charles Boelkins and Jon F. Heiser, "Biological Bases of Aggression," in

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ous kinds, varying to some extent among cultures, soon leads to a "pecking order," which may be more or less stable depending upon the degree to which it is accepted by the members of the play group. As Etkin puts it, "the great importance of dominance in social life is that it acts as an organizing principle which minimizes aggression by, in effect, securing to the dominants the fruits of victory without disrupting group life by conflict."[85] Significantly, dominance hierarchies are most clear-cut in those species that show a high degree of individual aggressiveness.[86]

So essential, apparently, is this check on male aggressiveness that hierarchical relationships are a cultural universal.[87] I must hasten to add, however, that this is not to say that any given hierarchy is necessarily adaptive. A peculiarity of advanced, highly structured human cultures is that they often perpetuate a particular hierarchy and protect dominants from being challenged for leadership long past the point where they may have become dysfunctional for the society.[88] Certainly any system that is able to replace maladaptive leaders bloodlessly, as other animal species are able to do, is more likely to remain adaptive over the long run.

A second device for containing aggressiveness in group-living species is territoriality. Individual territories, as distinct from group territories, may serve various functions: establishing individual food supplies, helping to coordinate mating behavior and the nurture of the young, regulating population density, and so on. Equally important, in highly aggressive species, territory minimizes the amount of conflict among males and may even facilitate reproduction by reducing the "psychological castration" that subordinate males often experience in the presence of dominants. Again, territoriality—at least in the sense of a minimal personal "space"—appears to be species-specific.[89]

David N. Daniels, Marshall F. Gilula, and Frank M. Ochberg, eds., *Violence and the Struggle for Existence* (Boston 1970), 31-33.

[85] Etkin (fn. 26), 15. Dominance does not, however, entail a license for unlimited exploitation. If this were the case, an animal would more often fight to the death before accepting inferior status. A necessary concomitant of dominance in any species is restraint and social responsibility on the part of the dominants.

[86] *Ibid.*, 21.

[87] Berelson and Steiner (fn. 81), 76; also Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York 1949), 336.

[88] Etkin notes that dominance is not synonymous with leadership but in the case of humans, who evolved as closely cooperating pack-hunters, dominance would have tended toward the fairly benign leadership pattern that is common today (fn. 26), 17, 140.

[89] See Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott, "Territoriality: a Neglected Sociological Dimension," *Social Problems*, xv (Fall 1967), 236-49; Edward T. Hall, *The Hidden*

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Another device that helps to contain aggressiveness is the semipermanent pair-bond. Not only does it involve affectional ties, but it reduces the degree of male competition over mates. Other devices that may also serve to minimize aggressive confrontations include male-bonding (possibly),[90] group loyalties, man's ethical and authority-accepting capacity, and various cultural mechanisms such as ritualization of male competition (another cultural form with widespread parallels in the animal world), rule systems, and social norms. Although some of these possible constraints upon aggressiveness may come into play only in adulthood, the basic pattern emerges in childhood—and, significantly, it is linked to the simultaneous development of peer-group bonds and of individual male aggressiveness.

Having suggested above that aggressiveness has a biological basis, I have, of course, opened a Pandora's box. Unfortunately, a full discussion of this urgent and hotly debated subject is not possible here, but a brief synthesis of some of the current thinking is in order.

In recent years, innumerable books, articles, and studies have been published on aggressiveness,[91] but some of them have succeeded only in confusing the issue. There is, first of all, a problem of definition—of semantics. Some writers treat "aggression" and "violence" as equivalent to one another and, furthermore, link both terms exclusively to the "intent" to do physical injury to a person or his property. This may be a workable political or legal definition, but from an evolutionary perspective it is too narrow. It is defined not in terms of the basic neurophysiological and biochemical mechanisms involved but, apparently, in terms of conscious human "will." Furthermore, self-inflicted "vio-

Dimension (Garden City 1969) and "Proxemics," *Current Anthropology*, IX (April-June 1968), 83-108 (with comments); P. D. Roos, "Jurisdiction: An Ecological Concept," *Human Relations*, XXI (February 1968), 75-84; E. Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places* (Glencoe 1963); and Hans Kummer, "Spacing Mechanisms in Social Behavior" (unpublished). See also papers from the "Use of Space by Animals and Men" symposium of the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 29-31 December 1968, Dallas.

[90] See Tiger (fn. 12).

[91] See especially Ardrey (fn. 12); Lorenz (fn. 12); and their critics in Ashley Montagu, ed., *Man and Aggression* (fn. 9); Morris, *The Naked Ape* (fn. 12); Etkin (fn. 26); Anthony Storr, *Human Aggression* (New York 1968); J. D. Carthy and F. J. Ebling, Jr., eds., *The Natural History of Aggression* (New York 1964); J. P. Scott, *Aggression* (Chicago 1958); Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York 1962) and Berkowitz, ed., *Roots of Aggression* (New York 1969); Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, *Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* (New York 1969) and Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton 1970); Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression* (Garden City 1968); Robert Bigelow, *The Dawn Warriors* (Boston 1969); Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg (fn. 84), and works cited below.

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lence," displaced "violence," and sublimated "violence" (verbal or psychological aggression) would have to be excluded. An attack on another man's reputation, let us say, would not be considered aggressive by this definition, even if harm were intended and the target felt injured by the onslaught. Finally, it would exclude forceful and sometimes "violent" goal-seeking behaviors not directed toward other persons or their property, as well as the noninjurious interindividual competition so ubiquitous among man and a great many other animal species.

Accordingly, I prefer to distinguish between aggression and violence. Following the approach of the Committee on Violence of the Stanford University School of Medicine,[92] I will treat violence as a special case of the more general category of aggressiveness. Aggressiveness is here defined as an aspect of the entire spectrum (or class) of assertive and attacking behaviors found in man *and* other animal species. It includes overt and covert attacks, self-directed attacks, displacement attacks, dominance behavior, defamatory acts, and the motivational and emotional components of any determined attempt to accomplish a task. Violence, on the other hand, will be limited to destructive forms of aggression.

Of course, even this limited definition of violence leaves us with a very complex array of behaviors. It includes the uncontrollable individual compulsions of a Richard Speck, the calculated, if pathological, "political" violence of a Lee Harvey Oswald or a Sirhan Sirhan, and the "carnival violence" of some ghetto riots—or following a soccer match. Just as it is possible to have anger without violence (say in a family quarrel), it is also possible to have violence without anger (for instance, in the cold-blooded use of torture or terror, or in the deliberate resort to war or revolution as an instrument for achieving a particular goal). Aggression and violence are thus not unitary concepts.[93]

A second problem with respect to aggression involves the issue of causation. In recent years, three apparently competing explanations have been advanced (frustration-aggression, social learning, and biological-instinctual), though as time goes on they appear to be increasingly convergent. The first, and most widely employed by political scientists,

[92] The committee's work has been published in Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg (fn. 84). See also Gilula and Daniels, "Violence and Man's Struggle to Adapt," *Science*, CLXIV (25 April 1969), 396-405.

[93] A number of scientists have suggested this conclusion in recent years. See especially Scott (fn. 91); Kenneth E. Moyer, "Kinds of Aggression and Their Physiological Basis," *Communications in Behavioral Biology*, Part A, II (August 1968); and Berkowitz, "Simple Views of Aggression," *American Scientist*, LVII (Autumn 1969), 372-83.

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is the frustration-aggression model originally put forward in 1939 by members of the Yale Institute of Human Relations (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears)[94] and more recently associated with psychologist Leonard Berkowitz.[95] As originally formulated, it posited an essentially one-to-one relationship between environmental frustration (or the interference with goal-directed activities) and aggressive responses. There were no intervening variables, and what went on inside the organism was irrelevant—a mechanistically predictable innate reaction. Berkowitz' current position, however, is far removed from this and much more interactional. In a 1969 essay, Berkowitz spoke of aggression as the result of a "complex interplay between nature and nurture,"[96] thus acknowledging biological determinants *and* social learning to be variables that may contribute to or inhibit aggressive responses to frustration.[97]

[94] J.D.L. Dollard and others, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven 1939).

[95] Berkowitz, *Aggression* (fn. 91).

[96] Berkowitz (fn. 93), 373. See also Berkowitz, ed., *Roots of Aggression* (fn. 91). Actually, the Yale group later modified its theory to account for responses to frustration that were other than aggressive (whether natural or learned). However, frustration remained the necessary *prerequisite* to aggression. Reviewed by A. Bandura and R. H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York 1963), 110-12.

[97] Berkowitz (fn. 93). In addition to "innate determinants" and social learning, Berkowitz also observes that some aggression can result from pain. In utilizing this model, political scientists have adapted it to their own purposes. James C. Davies links violence at the individual level to the frustration of the hierarchy of needs hypothesized by Abraham Maslow (Davies, fn. 21), and, at the macro-level, to severe short-term increases in the gap between rising expectations and the systemic ability to fulfill those expectations, which Davies has visualized graphically as a J-curve (Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, fn. 91, 690-730). Ted Robert Gurr, applying the model to large-scale political violence, finds evidence of a causal relationship between violence and perceived "relative deprivations" among the individual members of a society (Gurr, fn. 91; fn. 20; and "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Graham and Gurr, fn. 91, 572-631), whereas Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold associate such violence with "systemic frustrations" ("Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Graham and Gurr, fn. 91, 632-87).

Like Berkowitz, political scientists are not insensitive to the interrelationship between frustration and the effects of social learning. Gurr, for instance, identifies relative deprivations as the key variable, yet he emphasizes that it is not deprivations *per se* but the "perception" of unjustified deprivations (which is quite obviously susceptible to *in situ* learning) that is the necessary precondition for civil violence. Furthermore, Gurr introduces as mediating factors the individual's attitude toward the propriety of violence and his perception of its potential efficacy (that is, the perceived likelihood of success). Again, such perceptions are highly responsive to social learning, even though Gurr chooses in the end to put most of his stress on the underlying deprivations.

On the other hand, while biological factors are not unappreciated by the political scientists, these factors seem to be treated as constants. Davies, for example, assumes that biologically "each man is like every other man" (fn. 21), 8. Similarly, Gurr introduces a biological mechanism into his explanation in order to establish the linkage between frustration and violent responses, but he appears to treat this mechanism as a

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The second explanation of aggression has been associated with Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters.[98] Originally developed as an alternative to the frustration-aggression model, Bandura and Walters' explanation asserted that social learning alone could account for aggression. By social learning, they meant "antecedent social stimulus events," including models from which learning takes place imitatively, classical reinforcement learning, and the methods of training utilized in childhood development. Of course, social learning also includes the influence of the larger society, including the mass media, etc. Although frustration situations may elicit aggression, aggression is only one of many possible responses to frustration. The reaction of the individual is controlled by the "response pattern that is currently dominant in the subject's response hierarchy"—and this response pattern is developed through social learning; indeed, Bandura and Walters see biological or "constitutional" factors as having only the most indirect influence.[99]

The third explanation is the so-called biological-instinctual hypothesis—which has a long history, but which has most recently been associated with Konrad Lorenz,[100] Anthony Storr[101] and others (although Lorenz, like Berkowitz, has recently modified his earlier, more dogmatic position). In its most extreme form this approach postulates an instinctive and spontaneously generated "drive" that often asserts itself independently of environmental factors. Aggressiveness is thus not always learned, or necessarily evoked by environmental stresses or stimuli, and it cannot be totally eliminated. In its natural forms, it can

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constant: "The underlying causal mechanism," he tells us, "is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response" (fn. 20). He assures us that the degree of anger and violence thus evoked is *directly proportional* to the intensity of the perceived deprivation (fn. 91), 9. This is analogous, he says, to the law of gravity (*ibid.*, 37). Elsewhere, though, Gurr inserts the idea (following Berkowitz) that threat-aggression or fear-aggression might result from "avoidance-survival" mechanisms (*ibid.*, 35). Also, he concedes that there might ("infrequently") be aggression that is not motivated directly by anger (*ibid.*, 36). Furthermore, he acknowledges at one point that there may be a distribution of individual responses to frustration—although he doesn't explain whether or not such differences might be due to heredity or to environment (*ibid.*, 9).

[98] Bandura and Walters (fn. 96) and *Adolescent Aggression: A Study of the Influence of Child-Training Practices and Family Interrelationships* (New York 1959).

[99] Bandura and Walters (fn. 96), 26-29, 136. The authors suggest that patterns of social reinforcement may vary for individuals because of the possible variations in preferences for and responses to different constitutional characteristics (e.g., body build or I.Q.) on the part of parents and society. The significant variable is not, then, the biological variation of individuals but is rather society's response to these variations. This conceptualization embodies a curious notion of causation. Nor can the authors explain *why* society expresses differential preferences for these "constitutional factors."

[100] Lorenz (fn. 12).

[101] Storr (fn. 91).

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only be channeled or, as many Freudian psychiatrists would argue, turned inward.

Although evidence has been adduced in support of each of these three models of aggression, by the same token objections have been raised against the more extreme versions, at least when put forward as exclusive explanations.[102] As Berkowitz concedes, a simplistic frustration-aggression model ignores instrumental aggression not induced by anger, and threat or attack responses. It also cannot account adequately for disproportionate responses, for individual variation in the response to frustration and for variations among cultures in the response to frustration. Even more tellingly, it is insensitive to differences between sexes, age-groups, and species.

On the other hand, the social-learning approach cannot explain why aggressive behaviors are so *easily* learned and, more important, why there can be individual differences despite similar learning environments. The instinctual model, likewise, cannot account for the differences among cultures and for the clear evidence that linkages do exist between both frustration and aggression, and social learning and aggression. Finally, none of these models can adequately explain the *origins* of such behaviors or their functions in the light of our evolutionary history. Why is it, for example, that violence is an "inherently satisfying" release for anger, as Gurr puts it?[103] Why is anger an "innate" response to frustration? And why is frustration sometimes released in, say, tears instead of in violent aggression?

Perhaps a resolution of some of these difficulties may be found in a fourth explanation—an interactional, evolutionary-adaptive model that includes a synthesis of the three posed above. First suggested by Marshall F. Gilula and David N. Daniels of the Committee on Violence,[104]

[102] A useful review of the various hypotheses about aggression has been made by the Stanford Committee (Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg, fn. 84). Proponents of the frustration model include Dollard and others (fn. 94), Berkowitz (fns. 91 and 93), Davies (fns. 21 and 97), Gurr (fns. 91 and 97), and the Feierabends (fn. 97). Shortcomings of the frustration model are discussed by Bandura and Walters (fn. 96), 110-12, 115-17, 133-37, among others. Bandura and Walters (*ibid.*, and fn. 98) advance the case for social learning causation; relevant research is also surveyed by Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York 1965), 350-401. The insufficiency of this model is commented upon by, among others, ethologist Niko Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Man," *Science*, CLX (28 June 1968), 1411-18. Biological-instinctual explanations are advanced by Lorenz (fn. 12), Storr (fn. 91), and Ardrey (fn. 12), and by Carthy and Ebling (fn. 91), who are roundly criticized in Ashley Montagu, ed., *Man and Aggression* (fn. 9).

[103] Gurr (fn. 20).

[104] Gilula and Daniels (fn. 92).

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this approach has been further developed elsewhere by this writer but can only be outlined here.[105]

The evolutionary approach proceeds from the thesis that aggressiveness in man (including the propensity to violence) is a product of evolution and can be understood only in terms of its functional contribution (at least as a behavioral category) to the ongoing survival problem of the species. Aggressiveness has aided man (and many other species as well) in adapting to his environment—that is, in goal-directed efforts to satisfy his continuing survival needs and in coping with various stressful and threatening situations (both natural and man-made).[106]

Aggressiveness may thus be measured empirically as the threshold and intensity of various assertive responses (as opposed to flight) and as the relative intensity and energy with which an individual endows various goal-directed behaviors. In other words, aggressiveness may be treated as a substrate of a number of different behaviors—exploration, problem-solving activities, interpersonal competition, responses to stress or deprivation, and, of course, calculated instrumental violence.[107]

In any specific instance, furthermore, aggressiveness will be the product of an *interaction* between environmental and biological factors, both of which must be treated as *variables*. There is increasing evidence that biological factors represent not merely the necessary linkage between environmental stimulus and behavioral response, but also a highly complex source of variance in aggressive behavior.

Over the years, a great many experiments with other animals have illuminated some of the neural and endocrine mechanisms involved in aggressive behavior, and there is now conclusive evidence for other species that individual differences in aggressiveness are influenced by genetic factors.[108] Less evidence has been accumulated to date for man,

[105] Corning, "On Aggression: An 'Interactional,' Evolutionary-Adaptive Model" (forthcoming).

[106] Daniels and Gilula, "Violence and the Struggle for Existence," in Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg (fn. 84), 405-43; Andrew P. Vayda, "Hypotheses About Functions of War," in "War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression," *Natural History* (special supplement), Dec. 1, 1967, and works cited therein; Vayda, "Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand: Disruption of a War System" (unpublished manuscript, 1970); Bernard J. Siegel, "Defensive Cultural Adaptation," in Graham and Gurr (fn. 91), 764-87; and Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (April 1956), 264-81.

[107] This observation meshes with David Schwartz's still-developing hypothesis that personal "energy levels" may be causally related to political involvement (fn. 21).

[108] The voluminous literature on this subject will be reviewed in a subsequent paper. But see especially McClearn (fn. 40), Hamburg (fn. 84), Moyer (fn. 84), Boelkins and Heiser (fn. 84), 23-33, and Scott (fn. 91).

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but among the most striking are some as yet unpublished data from an experiment conducted by Steven G. Vandenberg of the Institute for Behavioral Genetics at the University of Colorado. Using the well-validated twin methodology (with a sample of about 200 sets of twins of high-school age) and a specially developed personality assessment test, Vandenberg found that (subject to certain caveats), 76 percent of the inter-individual *variance* in aggressive responses could be attributed to genetic inheritance.[109]

Other possible sources of biologically based variation are chromosomal abnormalities such as Klinefelter's syndrome. Some individual males are born with one or more extra male sex chromosomes (XYY, XYYY, XYYYY, etc.). And there is a strong suspicion that this condition, which often results in heightened male hormonal levels (among other things), may be more than coincidentally related to the fact that such abnormalities are represented to a disproportionately high degree in delinquent and violently criminal cases.[110] It is consistent with the growing evidence that hormonal patterns represent a significant mediator and cause of variation in aggressive behavior.[111]

Also, there is the disquieting estimate by Drs. John R. Lion, George Bach-Y-Rita, and Frank R. Ervin of the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital that at least 10 million and possibly as many as 20 million Americans suffer from impaired brain functions to a degree that limits their ability to "understand, channel, and re-direct aggressive energies."[112] For example, some individuals experience "spontaneous firings" of the cells in the temporal lobe and other areas of the brain, which correlate with subjective feelings of rage and a high incidence of uncontrollable violent behavior. These firings are detected by six-per-second and fourteen-per-second positive spikes on an EEG record, and a number of studies have associated this brain anomaly with acts of violence such as fire-setting, aggressive sexual behavior, and murder.

A complete causal model of violent aggression, moreover, must be able to account for certain striking behavioral anomalies. Regard-

[109] My deep appreciation to Dr. Vandenberg for permitting me to make use of his data.

[110] McClearn (fn. 40); Lerner (fn. 22), 118-19; Mary A. Telfer and others, "Incidence of Gross Chromosomal Errors among Tall Criminal American Males," *Science*, CLIX (15 March 1968), 1249-50; and socio-legal implications raised by Kennedy McWhirter, letter to the editors, *Science*, CLXIV (6 June 1969), 1117.

[111] Hamburg (fn. 84); McClearn (fn. 40); Moyer (fn. 84), 104-14; and Boelkins and Heiser (fn. 84), 31-35.

[112] John R. Lion, George Bach-Y-Rita, Frank R. Ervin, letter to the editors, *Science*, CLXIV (27 June 1969), 1465; V. Mark and F. R. Ervin, *Violence and the Brain* (New York, forthcoming).

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less of culture, the great preponderance of violence is perpetrated by young males in their teens and early twenties, whereas very little violence proportionately is attributable to old men[113] (excepting, of course, political leaders and generals). Likewise, very little violence can be ascribed to women (though, significantly, most of it is clustered during the premenstrual week).[114] One could argue, I suppose, that young males suffer a sufficiently greater degree of frustration (or are subject to sufficiently different social learning) to account for these anomalies. A more plausible explanation, however, is that such anomalies are the result of an interaction among environmental stresses, social learning, and biological factors; for reasons not yet completely understood, young males of the species seem to have a lower threshold of tolerance to stress and respond more intensely. Doubtless a number of physiological attributes are involved, including hormonal patterns.[115]

Perhaps the single most persuasive piece of evidence that aggressiveness is not *solely* the product of cultural circumstances (frustration or learning) but is ultimately rooted in our evolutionary past is Kenneth Moyer's tentative seven-fold classification of aggression: predatory, inter-male, fear-induced, irritable, territorial, maternal, and instrumental.[116] Not only does this taxonomy conform to the repertoire of functional, survival-serving behaviors so widely observed by ethologists, but Moyer has amassed considerable evidence for the proposition that each of these forms of aggression may have a particular neural and endocrine basis and that each is characteristically elicited by different stimulus situations.[117] Furthermore, there is some reason to believe that the neurophysiological and biochemical *differences among species* will be found to correlate well with the different behavioral matrices worked out by different species for meeting their survival needs.

A third problem with respect to aggressiveness is the question of how to control it. To suggest that the conspicuously high degree of

[113] Berelson and Steiner (fn. 81), 30-31, and Boelkins and Heiser (fn. 84), 31.

[114] In one study of female prisoners, 62% of the crimes of violence had been committed in the prisoners' premenstrual week. J. H. Morton and others, "A Clinical Study of Premenstrual Tension," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, LXV (June 1953), 1182-91.

[115] These anomalies all correlate with observed hormonal patterns.

[116] Moyer (fn. 93).

[117] Moyer (fn. 84), (fn. 93). He suggests that his approach to violence does not require hypothesizing a spontaneous drive. However, in many animals, attacking behaviors are the pre-programmed and highly specific responses to specific stimuli—either external or internal. See also Robert A. Hinde, "The Nature and Control of Aggressive Behavior," paper for UNESCO Interdisciplinary Expert Meeting (fn. 84).

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human aggressiveness, including violence, may have a biological basis, and that these proclivities must have evolved in a functional relationship to our survival problems, is not to say that violent aggression is always functional.[118] Far from it. Because man's environment has radically changed virtually overnight (in evolutionary time), many behaviors that have strong support and encouragement, so to speak, at the biological level[119] may be increasingly dysfunctional.

But, more important, if the causes of violent aggression are interactional and multivariate in nature, then our efforts at controlling aggression must also be multiform. It may well be, as Gurr's data suggest, that socioeconomic deprivations are of greater proximate importance than genetic variables in evoking mass political violence. Accordingly, remedial socioeconomic measures, coupled with the creation and teaching of nonviolent alternatives for seeking redress, may be the most appropriate action in such cases. In the same vein, some degree of cultural modification may be an effective way of reducing violence, to the extent that violent behavior is encouraged by social learning. Conversely, bio-meliorative measures might be the most direct and effective way to cope with those individual pathologies where genetic factors are of greater significance.

Though the above discussion has not begun to do justice to the subject of biological aspects of behavior, certain general points should be made by way of a summary. First, it should be evident that in fundamental respects, our social life has been shaped by our biological needs and by the characteristics of our evolved survival-related psycho-

[118] Lewis Richardson has estimated that 59 million people have died from wars and other murderous quarrels in the 125 years from 1820 to 1945—one every 68 seconds. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh 1960), 153. Derek Freeman considers this figure "almost certainly an underestimate." Freeman, "Human Aggression in Anthropological Perspective," in Carthy and Ebling (fn. 91), 110. This excludes, of course, the countless members of other species killed by *homo sapiens*, many for sport.

[119] In order to appreciate just how important the genetic foundation is, consider the consequences of a small genetic defect, such as mongolism or Down's syndrome (Lerner, fn. 22, 196-97), Klinefelter's syndrome (fn. 110), or phenylketonuria (Lerner, fn. 22, 89-92). Although the case is less conclusive, there is also substantial evidence today for the belief that schizophrenia, anxiety neurosis and manic depressive disease have at least partial genetic bases. See Leonard L. Heston, "The Genetics of Schizophrenic and Schizoid Disease," *Science*, CLXVII (16 January 1970), 249-56; E. Inouye and others, "Research on Genetics in Psychiatry," World Health Organization Technical Report Series (Geneva 1966); Arnold H. and Edith H. Buss, eds., *Theories of Schizophrenia* (New York 1969); Ferris H. Pitts, Jr., "The Biochemistry of Anxiety," *Scientific American*, CCXX (June 1969), 69-75; and George Winokur, "Genetic Findings and Methodological Considerations in Manic Depressive Disease," *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, CXVII (September 1970), 267-74.

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logical equipment. Some apparently intrinsically motivated behaviors are not the result, as Abraham Maslow believed, of "higher" motivations, but evolved because of their instrumental relationship to the development of the individual and, ultimately, to the survival needs of the group.[120] Even such supposedly "subjective" phenomena as emotions prove in fact to be measurable neurophysiological events that are the responses of specific brain centers to various internal and external stimuli. Our emotional repertoire is inborn (apparently it is seated in the hypothalamus, although it involves other brain subsystems), and it undergoes definite stages of maturation, as does the rest of the organism.[121]

To assert that there is indeed a biologically based "human nature," on the other hand, is not to suggest that we are all psychologically identical. Just as we differ greatly in gross physical characteristics—around certain norms—so do we differ, apparently, in those areas that relate to "personality" characteristics.[122] Furthermore, human nature, even for each individual, is not fixed. It is no more to be found in the crib (as the Watsonian behaviorists believed) than it is to be found

[120] This is not to deny, however, the reality of higher spiritual or esthetic experience that goes beyond survival needs. As Berelson and Steiner observe, "all known societies have religions" (fn. 81), 46. Maslow may also have done us a service by pointing out that some of these needs may become ends in themselves. Maslow, "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation," in R. C. Teevan and Robert C. Birney, eds., *Theories of Motivation in Personality and Social Psychology* (Princeton 1964). It is a fundamental contradiction of the theory of evolution, though, to divorce such needs from their evolutionary origins and survival consequences. See Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 214-18.

[121] Clifford T. Morgan, *Physiological Psychology* (3rd ed., New York 1965), 307. Indeed, certain kinds of environmental "programming" are absolutely essential if the human organism is to develop normally. Without a "normal sensory environment," some neural structures will not develop or will tend to degenerate from disuse. Hebb (fn. 13), 147. Some emotional consequences of an abnormal environment were demonstrated in the now famous monkey-isolation experiments by Harry F. and Margaret K. Harlow at the University of Wisconsin's Primate Laboratory. When deprived of "normal" mothering in infancy, laboratory-raised monkeys exhibited a range of "neurotic" behaviors—passivity, self-aggression, sexual incompetence, etc. Harlow and Harlow, "A Study of Animal Affection," *Natural History*, LXX (December 1961), reprinted in Southwick (fn. 67), 174-84.

[122] This point was discussed and documented in some detail in the original version of this paper: Corning (fn. 83), 52-55. See also John L. Fuller and W. Robert Thompson, *Behavior Genetics* (New York 1960); Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), chaps. IV and V; Manosevitz, Lindzey, and Thiessen (fn. 13); Glass (fn. 11), especially chapters by Dobzhansky, "Genetics and the Social Sciences," Irving Gottesman, "Beyond the Fringe—Personality and Psychopathology," J. N. Spuhler, "Sociocultural and Biological Inheritance in Man," and Steven G. Vandenberg, "The Nature and Nurture of Intelligence"; D. G. Freedman in Washburn and Jay, eds. (fn. 78); and Vandenberg, "Hereditary Factors in Normal Personality Traits," in *Recent Advances in Biological Psychiatry* (New York 1967), IX, 65-104.

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in Rousseau's hypothetical state of nature. Instead, it is a continuum, reflecting the life cycle of the organism itself.[123]

One of the most eloquent, as well as authoritative, sources on the subject of genetic diversity is Theodosius Dobzhansky, who has written: "Human nature is not a constant. Instead of a single, invariant and unchanging human nature there are about as many different human natures as there are persons living. This does not mean, of course, that what a person is or can become is foreordained by his fixed nature, but neither are the genetic differences so insignificant as to be negligible . . . every human being is a genetically unique and unrepeatable individual. . . . Mutation generates stores of variant genes; sexual recombination creates countless genetic endowments, genotypes, of individuals. Every individual is a biological experiment in adaptedness."[124]

IV. Some Implications

Although the evolutionary model of society contains many significant implications for political science, only a few can be mentioned here.

In the first place, evolution is a process, not a trend or a goal. It is thus historical in nature but does not project any ultimate end. While certain evolutionary trends have been postulated at one time or another (such as decrease in entropy, maximization of metabolism, minimization of effort, increase in homeostasis, a growth in complexity, an increase in cooperation, and progress in feeling, knowing, willing, and understanding), there is no agreement on this point among biologists.[125]

The main "causal agent" of evolution is natural selection, but it is not purposive; it acts rather as an editor. Whichever organic or behavioral processes "work" in the sense of enhancing the survival

[123] The child's brain triples in size within the first year, during and after which he is able to develop latent capacities, both intellectual and sensory. Loren Eisely, *The Immense Journey* (New York 1967), 109. Biological changes continue to affect behavior throughout the organism's life; puberty, pregnancy and lactation, menopause, senility, and so forth all affect behavior in more or less obvious ways. Conversely, it is now realized that environmental influences are at work even while the baby is *in utero*. Thus, it is not possible to choose any one point in the biological life-cycle and designate it "human nature."

[124] Dobzhansky, "Genetics and the Social Sciences" (fn. 122), 130-32.

[125] Summarized by Simpson (fn. 23), 139-42, except for "cooperation," Bigelow (fn. 91). See also Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 221. "Whatever criterion you choose to adopt, you are sure to find that by it the history of life provides examples not only of progress but also of retrogression or degeneration," Simpson (fn. 22), 242, and chap. 15.

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chances of an organism, its progeny, and/or a deme are rewarded only in the sense that the probabilities are increased that those individuals or demes will survive and reproduce. Thus, natural selection converts partly random changes into apparent directionality. It cannot work to complete a design and cannot plan ahead; it can only produce results of immediate biological advantage and has frequently led species into blind alleys that result in extinction.[126]

Because of the very nature of this process, it will never be fully susceptible to statistical control.[127] To begin with, most geneticists despair of ever being able to predict genetic changes in human populations—changes that are going on all the time. Prediction would be possible only if we knew the precise genetic composition of each member of a deme, if we could predict the pattern of assortative mating (and thus genetic recombination), if we could anticipate the outcomes of random mutations, and delineate the matrix of selection pressures (the ecological and sociological variables) that are operative at any time.

But to say that there are elements of randomness, or unpredictability, in the evolutionary process is not to say that it has no structure at all. Because it is an historical process, it is cumulative. Evolution combines elements of continuity and change (both genetic and behavioral),[128] and it is certainly possible to get a better fix on the forces that have shaped our present world and are operative today. Moreover, if we cannot entirely predict or control our evolutionary future, we can greatly increase our leverage. Long-run unpredictability may not rule out short-run regularities and probabilistic, "if-then" projections.

Furthermore, to say that evolution has no goal is not to suggest that its products, individuals and societies, are purposeless. In order to survive, individuals and the societies of which they are a part must actively *seek* to survive; the demands of survival and the efforts required to maintain a viable society are such that natural selection would "select out" any group not sufficiently diligent in the pursuit of survival. It is estimated that 99.9999 percent of all the species that have ever arisen are now extinct. We are among the very few survivors.[129]

Because survival is such a basic, pervasive, and unavoidable prob-

[126] Huxley (fn. 22), 48; Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 17-18.
[127] Simpson (fn. 31), 189.
[128] *Ibid.*, 71, 74, 76, 176-89.
[129] Richard C. Lewontin, ed., *Population Biology and Evolution* (Syracuse 1968), 2; see also Wallace and Srb (fn. 46), 3, and Simpson (fn. 44).

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lem, the products of evolution must perforce be teleological systems—though in the cyberneticists' rather than the metaphysicians' sense of the term. That is, all complex organic systems fit the cybernetic model of a self-controlling learning net and, as such, are endowed with systemic purposes—purposes inherent in the design and functioning of their systems, inclusive of their behavior.[130] This also applies to the macro-level, to the collectivity—not by analogy or through the loose use of an organismic metaphor, but as a descriptive statement of the functional relationship of a society to the survival problem of the species. This point was well summarized by ethologist Niko Tinbergen: "The very nature of living things, their unstable state, leads us to ask: how is it possible that living things do not succumb to the omnipresent destructive influences of the environment? How do living things manage to survive, to maintain and to reproduce themselves? The purpose, end, or goal of life processes in this restricted sense is maintenance, of the individual, of the group, and of the species. A community of individuals has to be kept going, has to be protected against disintegration just as much as an organism, which, as its name implies, is a community of parts. . . . Just as the physiologist asks how the individual, or the organ, or the cell, manages to maintain itself by organized cooperation of its constituents, so the sociologist has to ask how the constituents of the group—the individuals—manage to maintain the group."[131]

Accordingly, every biologically distinct breeding population (whether it be a tribe, principality, city-state, or nation) can be con-

[130] "The organization of organisms certainly has utility, and the evolution leading to them has that utility as a goal in a sense. That sense is, however, quite special and does not at all correspond with teleology in the classic meaning of correspondence with a preordained plan, with divine Providence. . . ." Simpson (fn. 31), 173; see also 173-75, 100 ff., 111 ff., 134 ff., 202, 210, 212. Also Deutsch (fn. 76), chaps. V and VI; Charles R. Dechert, "The Development of Cybernetics," in Dechert, ed., *The Social Impact of Cybernetics* (New York 1967); Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (Boston 1950); Morton Beckner, *The Biological Way of Thought* (Berkeley 1968); and Alexander S. Fraser, "The Evolution of Purposive Behavior," in Heinz von Foerster and others, *Purposive Systems* (New York 1968), 15 ff.

[131] Tinbergen (fn. 67), 2. Man, like other animal species, has innately pre-programmed preferences for survival-serving behaviors—for eating, for physical comfort and security, for sleep, for sex and procreation, for group participation, for play and exploration—and *against* physical injury and death (fn. 75). Although it is true that there are instances of people choosing *not* to survive—suicides, martyrs, etc.—we consider such cases either as pathological (and some psychologists now suspect that even these phenomena may have an evolutionary explanation), or as deliberate acts of *sacrifice* for the sake of some "higher purpose," usually the survival of the collectivity or "eternal life," as in religious martyrdom.

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ceived of as a *collective survival enterprise*.[132] This term was chosen with care and requires some further explanation.

First, as I explained above, the basic survival unit for any group-living, sexually reproducing species such as ourselves is the *collectivity*, although this fact does not—as I will explain—invalidate individualist values.

Second, *survival*, even "mere" survival, *is* the basic problem for all societies. At the very least, each new generation must be conceived, brought into the world, nurtured, trained, and, perhaps most important, motivated to take over responsibility at the appropriate time for carrying on the survival enterprise. But, more to the point, if our culture and technology have temporarily enhanced our survival potential and reduced selection pressures, short-run gains may have been purchased at the cost of long-run disaster. A partial list of some of the more pressing issues confronting us today makes it clear that even "mere" survival is uncertain and a continuing challenge. Consider: The population explosion, the exhaustion of natural resources, environmental (soil, air, water) pollution, social disorganization and all its pathologies, and, of course, the arms race.

A third point, and a further reiteration of what has been discussed above, is that survival—as biologists use the word—does not mean just "mere" survival. It must be understood to connote an *enterprise* of varying complexity and requiring varying degrees of struggle, and cooperation, depending upon the species, the particular population within the species, and its particular ecological situation. Long-range survival involves not only the immediate problem of physical security, but also living in harmony with the environment and organizing society in such a way that priority is given to the interests of *subsequent* generations. (As biologists are fond of saying, evolution favors the offspring.)

To so characterize a human society is not, however, equivalent to

[132] There are certain difficulties involved in characterizing a *human* collective survival enterprise as a "breeding population." Although this formulation may be biologically correct and may well have been true of our ancestors, in the contemporary world a biologically distinct breeding population may not necessarily be coextensive with a territorial or political unit, or with a self-sufficient economy. Furthermore, world communications, travel, trade, the shared biosphere or ecosystem, and even world conflict have moved us toward greater interdependence. The exceptions and qualifications necessary for applying the concept of a collective survival enterprise to a given human society do not invalidate the concept. However, it may ultimately be necessary to expand the definition to take account of the growing internationalization of the survival problem. In the parlance of the systems analysts, each breeding population may ultimately have to be viewed as a subsystem in the global system, or *global survival enterprise*.

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asserting that man necessarily pursues the survival of the collectivity as a *conscious* goal. Like other animal species, man has been endowed by evolution with internal sources of rewards and punishments as incentives for engaging in survival-serving behavior. But regardless of the sources of our motivations, or the subjective meaning we assign to our activities, all that an evolutionary paradigm requires is that our actions have consequences for our survival and for that of the species.

Nor does such a conceptualization exclude the possibility of positing "ultimate" purposes or value preferences *beyond*, or *in addition to*, survival. But survival is the *sine qua non*.[133] The problem of our survival can never be completely "solved," as some social scientists would have us believe, and we cannot avoid the fact that much, if not most, of our behavior as a species has survival consequences.

This being the case, certain normative implications would appear to follow. In *The Nerves of Government*, Karl Deutsch enumerates four possible orders of purpose: 1) immediate satisfaction; 2) self-preservation; 3) preservation of the group or species; and 4) preservation of a process.[134] The first three orders of purpose, at least, seem to be evident in man and are reflected in his behavior. (The fourth might be considered to be implicit in man's relationship to the rest of organic life.) And from what we know of the priorities set by "the grand constructor" (natural selection), these purposes can be viewed as forming a hierarchy. The supreme purpose must be the long-run reproductive success of the deme. Self-preservation (and all of the activities implied in that term) is usually instrumental to group preservation, but in many cases individual self-interest must be subordinated to the needs of the group.[135]

[133] At the root of the modern *Weltanschauung* is the value-relativism first put forward by David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*. But as this writer will argue in a subsequent paper, there is a serious flaw in Hume's logic, in that he *assumed* survival —a prerequisite to *any* value-choices—as a given.

[134] Deutsch (fn. 76), 92-93.

[135] See Simpson (fn. 23), 147, Allee (fn. 26), 30-61, 96-153, Klopfer and Hailman (fn. 26), 138-51. A corollary of this point involves the evolutionary status of intellectual freedom, individual creativity, and other cherished democratic values. In subordinating them to a collective purpose, we need not abandon them. Quite the opposite. Generally, though not necessarily always, these values are adaptive. Our commitment to equality of opportunity, for example, is also sound genetic practice. As Dobzhansky notes: "If human abilities were not influenced by the individual genetic endowments, the social mobility or the constraints imposed on it would be biologically immaterial. An involvement of genetic variables makes social mobility both a biological and a cultural evolutionary agent of far-from-negligible consequence. Social mobility enhances the fitness of the population groups between which it occurs, and it may lead to the emergence of superior genotypes, which would be less likely to arise without mobility," "Genetics and the Social Sciences" (fn. 122), 133.

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By the same token, group-preservation and self-preservation must take precedence over immediate self-gratification—although as often as not self-gratification may also contribute to "higher" purposes and thus help to insure that our survival needs are met; as I have noted, an internal system of rewards and punishments is a design feature of complex organic systems. Sexual reproduction is an obvious example, but the "personal" satisfactions we derive from parenthood, social interaction, and group participation operate in the same manner.

In terms of our evolutionary "purpose," therefore, there is no clearcut ethical dichotomy between the individual and the group. Rather, the problem is one of maintaining a dynamic balance between the two, a balance that may have to be adjusted frequently in order to sustain the adaptiveness of a society. The proper balance is not something that can be determined *a priori* in all cases. Each problem, or type of problem, may have to be weighed separately. But in theory, at least, there would appear to be three possible forms of self-serving behavior: 1) that which also contributes to the welfare of the group; 2) that which is neutral in its effects on the group; and 3) that which is maladaptive, or detrimental to the long-run survival potential of the group.

Implicit in what I have said is the idea that naturalistic ethics can be derived from the purpose defined by evolution. In other words, normative questions can be evaluated empirically in terms of their effect upon the long-run survival potential of the group. Because the human animal has a far greater degree of behavioral flexibility than has any other species, his behavioral choices, including those we call "ethical," can profoundly affect his survival chances. As Julian Huxley put it, ethical choices have evolutionary consequences.

At a very minimum, therefore, ethics can be seen as a means to a biological end. Biologist C. H. Waddington expressed it as follows: "The function of ethicizing is to mediate the progress of human evolution, a progress which now takes place mainly in the social and psychological sphere."[136] Not only are social norms functionally necessary, but there now seems to be strong support among biologists for the hypothesis that ethicizing is a species-specific biological adaptation; among other things, man is an "ethical animal."[137] As Simpson says, "There is no real doubt, and neither Julian Huxley nor Waddington has doubted, that the capacity or, one can say, the necessity

[136] Quoted in Simpson (fn. 23), 134.
[137] See C. H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (Chicago 1967).

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for ethicizing is in fact a *biological* characteristic of the human species developed by natural selection because it is adaptive for the species. . . ."[138] This is not to say that specific ethical principles are transmitted in the genes. Instead, what is transmitted is a genetic capacity for developing a conscience, or "superego," and, as with other aspects of the modern approach, the process of ethical development is held to be interactional—the product of both biological and environmental variables.[139]

Furthermore, since the culture of every society is historically unique, and since its survival problems and strategies are to some extent situation-specific, it is to be expected that a variety of ethical systems would exist. As Simpson notes, "We know that a great number of ideologically and theologically conflicting religious and ethical systems have all served adaptive biological and psychosocial functions with considerable success. . . ."[140] The relevant question is whether or not a particular ethical precept or system is adaptive for a particular society at a given time. But, in any event, *some* system of ethics is functionally necessary; every society has an ethical system of some sort.[141] Moreover, it is not biologically sound to assert that these value systems—and the psychic rewards and punishments

[138] Simpson (fn. 23), 134. See also Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (fn. 22), 214-18.

[139] The view that ethics has a biological component and serves an evolutionary function is supported by four separate sources. One is the work of ethologists, who find many examples among group-living animals of behaviors we characterize as moral—the altruism of parents toward the young, self-sacrifice in the interest of group survival, food-sharing, inhibitions against killing a conspecific, and so forth. In many instances, these behaviors are clearly precoded in the genes. But since our behavior is organized and shaped to a far greater degree in the domain of culture, it is not surprising to find ethical behavior organized at this level also. A second source of support is from child psychology and related fields (the current sobriquet being "the growth sciences"). Of particular importance is the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget, *The Moral Development of the Child* (New York 1965); J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* (Princeton 1963); Roger Brown (fn. 103), 384-401; Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," *Psychology Today*, 11 (September 1968), 25-40. Support also comes from psychologists working with primates in the laboratory. Hebb cites, for instance, the experiments of H. W. Nissen and M. P. Crawford on food-sharing among chimpanzees, and concludes: "The evidence from infrahuman mammals indicates that altruism is a product of evolution and not something that must be beaten into the growing human child because of the needs of society." Hebb (fn. 13), 247-48; finally, there is a growing body of research evidence from laboratory experiments relating to the neuro-physiological bases of social behavior, including brain stimulation, chemical (hormonal) stimulation, and brain lesion experiments. See, especially, Kenneth E. Moyer, "The Physiology of Affiliation and Hostility," Report No. 70-1, Carnegie-Mellon University (Pittsburgh 1970).

[140] Simpson (fn. 23), 134.

[141] See Robert Redfield (Margaret Park Redfield, ed.), *Human Nature and the Study of Society* (Chicago 1962), 464-65; Berelson and Steiner (fn. 81), 46-48; and Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Baltimore 1964), 35.

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we derive from our actions in relation to them—could have evolved entirely outside the processes of natural selection and the exigencies, or rather the imperatives, of the collective survival enterprise. So to argue, one would have to reject the theory of evolution or posit special creation.

That is not to say, however, that all of our values and activities are presently adaptive. Quite the opposite. We may not now be using our capacities for the functions for which they evolved in our evolutionary past. Some presently neutral or maladaptive values or activities may be explained as part of the ongoing trial-and-error process of adaptation, as the "cost" of a cultural pleiotropism,[142] or as "survivals"—the spin-off from idle or obsolete values or capacities not presently required for our survival.[143] These maladaptive activities may continue to be sustained on the "margin of profit," so to speak, beyond our immediate survival needs. Or, if they are sufficiently destructive to our survival, either they—or we—will eventually be selected out.[144]

But how do these considerations relate to political science as an empirical discipline? How can we integrate evolution and behavioral biology specifically with political theory and research?

Although most social scientists in recent decades have acted as if Darwinian evolution were none of their business—somehow not applicable to human societies—the evolutionary *Weltanschauung* has subtly influenced many of the theoretical approaches developed in the social sciences (and analogies have been borrowed freely from the biological realm). None of these paradigms has been predicated explicitly upon the hypothesis that the biological survival of the gene pool is the basic problem for all human societies (whether or not the members of a society happen to be conscious of that fact). However, by hypothesizing the "purpose" of society in evolutionary terms, we can then proceed to analyze specific social behaviors, institutions, and values in the light of their consequences for the survival of a society; in other words, because social behavior has evolu-

[142] In genetics, a pleiotropism is a situation in which one gene influences two or more traits, one of which might be maladaptive, so that an animal is forced, so to speak, to take the good with the bad. Klopfer and Hailman (fn. 26), 179-80. A cultural analogue might be the use of human fecal matter as a fertilizer. Against the benefits of increased crop yield and preservation of soil fertility, a society must weigh the increased risk of spreading disease within a population. Alland (fn. 13), 210-11.

[143] The concept of "survivals" was developed by anthropologist Malinowski (fn. 61), 27-29. On maladaptive characters, see Stebbins (fn. 66), 73-80.

[144] We can see such a process of adaptation presently at work, for example, upon the historic American ideology of individualism and free enterprise, which has tended to discourage needed collective action in such areas as national planning, pollution control, population control, and so on.

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tionary consequences, we can subject social phenomena to functional analysis within an explicitly evolutionary framework—as ethologists have been doing for many years with animal behavior. The basic question for the social scientist, then, is: How does a particular social phenomenon help (or hinder) the human animal in satisfying his survival needs? And how does it affect the survival and reproductive efficacy of his society as a collectivity? Needless to say, such an approach does not preclude other modes of analysis based on different value-premises, although it may well be found on further examination that some of the other approaches have utilized evolutionary criteria *implicitly*. That is, an analyst who, without reference to any specific value-premise, was able to conclude that a particular behavior was more "rational" or more "successful" than others may in fact have been intuitively applying evolutionary criteria.

Such an approach to political science, utilizing specifically Darwinian "values" or criteria for analyzing social phenomena, could be applied both at the "micro"-level (to individual behaviors) and at the "macro"-level (to the behavior of total systems and subsystems).[145] Though analytically distinct for certain purposes, an evolutionary paradigm links micro- and macro-levels in at least four respects. First, each level can be delineated (and relevant data selected) in terms of the same basic problem—the problem of ongoing biological survival. Second, the same Darwinian criterion—reproductive efficacy (and all that it entails)—is applicable at both levels. Third, both levels are marked by analytical permeability. That is, they interpenetrate and affect one another. Though there are important qualifications and exceptions, in general the reproductive success of a deme is inseparable from that of the individuals within it. (As a theoretical generalization about the human animal, we would expect that the fit between the "wants" of the individual and the "needs" of the collectivity would be imperfect, like a Venn diagram.) Finally, both levels of explanation are ultimately dependent upon work that crosses several disciplinary lines. An evolutionary explanation perforce involves the interrelationship among biological survival needs, evolved psychological characteristics, the natural environment, and intra-specific cultural environments (both external and internal), as well as the functional (survival) consequences of behavior in specific situations.[146]

[145] On this point, see discussion in Corning, "The Problem of Applying Darwinian Evolution to Political Science" (fn. 21), 18-32; and Corning, "The Theory of Evolution as a Paradigm for the Analysis of Political Phenomena" (fn. 21), chap. VII.

[146] We are being driven toward a unified science of man precisely because the most significant relationships, so it seems, are those among the classes of phenomena we

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Indeed, the problem of survival and reproduction in complex human societies may have to be conceptualized as involving several interdependent layers. Take, for example, an individual living in a large city. His survival problem is partly one of a purely personal nature. Given the means at his disposal (including his genetic and culturally acquired equipment), and given the configuration (and hazards) of his specific social environment, he must attend to a number of personal and family needs. Yet, whether he is aware of it or not, that individual is also dependent upon many others in his community, as well as public services, city and state governments, major subsystems of the American economy, the Federal government, and international politics—to the extent that events and activities at each of these other levels (or among them) affect his personal chances of survival and reproductive success. (As I have noted, the increasing internationalization of many survival-related activities suggests that to some extent we are dependent upon a *global survival enterprise.*)[147]

In other words, the theory of evolution should be applicable at all levels of analysis, from the behavior of individuals to the international system (where we should be able to evaluate the systemic behavior of nations, groups of nations, and various international organizations in terms of its survival consequences for individual societies and for the international system as a whole). Such analyses must be conceived broadly, however, so that the problem of survival is not reduced to that of national defense. (In this respect, see the pioneering work by Harold and Margaret Sprout on the role of man-milieu relationships in international politics.)[148] Indeed, a logical next step might be the formal development of an "interactional," evolutionary-adaptive paradigm for analyzing international politics.

By the same token, as Deutsch has observed,[149] power must be seen as a currency, as a means by which nations may seek to maximize

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have by convention labelled ecological, physiological, psychological, economic, sociological, cultural, and political.

[147] Consider, as an example, the effect of ICBMs. In this apocalyptic matter, Americans are, ironically, as dependent upon the good judgment of the men in the Kremlin as upon their own President. This is also obviously true in the ecological realm.

[148] Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton 1965) and "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York 1969), 41-56. The Sprouts define the concept of "milieu" broadly, but not precisely in terms of the survival problem—or in terms of the interaction between survival needs and biologically-based psychological characteristics of the species, on the one hand, and man's various "environments," on the other.

[149] Deutsch (fn. 76), 120-22.

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their survival chances or secure themselves a niche both in the physical environment and in relation to other human populations.

Another area where an evolutionary paradigm might well be fruitfully applied is in making systematic, functional comparisons among the socioeconomic and political systems of nations (comparative politics). An evolutionary approach would be concerned particularly with such matters as the way in which each society has organized its survival enterprise, its basic survival strategy, the functional relationship of its government to the total survival problem, and the relative effectiveness of various societies in maximizing their long-run survival chances, given their particular ecological, cultural, and external human environments.

An evolutionary approach may be particularly relevant to the analysis of "development." Until very recently, development was all too often defined as the "progress" of a society in providing goods and services.[150] Or, to be precise, the problem of development was delimited by what was required for a "developing nation" to achieve a socioeconomic system and level of living comparable to that of industrialized countries. (Political development was, of course, seen as a necessary prerequisite or concomitant of this process.) Thus, development was not ordinarily defined in terms of any fundamental life-and-death problems. Development was not from A to Z but from, say, G to K and not, maybe, the reverse.[151]

In the past few years, however, there have been some serious second thoughts on this issue.[152] Samuel P. Huntington, for example, has introduced us to the converse problem of political decay,[153] and Gunnar Myrdal (among others) has challenged the conventional

[150] For a sampling of the literature on development, see especially Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1966); and Jason Finkle and Richard W. Gable, *Political Development and Social Change* (New York 1966).

[151] This assumption has often been justified on the ground that it accords with the value premises and goals of the developing nations themselves. It has seldom been asked whether or not the goals of the developing (and, perhaps more important, the developed) nations might be misguided.

[152] See especially Claude E. Welch, ed., *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change* (Belmont 1967); Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds., *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs 1967); Harvey G. Kebschull, *Politics in Transitional Societies* (New York 1968); and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968).

[153] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

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attitude that Western countries are necessarily good models for "developing" nations.[154]

Perhaps the point of view most congenial to the theory of evolution, though, is that of Fred von der Mehden, who urged political scientists to reduce the concept of political development to its "lowest common denominator"—the ability of a state to provide security and the necessities of life for its people.[155] This meshes quite well with what we might expect of an evolutionary conceptualization of the nature and purpose of the state; it relates the state functionally to a society's basic problem of survival, with all its many ramifications, while shifting the focus away from more ethnocentric Western conceptions of development. In other words, we could define development empirically as the enhancement of a society's long-run survival chances; and it may be that part of the explanation for the attractiveness of Western nations as models is due to their *apparently* greater success in coping with the basic survival problem.

Equally significantly, an evolutionary approach may be capable of linking "is" and "ought" (or normative and empirical) questions within a single theoretical paradigm. Given the basic problem of survival, one type of question would be: Does a particular behavior, institution, or policy *in fact* contribute to (or detract from) the meeting of individual or collective survival needs (or both) and, if so, how significant is its effect? The other type of question would be: What behaviors, institutional arrangements, and policies *ought* a particular society to pursue if it wishes to maximize its survival chances? An evolutionary policy science, in other words, would be consistent with a value-free, evolutionary science of politics.[156]

Finally, it would seem that the theory of evolution provides us with the theoretical core that has been missing from the macro-theoretical frameworks put forward in political science in recent years. As is well known, the fabricators of functionalist, communications, and systems models of political life assert only that their constructs are analytical tools—intermediate steps on the way to an over-arching theory of politics.[157] James Charlesworth explains: "They see all political activity as a manifestation of a grand but as yet unrevealed design, wherein human needs and desires set in motion social and

[154] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York 1968).

[155] Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations*, rev. ed. (Englewood Cliffs 1969).

[156] This thorny issue will be the subject of a subsequent paper by this writer.

[157] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), chap. I; Deutsch (fn. 76), preface; Almond and Powell (fn. 150), chaps. I and II.

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political processes called systems, and these in turn eventually bring about the creation of political laws and institutions.[158]

On the other hand, although these models are offered as empty analytical frameworks, as heuristic devices, nonetheless they are rooted in the implicit assumption that the "real" world, which these models are after all supposed to help us analyze, does in fact have a purpose. That is, the real system is teleological or goal-directed. As Easton puts it, his is a "systems persistence" theory.[159]

From the evolutionary point of view, we can perceive that functionalist, communications, and systems paradigms are, after all, not merely misbegotten organismic analogies, but intuited descriptions of the empirical world (what A. James Gregor[160] referred to obliquely as "explanation sketches"), which have been transmogrified into abstract analytical frameworks.[161]

What I am suggesting is that we need not abandon the functionalist, communications, and systems frameworks in order to utilize evolution as an explanatory theory. We need only state the implicit hypothesis more explicitly. What I propose, in other words, is that evolution be employed as a general theory to explain all human life, including political life.[162] As should be clear by now, the theory of evolution does not start with an analytical framework or a methodology and then go searching for problems or values to plug into it. Rather, it starts with a major hypothesis about the nature and purpose of society, postulates values instrumental to that purpose, and remains open about the particular framework or methodology appropriate to the application of that theory. Indeed, it may be that most of the approaches developed by social scientists in recent years—including functionalism, communications models, systems analysis, decision-making theory,

[158] James Charlesworth, ed., *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York 1967), 7.

[159] Easton (fn. 157), 476. This point was discussed in detail in Corning, "The Theory of Evolution as a Paradigm for the Analysis of Political Phenomena" (fn. 21), chap. II.

[160] A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (June 1968), 425-39.

[161] This point is also discussed in detail in Corning, "The Theory of Evolution as a Paradigm for the Analysis of Political Phenomena" (fn. 21), chap. III.

[162] In an extraordinary passage in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Easton himself reveals just how close he came to making the vital connection without actually doing so. He says: "The perspective of a systems analysis of political life impels us to address ourselves to the following kind of question. How can any political system ever persist whether the world be one of stability or of change? It is *comparable* to asking with respect to biological life: How can human beings manage to exist? Or for that matter, what processes must be maintained if any life is to persist, especially under conditions where the environment may at times be extremely hostile?" Italics added (fn. 157), 14-15.

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game-theory, energy transfer models, and so forth—may be suited to the analysis of one or another aspect of the total survival enterprise and may therefore prove useful in operationalizing an evolutionary paradigm in political science.

From an evolutionary perspective, therefore, a political system may be seen as a functional division of labor within the collective survival enterprise. That is, political systems are accumulations of evolved cultural responses to the problems of survival in specific natural and cultural environments. And if the problem of human survival typically involves interdependency and is thus a problem of collective goal-attainment, then the basic functions of political systems must be defined in relation to the common "purpose" of the collectivity. In *Politics and Vision*, Sheldon Wolin puts it as follows:

> From its very beginnings in Greece, the Western political tradition has looked upon the political order as a common order created to deal with those concerns in which all of the members of society have some interest. . . . The "commonness" of the political order has been reflected in . . . the basic belief of theorists that political rule is concerned with those general interests shared by all the members of the community. . . . Long ago Aristotle had insisted that the political association, by virtue of its superior comprehensiveness and *purpose*, had a stronger claim on men's loyalties than any lesser association, and that political membership was therefore superior to other forms of membership. In terms of *function* and *purpose*, a lesser association, such as the family or the religious group, served a limited good and hence could justifiably extract only partial loyalty. A political association, however, was conceived by him as promoting a more comprehensive good—that of the whole community—and hence was deserving of fuller obedience.[163]

Politics, in the Aristotelian conception, was not equivalent to the struggle for power. Nor was it equivalent to the role of refereeing the fights between contending interest-groups. Nor was it merely a matter of vying for governmental benefits on the part of this or that interest. Quintessentially, the Aristotelian view fits the evolutionary conception of society as a goal-directed enterprise in which the "authoritative allocation of values for a society," in Easton's phrase,[164] must have as its object James Madison's "permanent and aggregate interests of the community."[165]

In attempting to specify the precise functions of political systems within an evolutionary paradigm, we might take Talcott Parsons'

[163] Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston 1960), 433, italics added.
[164] Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), 29.
[165] *The Federalist.*

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typology as a point of departure. Parsons recently explicated his four functional requisites for any "action system" as follows: (1) *pattern maintenance*, that is, "maintenance of the highest 'governing' or controlling patterns"; (2) *internal integration*; (3) "orientation to the *attainment of goals*" in relation to the environment; and (4) an "*adaptation* to the broad conditions of the physical environment."[166] Parsons chooses to assign to the political system principal responsibility only for the goal-attainment function. However, it could be argued that all four of Parsons' functions, or ones that are conceptually similar, could be encompassed in the activities of government, although this is not to say that all governments necessarily perform such functions.[167]

As for the specific activities of political systems, they can be expected to reflect a number of situation-specific variables—the physical environment and its challenges, the external political environment, the basic strategy or strategies by which a society pursues its survival needs,[168] the kind of technology employed by a society, internal social and political relationships, and unique historical factors. In other words, the need for political activity ranges along a continuum from that of simple, egalitarian hunting or herding societies exhibiting a homeostatic fit with their environments[169] to that of societies in which the need for an adaptive response has become so acute that we have on our hands what Ralph P. Hummel has called a "pre-charismatic crisis,"[170] the frequent outcome of which is some sort of "revitalization movement."[171]

It should be emphasized that an evolutionary conception of politics

[166] Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 7, italics added.

[167] Corning, "The Problem of Applying Darwinian Evolution to Political Science" (fn. 21).

[168] The overall survival strategy of a society may be consciously pursued by the leadership or be the resultant vector, so to speak, of major survival-serving behaviors. A preliminary typology of such strategies might be: 1) *Homeostatic strategies*, or strategies designed to stabilize a population in relation to limited resources; or 2) *Expansionist strategies*, under which we might include a) territorial expansion, b) maximum exploitation of the internal resource base, c) external trade, d) exploitation of the resources of other societies, or e) a combination of the above.

[169] Mair (fn. 141), 8-32; Morton H. Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York 1967); Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *Comparative Political Systems* (Garden City 1967).

[170] Hummel (fn. 21).

[171] Wallace (fn. 106). A revitalization movement was defined by Wallace as a "deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture" (*ibid.*, 265). Wallace includes in his concept a great variety of social movements (including cargo cults, religious revivals, reform movements, utopian communities, revolutions, and charismatic movements, etc.), and though he does not link such phenomena explicitly to the theory of evolution (as adaptive responses), they certainly fit well into an evolutionary paradigm. This point is further developed in Corning, "The Theory of Evolution as a Paradigm for the Analysis of Political Phenomena" (fn. 21), chap. VII.

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does not require that everything governments or political leaders do be functional for the survival of the collectivity. As with any other aspect of social life, it is possible to speak of adaptive and maladaptive behaviors, political leaders, or political systems, and part of the task of an evolutionary political science should be to make just such appraisals of political phenomena.[172] On the other hand, from an evolutionary point of view, no one form of government is necessarily more adaptive than others; an evolutionary paradigm would not be ethnocentric. Nor is any one form of social organization, or any particular survival strategy, *necessarily* the "best." Adaptiveness is situation-specific, so that an evolutionary framework could as readily be used to justify a revolution as the *status quo*, depending upon the context.

Of course, the problems involved in trying to operationalize an evolutionary paradigm in political science are manifold and cannot be dealt with in detail here.[173] But suffice it to say that, since man is embedded in the "bio-sphere" and since his basic survival needs are biological, an evolutionary approach must focus on the interrelationship between social and political phenomena, on the one hand, and biological and ecological factors on the other. A key element in the strategy being developed by this writer involves an effort to delineate more precisely the basic parameters of an adaptive society for use as a framework for evaluating particular societies and their political systems. One facet of this effort is an array of survival-relevant "indicators" drawn from a number of disciplines, including genetics, ecology, economics, and political science.

A second line of development could involve attempts at three-dimensional functional comparisons of specific behaviors—across species, cultures, and epochs.[174]

Efforts could also be made, through a more thoroughgoing application of biological variables, to increase the explanatory and predictive power of our models of individual behavior, as I suggested with respect to aggression.

Finally, an evolutionary approach may be able to enrich our explanations of such major political phenomena as war and revolution, nationalism, stratification, organizational behavior,[175] leadership, and

[172] For further discussion of this point, see Corning (*ibid.*).

[173] *Ibid.*

[174] Sociologist Walter L. Wallace is currently working on a systematic exploration of conceptual analogues between sociology and ethology as a preliminary to making cross-species comparisons. Wallace, "Toward Comparative Sociology: Conceptual Analogs Between Human and Infrahuman Studies" (unpublished, 1969).

[175] In this respect, see Dennis R. Eckart's pioneering systems approach to the analysis of "Innovation in Complex Organizations" (Ph.D. diss., University of California 1970). Eckart's focus is upon the process by which organizations seek to ensure

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leader-follower relations. For example, I am currently developing an evolutionary-adaptive approach to leader-follower phenomena, from tribal chieftainship to the leadership of revitalization movements and the "institutionalized Presidency." It will involve such considerations as the evolutionary origins of leadership, the survival functions of leadership, "adaptive" versus "maladaptive" leadership, and the question of what factors, biological and cultural, may be involved in the selection of leaders and the behavior of followers.

Dobzhansky has written that "nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution."[176] It is my belief that the same applies to political science. Because we are the products of evolution and are subject to its processes, we should certainly be able to make more sense of social phenomena by utilizing an evolutionary paradigm.

In confronting the intellectual challenge of evolution, there are, indeed, only four (or perhaps five) possible postures to choose among. We could argue that Darwinian theory is simply not relevant to social life, because our survival problems have been *solved*. (I maintain, though, that the burden of proof should be put upon those who so argue.) Second, we might concede the problem of biological survival but assert that social evolution and social phenomena are simply unrelated (an untenable argument, I think). Third, we can take the position that human social evolution may indeed have an effect upon our survival chances, but that the process is a deterministic one, the understanding of which requires only that we identify and comprehend its prime mover. Accordingly, we could argue that we need not concern ourselves with "externals." However, if none of the foregoing arguments is defensible (or, in any event, satisfying), then we must confront the hard choice—either to reject the theory of biological evolution altogether or to accept the argument that social life is relevant to the basic problem of survival and that human social structures and mental processes (value-choices, problem-solving activities, etc.) do affect our long-run viability as a species.

However, if we should choose to accept the evolutionary view of society, then we will have to face up to the far more difficult challenge of trying to build a social science based upon it.

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their own survival, but I would prefer to focus on the interrelationship between an organization and the larger system in which it is embedded. From an evolutionary viewpoint, the criteria by which such "subsystems" should be evaluated are the survival needs of the larger society; a self-serving motivational orientation on the part of an organization—ubiquitous as such an orientation may be—should be viewed as potentially maladaptive.

[176] Dobzhansky, *Heredity and the Nature of Man* (fn. 22), 118.

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ELITE RECRUITMENT IN TURKEY

The Role of the Mülkiye

By JOSEPH S. SZYLIOWICZ*

I

THE study of elites, or "who's who, when, and how," as Professor Rustow has described this field, has long been a topic of concern to scholars in a wide variety of disciplines. Social and political philosophers dating back to Aristotle and including such diverse figures as Marx, Pareto, and Mosca have written about the relationships between elites and the social order, and a host of social scientists and historians have carried out detailed analyses of the social background of high-level decision-makers in various societies.[1]

The reason for such interest stems from the existence in every human society of a minority that enjoy more power, influence, and status than the rest of its members and, in Harold Laswell's phrase, "get the most of what there is to get." As a result, generations of scholars have developed a wide range of theories and propositions about the nature of leadership and a considerable amount of detailed empirical data has been gathered on the social background of governing elites in different societies.

Despite such outward appearances of vitality, however, the field of elite studies has come under recent severe attack. Critics have charged that many of the findings have been trivial, that the methodology has often been weak, that tabulation of the data has been marked by a lack of coherent criteria, that few relationships among social background characteristics and attitudes and behavior have been established, and that the possibilities of developing theoretical and comparative insights have been greatly hampered by the focus of most studies upon the members of a specific political institution (usually a legislative

* This paper was first presented at the third annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Toronto, 1969. In its preparation the author benefited from the comments of Professor Norman Itzkowitz, the founder of the "Neo-Namierite School of Ottoman Studies," and from the methodological expertise of his colleague, Professor Maurice A. East. Two students at the Graduate School of International Studies, Miss Tufan Kolan and Mr. Richard Lovell, also contributed greatly by coding the data, running the program, and making many valuable suggestions. Financial support by the Graduate School of International Studies enabled the author to carry out the study.

[1] For a comprehensive bibliography of elite and related studies see Carl Beck and J. Thomas McKechnie, *Political Elites* (Boston 1968).

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body) at a particular point in time.[2] Even if such accusations are justified, the weaknesses of many past studies do not invalidate the potential of social background analysis, and most scholars would agree with the following conclusion: "Today, research of the social background of political elites holds particular promise in the study of Asian, African, and Latin American politics, where the institutional approach tends to mislead and the functionalist approach to confuse. The scarcity of biographical data would seem to be the only serious limitation on the possibilities of such research. . . . It is by now obvious that elites are a vast subject; that quantification of social data about them is a technique of potential precision and versatility; but that neither subject nor technique will add up to our knowledge except as we ask significant questions of one and manage to answer them by the other."[3]

Although rather intensive efforts at gathering social background data have characterized the activities of scholars concerned with many regions of the world, the Middle East (with few exceptions) has remained relatively untouched by such research. Furthermore, it is no exaggeration to suggest that if the Middle East as a whole has been neglected the Ottoman Empire has been totally ignored, although it is a truism that for scholars concerned with the contemporary Middle East, and, especially for those whose focus is upon modernization, an understanding of the structural and dynamic changes that occurred during the nineteenth century must be of basic concern.[4]

The neglect of the nineteenth century, however, has not been limited to elite studies, and no less a historian than Bernard Lewis has pointed out that "What is still lacking is good solid research on 19th century history conducted by the tried and tested methods of critical historical scholarship, using both Western and Middle Eastern sources and not governed by the desire to prove the virtue or villainy of persons, parties, sects, or nations. There are such works, produced both

[2] See William B. Quandt, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Santa Monica 1969); Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 690-717; Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 428-45; Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (January 1969), 471-500.

[3] Rustow (fn. 2), 716.

[4] Nor is this neglect limited to the Middle East; one scholar has pointed out that "One might have supposed that historians, largely occupied as they have been with the activities of ruling classes, would have been among the first to study systematically the problems of the recruitment and tenure of elites. This problem is an especially interesting one in a country such as the United States. . . . Yet most American historians have shied away from it." William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite," in William Miller, ed., *Men in Business: Essays on the Historical Role of Entrepreneurship* (New York 1962), cited in T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Baltimore 1966), 62-63.

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in the Middle East and elsewhere, but their numbers are still lamentably few."[5] The lack of detailed studies has, of course, not inhibited scholars from generalizing about the processes of change in the nineteenth century or about the fundamental role of political leadership therein, and many have presented "insights" based on social background characteristics to explain events during the nineteenth century. To take but one example, a recent essay contains the argument that the "Men of the *Tanzimat*" (the products of the secular civil schools) became the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire following the Crimean War. "These Men of the *Tanzimat* formed a new ruling class of relatively well-educated and well-motivated individuals whose main desire was to modernize their state. . . . Many were . . . children of members of the older Ottoman ruling class. . . . It was only when the *Tanzimat* produced a new generation of twentieth-century reformers not directly tied to the older ruling class that a significant reform was possible. This new generation consisted mainly of men from relatively modest families who rose through the army and the civil schools created by the *Tanzimat*. . . . It was men such as these who united in the Society of Union and Progress."[6]

In other words, the author has isolated the two variables that he considers most important in explaining the behavior and policies of the "Men of the *Tanzimat*," their educational and social background, and in effect has argued that (1) the elite sent its children to the new civil schools when these were established during the nineteenth century, (2) a new elite was thus created that, though possessing new values and attitudes, was largely unchanged in terms of socioeconomic background characteristics, (3) the secular schools also served as channels of mobility for other groups within the society, and (4) the existing elite was displaced in 1908 by this new educated group.

By carrying out this exercise I do not wish to suggest that these statements are wrong—indeed, most of them are widely accepted by most persons who have written about the nineteenth century—but I do wish to emphasize the extent to which such generalizations are often based on inadequate data. As we shall see below, recent research has suggested that many similar generalizations on the role of modern education, the impact of specific schools, and the criteria for recruitment into the ruling institution are at best oversimplifications. Further-

[5] Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1 (April 1965) 284-85.

[6] Stanford J. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago 1968), 36-37.

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more, although many scholars have in fact used background variables to explain political developments, they have usually done so without any explicit definition of the concepts and variables with which they were concerned. Thus, in view of our limited knowledge concerning such basic topics as the composition and circulation of elites in the nineteenth century and the development and functioning of modern schools in the Middle East, the above statements should be considered as hypotheses that remain to be proved or disproved through further research.

Such research would have to seek answers to such questions as these:

(1) What elite groups competed for power during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and what was the result of this competition in terms of shifts in the power positions of these groups during this period?
(2) What were the characteristics of the members of each group (including educational background) and what circulation of individuals within each of these particular groups occurred?
(3) What coherent relationships between changes in recruitment patterns into these groups and the composition and characteristics of a particular group and its political power, attitudes, and behavior can be discerned?
(4) What was the relationship of the new educational institutions to the total state apparatus in terms of the nature of the input into these institutions, the impact of their output upon the society, and the dynamics of the socializing processes that occurred within them?

To answer such questions fully, it is obviously necessary to have precise and detailed biographical data available and to utilize the techniques of elite analysis.

The fallaciousness of history written without attention to the lives of individuals has been vividly demonstrated by the contribution of such great historians as Sir Lewis Namier and the utility and applicability of the prosographic method to the Middle East by Professor Norman Itzkowitz, who has, by tracing the biographies of Ottoman statesmen, forced a reappraisal of the well-known Lybyer and Gibb and Bowen thesis concerning the composition of the Ruling Institution and the cause of its decline. He has demonstrated by an examination of the social backgrounds and career patterns of high-level functionaries that religious criteria did not dominate recruitment into the Ruling Institution. Many of the eighteenth-century grand viziers were not born

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Muslims and many persons who served as *defterdar* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were in fact of Muslim origin. Similarly, persons of non-Muslim origin were to be found within the Religious Institution itself. Hence, the argument that changes in recruitment patterns in the eighteenth century led to the decline of the Empire by permitting free-born Muslims to enter the Ruling Institution is at best an oversimplification.[7]

In addition to the need to "namierize" Ottoman history, there is a lack of detailed studies of the major modern schools that were opened during the nineteenth century, although practically every scholar who has written about the nineteenth century has viewed the modern schools as having deeply influenced Ottoman society. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the nineteenth century can best be understood in terms of a struggle between the graduates of the *medreses* and the graduates of the modern schools. In the words of one scholar, "On one side [were the] 'modernists,' influenced by a Western-Oriented, secular education. . . . Grimly opposed . . . in mentality and in action, was the other part of the educated elite—the *medrese*-trained intellectuals."[8] Recent historical research, however, suggests that such an analysis may well be highly simplistic, since at least during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II many of the leading *ulema* were not only supporters, but active proponents, of reform.[9] And, although similar studies are, to the best of my knowledge, lacking for the rest of the nineteenth century, it is known that many persons of *ulema* background played active roles as directors and faculty in the modern schools that were established.[10]

Discussions of the role of specific educational institutions in the modernization process may also be criticized on the same basis. Many scholars, for example, would agree with the often-quoted statement by Professor Bernard Lewis in his classic study, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, that "The influence of the Galatasaray school on the rise of modern Turkey has been enormous. As the need for administrators, diplomats, and others with a Western education and a capacity to handle Western administrative apparatus became more and more pressing, the graduates of Galatasaray came to play a preponderant role

[7] Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica* (1962), 73-94.

[8] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Boston 1965), 37-38.

[9] Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman *'Ulema'* and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," *Scripta Hierosolymitana* (1961), 63-96.

[10] Richard L. Chambers, "Notes on the Mekteb-i Osmani in Paris, 1857-1874," in Polk and Chambers (fn. 6), 313-29.

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in the politics and administration of the Ottoman empire and, after it, of the Turkish republic. The Imperial Ottoman Lycée had no playing fields but not a few of the victories in modern Turkey were won in its classrooms."[11] Yet, once again, recent research has cast doubts upon this analysis, for a study of the careers followed by the graduates of this school has shown that, although about two-thirds of the graduates before 1900 entered the military or civil bureaucracy, only five of them attained high positions, and that in subsequent decades most graduates entered the professions.[12]

Two other educational institutions that are usually singled out as having made major contributions to the modernization of Turkey are the *Mülkiye*, the Civil Service School established in 1859, and the *Harbiye*, the Military Academy opened in 1849. Their influence has been so great that one irreverent Turkish friend has summarized the role of these schools as follows: "*Harbiye* plus *Mülkiye* equals *Türkiye*." Despite their acknowledged importance, however, detailed studies of the development and functioning of these institutions are also lacking.

II

Because of considerations such as these, I undertook an analysis of the graduates of the *Mülkiye*. I chose this institution over the *Harbiye* for two reasons: first, the data were readily available in Ali Çankaya, *Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler* [History of the *Mülkiye* and its Graduates] (Ankara 1954), and second, I hoped that such an analysis might provide insights into the development and functioning of the Turkish bureaucracy, another important topic that has been largely ignored until very recent times.

This does not mean, however, that the findings of this paper are completely applicable to the bureaucracy. Not all the students who graduated from the *Mülkiye* entered the administration (though 86 percent did indeed do so), and, furthermore, those that did embark upon civil-service careers are concentrated in certain central ministries, especially Interior, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, if these reservations are kept in mind, the analysis of this student body can provide some indication of the patterns of bureaucratic recruitment that were operative between 1859 and 1949.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the results of a pre-

[11] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford 1961), 120.
[12] Andreas Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago 1966), 103.

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liminary analysis of data that can serve to elucidate the types of problems discussed earlier. I shall be concerned primarily with describing the kinds of persons who attended the *Mülkiye* and analyzing recruitment patterns over time. Subsequently, I expect to analyze different parts of these data in depth and relate them to the existing theoretical and applied literature on such topics as occupational mobility, center-periphery relations, and elite integration, as part of an ongoing project on the development of the bureaucratic elite. The methodology behind this paper consisted essentially of taking a sample, stratified by graduating class of the biographies listed in the source-book mentioned earlier. To eliminate any bias, I utilized a table of random numbers. Because of limitations of time and resources, I limited the population to 475 persons (about 15 percent of the total number of graduates between 1859 and 1949), a number that should be large enough to provide sufficient respondents in various categories to permit the later utilization of sophisticated quantitative methods when necessary. The data were then coded for those characteristics that seemed most relevant, including year of birth, place of birth, size of birthplace, father's occupation, father's title, educational background, year of graduation, highest position achieved, foreign contact, grades received in the school, and so forth. Unfortunately, data were not available on each of these variables for every person, so that the number of cases varies greatly depending upon which variables are being analyzed. This information was placed on punch cards and tabulated by the use of a NUCROS cross-tabulation program run on a B 5500 computer at the University of Denver.

Since the purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the graduates of the *Mülkiye* in order to demonstrate the utility of aggregate biographical analysis in providing insights into political and social developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, elementary quantitative methods, particularly simple percentage analysis, suffice. When a temporal dimension is introduced the sample is broken down to approximate well-known historical periods, from the founding of the school to the Young Turks (1859-1907); the Young Turk era (1908-1919); the Ataturk era (1920-1939); and the İnönü era (1940-1949). The last period will frequently be omitted from the discussion because of lack of data.

As might be expected, the sample is overwhelmingly male (95 percent) and composed of Turks (96 percent). Although the eight females were involved only in the later period, all the non-Turkish students attended the school during the last decades of the Ottoman

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Empire—a reflection of the nature of the empire and of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's policies.

In terms of the geographic origin of the entire student body, the Marmara region (where İstanbul is located) was the birthplace of the greatest percentage (38 percent). The second-largest category comprises those born in the Anatolian provinces (21 percent), followed by students whose birthplace lay outside the present boundaries of the Turkish Republic (20 percent), persons from the Black Sea (9 percent), the Aegean (8 percent), and the Mediterranean coast (5 percent). Although the Anatolian provinces account for the second-largest group of students, it has always been underrepresented in terms of population. Conversely, the Marmara region has always been overrepresented.

	1860-1907	*1908-1919*	*1920-1939*	*1940-1949*	*Total*	*Population*[a] *1927*	*1950*
Marmara	46%	40%	36%	27%	38%	28%	27%
Aegean	4%	8%	7%	12%	8%		
Mediterranean	5%	1%	3%	10%	5%	5%	7%
Black Sea	5%	12%	9%	11%	9%	16%	16%
S., S.E., Anatolia	8%	17%	33%	35%	21%	50%	51%
Foreign Born	31%	22%	1%	5%	18%		
	N=144	N=77	N=117	N=124	N=475		

[a] İstatistik Yilliği [Statistical Yearbook], xx (Ankara 1950).

It is evident that important changes have taken place over the period covered by the data, the most obvious being the consistent decline in the number of students born outside the borders of present-day Turkey since the Young Turks came to power. Second, the number of students coming from the Anatolian provinces has grown steadily and the representation of students from the Marmara region has declined. The representation of other provinces has also tended to increase, with the exception of the Black Sea region, which has remained fairly stable at a rather high level. Recent trends, however, are somewhat unclear. Data from another study on the geographic origins of students who attended the school between 1946 and 1955 indicate, rather surprisingly, that the percentage of students coming from the Marmara and Aegean regions rose to 45 percent and the proportion recruited from Anatolia declined to 31 percent.[13] These data run counter to the findings

[13] Fahir Armaoğlu and Guthrie S. Birkhead, *Graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Ankara, 1946-1955* (Ankara 1957), 6.

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of a study of district governors that, though not fully comparable, due to the use of different categories and different populations (though most of the district governors are *Mülkiye* graduates), indicates that the trend from 1940 to 1956 was toward a decrease in the importance of Western Turkey at the expense of the rest of the country.[14]

The tendency toward diversity of geographic representation did not really begin until the 1890's, and one reason why the subsequent decades witnessed a growing influx of students from the "underdeveloped regions"—the interior Anatolian provinces—may well be the national developments in communication and education. It was at this time that educational opportunities were expanded by the opening of new schools throughout the country so that students in these regions had the opportunity to obtain the training that was a prerequisite for admission to the *Mülkiye*. By 1876 there were 253 middle schools distributed throughout the empire, with practically every large town having at least one; twenty-one were located in İstanbul.[15]

Another way of considering birthplace is by examining the size of the communities where the students were born. If we consider only those born within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic we find, naturally, that the largest single percentage (40 percent) came from major urban centers (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir) though, rather surprisingly, extremely few students were born in either of the last two cities (about 3 percent). This fact can probably be explained by the overwhelming dominance of İstanbul in the Ottoman Empire, the fact that Ankara became a major city extremely late (at the end of World War I its population was a mere 20,000), and the traditional emphasis in İzmir upon trade and commerce. Of the remainder, 31 percent were born in the larger towns (provincial centers), and 28 percent in the rural areas.

	1860-1907	*1908-1919*	*1920-1939*	*1940-1949*	*Total*
Urban centers	58%	47%	36%	25%	40%
Large towns	20%	27%	39%	40%	31%
Rural areas	22%	25%	25%	34%	28%
	N=106	N=59	N=88	N=113	

[14] Noralou P. Roos and Leslie L. Roos Jr., "Changing Patterns of Turkish Public Administration," *Middle Eastern Studies*, IV (April 1968), 288. The explanation for the discrepancy in these findings apparently lies in the fact that a process of selective recruitment and selective leaving is taking place, and that the Ministry of the Interior is not retaining graduates from Western Turkey who tend to be from relatively privileged backgrounds. [Personal communication from Leslie L. Roos, Jr.]

[15] Kazamias (fn. 12), 83.

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Once again, important changes are evident over time as the tempo of development reached out into the smaller communities. The percentage coming from İstanbul declined perceptibly and the representation from the other communities has increased significantly, from 42 percent during the last decades of the nineteenth century to 74 percent in the 1940's. However, it appears that this development did not occur in a balanced way as far as the provincial centers and the smaller communities are concerned, the former rising steadily until the end of the Ataturk era, the latter remaining about the same. In other words, these data substantiate the argument that the developments during both the Young Turk and the Ataturk periods did not significantly affect the rural areas but had their greatest impact upon the provincial capitals.[16] On this point, too, the related studies differ on recent trends; one indicates that the proportion of students drawn from rural areas declined to 30 percent between 1946 and 1955;[17] the other that the percentage of district governors not born in an urban center increased from 76 percent in the 1940's to 85 percent in the 1950's.[18]

In any event, it appears that a significant proportion of the student body was always drawn from the smaller communities. At least two other studies bear upon and corroborate this finding. First, another study of the *Mülkiye* showed that about 25 percent of the students in the period from 1860 to 1909 came from "small towns in Anatolia."[19] Second, it appears that rural representation is to be found at the highest level of the bureaucracy; a 1964 study of the background of Turkish administrators found that "some 55 percent of the highest officials were born in small towns and villages and received their early education there."[20] Hence it appears that the *Mülkiye*—and other educational institutions as well—has served as a channel for the recruitment of persons from rural areas for civil-service careers and that many of these persons have achieved high-level positions within the administration. Such a finding is of course quite striking and poses many questions for further research concerning the extent to which such a background affects the ideological orientation, values, and work style of these individuals and the functioning of socializing processes within the educational system and the bureaucracy itself. This problem is particularly important in terms of elite-mass relationships, since the bureaucracy has often been criticized for its ignorance of and apathy

[16] Frey (fn. 8), 40-41.
[17] Armaoğlu and Birkhead (fn. 13), 5.
[18] Roos and Roos (fn. 14), 287.
[19] Kazamias (fn. 12), 89.
[20] C. H. Dodd, "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1 (April 1965), 274.

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toward the problems of the rural populace. A second dimension of this question is that of elite integration. Many observers have argued that much of the conflict that has characterized the Turkish political system in recent years can be attributed to the emergence of a political elite with strong local attachments, yet on the basis of data such as the above it would appear that the fundamentals of conflict cannot be explained solely by localism.[21]

If insights are to be gained into these issues, it is necessary to delineate the origins and characteristics of this group more precisely. One explanation that has been advanced to account for this phenomenon is that many of the "provincials" come from communities located near the major urban centers,[22] but it is likely that other considerations are involved. One of these is that some small communities have always provided a constant flow of students into the *Mülkiye*, the most notable example being perhaps the town of İbradı located in the province of Antalya, which for generations has had at least one student enrolled in the school. How and why the first person in this community decided to become an administrator is unclear, but it has become such a well-established tradition that mention of it can be found in at least one reference work on Turkish municipalities.[23]

Traditions of this sort, however, provide only part of the answer to the problem of identifying more precisely this large group of individuals of nonurban origin, many of whom have apparently become high-level officials. In an effort to gain further insights into the background of these students, I arranged the data for those born within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic according to size of birthplace and father's occupation, with the following results:

	Urban Centers	*Large Towns*	*Rural Areas*
Bureaucrat	58%	53%	41%
Military	18%	11%	15%
Religious	5%	—	5%
Other	19%	36%	38%
	N=62	N=47	N=39

The table indicates that the smaller the birthplace the less likely is the student to come from an official background; 81 percent of those from

[21] For a similar conclusion based on contemporary data see Roos and Roos (fn. 14), 291.

[22] Dodd (fn. 20), 274.

[23] *Belediyelerimiz* [Our Municipalities] (Ankara 1956), 258.

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an urban center as compared to 64 percent of those from large towns and 61 percent from the rural areas.

Further research is needed to define more accurately the social strata from which these students are drawn, but at least one assumption can be made—that these students are not the sons of poor peasants. Hence, it is most probable that they come from important families in the small and middle-sized towns and are of *ayan-eşraf* (local gentry) background. The emergence of this group during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and its success in acquiring and maintaining local power, have been described in some detail,[24] but it now appears that many of its members are also to be found within the bureaucracy. Some supporting evidence for this hypothesis is available. Preliminary investigation of the background of high-level bureaucrats during the past 150 years indicates that a significant number are from important regional families. A similar finding has been reported by a Turkish scholar who writes: "Toward the end of the nineteenth century the further modernization of Turkey brought with it a further change in the structure of the bureaucracy: a pyramid with a somewhat narrow base was transformed into one with an increasingly wider base. To staff the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy, new Western-oriented schools were created. Since tuition was free and room and board were provided in addition, a number of provincials flowed to these schools. These provincials came mainly from the stratum of the lesser *ayan* and *eşraf* and a few prosperous peasants. This view is for the moment based on impressions acquired during work on the origins of the Young Turks only. Quantitative studies will have to bring greater clarity to the picture."[25] However, it does not appear that these provincials were limited to the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Reinforcing the data presented earlier concerning the origins of contemporary high-level bureaucrats is the fact that an inverse relationship exists between size of birthplace and career success. My preliminary hypothesis, which could not be verified, was that students from the smaller communities would suffer from serious handicaps in educational background and from a lack of powerful family connections and therefore would not be as likely to succeed as those from İstanbul.

[24] See Kemal H. Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," in Polk and Chambers (fn. 6), and Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964).

[25] Şerif Mardin, "Historical Determinants of Social Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi* (1968), 139.

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To permit exploration of this and related hypotheses the concept of career success had to be operationalized. I considered various possibilities, including the number of years necessary to reach various administrative posts, but unfortunately specific dates were often lacking. Therefore I defined the concept of career success by the highest administrative position achieved regardless of the time taken to reach it. Another complication was that such a definition limited the concept of career success to those persons who had followed administrative careers and excluded those students who, upon graduation, had entered business or a profession, about 14 percent of the total. Despite such drawbacks, the nature of the data and my primary concern with the bureaucracy led to the operationalization of the concept of career success in terms of position achieved within the administration. Specifically, all persons who occupied a post at the level of general director or higher (undersecretary, assistant undersecretary, ambassador, governor, and so forth), about 26 percent of all the students who entered the bureaucracy, were defined as "successful."

This figure, however, is greatly influenced by the inclusion of those who had graduated in recent years and who thus probably had not enjoyed the same opportunities to climb within the bureaucracy as earlier graduates. That this is indeed the case is reflected in the following table, wherein the rate of career success is shown for different periods:

1860-1878	*1879-1889*	*1890-1907*	*1908-1919*	*1920-1931*	*1932-1939*	*1940-1949*
Career Success						
0	33%	28%	55%	44%	29%	3%
N=13	N=36	N=90	N=60	N=25	N=78	N=110

The most successful students, and they are very successful indeed since over half of all who entered the administration went on to occupy a high position, are those who graduated between 1908 and 1919, during the Young Turk era. To some extent this may be due to the time factor, graduates of the later classes not having had the same opportunity to reach the upper echelons as did the earlier classes—the graduates of the thirties, for example—being between 36 and 43 years old at the time the data was compiled. The differences between the third, fourth, and fifth classes—those who graduated between 1890-1907, 1908-1919, and 1920-1931—however, suggest that other factors are operative.

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The sharp increase in the rate of success between those students who graduated under Abdul Hamid and those who did so later cannot be explained by age alone. The graduates of class 3 (1890-1907) were about 37 to 54 years old at the time that Ataturk came to power and hence highly eligible for appointment to high positions. However, it appears that Ataturk chose to bypass this group and to favor people who had not been recruited by Abdul Hamid II. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to establish the median age at which graduates achieved high-level positions over time, but two pieces of evidence can be marshalled in support of this argument. First, there is no doubt that the students who attended the school during the Young Turk era differed from their predecessors in such background variables as fathers' occupations and regions of birth. Second, it is plausible to assume that Ataturk wished to bypass the entrenched bureaucracy in view of its opposition to (or at least its lukewarm support of) his fight to establish the Turkish Republic. It has been pointed out, for example, that "The *civilian bureaucracy* proved to be far more consistent than the army in its loyalty to the Sultan . . . and hence more disinclined to take any pro-nationalist action that might smack of treason or insubordination. İstanbul Ministers of the Interior . . . provided some of the most determined opposition to Mustafa Kemal's attempt to consolidate the Anatolian movement—at a time when the War Ministry and the General Staff still were solidly controlled by nationalist sympathizers. This divergence at the apex presumably accentuated, by means of contrasting appointment policies, the political differences between military and civilian officials at the provincial base. Most of the Anatolian governors and subgovernors (*valis* and *mutasarrifs*) in the summer and fall of 1919 seem to have been hostile, cool, or at best cautiously correct toward the nationalist cause."[26]

The decline in the success rate of those students who attended the *Mülkiye* during the 1920's is somewhat harder to explain. One reason may lie in the method of calculation; if the percentage of successful students is computed for the entire class regardless of their subsequent career choices, the only period for which any significant difference exists is that of the Young Turks, when it declines to 46 percent, because of the relatively large number of students (about 30 percent) who did not enter the bureaucracy. Two hypotheses can be presented to explain this fact. First, only those graduates who welcomed the victory of Ataturk or who did not feel that their chances of advance-

[26] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, XI (July 1959), 524.

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ment would be damaged by the change of regime remained in the bureaucracy; second, many graduates were attracted by the prospects that now existed outside the administration as a result of the social changes that were taking place within the country. The validity of these arguments awaits a much-needed analysis of the internal dynamics of the bureaucracy during and after this period.

Data on the growth of the bureaucracy during the Ataturk period, however, suggest that a drop in the success rate did indeed occur between the graduates of the Young Turk period and those that came after. Although the total number of bureaucrats rose from 50,666 in 1931 to 74,183 in 1938,[27] all branches did not participate equally in this increase. The number of persons employed in those ministries where the graduates of this school were traditionally concentrated—Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs (in 1938, for example, 70 percent of all *Mülkiye* graduates working in the administration were to be found in these departments)—rose only slightly during this period from 14,574 in 1931 to 15,037 in 1938, and the proportion of administrators in these ministries decreased from 29 percent to 17 percent of the total number of civil servants. In other words, the opportunities open to *Mülkiye* students within the administration did not increase, and it is reasonable to assume that the existing high-level positions were filled by the earlier graduates. Not only did the *Mülkiye* students suffer during this period from a stagnation of opportunities in those ministries for which they were prepared, but their importance within the administration also declined with the opening of new higher educational institutions whose graduates staffed the expanding sections of the bureaucracy. It would appear that this trend has continued to the present.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that the rate of success for the earliest graduates was a low one. None of the students who graduated before 1878 achieved a high position—a not especially surprising finding, since between 1869 and 1877 the institution was in effect a secondary-level school with many obvious weaknesses. The limited impact of the school was widely criticized, and a memorandum submitted by Cevdet Pasha to the Grand Vizier stated: "It is an urgent necessity to expand the *Mülkiye* School in accordance with the time and situation, to rearrange the programme of studies correspondingly, to employ its graduates progressively in important posts, and thus to train competent administrative officials. Our im-

[27] *Memurlar İstatistiği* [Civil Servant Statistics] (İstanbul 1932); *Memurlar İstatistiği* (Ankara 1939).

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mediate obligation is to take care to choose and employ those who are already fairly experienced and thus put the state administration on the right path."[28] Subsequently the school was indeed reorganized and upgraded, and its graduates were employed in more important positions—altogether, about 26 percent of those who graduated before 1908 achieved high-level positions.

The fact that a significant number of these graduates came to occupy important posts is corroborated by the findings of another study, which showed that about 4 percent of the graduates from 1860 to 1909 became ministers, and another 6 percent governors of a province.[29] Thus, we must differentiate between the impact of the *Galatasaray Lycée* and the *Mülkiye* upon the modernization of Turkey and modify any suggestion that the role of the two schools during the last decades of the nineteenth century was essentially the same. *Galatasaray* provided "a substratum of bureaucrats, administrators, professionals, etc., who were ready to accept innovation and the modernization of the institutions of government."[30] But the *Mülkiye* had a greater and more direct influence, for many of its students, as we have seen, went on to fill the highest decision-making positions within Empire and Republic. Hence, we may conclude that if many victories of modern Turkey were indeed won in classrooms, those classrooms were located not in the *lycée* but in the *Mülkiye*.

Another way of judging the influence of the institution is by its socializing function, that is, to what extent it acted as a channel for the dissemination of new philosophies into Ottoman society. In this regard the *Mülkiye* has been highly praised and its role in the Young Turk revolution often equated with that of the military schools. In view of the nature of Abdul Hamid II's rule, however, such a statement can probably not be substantiated. Through an efficient network of secret police all opposition was eliminated or exiled, and Hamid maintained especially strict surveillance over all educational institutions; no radical or revolutionary ideas could be discussed in any school. The climate of the times can perhaps best be illustrated by noting that when a university was opened in 1900, inspectors of the Ministry of Education attended classes in order to control the teaching of the faculty, and no courses on politics, sociology, philosophy, literature, or even history were included in the curriculum because of the Sultan's fear of the dangerous ideas that might be disseminated in

[28] Lewis (fn. 11), 368.
[29] Kazamias (fn. 12), 90.
[30] Kazamias (fn. 12), 106.

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such courses.[31] Nor did the *Mülkiye* escape such control—indeed, in view of the Sultan's active interest in the institution (he took the two top students into palace service), it is probable that Abdul Hamid II was fully aware of all developments there. Certainly many students resigned or were dismissed during this era, and several of the more liberal professors were replaced by more conservative individuals. In view of such a climate and the fact that the Young Turks, upon assuming power, rapidly moved to transform the institution by changing both the faculty and the curriculum,[32] it is probably an exaggeration to argue that the *Mülkiye* was a hotbed of revolutionary ideas. After all, though some of the students and faculty may have been sympathetic to and even active in the opposition, it was in the military schools that revolutionary activities were undertaken.

Nevertheless, it is probably simplistic to equate "revolutionary" and "modern." Although most of the students entered a bureaucracy that supported and executed the policies of Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks, their preparation may well have socialized them into an acceptance of change and innovation. After all, it is a mistake to regard the decades of Abdul Hamid's reign as a period of conservatism. Professor Lewis has pointed out that "Abdul Hamid was far from being the blind, uncompromising, complete reactionary of the historical legends; on the contrary, he was a willing and active modernizer. . . . It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was in these early years of the reign of Abdul Hamid that the whole movement of the Tanzimat—of legal, administrative, and educational reform—reached its fruition and climax."[33] To plan and implement these reforms was the function of the bureaucracy and the fact that it was able to do so may well have been due at least partly to the fact that many of its members were graduates of the *Mülkiye*. The extent to which this is indeed the case, however, remains a subject for further research. Although many graduates have emphasized the role of the school in helping shape their philosophies, to substantiate this argument fully it would also be necessary to examine the background of the high bureaucrats during the Abdul Hamid and Young Turk periods and to determine how many were graduates of the school and what positions they held. Unfortunately, the available data did not permit such an analysis.

[31] Osman Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi* [History of Education] (İstanbul 1941), III, 1008.
[32] Çankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi Mülkiyeliler* [New History of the Political Science Faculty and Its Graduates] (Ankara 1969), I, 323ff.
[33] Lewis (fn. 11), 174-75.

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Earlier I noted that a sizable percentage of students came from the less developed parts of the country and from the smaller communities, and hypothesized that these students would be less successful in their careers than those from more developed regions or those from urban centers. The data, however, do not substantiate this hypothesis; indeed, among those who enter the administration and who were born within the borders of the Turkish Republic the tendency is for those from the smaller communities to be more successful than those from İstanbul.

	Urban Centers	*Large Towns*	*Rural Areas*
Successful	25%	36%	43%
Unsuccessful	75%	64%	57%
	N=137	N=66	N=43
	(Class 7 is omitted)		

A similar relationship holds when the academic ability of the students is examined, though once again I hypothesized that those coming from the metropolis would do better in school than would those from rural areas. To test this hypothesis, I constructed a simple index of academic success, in the following way. A notation was often included in the biographies of those students who graduated between 1879 and 1931 that they had done "very well" or "well" at the school. My assumption, later verified by the author of the source-book, was that those students for whom no information was included were the poorer ones. When the data are arranged according to size of birthplace and academic performance, a monotonic increase is once again obtained:

	Urban Centers	*Large Towns*	*Rural Areas*
Good Students	41%	49%	60%
Poor Students	59%	51%	40%
	N=99	N=49	N=40

Two possible explanations can be presented to explain the high achievements of those coming from the smaller communities. First, it was probably more difficult for a person coming from the rural areas to gain admission to the school than for the student born and raised in İstanbul, so that the students coming from the provinces would tend to be abler and harder-working than those from the metropolis.

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In other words, a typical aspirant to the *Mülkiye* from these areas probably had to be both an extremely high achiever and highly motivated if he were to acquire the necessary preparation to qualify for an official career. A second possible explanation is that many of them may have come from communities that though small in size were thriving and active centers of trade and government, perhaps located on centuries-old military, postal, or caravan routes. In such an environment, achievement-oriented values may well have been commonplace.

Some evidence to support these hypotheses is provided by an examination of the relationship between academic and career success and the type of *lycée* from which the student graduated. Many scholars have noted the important role of elite secondary schools in shaping attitudes and subsequent behavior, and Turkey, too, possesses several institutions of this type, including *Galatasaray*. However, judging by the representation and performance at the *Mülkiye* of students from such institutions, these schools were of far less importance in the Turkish political system than has been the case, for example, in Great Britain. Only a small proportion of the student body (25 percent) attended these schools (especially *Galatasaray, Daruşafaka* and İstanbul *Erkek Lisesi*), and most of those have done so since 1920. Not only did relatively few students come to the *Mülkiye* from these institutions, but those that did appear to have been less able and successful than the graduates of the other schools, both academically and in their later careers.

It might be inferred from the fact that the same students tended to do well both academically and vocationally that a positive relationship existed between a student's performance in school and the achievement of high-level administrative positions. This does prove to be the case for those who entered the administration, as the following table indicates:

	Good Students	*Poor Students*
Successful	59%	37%
Unsuccessful	41%	63%
	N=82	N=132

(Classes 1, 6, 7, omitted owing to lack of data)

One way of approaching these results is to suggest that the *Mülkiye* performed its function of preparing students for the bureaucracy exceedingly well. A high degree of harmony apparently existed between

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the culture of the school and that of the administration, as students were effectively socialized into an acceptance of the values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior that were necessary for success within the administration. For this reason any assessment of the performance of the Turkish bureaucracy, or at least of those ministries where *Mülkiye* graduates are concentrated, must take into account the culture of the school.

More importantly, we can argue (if we may equate academic success with ability) that the bureaucracy from the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid II onward was marked by rational personnel policies. Though additional studies would obviously be necessary, it does appear that the bureaucracy had been transformed from one in which promotion was based mainly on such ascriptive considerations as patronage to one in which merit was at least *one* of the main determinants of advancement. This qualification must be emphasized at this time since, as I shall show later, the children of important personages were far more successful within the bureaucracy than was the case for the other students even though no distinction exists in the academic performance of the two groups. Thus it would appear that advancement was determined not only by merit but also by nepotism, and that the Turkish bureaucracy contained an admixture of traditional and modern elements. To substantiate this point it is necessary to turn to an examination of the family backgrounds of the students.

III

Of all the background variables, those dealing with social characteristics are perhaps the most commonly discussed by scholars concerned with Turkish history and development. Two basic and somewhat contradictory approaches can be discerned in the scholarly literature. The first emphasizes the circulation of elites and argues (as we have seen) that fundamental change was possible only when the traditional elite was displaced by a new group of middle-class origins. The second approach stresses the continuity of structures and personnel that marked the transition from Empire to Republic and often points to this continuity as representing one of the fundamental reasons for the success of the Ataturk revolution.

This argument is often held to be particularly applicable to the field of administration, and one recent study maintains that if continuity is conceptualized in terms of recruitment of persons with similar social-background characteristics, then the present day bureaucracy

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is indeed marked by a high degree of continuity.[34] The basis for this contention lies in the fact that a high percentage of the contemporary high-level bureaucrats have fathers who were themselves bureaucrats or possessed some other sort of official background. Variations in the definition of "official" can, however, inflate or deflate the number greatly. If defined in the narrowest of terms (bureaucrat plus military officer) the figure is 46 percent; if judges and teachers are included the figure rises to about 60 percent, and if *all* those in the "professional" category are included, about three-quarters of the present top administrators can be defined as possessing an official background.[35] At least one severe limitation further detracts from the utility of such data—no indication is provided as to the level of the official position held by the father, although this is a vital matter in view of the stratification patterns that existed within the Empire, particularly within Ottoman officialdom.

As is well known, the social structure of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by an elite-mass gap. The ruling elite was separate and distinct from the mass in language, appearance, manners, and customs, and hence minimal social mobility existed between these two strata though it was possible for able and talented individuals to achieve elite status. Within the elite stratum, however, restrictions on mobility also existed and though upward mobility was possible, kinship-oriented norms often limited the opportunities that able but poorly connected individuals had to rise to higher status. In effect, a fundamental gap existed within the official class—whether within the religious institution or the civil bureaucracy—between the descendants of the old Ottoman families and those who depended upon merit and ability alone for advancement. And, as the high-level bureaucrats consolidated their position within the higher reaches of the state apparatus, mobility became less feasible for the lower-level bureaucrats.[36]

The nineteenth century, however, was a period of rapid change characterized by demands for new skills and abilities, especially knowledge of a foreign language. A concomitant of the increasing differentiation and specification of roles was the emergence of new opportunities within the social structure, and the establishment of such institutions as the *Mülkiye* provided a means of acquiring the new skills and techniques necessary for advancement. To gain insights into the process of elite circulation, a process that, as we have

[34] Roos and Roos (fn. 14), 270. [35] *Ibid.*, 273-74.

[36] Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton 1962), particularly chap. IV.

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already noted, is usually considered one of the fundamental enabling factors for the radical changes that characterize the Young Turk and the Ataturk eras, it is therefore necessary to identify the type of official background from which the new bureaucratic elite was descended. In other words, did the upper elements of the elite enroll their children within the *Mülkiye* and thus protect their position within the system or did the lower elements seize the opportunity for mobility, thus opening the way for the emergence of new leadership with different social background characteristics? To answer such questions, detailed information on family background is obviously necessary, but unfortunately such data were limited to information on the occupations of some fathers and on the titles of a somewhat larger number.

Although it is difficult to define titles with precision they do provide some indication of a person's background and status. Three official titles were used in the Ottoman empire—pasha, bey, efendi—but unfortunately none of them refers to a specific category or level and each is used in a variety of ways, which have changed over the centuries. The title of bey was given to the sons of important statesmen, to those in the service of royal princes, to all army officers between the ranks of major and general, and in time to many people without any official connection whatsoever. Efendi was used mainly for persons in the religious institutions and in the nineteenth century began to be applied to other groups, especially civil servants below the rank of vizier and military officers below the rank of major; ultimately it came to be used for any literate person. The term pasha was used during the nineteenth century to refer to high military officers, but beginning in the second half of the century was also applied to high-level civil administrators. Of the three titles, then, pasha is the most precise, denoting an important personage in the military or in the administration. The other two are more difficult to use; about all that can be said about the holder of the title of efendi or bey is that he probably possessed an official connection of some sort. Unfortunately, the limited information on fathers' occupations made it impossible to define accurately any relationships among type of occupation, position-level, and title. Nevertheless, the distribution of fathers' titles was run over time to determine whether these data correspond in any way with the more precise but more limited data on fathers' occupations. The results are shown in the following table.

This table indicates a close correlation between the percentage of fathers with a title and those with a known official background for all periods except the Ataturk era. This difference may be explained

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	1859-1907	*1908-1920*	*1921-1939*	*Total (1859-1939)*
Father's occupation				
Bureaucrat	57%	66%	26%	53%
Military Officer	9%	14%	24%	14%
Religious official	6%	7%	—	5%
Percentage with Official Background	72%	87%	50%	72%
Professional	10%	11%	24%	13%
Business, landowner etc.	28%	2%	26%	15%
Nonofficial Background	28%	13%	50%	28%
	N=81	N=56	N=25	N=162
Percentage of all students whose father has title of bey, efendi, pasha	69%	84%	78%	72%
	N=110	N=70	N=87	N=267

by either of two facts: first, the small number of persons with fathers for whom we have occupational information may not be representative of the entire student body for the Ataturk period; second, the data may be an accurate representation of the total, and the difference due to the growing tendency in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire for titles to be acquired by nonofficial persons. Since it is unclear as to which explanation is in fact operative, conclusions concerning the Ataturk era must be considered as highly tentative.

In any case, it is evident that a large percentage of the students (about 70 percent) have indeed always been drawn from the official classes though the degree of representation of this stratum has changed over time. The proportion of those with bureaucratic, military, or religious fathers rose (in round numbers) from 70 percent to 85 percent during the Young Turk period and dropped to somewhere between 50 percent and 80 percent for the Republican period. The high point in the proportion of students from official families was reached during the Young Turk era—a finding that reflects the origins and nature of that regime. Conversely, the representation of those groups that had been favored by Abdul Hamid decreased sharply, the number of students with fathers who were businessmen, farmers, landowners, tradesmen, and so forth dropping from 28 percent to 2 percent of the total. The decrease in the number of students with military or bureaucratic fathers during the Ataturk era is quite striking, especially since there is a sharp divergence between the pat-

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terns for the two groups; the former rose by 10 percent, the latter declined by 40 percent. Though this shift and the growth in the number of students with nonofficial backgrounds can be explained by Ataturk's desire to recruit new men into the bureaucracy as a result of his experiences during the struggle to establish the Republic and his strong support from the military, and by shifting patterns of occupational prestige and opportunities, such conclusions can, as I have noted, be considered only as preliminary hypotheses. Information for a later period (1946-1961) indicates that the proportion of students with bureaucratic or military fathers was about 50 percent at that time.[37] If the data for the Ataturk era are valid, the establishment of a multiparty system did not significantly broaden recruitment patterns into the school.

In an attempt to answer the questions posed earlier concerning the level of the officials who sent their sons to this institution, I combined fathers' titles and fathers' occupations, to produce a select group of fathers who had either the title of pasha *or* occupied a bureaucratic or military position of vizier or pasha rank. I did this because some of the fathers who were known to occupy very high-level positions did not possess the title of pasha and, conversely, no specific occupational information was available for some of the fathers with this title. I categorized the resulting group of 24 persons as upper-class fathers, and it can be assumed that they were members of the elite.

Although the determination of who should be included in this group presented no great difficulty, it was no simple matter to interpret these data to determine the extent to which such parents were represented at the school. Should calculations be made, for example, for the entire student body or would it be more correct, since we are concerned only with officials, to do so for those students who were known to come from a bureaucratic or military family? And if the latter were desirable, what would be the most accurate way of defining the bureaucratic-military group for various periods in view of the data limitations? Because of these difficulties, I decided to compute the representation of elite fathers in the following ways: 1) as a percentage of those fathers with a known military or administrative occupation; 2) as a percentage of those fathers with an administrative or military occupation *plus* all other fathers who possessed an official title regardless of their known occupation; 3) as a percentage of the entire student body. The results are shown in the following table:

[37] Roos and Roos (fn. 14), 286.

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	1860-1907	*1908-1919*	*1920-1939*
Elite fathers as percentage of fathers with known official occupations	28% N=47	20% N=45	13% N=15
Elite fathers as percentage of all fathers with known official occupations plus all fathers with official title	13% N=98	11% N=78	2% N=85
Elite fathers as percentage of all fathers	9% N=146	11% N=83	2% N=109

It can readily be seen that different methods yielded different results —the narrower the definition of "official" the larger the representation of elite administrators within the school. The slight increase in the proportion of elite fathers during the Young Turk period by the last method is probably due to the drop in the representation of non-official fathers as compared to the preceding era. Despite these variations, however, the basic pattern is always the same—a decline in the representation of elite fathers between Empire and Republic.

At least two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, a significant number of elite fathers did send their sons to the *Mülkiye*, especially in the days of the Empire. Though it is impossible to specify the number precisely, there appears little doubt that an elite tradition was perpetuated through this institution. That even the smallest figure attained by these calculations (10 percent of the student body) is a significant one is indicated by an examination of the number of persons within the bureaucracy who were of vizier rank: In 1890 such persons accounted for only 3 percent of the total (115 out of 3,589 bureaucrats).[38] Though this figure does not include military officers it does provide some evidence that the representation of elite families in the *Mülkiye* was a substantial one. Second, the trend over time is clear; fewer elite fathers sent their children to this institution during the days of the Republic than during the Empire. The degree to which they did so and the career choices that were made remains a subject for further research, but it does appear that the changes in occupational prestige within Turkish society that have taken place in recent decades have had a marked influence upon the occupational choices of these families. One of the most obvious has been the loss of administrative prestige, a change to which such families would probably be most sensitive. That elite families were indeed aware of con-

[38] *Devlet Salnamesi* [State Almanac] (İstanbul 1890).

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siderations of power and prestige is reflected by the fact that a detailed analysis of the last decades of the nineteenth century revealed that scions of such families attended the school only after 1879—in other words, when the *Mülkiye* had been reorganized and its graduates began to occupy important administrative positions.

The relationship between the influx of students with elite fathers and the achievement of high-level positions by the graduates of the institution is not an accidental one; the sons of elite fathers are prominent among those who climb within the administration. Earlier I noted that ability was only one of the factors making for career success; that kinship is another is evidenced by the positive relationship that emerges when the data are arranged by father's elite status and son's success:

	Elite Fathers	*Other Fathers*
Career Successful	62%	36%
Career Unsuccessful	38%	64%
	N=21	N=267
(Classes 1 and 7 are omitted)		

Nor are such achievements (if we use the index of academic performance) the result of superior merit; children of elite parents are not better students than the others:

	Elite Fathers	*Other Fathers*
Good Students	42%	45%
Poor Students	58%	55%
	N=19	N=196
(Classes 1, 6, 7 are omitted)		

Hence it can be concluded that several factors determined occupational mobility within the Turkish administration from the 1880's onward. Ability was a consideration but kinship was of even more importance, so that the bureaucracy can be characterized as moving away from ascriptive criteria toward those of achievement. One implication that emerges from these data is that since the attractiveness of bureaucratic careers has decreased with a concomitant lack of interest in such careers by persons of elite status, it may well be that criteria of achievement have increasingly come to characterize promotion policies within the administration.

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IV

Whether this suggestion, as well as the others contained in this brief analysis of the composition and character of the *Mülkiye* students from the days of the Ottoman Empire to the post-World War II era, is valid awaits further studies, particularly on the development and functioning of the bureaucracy itself. Our data, however, do support the argument that a new administrative elite did in fact emerge from the *Mülkiye*. Especially during the Young Turk era, a marked shift took place in recruitment patterns—occupationally toward persons from official backgrounds, geographically away from İstanbul—so that the great majority of the students were sons of officials located in provincial and district centers. Furthermore these students were very successful, one in every two going on to occupy an important high-level administrative position. Thus it does appear that a new elite was in fact created in the *Mülkiye* from the ranks of middle- and lower-level administrative and military families. A second group, students of *ayan-eşraf* background, was also well represented at the school, though in varying proportions under different regimes. That many of these students succeeded in achieving high-level positions is an interesting finding in view of the frequent argument that contemporary Turkish political life is characterized by conflict between a parochial political and a national bureaucratic elite.

It does not appear, however, that the existing elite was totally replaced by these new groups. Limited evidence suggests that many elite families were able to maintain their positions; their sons attended the school and many of them went on to achieve important administrative careers. If this is indeed the case, it may be possible to draw an analogy with the British experience and to suggest that this mixture of tradition and modernity may have proved highly functional to development by permitting mobility for certain social groups within the system while at the same time permitting the elite to preserve much of its power and influence. In this sense, continuity may indeed be one of the underlying themes of Turkish history during the past decades.

All these findings and implications, however, must remain tentative, in view of the limitations of our data and the lack of related studies. Further research is clearly necessary before an accurate portrayal of the pattern of elite composition, formation, and circulation can be undertaken, research that must be based upon a study of men's lives. Hence, a basic prerequisite is the establishment of an archive of biographical data containing the kinds of information necessary for ag-

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gregate elite studies. The development of such an archive and the systematic analysis of its contents by social scientists and historians would represent a most important contribution to the furthering of our understanding of the dynamics of change in the Middle East and elsewhere.

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A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO MILITARY RULE IN NEW STATES

Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case

By ROBERT M. PRICE

A STRIKING characteristic of the literature on military rule in developing countries is the gap between theoretical expectations and political, social, and economic reality. On the one hand, practitioners of comparative social and political theory have tended to view the military, at least in the non-Latin American area, as an organization capable of playing an important modernizing role. On the other hand, empirical researchers, often the very same individuals who at a different time wear the hat of the "theoretical practitioner," have found the performance of the military as political agents of modernization to have been rather dismal. This theory-research gap is strikingly illustrated by the volume of essays on the military edited by J. J. Johnson.[1] In that volume we find a theoretical article by Lucian Pye that argues that in the new states the military organization represents the most effective public institution available for leading the modernizing effort.[2] In the same volume we find empirical case studies of military rule by Pye and Guy Pauker,[3] a scholar who had earlier written theoretical articles in which he viewed the military as a "harbinger of progress."[4] These empirical case studies are striking for the lack of empirical support they offer the theories of military potentiality developed earlier by the same authors.

This paper will attempt to show that at least a portion of the theory-research gap is the consequence of an excessive reliance on what can be termed a formal organizational model. This model, which can be found at least implicitly in the works of the most prominent writers in the field,[5] attributes certain capacities and qualities to military regimes

[1] J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962).

[2] Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization," in Johnson (fn. 1), 69-90.

[3] Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics," in Johnson (fn. 1), 231-52; Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in Johnson (fn. 1), 185-230.

[4] Cf. Guy Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVII (September 1958), and "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics* XI (April 1959).

[5] See S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago 1964); Pye (fn. 2), 69-90.

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in developing countries that, it is asserted, inhere in the very nature of modern military organization, and, by extension, in the modern military profession. Distilled to its essentials, the military in developing countries is viewed as an ideologically and structurally cohesive organization capable of high levels of internal discipline and serving as a repository of technological and managerial skill, whose members share a professional belief-system combining the elements of secular rationality, puritanical asceticism, patriotic nationalism, dedication to public service, and an orientation toward the goal of modernization. These conclusions are reached by inferring what the consequences would be of transferring the organizational forms of the military in Western countries to transitional societies.

Recently, Professor Samuel P. Huntington has offered an extensive critique of this reliance on formal organizational properties in the analysis of the military's role in the modernization process. In his *Political Order in Changing Societies* he argues that the social and political condition of a society will determine the role played by the military, not the armies' organizational characteristics.[6] Thus, military intervention will in some societies be conservative toward modernization, and in other societies its impact will be "progressive." The factor that determines which of the two patterns military rule will take is, according to Huntington, the state of political participation in a polity at a given time. "As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. . . . The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society."[7]

Although the analytic framework presented by Huntington is a decided improvement over the literature that asserts an undifferentiated modernizing role for military intervention, it would seem that his complete dismissal of organizational factors as playing a role independent of the state of political participation is something of an overstatement. Aside from the fact that the military elite's orientation toward political participation is made the *sole* determinant of its role in the modernization process, the credibility of this model is strained by the assumption that military men at all times and in all places will

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1969), 192-263.
[7] *Ibid.*, 221-22.

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have the same orientation toward political participation; positive toward the middle class and negative toward the masses. What is needed is an analytic approach that can differentiate the military from other organizations and social groups within a society, as does the formal organizational model, and, at the same time, differentiate among military organizations in different societies, something both Huntington and the formal organizational model fail to do. Such an approach would avoid the pitfall of assigning a modernizing role to military rule in all cases, but would not demand the banning of organizational factors from the explanatory picture altogether. In this paper we shall introduce one such analytic approach, reference-group theory, and illustrate it with an empirical case, that of military rule in the West African state of Ghana.

New States and Organizational Emulation

It is undoubtedly true, as is stressed in the formal organizational model, that military organizations in the developing areas, especially those in newly independent ex-colonial territories, have been formed along the lines of their Western counterparts. In the ex-colonial countries, the organizational structures are usually identical to those existing in the army of the metropole, often down to details of uniform, insignia, and rank. Training, especially that of senior officers, is usually undertaken by the army of the ex-colonial power.[8] But, however great the emulation of the Western military format, the consequences for the behavior of organization and officer corps cannot be inferred from the formal organizational model that has been emulated. For when the organizational forms of European armies are copied and transplanted to a "transitional" social and cultural environment they may undergo transformations in the process: transformations that may seriously alter the behavior of the organization and its members. By the failure to take account of these transformations, the explanatory power of the formal organizational model is severely weakened.

In order to demonstrate and explain this weakness we shall concentrate on a number of propositions derived from the formal organizational model that relate to the ideology of military officers. A central proposition derived from this model is that the outlook and ideology of all military officers in the contemporary world will have certain similar components; that there are ideological "themes" that inhere in the military as a profession. According to Janowitz, "These

[8] See William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in New States* (London 1964), *passim*.

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common themes are grounded in the social composition of the officer corps, their education, and their professional experience—more in education than in social composition, and more in professional experience than education."[9] Among these common themes two are considered central and pervasive—nationalism and puritanism. Janowitz, for example, writes that "At the core of these themes is a strong sense of nationalism and national identity, with pervasive overtones of xenophobia. In varying degrees this outlook adheres to the military as a profession. . . . A second and widespread element is a strong 'puritanical' outlook. . . . This again seems to be a rather universal characteristic of the military profession."[10] In a similar vein, S. E. Finer, in his classic *The Man on Horseback*, writes: "By the very nature of its appointed task, i.e., national defense, the military is and indeed has to be indoctrinated with nationalism. This forms its distinctive ideology. Its whole *esprit de corps* without which it would have no fighting spirit is founded on the supposed national values and virtues. All military training lays heavy emphasis on the national identity, and whips up patriotism and nationalism in its recruits."[11]

Although formal organizational analysis leads to such conclusions, an investigation of the process whereby ex-colonial armies seek to emulate the Western military format may call into question what otherwise would appear to be these almost self-evident conclusions. In the course of our discussion we will suggest that there occurs what might be called an "emulation paradox"—the very fact of emulation produces military officer corps in new states that tend in fact to be *non-nationalistic* and *non-puritanical*. To come to grips with this "emulation paradox" a scrutiny of the training process whereby the top officers in new states are professionally socialized is demanded.

In newly independent states the most promising officer material usually is sent for professional training to the elite military academy of the former mother country, the two most significant such academies being Britain's Sandhurst and France's St. Cyr. There the cadet from the new state takes the regular course alongside his counterpart from the host nation. In Senegal, for example, noncommissioned officers compete for placement in military schools in France, and earn regular commissions at St. Cyr, Saumur, or other service academies. In mid-1963 all of the eighty Senegalese officers had received training at military schools in metropolitan France, ten of them having graduated from St. Cyr.[12] A similar pattern can be found in practically all

[9] Janowitz (fn. 5), 63. [10] *Ibid.*, 63-64. [11] Finer (fn. 5), 33.
[12] American University, *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Senegal* (Washington 1963), 463.

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the former French and British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Officer training policy in the states of South and Southeast Asia are of the same general form. Ceylon and Malaya, for example, continued to rely heavily upon British training long after their independence. Between independence and 1962, Ceylon had about 100 officers graduate from Sandhurst, and the corresponding figure for Malaya was 178.[13] India, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, tended to rely after independence upon locally established military academies for the production of senior officers. However, pre-independence practices continued to have influence in the post-colonial era. Thus William Gutteridge reports that the 1958 edition of the *Indian Armed Forces Year Book* shows that all but one of the senior officers whose biographies appear (general to major general) had attended either RMC Sandhurst or RMA Woolwich.[14] In addition to attendance at degree-conferring military academies, it is customary for the best officers in an ex-colonial army to be periodically selected to attend courses at various training institutes in the ex-metropole. In a new state of British origin, for example, the successful officer will have his career punctuated with stays at such places as British Army Staff College, Imperial Defense College, and Mons Officer Cadet School.[15] It is useful to conceptualize officer training in general and the consequences of the particular form of training just described in terms of reference-group theory.[16]

Reference Groups and Officer Training

An individual's reference groups are those social groups to which he psychologically relates himself, with which he identifies. To become a member of a group in the psychological sense implies the internalization of its central norms and values—for to be a member

[13] Gutteridge (fn. 8), 119. [14] *Ibid.*, 97.

[15] The military establishments of the Middle Eastern states reflect more reliance on indigenous training institutions than do those of Africa and Asia. This may be a reflection of pre-colonial Ottoman military traditions existing in the area, and of the less lengthy and less intense colonial experience undergone by these states. See Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in Johnson (fn. 1), 292-93 and *passim*.

[16] Cf. T. M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York 1950); T. M. Newcomb, "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups: The Bennington Study," in E. E. Maccoby and others, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York 1947), 265-75; M. Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology* (New York 1948); M. Sherif and C. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (New York 1953); M. Sherif and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements* (New York 1947); M. Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York 1936); M. Sherif and C. Sherif, *Reference Groups* (New York 1964); Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe 1957), chaps. 8 and 9; H. H. Kelley, "The Functions of Reference Groups," in G. E. Swanson and others, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York 1952), 410-15; Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (Palo Alto 1950).

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implies certain modes of thought and behavior. Although in most cases an individual's reference groups are also his membership groups, i.e., groups in which he actually socially interacts, this need not always be the case. A person may identify with a group within which he does not socially interact, and conversely he may be a member of a group—in the social sense—with which he does not psychologically identify and that is thus not a reference group for him. The behavioral manifestations of nonmembership reference groups are widely illustrated in the literature of the social sciences. Survey research analysis, for example, has shown that working-class persons whose political attitudes resemble the middle-class "norm" tend to be individuals who regard themselves as middle-class, while middle-class persons who resemble the working-class "norm" in their beliefs tend to be working-class identifiers.[17]

The military training officers undergo can be viewed as a socialization process within which the recruit's identifications with his previous civilian reference groups are broken down and replaced by new ego-involved associations that are centered in the military organization. The period of total isolation from civilian life and intense interaction within the military organization that characterizes the early period of training at such institutions as West Point should be seen in terms of its functional role in forcing the individual to change his reference group identifications.[18]

In the case of military officers from newly independent states, one likely consequence of this training process is the development of positive reference-group identifications with the officer corps of the ex-colonial power, for, as we noted earlier, the top officers in such states receive their training at European military schools. In the military

[17] See Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton 1949), 126. See also Heinz Eulau, "Identification with Class and Political Perspective," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (May 1956), 232-53; V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York 1961), 138-44.

[18] This phenomenon, by which new recruits go through a period of isolation from outside social groups, is characteristic of organizations whose belief systems are distinct from that of the social system in which they operate, and who thus must change the reference-group identifications of their new members. Thus we find church organizations utilizing monasteries. Likewise, revolutionary political parties that have been successfully institutionalized are likely to have gone through a period of isolation during which new reference-group identities are formed by novice cadres. Thus in the history of the Chinese Communist Party the "Yenan Period" and the Long March that preceded it provided the conditions under which members were geographically and socially isolated from their past membership and reference groups, allowing for highly effective cadre-formation, i.e., socialization to new reference groups. For a discussion of the importance of isolation in building political parties of the Leninist type, see Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe 1953), 25-28.

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academies of Britain and France, the recruit from the new state goes through the regular course; he is trained as though he were a member of the military of the host country. At Sandhurst, at St. Cyr, at Mons, Camberley, Saumur, and the like, the ideology, values, and traditions that are carefully impressed upon the student are those of the European military.[19] And the impact of the military academy in such matters can be expected to be great, for the socialization process in these institutions is structured in ways that experimental social psychology has shown to be extremely effective in shaping attitudes and behavior.[20] The individual trainee is isolated from his past reference and membership groups, that is, from the sources of social and psychological support for his previous beliefs. He is enmeshed in a network of new membership groups, characterized by high levels of cohesiveness and a reinforcing ideological homogeneity. The new group processes, in turn, operate in an environment in which conformity to group norms is highly rewarded, and deviation is met with severe negative sanctions.[21] The influence of these processes is increased in the case of recruits from the new states because of the fact that their presence abroad at an institution like Sandhurst or St. Cyr is viewed as a mark of great personal triumph. Not only are they abroad, which in itself brings great prestige in their home countries,

[19] Training given to "third-world" military officers in the U.S. differs in at least one significant aspect from its European counterpart. In the U.S., training is of a special nature, in which groups of officers from the same nation are given a course designed to be relevant for their home environment.

[20] Cf. Stanley Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVI (April 1951), 190-207; Kurt Back, "Influence Through Social Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVI (January 1951), 9-23; Elizabeth Eddy, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation Among Southern Students on a Northern Campus," *Journal of Social Psychology*, LXII (April 1964), 285-301; Siegel and Siegel, "Reference Groups, Membership Groups, and Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LV (November 1957), 360-64; Bernard C. Rosen, "Conflicting Group Membership: A Study of Parent-Peer Group Cross Pressures," *American Sociological Review*, XX (April 1955), 155-61; Kurt Lewin and Paul Grabbe, "Conduct, Knowledge, and Acceptance of New Values," *Journal of Social Issues*, I (August 1945), 53-64; J. M. Jackson and Herbert D. Saltzstein, "The Effect of Person-Group Relationships on Conformity Processes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LVII (July 1958), 17-24; Leon Festinger and John Thibaut, "Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVI (January 1951), 92-99.

[21] The experimental literature on the power of groups to elicit conforming behavior from their members is voluminous. A few of the classic experiments in this area are: S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in H. Proshansky and B. Seidenberg, eds., *Basic Studies in Social Psychology* (New York 1965), 393-401; R. S. Crutchfield, "Personal and Situational Factors in Conformity to Group Pressure," *Acta Psychologica*, XV (1959), 386-88; Morton Deutsch and Harold B. Gerard, "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LI (November 1955), 629-36.

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but the successful completion of their course practically guarantees them elite status in their home societies. Since we know from the experimental literature in social psychology that conformity to group norms and acceptance of group standards is powerfully related to the value an individual places on group membership,[22] we would expect recruits from the new nations to be especially motivated to adopt the values and identify with the traditions that are part of the military academy to which they have so fortunately been admitted. These of course are values and traditions appropriate to the military of the host European country, not necessarily those of the recruit's own nation.

The powerful nature of the experience at an institution such as Sandhurst for a recruit from the "third world" and the positive manner in which this experience is viewed is illustrated well by a passage from a book written by a Sandhurst-trained member of the Ghana army:

> I was thrilled by Sandhurst, the beauty of its countryside, and the calm Wish Stream which separated Sandhurst from the rest of the world. Sandhurst so far was the best part of my life—learning to be a soldier in a wonderful and mysterious institution with traditions going back to 1802. . . . It was a good, solid military school where one pulled one's self up as a man. I met many boys of my age for whom there was nothing sweeter than bearing arms in the service of their country, boys to whom Her Majesty's Army was a symbol of their very existence. . . .
>
> Now I look back on Sandhurst with nostalgia. It is one of the greatest institutions in the world. Through its doors have passed famous generals, kings and rulers. . . .
>
> I left Sandhurst, crossed the Wish Stream, looked back at my old school, and was filled with boundless gratitude.[23]

For those individuals who became officers prior to the period in which training in the metropole was the normal channel of recruitment to top officer status, and who instead worked their way up through the ranks of the colonial army, the socialization process is somewhat different but the end result is the same. These men were being promoted into what was an exclusively European officer corps, and their eligibility for promotion was determined solely by Euro-

[22] Cf. Leon Festinger, "Informal Social Communication," *Psychological Review*, LVII (September 1950), 271-82; Festinger and others (fn. 14); R. S. Crutchfield (fn. 21), 386-88; R. M. Emerson, "Deviation and Rejection: An Experimental Replication," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (December 1954), 688-92; Jackson and Saltzstein (fn. 17); Harold H. Kelley and Edmond H. Volkart, "The Resistance to Change of Group-Anchored Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (August 1952), 453-65.

[23] A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup* (London 1966), 51.

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pean officers. Consequently, promotions were given to those who manifested the attitudes and behavior considered appropriate from the standpoint of the European military profession. In short, the NCO or Warrant Officer who rose through the ranks to General had to undergo what Robert Merton has termed "anticipatory socialization":[24] identification with and concomitant adoption of the values of a group to which the recruit aspires but does not belong. It should also be noted that though this group of officers did not attend the extensive course at the European military academies, most of them have spent some time at infantry schools or staff colleges in Europe.

To summarize our theoretical position, we are arguing that the training process undergone by the officer corps of many of the new states is such as to produce reference-group identifications with the officer corps of the ex-colonial power and concomitant commitments to its set of traditions, symbols, and values. Such identifications and commitments are seen to affect the behavior of these officers, both in their relations with civilian political authorities and in their capacity as governmental leaders should they accede to political power, in ways that are neither explicable nor predictable in terms of the formal organizational model.

In the remainder of this paper we shall offer some empirical validation for these theoretical observations through an analysis of one case of military rule, that of the National Liberation Council (NLC) of Ghana. Ghana is a former British colony that obtained its independence in 1957. As with most other ex-colonial countries Ghana moved to "Africanize" or "localize" its army's officer corps, replacing the British officers who were in command positions at the time of independence with Ghanaian nationals. By the time of the coup d'état in 1966 the officer corps was entirely Ghanaian. However, Ghana had followed the usual pattern of ex-colonial states in relying upon the former metropole for the training of the elite of her officer corps. The most promising cadets at the Ghanaian Military Academy are after six months transferred to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England, where they take the regular course. In addition, the best Ghanaian officers are periodically sent to England to attend British Army Staff College, Imperial Defense College, and Mons Officer Cadet School.[25]

[24] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe 1963), 265.

[25] American University, *Special Warfare Area Handbook for Ghana* (Washington 1962), 518.

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Military rule came to Ghana after an army-police coup against the regime of Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966, and was exercised through a "junta" called the National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC remained in power for three and a half years, after which they voluntarily returned governmental authority to civilians.

Nationalism and Military Rule

As we noted earlier, a major proposition derived from the formal organizational model is that intense nationalism and patriotism are universal components of the ideology of military officers. The empirical evaluation of this proposition is made difficult by the problem involved in assessing the degree to which a political actor or set of actors can be viewed as nationalist in orientation. Generally, it can be said that a nationalistic orientation is one that stresses national self-assertion and self-reliance. However, in any concrete instance such an assessment is often difficult to make. For example, an "open-door policy" toward foreign-owned and -operated businesses may, in the short run, appear to be a non- or anti-nationalist policy, but it might be argued that in a situation of scarce capital and managerial skill such a policy will, in the long run, accrue to the economic benefit of the nation, and thus must be seen as the only rational nationalistic policy given the situational constraints. A way out of this problem is offered by Hans Kohn, in his *The Idea of Nationalism*, when he argues that nationalism involves dramatically differing sentiments regarding those defined as inside and outside the nation. Although within the nation the sentiment of nationalism "leads to a lively sympathy with all fellow members," for those outside the nation it "finds its expression in indifference . . . or distrust."[26] Thus the nationalism of the political actor can be determined, regardless of his short-run policies, by his orientation and mode of expression toward outside groups. Is the short-run open-door policy conceived of as a "forced" choice, and is the orientation toward foreign business characterized by scepticism and/or distrust? Or, on the other hand, is the open-door policy engaged in with little trepidation, and is the orientation toward foreign business characterized by admiration, trust, and other forms of positive affect? If we approach the question in this way, nationalism can be conceptualized as a continuum between extreme positive and extreme negative affect toward outgroups,

[26] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York 1944), 20.

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with the dividing line between non-nationalists and nationalists being the point at which positive affect toward outgroups shades off into indifference. On such a continuum, intense or xenophobic nationalists would fall on the extreme negative-affect end of the scale. Thus in the discussion that follows, we shall make our assessment of the nationalist orientation of Ghana's military officers by reference to both their policy preferences and the affective mode within which they express these preferences.

Because of the underdeveloped condition of the sociology of the military in new states, it is impossible to analyze the attitudes and identifications of military officers on the basis of data obtained by direct testing techniques. However, the rash of military interventions in the politics of new states has had a rewarding side effect for the scholar interested in such problems—military officers have begun to write their memoirs, and these memoirs can provide valuable data on their identifications and beliefs. The analysis presented in the balance of this paper will rely heavily on two such recently published memoirs, those of Brigadier Afrifa and Major-General Ocran of the Ghana army, both of whom were leading participants in the coup that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. Their books, *The Ghana Coup*[27] and *A Myth is Broken*[28] are attempts to explain the reasons behind the authors' participation in the military intervention. Brigadier Afrifa is thirty-three years old, a member of the large Ashanti tribe of central Ghana, and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Prior to his entry into Sandhurst in 1958 he attended one of Ghana's leading secondary schools, after which he enlisted in the army, receiving officer training in Ghana and at Mons Officer Cadet School at Aldershot, England. In the military regime that followed the Ghana coup, Brigadier Afrifa was at first a member and later the Chairman of the ruling National Liberation Council. Following the return to civilian rule in the fall of 1969, he was Chairman of the transitional Presidential Commission.

Major-General Ocran is forty years old, and a member of the coastal Fanti tribe. He enlisted in the army in 1947 after completing his pre-secondary education. By 1954 he had risen through the ranks to be commissioned as a lieutenant. He has received officer training in the United Kingdom at Eaton Hall and Camberley. General Ocran participated in the coup of February, 1966, in his capacity as a com-

[27] Afrifa (fn. 23).

[28] A. K. Ocran, *A Myth is Broken; An Account of the Ghana Coup d'État* (London 1968).

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mander of the strategically located southern brigade of the Ghana army, and was then made a member of the ruling army-police National Liberation Council. In May, 1967, he was, in addition, appointed Commander of the Ghana army, and then in November of 1968, made acting Chief of Defense Staff, head of the entire Ghanaian military establishment. In the period immediately following the return to civilian rule he was one of the members of Ghana's Presidential Commission. In social background, neither Brigadier Afrifa nor Major-General Ocran comes from a socially prominent family.

One aspect of the memoirs of both Generals Afrifa and Ocran is striking—the strength of their personal identification with Britain is such that it competes with their own nation as a reference group. This anomalous situation, in which a military officer holds a reference-group identification that competes with that of his own nation, is succinctly expressed by Ocran in a single sentence. In a discussion of the history of the Ghanaian military he writes: "Its members fought and died as loyal soldiers who answered the call to defend the *Commonwealth, their country*, and *Africa's freedom*."[29] Note, of course, that Ghana and Africa are placed after the Commonwealth in order of commitments. This allegiance to the British Commonwealth is something that recurs many times in the writings of both African officers. Take, for example, this passage from Afrifa's book: "One of the reasons for my bitterness against Kwame Nkrumah's rule was that he paid only lip-service to our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and proceeded to undermine the bonds that bind us in this great union of people . . . ; so far as this Commonwealth is concerned, Ghana should not be different from Canada, Australia or New Zealand. For we have to learn to solve our problems like a family. Nkrumah made a mockery of this organization, and under the mask of African Unity and non-alignment proceeded to discredit the Commonwealth and to put difficulties in its way."[30]

Along with an intense political allegiance to the Commonwealth, romantic descriptions of British traditions are found in the works of both Ghanaian officers. Afrifa, for example, at one point states: "This army has inherited wonderful traditions from the British, traditions of integrity, fair play and above all honour."[31] And, "I am a great admirer of the British way of life, its legal system, the Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights. These are institutions on which the civil liberties of the people are founded. The British

[29] Ocran (fn. 28), xviii, italics added.
[30] Afrifa (fn. 23), 108.
[31] *Ibid.*, 93.

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Constitution safeguards not only the rule of law but also the freedom of the press, of thought, of action within the law, and of the individual. It is these things that make Britain the home of democracy."[32] Afrifa's acceptance of the British military as his normative and comparative reference group is nicely illustrated when in describing his reluctance to participate in a political coup he makes reference to the tradition of British generals and alludes to his personal identification with that tradition: "I have always felt it painful to associate myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional government, however perverted that constitution may be. Oliver Cromwell was a good general, but he did not take his rightful place in the glorious gallery of British generals because he overthrew a constitutional authority by force of arms. It was painful, therefore, to come to the conclusion that the coup was necessary."[33]

The strength of both Afrifa's and Ocran's identification with Britain can be seen in their perception and interpretation of an important period in their own country's history—the era of terminal colonialism. If the two officers identify with a European reference group we would expect them to have a "European" view of colonialism and the anti-colonial movement. This is precisely what is found in their memoirs. Ocran deals with the colonial past only briefly, but revealingly: "Despite the *good intentions* of those who handed over power and *grandiose* aims of those who received it, the aftermath of yesterday, all over Africa, clashes with today, while the uncertainties of tomorrow add to the confusion."[34] Afrifa, dealing specifically with the anti-colonial movement as it developed in Ghana, writes:

> *Kwame Nkrumah played hard on the illiteracy of his fellow men and women*, marshalling the majority of the 80 per cent illiterate citizens around himself, and working them up against the rightful authors of Ghana's Independence. . . . And while these big brains—J. B. Danquah, Akufo Addo, Obetsebi-Lamptey, William Ofori-Atta and many others—advocated self-government step by step in the shortest possible time, Kwame Nkrumah insisted that it should be self-government "now or never." *His majority of illiterate followers, to whom he promised bread and honey if they supported him . . . disregarded brain and wisdom in favour of brawn.*
>
> The British had no alternative—not that they believed it would work—but to grant to the country its independence as the wish of the majority of the people. The more the British tried to hand over power step by step, the more Kwame Nkrumah and his followers shouted for

[32] *Ibid.*, 108.
[33] *Ibid.*, 37.
[34] Ocran (fn. 28), 4, italics added.

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self-government "now." The British, duty conscious, tried to do that which was right against all odds, but the people had become so inflamed that they became violent.[35]

As can be clearly seen from the above quotations, the events that constitute what must be the most important national tradition of contemporary Ghana are perceived in rather anomalous terms by the two Ghanaian officers. They evaluate the role played by the British in a positive and complimentary manner—theirs were "good intentions," they were "duty conscious," tried to do "that which was right against all odds," and bowed to "the wish of the majority of the people." In contrast the Ghanaian nationalist movement is depicted in extremely derogatory terms—its aims were "grandiose," its leader was a demagogue, and its rank and file were ignorant illiterates, whipped up to violence against both the British and those intelligent Ghanaians who wished to cooperate with them in working "step by step" toward independence.[36] Such a perception of the terminal colonial era is unexpected only to the extent that we are working within the framework of the formal organizational model, a major proposition of which is that an inherent characteristic of the ideology of military officers is intense nationalism and xenophobic patriotism. If, however, our analytic model is reference-group theory and we take account of training procedures for officers in the armies of the new states, then the discovery of this type of attitude is what we would predict.

Foreign Reference Groups and Civil-Military Relations

When the officer corps of a nation's military organization, its symbol of independence and sovereignty, identifies itself strongly with a political unit other than the one it officially serves, serious consequences for the stability of the state are likely to ensue. In the formerly colonial state, the officer corps not only is likely to share the disdain for politicians that is a component of the military ideology of the

[35] Afrifa (fn. 23), 54, italics added.

[36] Objection may be raised here that Ocran and Afrifa are merely expressing their identification with one strand of Ghanaian nationalism—that represented by the "intelligentsia" who opposed Nkrumah and the CPP. It is true that such identification is expressed in these passages, but it would seem that what we find in these passages is more than comparison between two Ghanaian political traditions. Rather, the thrust of the argument is a comparison between the proper behavior of the colonial power and the illegitimate activity of the dominant anti-colonial forces in Ghana. To the extent that the political opposition to Nkrumah perceived and expressed its opposition in a pro-British mode, then the extent and intensity of its nationalism can also be called into question.

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army of the "mother" country, but also is likely to share its contempt for leaders of the anti-colonial movement, men who subsequently become the leaders of the governments under which these officers serve. Beyond this, there is an inherent source of tension in civil-military relations if the leaders of the new state are oriented toward nationalistic policies, since these policies are likely to conflict with the officers' psychological commitments to foreign reference groups. In the Ghanaian case this phenomenon played a crucial part in the breach between Nkrumah and his officer corps. In at least three instances Nkrumah undertook major policies that ran counter to the "extra-Ghanaian" political loyalties of his officers—in the Rhodesia and Congo situations and in the matter of acceptance of military aid from Communist countries. In the case of Rhodesia, Nkrumah advocated the use of force by Britain against the white-dominated government after its unilateral declaration of independence, and broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom after the British failure to do so. In addition, he spoke about using the Ghanaian army in aid of the Rhodesian Africans. Two passages from Afrifa's book indicate his strong negative reaction to these policies and again reveal his strong identification with and commitment to Britain.

> *I personally knew that Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom was quite capable of dealing with the Rhodesian situation.* I felt that Nkrumah was making too much noise about the whole issue, especially by raising the people's militia and hurling slogans at everybody, as if Rhodesia was his concern alone. . . . I do not know why we would have been fighting. . . . From concern for my troops, I felt it would be criminal and purposeless to lead such an army of excellent soldiers, ill-equipped, to fight in an *unnecessary* war. There were supposed to be four million Africans in Southern Rhodesia. . . . All they could do was to throw a few petrol bombs when they could have done so much more in fighting for their country. *And who was I to fight in Rhodesia when I believed that there could be a nonmilitary solution to the Rhodesian problem?*[37]

> Our severing of diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom over the Rhodesian issue was a rash and foolish step. . . . *It was in Kwame Nkrumah's scheme of self-glorification to break relations with Britain in the dramatic manner in which he did, and in the same breath threaten the very existence of the Commonwealth.* . . . Organization of African Unity or no Organization of African Unity, I will claim my citizenship of Ghana and of the Commonwealth in any part of the world. *I have been trained in the United Kingdom as a soldier, and I am ever prepared to fight alongside my*

[37] Afrifa (fn. 23), 104, italics added.

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> *friends in the United Kingdom in the same way as Canadians and Australians will do.* How could we be friends belonging to the Commonwealth and stay out in time of Commonwealth adversity . . . ?[38]

In the Congo situation, Nkrumah was a strong opponent of Katanga separatism and the Belgian military presence, and a strong supporter of Patrice Lumumba. These policies placed Nkrumah in conflict with the European powers and the United Nations, a somewhat anomalous situation since Ghana had sent a contingent of army personnel to the Congo as part of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force. Faced with these conflicting obligations, the Ghana officers, at least as their views are reflected in the writing of Afrifa, felt a primary commitment to their role as part of the U.N. Force, and resented Nkrumah's foreign policy efforts in the Congo because they conflicted with U.N. policy.

> To us, and to many students of the Congo scene, the actions of the ambassadors sent by Kwame Nkrumah to the Congo verged on stupidity. To Nkrumah and his aides, the United Nations troops had failed the Congo because they could not eject Belgian troops. Of course, Patrice Lumumba was made to think likewise. . . . The constant interference by Kwame Nkrumah and his aides in the internal problems of the Congo was bound to create difficulties for the Ghana contingent. The Congolese, rightly, perhaps, saw us as being in the Congo primarily to serve the interests of Ghana's Head of State. . . . Nkrumah simply wanted to assert himself.[39]

> I felt most disgusted with the whole operation, and ashamed. . . . The fault was that of our politicians at home who had placed us under the command of the United Nations, *and at the same time taken active and sinister sides in the whole Congo affair.* The Congolese assumed, and quite rightly, that the Ghana troops were in their country to keep Patrice Lumumba in power. Kwame Nkrumah had placed us in a terrible dilemma through an unbridled political adventure.[40]

It is no surprise that the Ghana officers, placed in a situation of role conflict, should feel uncomfortable, but what is significant is that Afrifa should give precedence to his U.N. role and resent the pressures placed on him in his role as a defender of Ghanaian national interest—particularly since the Ghanaian politicians were certainly not alone in maneuvering for their own national interests in the Congo.[41] Here we see a military officer in a new state behaving in a manner opposite to what would be predicted by the formal organizational

[38] *Ibid.*, 112, italics added.
[39] *Ibid.*, 71.
[40] *Ibid.*, 66, italics added.
[41] Cf. Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961* (New York 1965); Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York 1963).

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model, on the basis of which military men, who are characterized by an ideology of intense nationalism and super-patriotism, should be resentful of civilian politicians who place commitment to some foreign political unit such as an international agency above their commitment to the "defense of national interests."

In the cases of both Rhodesia and the Congo, Ghanaian foreign policy that was in conflict with the policy of the army officers' external reference group produced hostility on their part toward the civilian authorities. Civil-military friction was also produced by Nkrumah's version of a nonaligned foreign policy, which meant greatly increased involvement with the Communist nations, including the arrangement of military assistance. Major-General Ocran deals at length with this subject:

> In spite of his avowed policy of non-alignment, Nkrumah showed over the years a preference for the Communist East and its doctrines. The Ghana Armed Forces were traditionally supplied and trained from Western sources, mainly Britain. As far as the Army was concerned, 1961 saw the beginning, against all expert advice, of a turn to the East for military equipment and training.[42]

> The Ghana Armed Forces, of course, found no use for the ex-U.S.S.R. cadets on their return home and recommended the immediate discharge of the majority of them on the grounds that they were not suitable officer material. . . . There was the fear of the results of the indoctrination of the cadets (and I believe every student in the U.S.S.R. received his fair dose of "the Doctrine"). As one of the students later told me, they were taught, among other things, the non-existence of God.[43]

> The saying that "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet" came to acquire a new and more vivid meaning for me when Nkrumah took his leftward turn and tried to drag the country and the Army with him.[44]

Afrifa raises objections similar to those stated by Ocran.[45] Undoubtedly a certain amount of disagreement with Nkrumah concerning arms and training agreements with the Soviet Union is based on matters relating to operational efficiency, but, as the above quotations clearly show, there is also a large element of anti-Communist, pro-Western ideology involved. Here again, identification with a foreign reference group is reflected in values and attitudes that bring military officers into conflict with civilian authorities.

Thus far, our analysis suggests that, at least in the Ghanaian case, the proposition that military officers in new states will exhibit intense

[42] Ocran (fn. 28), 9. [43] *Ibid.*, 13-14. [44] *Ibid.*, 15.
[45] Cf. Afrifa (fn. 23), 109.

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nationalism is of rather dubious validity. The Ghanaian generals reveal strong identifications with, and evince a high level of positive affect toward, the national traditions and values of the army in which they were trained, that of Great Britain. This positive affect appears to carry over into their orientation toward concrete policy matters. Rather than the stress on self-assertion and the orientation of distrust toward "foreigners" that could be expected of the intense nationalist, these officers express themselves in modes that suggest a great deal of trust and respect for outside groups. Indeed, if a long-run orientation toward self-reliance and an attitude of indifference toward outsiders are taken as minimal characteristics of the moderate nationalist, then it is questionable whether the Ghanaian officers can be considered nationalists at all.[46]

In addition to nationalism, the proponents of the formal organizational model view puritanism as a major theme of military ideology.[47] This orientation, it is often argued in turn, will produce policies of austerity when armies intervene in the political process. Thus Samuel Huntington writes, "Like the Protestant entrepreneurs of western Europe, the soldier reformers in non-Western societies embody and promote a puritanism which . . . is a distinctive innovation in their societies."[48] These propositions, as in the case of the alleged nationalism of military officers in new states, fail to take into consideration the reference-group identifications of military officers. The question of what is puritanical and ascetic is meaningful only in relation to a given standard. What is seen as puritanical living in one society may be defined as luxurious in another. This is the paradox surrounding military officers in new states. Although they hold a general ideological predisposition toward an austere style of living, the standards supplied by their European reference groups often lead them in practice to oppose austerity, especially when it affects the military. In short, they apply standards appropriate in the social and economic setting of an industrialized country to the situation in their

[46] Because of the colonial background of the African countries, nationalism in its external aspect is usually associated with orientations toward the ex-colonial power and its great-power allies. Indeed, this is so much the case that nationalistic orientations toward the European powers have usually coincided with non-nationalist, i.e., pan-African, orientations toward other African peoples. Nevertheless, it is possible for Africans to have nationalistic orientations toward other Africans, or toward non-European immigrant entrepreneurial groups in their midst—Lebanese in West Africa and Asians in East Africa. Our discussion is concerned with the first type of nationalism—orientations toward European powers. It is possible that military officers with European reference groups would exhibit nationalism in the other two types of cases, because in such situations their European reference-group identifications would have low salience.

[47] Cf. Janowitz (fn. 5), 64.

[48] Huntington (fn. 6), 203.

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own societies. If the political elite in their own country attempts to bring military organization more into line with conditions existing in a pre-industrial society they are likely to be opposed by the officer corps.

The memoirs of Generals Ocran and Afrifa provide excellent illustrations of this thesis. Major-General Ocran, in a chapter about the reasons for military intervention against Nkrumah, writes the following:

> Members of the Armed Forces in many countries are taken good care of and given certain amenities and concessions to compensate them for the hard and dangerous life under which they volunteer to live in the interest of their country. In countries like Britain members of the services travel at reduced fares on public transport; are given privileged *shopping facilities through the* NAADI, *have special housing schemes,* retirement homes, furnished bungalows and other amenities.
>
> Nkrumah, after squandering millions of Ghana's hard-earned pounds [on himself and his "hangers-on"] ordered the immediate withdrawal or curtailment of the small amenities and benefits enjoyed by civil and public servants, including members of the Forces. Free passages abroad for children were cancelled, even though his Ministers managed to send their families; . . . travelling allowances were reduced to such a low level that Government servants could not afford to use their cars for duty journeys; rent was increased. . . .
>
> These cancellations . . . were to apply to all civil and public servants, including the Armed Forces. . . . The result was that like civil servants, we had to suffer a loss in pay and of certain amenities while the cost of living rose astronomically.
>
> One day they [Army officers] were to pay for electricity; the next day they were to lose their training allowances; the following day, they were to lose their travelling facilities. . . . We all wondered what was happening to us. . . . *When the British were here our interests were better protected.*[49]

Although it is clear from the above excerpt that General Ocran's resentment at having to sacrifice certain privileges was increased because he felt Nkrumah and his political associates were making no such sacrifice, it is also clear that he believes army officers can legitimately expect such privileges. And it is clear too that this legitimacy is established by reference to the British officer corps.

As in the question of special privileges, in the assessment of the proper type and level of stores and equipment for the armed forces, Generals Ocran and Afrifa utilize their British reference group. Here again, the utilization of a nonindigenous reference group produces

[49] Ocran (fn. 28), 41-43, italics added.

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conflict with civilian authorities. Common to both Ghanaian generals' defenses of the coup against Nkrumah is the charge that he neglected to provide a "fitting" level of stores for his armed forces. From Brigadier Afrifa we learn that "because of bad planning, economic mismanagement, and political interference, this army was rendered incapable, ill equipped, and had virtually been reduced to a rabble. By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were *without equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride, morale, and efficiency of the soldier.* There was an acute accommodation problem due to a rash military expansion scheme that Kwame Nkrumah had launched. It was shameful to see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, and sometimes without boots during his training period."[50] And General Ocran tells a similar story:

> I have described elsewhere how troops went about in tattered uniforms, often without boots on their feet. Those of them who were concerned about their turnout and who could afford the money bought their own khaki drill and made their own shorts and also bought other items of clothing such as canvas shoes (locally made, which lasted only two months on the average), pants or underwear.
>
> The Commanders were really hard put to it. They had known and had been accustomed to a high standard of turnout and cleanliness. What then, could they do to soldiers who turned out on parade in torn uniforms, . . . soldiers with no polish or shine on their boots or with their toes showing through their canvas shoes?
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Even the officers went about in very unpresentable uniforms. Since the approved type of officers' uniform material could not be obtained, officers started acquiring and wearing all sorts and shades of khaki drill from Japan, America, Canada and even from the U.S.S.R.
>
> The supply Commission only bought from the cheapest sources with the result that we had dumped on us boots that lasted only three months and vests that could only be used for general cleaning purposes in the house and which no one would wear.[51]

In these passages we can see the extreme importance placed on meeting standards of appearance and propriety established by British military practice. "The pride, morale, and efficiency of the soldier" is viewed as dependent upon the supply of specified types of high-quality imported boots and clothing. It is interesting that though Ocran finds it a great affront to be offered canvas shoes, cheap boots, and "vests that could only be used for general cleaning purposes," a large proportion of the Ghanaian population possesses none of these items. It is

[50] Afrifa (fn. 23), 104.

[51] Ocran (fn. 28), 45-47.

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also interesting to note Ocran's derogatory mention of locally made canvas shoes (they "lasted only two months on the average"), a remark common in Ghana where goods termed "made-in-there" are invariably preferred to those termed "made-in-here." This remark once again reveals the absence of any intense nationalism on the part of the head of the Ghana army.

Foreign Reference Groups and Military Rule

If the "extra-national" reference-group identifications of army officers in new states can have significant consequences for the stability of post-independence civilian regimes, they have equally significant consequences when these officers seize political power. It is our contention that many of the policies and much of the quality and character of military rule in countries like Ghana are produced by, and therefore should be understood in terms of, the extra-national reference-group identifications of the officers in power. The three and a half years of military rule Ghana has just undergone provide many instances that can be used to illustrate this argument.

Earlier we argued that, contrary to what would be predicted on the basis of the formal organizational model, reference-group theory would lead us to predict that officers in an ex-colonial army would behave in a non-nationalistic fashion, and indeed would often give high priority to their identification with reference groups connected to another political community. During their three and a half years of rule the economic policy pursued by Ghana's military officers adhered in a number of significant ways to this pattern. Indeed, the absence of economic nationalism displayed by the policies of the ruling National Liberation Council became a major source of tension between the military and Ghana's civilian intelligentsia.[52] The general policy of the NLC in regard to the economic quagmire it had inherited from the Nkrumah regime was to rely extensively on the managerial and financial capacities of European and North American governments and businesses. Symbolic of the extent of this reliance is the fact that even the job of cleaning the streets of the capital city was turned over to a foreign firm. The *Ghanaian Times*, under the banner headline "UK Firm to Clean Accra," noted that "a British company, Shelvoke and Drewry of Letchworth, South East England, has undertaken to clean up the present refuse problem facing Accra" and

[52] The development of this tension can be traced in the pages of the *Legon Observer*, published and largely written by members of the faculty of the University of Ghana.

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that "reliable sources said in Accra that the firm was confident to clear all the garbage in a matter of weeks."[53]

The particular aspect of the general reliance on foreign economic and managerial assistance that was most resented within Ghana was the NLC's handling of the State Enterprises situation. The leaders of the coup had inherited from the Nkrumah regime fifty-four state-owned enterprises, most of which were running at a loss. There were three ways in which the NLC attempted to deal with this inheritance: by engaging private business organizations to purchase the state enterprise; by entering into joint state-private ownership agreements; or by leasing the enterprise to a private business concern for a period of years. Naturally, in the case of the more substantial state enterprises, the business firms in question were foreign since only they had the requisite capital. It should also be noted that this policy meant first, the "de-nationalization" of only the more profitable or potentially profitable enterprises, since these were the ones to which private entrepreneurs could be attracted; and second, the granting of important concessions to private firms so as to make up for the lack of financial attractiveness in the enterprises themselves. One of the agreements signed under this policy, that with Abbott Laboratories of the United States to participate in the State Pharmaceutical Corporation, led to widespread criticism that the NLC had failed to protect and foster Ghana's national interests, and was part of the general pattern of events that led to disenchantment with military rule on the part of sectors of the population that had at first enthusiastically welcomed the military intervention against Nkrumah. Under the "Abbott Agreement" the State Pharmaceutical Corporation was abolished and a new corporation, jointly owned by the Ghana government and the American company, was formed in its place. The share capital of the new company was to be N₵ 1,000,000 (equivalent to one million dollars), with Abbott (Illinois) holding 45 percent of the shares through a contribution of $450,000 and the Ghana government holding 55 percent of the shares through the contribution of the existing pharmaceutical facility. This portion of the agreement was the subject of strong criticism, since Ghanaian authorities had put the value of the pharmaceutical facility at not less than $3,000,000.[54] Thus, Ghana could be said to be contributing almost seven times the amount that Abbott was contributing and was receiving only 10 percent more of the shares. Additional cause for complaint was the fact that the agree-

[53] *Ghanaian Times* (January 9, 1969), 1.

[54] Cf. A. Radix, "Foreign Participation in State Enterprises: The Case of Abbott Laboratories (Ghana) Ltd.," *Legon Observer*, 11 (November 1967), 4.

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ment gave Abbott-Ghana a ninety-nine-year lease on the property upon which the pharmaceutical plant was located at an annual rent of N₵ 1 (one dollar). Further, the agreement stated that "there shall be no increase in the annual rental *at any time*" and that the lease is "subject to renewal at the option of Abbott for an additional ninety-nine years."[55] Despite the fact that the Ghana government owned 55 percent of the corporation, the Abbott-Ghana agreement stated that the American partner was "assured of complete control of the management,"[56] and specified that it would have the power to appoint the company's Managing Director, the Chairman, and a majority of the Board of Directors, and have complete responsibility and control in the areas of accounting, personnel, and marketing. In the latter area the agreement granted the American company a virtual monopoly to market in Ghana products it manufactured in the United States.[57]

With the foregoing as background, it is not difficult to understand why Ghana's generally pro-government and moderate journal, the *Legon Observer*, should state that "it would appear incontestable that the agreement turns the State Pharmaceutical Corporation into a subsidiary of Abbott." "This is considered unnecessary, humiliating and dangerous."[58] The announcement of the agreement was met by a torrent of economic nationalism from the mass media. Typical is this passage from an editorial in the *Legon Observer*: "In post-coup Ghana we are not only relying heavily on foreign investments, but seem to be doing so on the most flesh-creeping economic terms. . . . The terms of the [Abbott] contract are so inimical to the long term interests of Ghana that, on reading it, one begins to wonder whether the legal and economic advisers of the N.L.C. have the economic interests of the country at heart."[59] The military rulers met this nationalistic criticism by dismissing the editors of two government-owned newspapers, intimidating the editor of the independent *Legon Observer*, and declaring that they would sign the agreement "ten times over."[60] Abbott, for its part, sensing the existence of a hostile environment, backed out of the agreement.

The significance of the Abbott Agreement for our purposes here is that it illustrates the weakness of the formal organizational model

[55] Cf. *Legon Observer*, 11 (December 1967), 26; note that Abbott, *not* Abbott-Ghana, is the party with the lease option.

[56] *Ibid.* [57] *Ibid.*, 57. [58] *Ibid.*, 28.

[59] "National Self-Reliance or Dependence?," *Legon Observer*, 11 (November 1967), 1.

[60] The "ten times over" statement was made by R. S. Amegashie, the then civilian Commissioner for Industries and the head of the National Liberation Council's contract negotiating committee. Cf. *Legon Observer*, 11 (December 1967), 28.

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as an explanatory instrument and correlatively suggests the utility of the reference-group approach in explaining the behavior of military regimes in developing countries. Rather than finding the military regime behaving in a highly nationalistic way, as would be expected according to the formal organizational model approach, we find it under attack from civilians for having "sold out" the national interest. This is precisely the type of situation that would be predicted by the reference-group approach we have been developing here.

The absence of a nationalistic orientation in the economic sphere can also be observed in the NLC's handling of Ghana's foreign debt. At the time of the coup, Ghana had one of the worst foreign-debt servicing structures of any country in the world, with payment of over 51 percent of its external debt coming due within five years.[61] The reason for this situation was the reliance of the Nkrumah regime on what are termed supplier credits to finance economic development. As his alternative sources of investment capital dried up, Nkrumah turned increasingly to the supplier-credit method of obtaining capital. Under this system, private companies lend capital directly to the recipient government in order to finance a project that the company itself will carry out. Often the loan is guaranteed by the government of the donor company. Such an arrangement lends itself naturally to "hard-sell" efforts by private businesses or capital-exporting countries attempting to increase their own profits or export earnings regardless of the economic implications for the borrower.[62] Under the supplier-credit arrangement, it is to the advantage of businesses to "sell" unneeded and even nonviable projects to the government of a developing country, since the businesses will benefit not only from receiving the contract to execute the project but also from the interest on the risk-free loan it has given to finance it. Thus Ghana found itself saddled with a huge debt, a good proportion of which was made up of supplier-credit high-interest/short-term loans for numerous economic ventures of dubious viability.[63]

When Ghana's National Liberation Council assumed power it was faced with essentially two choices in regard to the country's foreign indebtedness. It could default on a good number of the debts, especially those involving supplier credits, or it could ask the lending businesses and their national governments to negotiate a rescheduling

[61] Douglas A. Scott, "External Debt-Management Policy in a Developing Country," in T. J. Farrer, ed., *Financing African Development* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 58-59.
[62] Cf. *ibid.*, 55. [63] *Ibid.*

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of the debt, to allow Ghana time to improve its foreign-reserve position before having to assume the major burden of the debt. The case for defaulting was a strong one and was favored by many Ghanaian civilians as well as by some foreign economists advising the NLC at the time. It was argued that many of the supplier-credit loans had been arranged under corrupt and deceitful conditions involving the bribing of Ghana government officials by foreign businesses and the submission of misleading feasibility studies.[64] In addition, the political situation at the time of the coup appeared to preclude significant adverse reaction on the part of the Western governments who had guaranteed these loans, because they, and particularly the Americans, were hardly likely to turn on the avowedly pro-Western officers who had just overthrown Kwame Nkrumah. The new military rulers, however, did not opt for this nationalistic alternative but instead decided to attempt to reschedule the debts. The reasoning behind this decision is not clear, although some informed sources in Ghana say that the major reason was the notion that "a gentleman pays his debts." The long-term consequence of the decision may be devastating to Ghana's economic development. Table 1 sets out the figures on Ghana's supplier-credit debt before and after rescheduling. It reveals that successor governments will be saddled with a large debt that will, for at least the next twelve years, be a crippling drain on needed investment capital. The implications of this debt for economic development can be appreciated when it is realized that the mean annual supplier-credit debt repayment between 1970 and 1981, 32.9 million new cedis, is equal to more than one-third of the total allocated for development expenditure in the 1968-1969 Budget.[65]

TABLE I

COMPARATIVE EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE: AT TIME OF COUP AND IN MAY, 1969
SUPPLIER CREDITS (IN NC MILLIONS)

	1966	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*
Feb. 1966	62.1	82.9	81.5	66.6	56.0	42.4	23.7	16.6	10.9	5.7
May 1969		12.7	40.6	17.0	20.1	23.8	31.2	36.0	39.0	42.3
			1976	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*		
			3.7	2.9	1.7	0.6	0.6			
			45.5	44.1	43.1	29.8	21.4	19.4		

Source: Ghana, *Developments in the Ghanaian Economy Between 1960 and 1968* (Accra, 1969), 19.

[64] Cf. Kwame Arhin, "Why Should We Let Sleeping Dogs Lie?," *Legon Observer*, IV (November 1969), 11-12.

[65] Ghana, *The Financial Statement, 1968-1969* (Accra 1968), 3.

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Thus, in the case of two extremely important economic policies, the dispensation of state corporations and the handling of the external debt, the military government of Ghana behaved toward foreign businesses and governments in a manner uncharacteristic of intense nationalists. The openness and trust displayed toward foreign interests by the military regime appears anomalous within the framework of the formal organizational model, but is perfectly congruent with an approach informed by reference-group theory. The lack of a nationalist orientation on the part of the NLC is strikingly illuminated, not so much by contrasting it with its Nkrumaist predecessor, but by contrasting its orientation with that of the conservative Ghanaian "intelligentsia" who made up the main political opposition to Nkrumah. It was this latter group, which at first enthusiastically supported the NLC, that came in time to criticize it on nationalist grounds.[66]

Earlier we argued that puritanism, like nationalism, is an ideological theme incorrectly attributed to the military in the new states by the proponents of the formal organizational model. We noted that military officers in these states used their colleagues in the industrial West as a comparative reference group and consequently adopted standards that were anomalous in the economic and social environment of their own countries. Thus, although puritanism as an abstract theme may run through the military ideology of all national armies, the particular standards held by military officers in the new states, when placed in the context of their own countries, may often add up to the reverse. The formal organizational model leads to the hypothesis that military governments, infused by the ideology of puritanism, will introduce austerity into the public and private sectors of their societies.[67] We, on the other hand, working with the reference-group approach, would hypothesize that the military's commitment to the standards of a reference group external to their own society will greatly hamper, if not completely nullify, any inclinations they may have toward austerity in government and society. The Ghana case provides us with an excellent illustration of this proposition. Although the leaders of the coup in Ghana vehemently attacked Nkru-

[66] Although dissatisfaction with the NLC's economic policies focused primarily on relations with European and American businesses and governments, the military rulers were also under pressure to act so as to reduce the extensive role played by Lebanese entrepreneurs in Ghanaian commerce. The military government responded with promises of restrictive policies but never actually implemented these. It was not until a civilian government succeeded the NLC that policies that placed restrictions on the type of businesses that non-Ghanaians could own and operate were actually implemented.

[67] Cf. Janowitz (fn. 5), 64; Huntington (fn. 6), 203.

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mah for what they felt was his extravagant use of public funds, the military's record on the matter of public expenditure, as revealed by their budgetary policies, shows that their commitment to austerity was selective. Government spending in many sectors, particularly in the productive sphere, was drastically reduced, but in other sectors, and particularly in the unproductive defense sector, it was greatly increased. We have constructed Tables II and III from budget figures published by the Ghana government, to demonstrate this point. Table II shows that in comparison with the last Nkrumah budget (1966) the three NLC budgets represent deep cuts in allocations for such economically important sectors as industries, agriculture, trade, and communications. At the same time the defense sector, with no economic utility and in fact little strategic importance for a country in Ghana's international position, received substantial increases in funds, getting an average annual increase of 22 percent over Nkrumah's 1966 allocations, and reaching an extraordinary 41.4 percent increase over 1966 levels in the 1968-1969 budget. Table III reveals that the military's favored treatment of nonproductive sectors is manifest in relative as well as absolute terms. Here we see that though the share of the total budget allocated to the sectors of agriculture, industries, communications and trade was in each case reduced by more than half, the share of the budget allocated to defense was actually increased, albeit only slightly.

TABLE II

COMPARISON OF NLC BUDGETS WITH LAST NKRUMAH BUDGET (1966)

	Percent Change in Allocation from 1966 Level			
Sector	*1966-67*	*1967-68*	*1968-69*	*Average*
Defense	+ 4.0	+20.0	+41.4	+22.0
Agriculture	−16.5	−36.7	−28.3	−27.2
Industries	−56.2	−77.4	−78.2	−70.6
Transport and Communications	− 9.8	−54.1	−47.5	−37.1
Trade	− 3.6	−65.2	−62.3	−43.7
Foreign Relations	−25.0	+27.7	+22.4	+ 8.4

Sources: Ghana, *The Budget, 1966-67* (Accra), Part II, Table V; Ghana, *The Financial Statement, 1967-68* (Accra), Tables I and V; Ghana, *The Financial Statement, 1968-69* (Accra), Table V.

The military's commitment to a standard of equipment and stores found in a European army not only has serious consequences for the purely financial aspects of its austerity program, but additionally can

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have severe negative political side effects in regard to support levels for the military regime and its policies. The spectacle of the military, its officers and men attired in new and striking uniforms and driving fleets of brand new trucks, jeeps, personnel carriers, and half tracks, is hardly likely to convince the general population of the need for austerity and inspire it to acts of self-sacrifice. Indeed, whatever the alleged asceticism of military life, the image presented to the public

TABLE III
ALLOCATIONS IN SELECTED SECTORS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL BUDGET

	Allocation as Percent of Total Budget			
Sector	*1966* (Nkrumah)	*1966-67* (NLC)	*1967-68* (NLC)	*1968-69* (NLC)
Defense	10.7	10.9	10.6	11.5
Agriculture	10.2	8.3	5.4	5.5
Industries	6.7	3.3	1.4	1.3
Transport and Communications	7.3	6.4	2.8	2.6
Trade	1.2	1.1	.3	.3
Foreign Relations	2.3	1.9	2.8	2.5

Sources: Same as Table I.

by the Ghana military was not always congruent with the NLC's claims of national poverty and public austerity. Take for example this newspaper account of a public military ceremony in Northern Ghana: "Air Marshal Otu and General Ocran came in Black Mercedes 330s, driven by equally gorgeously uniformed soldiers. At precisely 9 o'clock General Ankrah arrived in a sleekly streamlined Rolls Royce adorned with Ghana's Coat-of-Arms."[68]

FOREIGN REFERENCE GROUPS AND "THE RETURN TO THE BARRACKS"

There is one last aspect of military rule in Ghana that should be part of this discussion: the relinquishing of power to civilians by the National Liberation Council in the fall of 1969. To many people it appears surprising that a military group would, in the absence of a serious threat to its position, voluntarily turn over the reins of power to a civilian regime that had been chosen independent of military desires. For it is rightly assumed that the perquisites of political office, involving access to the very zenith of status and wealth, are not easily, or often voluntarily, relinquished by those who seized power by force

[68] *Daily Graphic* (June 10, 1968), 5.

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in the first place. However, from the vantage point of reference-group theory, the behavior of the National Liberation Council is perfectly understandable and predictable. For it is a fundamental and centrally held tenet of British military ideology that the military and political spheres should be separate. Or, as Major-General Ocran has put it, "Politics amongst the military will wreck the army: the army in politics will wreck the State."[69] A reading of the memoirs of the two leading army members of the National Liberation Council, Generals Ocran and Afrifa, clearly reveals their belief in the essential separation of the military from politics as part of a more general reference-group identification with the British officer corps. Afrifa, for example, has written, "I have always felt it painful to associate myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional government, however perverted that constitution may be."[70] Ocran has stated the position even more forcefully: "Above all, our British training has taught us to leave politics alone for those who want to play it; that is, the civilians."[71] Thus the military intervention that occurred in February, 1966, should be seen as involving a violation of reference-group norms on the part of the Ghanaian army officers, a violation of which, their memoirs reveal, Ocran and Afrifa were keenly aware.

The long preparation for civilian rule, then, and the eventual relinquishing of power to a civilian government should be seen as the bringing of behavior and belief into consonance. Reference-group identification with the British officer corps acted as a counterforce to the perquisites of political office, pushing or pulling the Ghanaian military officers to give up the power they had earlier seized.

Summary and Discussion

Through the analysis of a single empirical case we have attempted to demonstrate that the commonly used theoretical model of military rule in new states—what we have termed the formal organizational model—is an inadequate analytic tool. Its use could explain or predict neither the ideology of the military men who ruled Ghana between 1966 and 1969 nor important economic and political policies undertaken by their regime. Another analytic tool was introduced, reference-group theory, in the belief that it could help make understandable what on the basis of the formal organizational model appeared anomalous. In this way we have attempted to narrow the theory-research gap that has existed in the subdiscipline of military rule and modernization.

[69] Ocran (fn. 28), 2. [70] Afrifa (fn. 23), 37. [71] Ocran (fn. 28), xviii.

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Although we have not dealt directly with the question of the military's potential as an agent of modernization, our analysis does suggest a number of hypotheses concerning military rule in newly independent states that are at variance with those derived from the formal organizational model. The reference-group approach we have utilized here suggests that in such states the political leadership potential of military officers may be decisively undermined by the fact that the military elite is unlikely to relate to the political symbols that have meaning in their own society. To the extent that the process of modernization involves the mobilization of popular sentiment around collective values and goals as a means of increasing the input of human and material resources to the development effort, and/or as a means of building solidarity in a fragile political community, the military elite may well be unsuited to the task. It can be hypothesized that as a consequence of foreign reference-group commitments the military tends to be cut off from the expressive symbols that will have resonance in their own societies. They will tend to rely instead on the martial rituals and symbols of a foreign cultural milieu, and this deficiency in the area of indigenous symbol manipulation will seriously reduce their political leadership capacity.

Another commonly held view that is called into question by the reference-group approach is that military rulers will introduce rationality and pragmatism into economic policy-making. But, as we have seen, the training of officers in technical decision-making takes place within a certain "value" framework that contains a strong expressive component. When situational cues tap the officers' reference-group commitments, the expressive rather than technical component may predominate. Thus it is a reasonable hypothesis that military officers trained in the West will behave in just as irrational and nonpragmatic ways toward "Eastern Bloc" economic interests as many "left-leaning" nationalist political leaders are alleged to behave toward Western economic interests.

Finally, beyond the question of whether the military has the modernizing capability attributed to it by the formal organizational model, that model suggests nothing about the particular type of modernization strategy the military is likely to pursue. In contrast, the reference-group approach should permit some specification of the type of strategy military elites are likely to employ. The analysis in this paper would suggest that in states with a recent colonial past a strategy characterized by heavy reliance on foreign participation of a financial and technical nature, and limited mobilization of indigenous resources,

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both material and human, will be followed. The political concomitant of such a strategy would be a "low-profile" approach to nation-building and political integration. Or, to use Lucian Pye's terminology, there would be only a minimal effort on the part of governmental institutions to "penetrate" the society.[72] Political integration at both community and regime levels would be expected to occur through a political "trickle-down" effect. This is a political laissez-faire strategy in which the hoped-for economic benefits of foreign capital and technical assistance will, ideally, produce reorientations in identifications and values so as to create political integration at the national level.

Perhaps the greatest strength of the reference-group approach is that, unlike the formal organizational model, it does not suggest that military organizations will perform similarly in all new states. Nor, parenthetically, does it assume, as does Samuel Huntington's alternative to that model, that military elites will in all states and at all times have the same orientation toward the entry of the masses into the political arena; an orientation that Huntington views as the sole determinant of the military's role in the modernization process. On the contrary, the performance of military officers in political roles is seen to vary according to differences in their reference-group identifications, and these in turn are seen to vary according to differences in the professional socialization process undergone by a nation's officer corps. To the degree that the socialization of officers in new states differs, or to the degree that it changes over time within the same state, differences can be expected in the nature of military rule. We therefore would expect the remoteness of a state's colonial experience to affect the reference-group identifications of its military officers, and thus their attitudes and behavior. In time the ex-colonial state may come to rely on its own training institutions, and/or its army may undergo combat experience from which it develops an indigenous martial tradition. In consequence, nonindigenous reference groups can be expected to be of much less salience for its officer corps than in a state such as Ghana, whose independent existence is relatively new. Likewise, in those new states with a pre-colonial military tradition, such as the Ottoman past of many of the Middle Eastern states, we would expect less reliance on foreign reference groups than was true in the Ghana case. Finally, it should be noted that even in newly independent states without a pre-colonial military tradition, junior officers who do not receive "elite" training in foreign academies, or who were not socialized in

[72] Cf. Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966), 64-65.

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the pre-independence colonial army, can be expected to possess less intense psychological commitments to nonindigenous reference groups than those of their superiors who have received such training.

Our concluding point, then, is *not* that military officers in all underdeveloped countries, or even in all new states, will approximate those of Ghana in their attitudes and behavior. On the contrary, military elites are seen to differ, and consequently so does military rule. What is needed is an analytic and explanatory instrument that can recognize and account for these differences. By avoiding formalistic structural analysis, the reference-group approach provides such an instrument. It can encompass the wide variety of military rule the empirical world presents. It is in this that its superiority to the formal organizational model lies.

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STRATEGIC PARITY AND BEYOND

Soviet Perspectives

By ROMAN KOLKOWICZ

THE strategic relations between the two superpowers have for a long time been influenced by the strategically superior position of the United States. This strategic imbalance has recently been rectified through a massive Soviet program of developing weapons systems that in effect created superpower parity. However, the concepts of strategic superiority and parity in the nuclear context are rather ambiguous. It is the purpose of this study to examine the influence of strategic parity as well as several related factors that have in the past shaped Soviet strategic doctrine and policy, and that are likely to continue to do so in the future.

The study will examine (a) political and strategic styles and preferences of several key Soviet leaders, (b) the dynamics of interaction between Soviet military doctrines and capabilities and those of the United States, and (c) adversary perception, i.e., some generally accepted beliefs about the nature of the United States as adversary held by several Soviet elites. It is postulated here that these contributing factors have had an overwhelming impact on Soviet strategic thinking and on the ordering of their resources, forces, and postures in the past two decades.

I. Political and Strategic Styles of Soviet Leaders

The evolution of Soviet military capabilities and postures, and of strategic doctrines and policies, since the end of World War II can be divided into three periods, which correspond approximately to the regimes of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev-Kosygin. This periodization also reflects some major political, military, and technological changes that roughly parallel the three regimes. Another reason for this historical breakdown derives from certain political practices in the Soviet Union. The political process and arrangements in the Soviet Union are such that major doctrinal or policy innovations depend upon the symbolic or actual destruction of a leader identified with the *status quo ante*. Thus, Stalin found it necessary to denigrate Lenin's and Trotsky's claims to military genius in order to legitimize his own

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strategic doctrines and policies.[1] Khrushchev chose to debunk Stalin's claims to military expertise by ridiculing the dead dictator in 1956.[2] The current regime unleashed a veritable torrent of abuse upon the deposed Khrushchev, seeking to denigrate his political and military ideas and policies. Each succeeding leadership thus used these and other methods to legitimize departures from established military policies.

Stalin: Soviet military policy, from the end of World War II to the death of Stalin, was characterized by a basic reliance on massive conventional forces deployed in an active defense posture with a narrow, continental mission. This military policy derived from Stalin's principles of warfare, which were based largely on his experiences during the war. Although modern military weapons and equipment were being introduced into the Soviet military establishment, Stalin continued to force his strategists to "look back" to the successful Russo-German war and to draw theoretical and practical lessons of warfare from it. Stalin, who had initiated a massive crash program for the development of atomic weapons soon after the war, did not consider the radical implications of such weapons for the nature of future warfare, or for strategy and politics. As one Soviet military analyst recently suggested, "Stalin did not consider the atomic bomb as a radically different weapon" and continued to view his military problems in the light of his past experiences.[3]

Khrushchev: Stalin left to his successors a host of complex problems whose solutions were in suspense as long as he ruled the Soviet Union. Yet, before his followers could seriously begin the necessary process of modernization and reform, they had to settle the struggles for political succession in the Party. Only after Khrushchev managed to oust Malenkov from his high positions in the Party and in government in 1955, and destroyed the myth of Stalin's infallibility in 1956, did Soviet strategists and analysts begin seriously to reform strategic doctrines and policies.

[1] "One may think that Lenin . . . left us a heritage of guiding theses on the military question. . . . Such a statement is incorrect, since in reality no such 'theses' of Lenin exist." J. V. Stalin, "Comrade Stalin's Answer to a Letter from Comrade Razin," *Bolshevik*, III (February 1947).

[2] "The nervousness and hysteria of Stalin demonstrated that interfering with actual military operations, caused our army serious damage." From Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the XX Party Congress, February, 1956.

[3] Colonel I. Korotkow, "O razvitii sovetskoi voennoi teorii v poslevonnye gody" [The Development of Soviet Military Theory in Postwar Years], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, IV (April 1964).

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Stalin's heritage was a troublesome burden on the Soviet state and society, and it was especially heavy in military affairs. His sterile principles of warfare, his resistance to innovation in strategic doctrine and policy, his vanity in assigning to himself total authority on the subject, his fiat on the need to study the past rather than the future—all of these impediments had to be removed before an orderly and productive transformation was to take place in military affairs.

In the decade after Stalin's death, Soviet military policy underwent far-reaching reappraisals and innovations. Military technology and weaponry were modernized, the massive conventional forces were gradually reduced by more than half, and strategic doctrine and policy were sharply modified. Moreover, the Soviet Union's political influence and role around the globe were enhanced and its commitments expanded. After a period of vacillation, Soviet military posture and strategic doctrine were formalized in 1960 along these lines: The newly created Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Defense Forces, and the expanded subsurface navy were given a global mission of deterrence, and the sharply reduced conventional forces were assigned a smaller role in a continental, defensive posture, largely as an auxiliary to the strategic forces.[4]

The new strategic doctrine and posture reflected Khrushchev's views that a future war, no matter how initiated, would rapidly become an all-out nuclear exchange, necessitating, therefore, reliable strategic deterrent capabilities and only marginal conventional forces. An underlying premise of the new strategy was Khrushchev's belief that nuclear war had become politically useless, since there would be no victors and damage so devastating that organized society would cease to exist. He arrived at this position gradually, having maintained in 1954 that in the event of a nuclear war the "imperialists will choke on it and it will end up in a catastrophe for the imperialist world."[5] In 1955 he still subscribed to the view that "we cannot be intimidated by fables that in the event of a new world war civilization will perish."[6] In 1956 he began to hedge, stating that "war is not fatalistically inevitable,"[7] and by 1958 he reversed himself, asserting that "a future war . . . would cause immeasurable harm to all mankind."[8]

Having rejected the idea of political utility of nuclear war, Khru-

[4] For details, see R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and Communist Party* (Princeton 1967), 150-73.

[5] *Pravda*, June 13, 1954.

[6] *Pravda*, March 27, 1955.

[7] TASS, February 14, 1956.

[8] Radio Budapest, April 3, 1958.

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shchev also rejected the idea of limited[9] local and limited nuclear war, since according to his new strategic doctrine these would rapidly become major nuclear wars. For ideological and tactical reasons he retained the formulas about "wars of national liberations" as being "just" and meriting the support of the Soviet government. It is rather unlikely that he actually contemplated direct involvement of Soviet forces on behalf of such "just" wars, given the rather inadequate size and quality of his conventional forces.

Though recognizing the basic political changes caused by the emergence of missile-nuclear weapons, and moderating accordingly the archaic dicta of Soviet ideology, Khrushchev nevertheless continued to pursue a very vigorous, frequently militant, policy; at the same time, he sought to avoid war or a major confrontation with the United States. While Soviet leaders continued to talk of peaceful coexistence with the West, the Soviet defense industry began to produce strategic missiles; the Red Army underwent a massive reorganization program intended to increase its firepower and mobility; and the emphasis of Soviet strategic doctrine was shifted from conventional to strategic-missile nuclear forces.

When the U-2 episode unmasked the superficiality of Soviet-American peaceful coexistence and exposed anew the deep-seated distrust that underlay it, Khrushchev abandoned the role of peace-loving statesman and turned to threatening the world with aggression. At the same time, the Soviets shrewdly exploited the highly publicized Western miscalculations of the number of deployed Soviet ICBMs. They seized upon the so-called "missile gap" as an opportunity to extract political gains, to maintain the initiative in international affairs, and to make negotiations on disarmament less desirable.

However, the "missile gap" was exposed as myth in 1961, and the West began to make more realistic estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities. The United States began to increase its missile production, massively raising Western strategic capabilities, and leaving no doubt as to where the strategic balance of power lay. The Soviet leaders then had to face some hard choices: First, they could deny the revised Western estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and insist on their nuclear superiority; second, they could engage in a large-scale arms race, trying to keep pace with, or even to outdistance, the West in the

[9] The following is a typical Khrushchev view on limited war "with which the imperialists want to suppress the national liberation movements and do away with governments that do not suit them. . . . Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war." TASS, December 5, 1967.

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production of strategic weapons; third, they could attempt stopgap measures in order to minimize the growing preponderance of United States strategic missile forces; or fourth, they could resign themselves to being an inferior military-strategic power and shift from a hard, militant line to a more conciliatory line in East-West relations.

In retrospect, it seems that Khrushchev, consciously perhaps, embarked on a policy of gradually ascending risks and costs. Because of the limitations of the Soviet economy (his ambitious Seven-Year Plan, aimed at the domestic sector of the economy, was running into difficulties), Khrushchev viewed a full-scale armaments race with the West as the least desirable option, and did not attempt it. (Presumably he also understood the futility of such a move; the United States could easily surpass any increment in Soviet strategic capabilities.) For a time, the Soviet leaders experimented with the first and third options. At the Twenty-second Party Congress in the fall of 1961, Marshal Malinovskii still boasted of the powerful might of Soviet missiles; later the Soviets declared that the superior "quality" of Soviet weapons (i.e., their enormous destructive power) counterbalanced the "quantity" of U.S. missiles. This was empty boasting. The next Soviet ploy, aimed at achieving some sort of parity in deterrence, was by far the most risky. This effort culminated in the attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba. When this venture failed, Khrushchev started to pursue the fourth option—a search for détente with the West.

Khrushchev's policies were based on theories of "tolerable" actions, on certain assumptions of Western constraints on Soviet initiatives, and on assumptions regarding the desirability and utility of exploiting strategic power for political purposes. Western political analysts generally agree that the basic aspects of Soviet foreign and strategic policies at that time included: an assumption that the United States would be very reluctant to go to war with the Soviet Union, unless, of course, it were dangerously provoked; a belief that the United States had rejected nuclear war as an instrument of policy; a certain lack of interest in the activities of smaller countries, which was in part the result of the Soviet's central preoccupation with the United States; and a belief that the balance of world power was gradually shifting to the advantage of the Socialist camp.

Having brought the Soviet Union out of the Stalinist isolation and inertia, Khrushchev launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign carried out by means of nuclear blackmail (in the form of exploitation of overstated strategic capabilities for political gains), by keeping Soviet

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policy and diplomacy constantly *engagé* and flexible, and by committing Soviet policy and prestige to situations that were very risky and from which he had to extricate himself under Western pressure or because the West had called his bluff. Khrushchev also accelerated the erosive forces within the Communist bloc, through his vulgarization of Communist ideology, his tolerance of simplistic economism, and his de-Stalinization campaign, on the one hand, and through his dangerous external political-military gambles, on the other. These actions resulted in lessened credibility of Soviet ability and intent to police its own zone of influence.

In sum, Khrushchev's foreign policies were designed to keep the West deterred as a result of asserted Soviet strategic superiority, while retaining and consolidating Soviet gains made since World War II. At home, he sought to generate an ambitious economic resurgence that would satisfy rising consumer demands and overcome the perennial weaknesses of the economy. The results of his policies, however, were disappointing—the West tested the credibility of his nuclear diplomacy and clearly showed the world the hollowness of Soviet militancy. Within the Communist bloc, the former satellites pressed for greater freedom and autonomy, and obtained a large measure of both, and China turned from an ally into an enemy; domestically, his sweeping reforms confused the planners and alienated the bureaucrats and most of the military and Soviet party leaders by undercutting their traditional powers and privileges.[10] Khrushchev tried to accomplish too much with too little, hoping to fill the gap between capabilities and objectives with a deceitful verbal overkill. His policy reflected his overcommitment to domestic, intra-bloc, and international objectives; his *modus operandi* became a hit-and-run process, which tried to achieve some objectives at one time and others at another time. It was a daring venture, which ended in failure.

The New Regime's Policy Style: The new regime, headed by Premier Alexei Kosygin and Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, was faced with a serious situation brought about by Khrushchev's methods and the substance of his policies. First, the credibility of Soviet military capabilities was severely undermined; the disbelief was a dangerous precedent that might embolden a potential opponent to challenge the Soviet Union. Second, Khrushchev's erratic and "harebrained" diplomatic behavior not only disturbed international politics and motivated the United States to remain prepared and militant, but also com-

[10] See Kolkowicz, "Die Position der Sowjetarmee vor und nach dem Sturz Chruschtschows," *Osteuropa*, x (October 1966), 671-84.

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promised Soviet policy and international influence. Third, his overcommitment to varied policy objectives often negated planning policies, which were convulsed by massive and sudden "grand designs." To the new regime, the antidote to this malaise of bombast, irresponsible claims, erratic political behavior, and confusing crash planning seemed to be sobriety, pragmatism, and the establishment of credibility through the attainment of conspicuous capabilities to match objectives and declaratory policy.

The new regime's policy formula struck this note: "We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active, and at the same time we exhibit flexibility and caution."[11] It was to be a policy of "opposing aggressive imperialist circles without allowing itself any sabre-rattling or irresponsible talk . . . [designed to] assess the situation soberly and to find a precise orientation in it under all circumstances, favorable as well as adverse, [and] to weigh, in a sober manner, the possibilities which we have [rather than to] succumb to illusions."[12] It was also to be a policy based on a "business-like approach" to a new pragmatism where "a mere bookish knowledge of Marxism does not supply the confidence possible for working policy."[13]

The new regime's policy was, therefore, one of restraint, prudence, and continuing détente, based on a deterrent relation with the United States and on pragmatic, balanced economic planning at home. It could be described as a "speak-softly-while-you-are-getting-a-big-stick" policy. The regime's appraisal of the nature of U.S. strategic deterrence convinced them of the need to avoid (a) provocations that would lead the superior adversary to war, (b) situations that could escalate into a major war, and (c) either-or situations in which the alternatives would be war or severe concessions.

Although the new regime significantly transformed the method and style of Soviet policy, it did retain at least two of Khrushchev's underlying assumptions regarding the political and strategic environment of the Soviet state: that nuclear war would be a catastrophe for both the East and West and that a policy of détente and nuclear deterrence is essential, since it is the primary mechanism for preventing unprovoked nuclear attacks and for regulating the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations, thereby leading to prudence and stability. This policy of détente and deterrence, however, is not seen as a constraint on political or

[11] L. Brezhnev, *Pravda*, September 30, 1965.

[12] In an editorial in the Party's main theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, XII (August 1965).

[13] *Ibid.*

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military initiatives in areas that are presumed to be of less than vital interest to the other superpowers, as long as they are pursued according to the "rules of the game."

Nor was this new attitude of prudence and pragmatism to prevent the new regime from undertaking accelerating and ambitious defense programs. The new leaders were clearly aware of the marked Soviet strategic inferiority compared to that of the United States. They also realized the fallacy of their predecessors' strategic doctrine, which rested on an all-or-nothing proposition regarding nuclear war. Such a rigid doctrine had deprived the Soviet Union of military flexibility and the necessary range of options for dealing with sub-nuclear conflicts. Consequently, the new regime embarked on a policy aimed at accelerated programs for the production of offensive and defensive strategic weapons, while simultaneously upgrading the role and mission of the conventional forces. As a result, Soviet military capabilities in the late 1960's have grown dramatically. The Soviets obtained near-parity with the United States in offensive strategic weapons; they embarked on an impressive building program for the navy and air forces, thus gaining desired flexibility and a wider range of policy options.[14]

II. Strategic Asymmetry and Symmetry

A remarkable aspect in the evolution of Soviet and U.S. strategies and capabilities lies in the fact that until very recently these two powers were in an asymmetrical, or out-of-phase, relationship. Only in the past two or three years did their capabilities, postures, and doctrines come into phase, achieving rough symmetry. We assume here that this variance between the two powers had strongly affected Soviet attitudes toward a wide range of issues and policies, including their assessments of "threat levels" and of the utility of arms control.

Let us briefly illustrate below the evolution of United States and Soviet strategic relations in the last two decades:

U.S.	*USSR*
1949-1954	
Rearmament, Containment of Russia, Engagement in Europe and Asia, Global posture.	Consolidation of gains, Defensive, continental posture.

[14] See R. Kolkowicz and others, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Baltimore 1970), Appendix.

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U.S.	*USSR*
	1955-1960
Massive retaliation doctrine, Reliance on strategic force, Militant posture.	Ambiguous doctrine, Reliance on conventional forces, Ambiguous posture.
	1960-1964
Evolution of deterrence theory and flexible-response capabilities, Search for strategic parity and superiority.	Massive retaliation doctrine, Nonflexible posture, Strategic inferiority.
	1964-1969
Deterrence capability, Flexible-response and global posture, Strategic parity.	Deterrence capability, Flexible-response and global posture, Strategic parity.

Soviet strategic doctrine and capabilities would appear to have lagged behind those of the United States by about five years. For example, the United States created a regional defense alliance system in Europe in 1949 (NATO), and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1955 (the Warsaw Pact). The United States adopted the principle of massive retaliation around 1955, and then rejected it several years later. The evolution of U.S.-Soviet strategic relations since 1960 bears a close look. In the first half of the decade the United States further developed the theory of deterrence and strove to retain a sizable strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Having abandoned its doctrine of massive retaliation, the United States embarked on a program of creating an all-purpose, flexible-response force that would be able to deal with conflicts in remote areas. During the same period the Soviet Union adopted a military doctrine similar to "massive retaliation" and sharply reduced the size and role of its conventional forces. Despite its declaratory policy, the Soviets assumed that the United States was strategically inferior to the Soviet Union. Soviet strategic doctrine resulted in a rigid posture for its armed forces.

Since 1964, the United States has strengthened and improved its deterrence capabilities and generally adhered to a flexible-response doctrine. Defense capabilities reached the designed ceilings and the United States' political and military policies remained globally committed. During this period the Soviet Union came into phase militarily with the United States. It also adopted a flexible-response doctrine, achieving strategic parity with the United States, and placed its strategic and conventional capabilities in a global configuration.

Several implications can be derived from the strategic asymmetry and symmetry in U.S.-Soviet relations. First, modern defense technol-

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ogy determines to a large extent the kind of strategic doctrines and policies that will be adopted by superpowers. Thus, technology seems to have a leveling effect that subsumes various political, ideological and social differences in various political systems. Second, Western strategic doctrines have had an "educative" effect on Soviet political and military leaders, persuading them to abandon their own idiosyncratic ideas and programs, and instead to adopt "capitalist," and "bourgeois," programs for their own needs. Third, socioeconomic systems less advanced than that of the United States can, when national priorities are adjusted, create massive and sophisticated arsenals of advanced weapons and technologies.

In a more pragmatic fashion, we can derive other important implications. First, claims to superpower need actual military and technological capabilities in their support. Previous inflated Soviet claims to such capabilities were bluntly discounted by the West, and in the process Soviet credibility became profoundly eroded. Moreover, inflated Soviet claims brought about unanticipated and countervailing results: having been threatened by Soviet verbal overkill, the United States undertook crash armament programs and quickly outdistanced the Soviet Union and that established a superior-inferior relationship between them. The Soviets seem to have learned their costly lessons from it and have undertaken their own crash armament programs. Second, having finally achieved parity at some cost, the Soviets created a new psychological threat for the Americans, who had become used to the notion that only Western strategic superiority can insure their basic interests as well as general international stability. Now that this superiority is no more, many in the West urge the need for a new armament cycle in order to outdistance the Soviets once more. Some even see in such action-reaction cycle an anti-Soviet weapon of its own. Their argument is that the West can "bleed" the Soviet system by forcing it to keep up with high levels of U.S. arms programs, which presumably would strain the Soviet economy to the breaking point.

The most important implication for the future that can be derived from our analysis is that Soviet strategic doctrine and policy are progressively more shaped by factors that are trans-systemic: the momentum of technology; the available economic capabilities in the system; the scale of priorities of the system; and the inherent constraints of nuclear weapons and their related technologies, which largely dictate the doctrines on their uses and limitations. Thus, we may discern a form of progressive strategic convergence of the superpowers.

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III. Systemic Interaction: Adversary Perception and Strategy

A vital "regulatory mechanism" of contemporary international relations in the nuclear context is represented in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Briefly, the use of nuclear weapons is generally assumed to be politically useless and militarily suicidal, since there would presumably be no victors in a total nuclear war, or at least the number of casualties would be so enormous that organized society would cease to exist.

An important aspect of the relationship of deterrence is a certain dualism: the adversaries are presumed to understand and abide by the new "calculus of terror," the implicit and explicit rules of the game of deterrence. Such concepts as signaling, adversary perceptions, escalatory levels, first strike, second strike, nuclear pause, assured destruction, damage limitation, catalytic war, etc., have been strongly embraced by strategic and policy communities of the West. Since a deterrence relationship is seen as a "balance of terror" it is crucial that such balance does not suffer from misunderstood signals, misinterpreted intent, and action from faulty adversary perception. Vital questions in this context are: How does the adversary read the presumed rules of the game? Does he understand them in a similar manner as we do? In other words, what is the nature of the adversary, and how do perceptions of the adversary influence strategic doctrines and policy?

The analysis of Soviet strategic schools and of their various "adversary assessments" is a bit complicated. This complication arises because Soviet public statements and writings are burdened with an all but obscuring ideological ballast. Second, Soviet strategic schools are actually parts of one large school, the military, with various subgroups within it. Thus, any differences in their attitudes and statements must be interpreted in terms of their specific institutional and parochial interests. However, these caveats aside, it is still possible to distinguish patterns of adversary assessments and to draw conclusions about their influences on strategic doctrine and policy.

Most Western studies of Soviet strategic schools or groups generally divide these into Traditionalist and Radical.[15] The former are assumed to reflect the biases and institutional interests of the conventional forces, and the latter appear to reflect the interests of the strategic and more technologically oriented branches of the armed forces. This typology is based on evidence provided by public Soviet "strategic debates" dur-

[15] See, for example, T. W. Wolf's *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964).

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ing the early and the middle 1960's. The typology is, however, rather narrowly derived and is too intimately bound to institutional military interests.

For the sake of simplicity, we shall divide Soviet strategic views and positions into two broad categories, the Conservative and the Moderate. This informal typology is based on analyses of Soviet conditions and, essentially, describes the broad outlooks of the two groupings. We shall schematically list the two strategic schools and the various differences on specific issues and values:

Conservatives	*Moderates*
Make high threat estimates;	Make moderate threat estimates;
Have militant, threatening adversary image;	Have selective adversary image;
Demand high defense budgets;	Are satisfied with Party-established levels;
See utility in nuclear war;	Deny utility of nuclear war;
Urge strategic superiority;	Desire parity;
Dissatisfied with deterrence-only;	Support a deterrence policy;
Prefer offensive strategy;	Desire an offensive-defensive strategy;
Are against arms control.	Support arms control.

The two strategic schools comprise people from the military establishment, governmental bureaucracies, and Party leadership. Their policy espousals and general world views tend to reflect operational needs (ongoing political maneuvering to maximize political or institutional interests), as well as basic attitudes and biases. Although specific articulated conservative or moderate attitudes are frequently dictated by specific policy phases of the Soviet Union (conciliatory or militant), at other times there appear to be sharp disagreements from various institutional or political spokesmen, which contradict state policy and which must be interpreted as reflecting actual expressions of dissent.

Let us briefly examine some details of this postulated conservative-moderate interaction in the Soviet Union and connect it to some strategic policies and doctrines.

The earliest public expression of conservative-moderate disagreements since Stalin's death appeared in 1953 when Premier Malenkov struck a tone of reasonableness and moderation with reference to foreign affairs and proposed curtailment of military allocations. The following spring he went even further, by introducing a nondogmatic view of international relations, suggesting that a thermonuclear war would result in a "new world slaughter . . . [and] would mean the destruction of world civilization."[16] This position, that international tensions

[16] *Pravda*, March 13, 1954.

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have eased and that future war would be futile, constituted a sharp departure from traditional Soviet views on war. It also challenged the interests and positions of the Conservatives in the Party and the military.

The Conservatives, threatened by the moderate views and proposed policies of Malenkov, challenged them publicly, forcing him to change his position and finally ousting him from the governmental and high Party positions.[17] Soon after his ouster in 1955, the Conservatives formally re-established their views and policies. Rejecting Malenkov's earlier positions, ranking Party leaders asserted that "no matter how severe the consequences of atomic war, they cannot be identified with the fall of world civilizations."[18] They also condemned views that maintained that "inasmuch as both East and West possess hydrogen weapons, the possibility of a thermonuclear war is automatically excluded." Such views, they stated, "can in fact lull the vigilance of the peoples."[19] Politburo member Molotov brutally asserted that in the event of a thermonuclear war "what will perish will not be world civilizations . . . but the decaying capitalist social system with its imperialist core soaked in blood."[20] The Conservatives also re-established the primacy of defense priorities and readjusted the budgetary allocations to that end.[21]

One of the strongest champions of orthodoxy and conservatism in the early and middle 1950's was Khrushchev, who, in the process, gained full political power in the government and the Party. As the decade wore on, however, there emerged a fuller appreciation of the implications of a nuclear war conducted with intercontinental ballistic missiles. A better perception of the delicate balance of terror, and the corollary deterrence relationship between the two major powers had various results. The vast expense necessitated by the new nuclear technology began to conflict with other high-priority objectives within the domestic programs. By the early 1960's, especially after the abortive Cuban missile venture, Khrushchev became a proselytizing Moderate. Ironically, he found himself in a position similar to that of the hapless Malenkov a decade earlier.

Having firmly embraced the new gospel of détente, deterrence, and negotiations, Khrushchev began to orchestrate a propaganda and policy campaign that was to persuade friend and foe of the necessity and desirability of his new views and policies. Asserting that "of late a

[17] See Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military*, 105-13.
[18] *Kommunist*, IV (April 1965), 16-17.
[19] Defense Minister N. Bulganin, *Pravda*, January 1, 1956.
[20] V. Molotov, *Pravda*, February 9, 1955.
[21] For details, see Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military*, 105-50.

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certain relaxation of tension has become apparent in international affairs,"[22] he suggested that "the tasks of the [defense industry] could be solved successfully with less expenditure."[23] Khrushchev now rejected the Conservatives' traditional demands for the subordination of "the needs of the stomach" (i.e., domestic- and consumer-oriented priorities) to those of defense: "The highest calling of Soviet man, his primary duty consists of amassing wealth for the country, for a better life."[24] He argued that revolutionary passion "is a fine thing, of course, but after the passion we must tackle the economy . . . so that we can eat well, have better housing." This Khrushchev considered as "far better than merely revolutionary passion."[25] Having thus established his preferences for new social priorities, Khrushchev went on to propose reduced defense budgets, maintaining that "the defense of the country is at suitable levels" and proposing a new policy line aimed at "solving controversial international problems through negotiations."[26]

These policies and attitudes of Khrushchev had a shock-effect on the Conservatives, especially among the military.[27] Khrushchev had denigrated the role and uses of conventional forces; he continued to adhere to an obsolescent strategic doctrine akin to that of massive retaliation; his new political moderation vitiated much of the necessary rationale for high defense priorities; and he resorted to selective adversary perceptions, distinguishing between "sane forces in the U.S.A." and "aggressive military circles."[28]

Like those of Malenkov before him, Khrushchev's moderate attitudes and policies alienated the Conservatives and unified them for the purpose of ousting him from power. Soon after his ouster, which was remarkable in its smoothness and swiftness,[29] the Conservatives celebrated their victory in a public outburst of self-congratulation and vindictiveness. Summarily rejecting most of Khrushchev's policies and views, they asserted that "the current international situation is characterized by a sharpening of international tension and increased danger of war."[30] They maintained that the primary consideration of the Party is "its sacred duty to strengthen the defense power of the USSR," which it regards as "the most important function of the Soviet state."[31] They warned that "we have no right to forget the continuous dangers

[22] *Ibid.*, Appendix G, 383-85.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, 150-73.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, 282-306.
[30] *Ibid.*, Appendix G.
[31] *Kommunist*, VII (May 1956).

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that threaten us in the form of a potential military attack by the imperialist aggressors."[32]

As for Khrushchev's "goulash communism" and his domestic priorities, these now received short shrift: "It would be most incorrect to see as the central purpose of communism mainly the satisfaction of the 'needs of the stomach.' "[33]

The new regime of Brezhnev-Kosygin seems to have embraced the view that "the Soviet Union has no right to ignore the constantly threatening danger of a new military attack by the predatory imperialists"[34] and that, accordingly, "the Soviet government is devoting untiring attention to the further strengthening of the country's defense capabilities."[35] This view was reiterated by Brezhnev, who maintained that "history has taught us that the stronger our army is, the more watchful we are, the stronger the peace on our frontiers. . . . We have learned that well."[36]

And, indeed, the new regime embarked on a massive, sustained, and orderly program for upgrading Soviet defense capabilities, which were to attain strategic parity with those of the United States. They also strengthened their conventional forces and assigned them a new, more active role. The defense budgets continued to escalate yearly and the political influence of the military increased considerably.[37]

However, by the middle 1960's the Conservatives, mainly in the military, felt themselves threatened anew by certain heretical views and policy proposals.

Like Khrushchev in the early 1950's, the current regime of Brezhnev-Kosygin came into power with the assistance, or at least tacit acquiescence, of the Conservatives in the Party and the military, among others. Once in power, the present leadership, like Khrushchev, had to satisfy many demands of the Conservatives. And again like Khrushchev, the current regime found itself pressed by a variety of conflicting demands and claims from many sectors of society and interest groups. In order to achieve a workable balance among the demands on resources, the priorities, and influence, the regime, like its predecessor, resorted to a policy of partial accommodation to the strongest claimants—in the process alienating most of them. The military's dissatisfaction was caused by concerns over the regime's emerging moderate and concilia-

[32] A. Shelepin, *Pravda*, July 25, 1965.
[33] *Pravda*, May 17, 1965.
[34] Defense Minister A. Grechko, Radio Moscow, February 23, 1968.
[35] A. Shelepin, *Pravda*, July 25, 1965.
[36] Radio Moscow, July 3, 1965.
[37] See fn. 14.

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tory foreign policy; by the attempts to subordinate strategic doctrine and policy authority to Party initiative and control; by the alleged inadequacy of allocations to the defense sector; and by the emerging economic pragmatism in the Party's planning policies.

The Conservatives embarked therefore on a sustained public (and private) campaign in order to impress the regime with the urgency, cogency, and rationality of their proposals, and demands. These included:[38]

a. demands for higher defense allocations
b. re-establishment of priorities in resource allocations and investments to defense-related industries
c. projections of very high "threat assessments"
d. re-establishment of the doctrine on the political utility of nuclear war
e. establishment of an offensive strategy preference
f. demands for the upgrading of conventional forces
g. arguments in support of subordination of domestic and consumer priorities to those of defense
h. rejection of a deterrence-only doctrine
i. arguments for the need of strategic or technological superiority over the United States
j. rejection of negotiatory approaches to outstanding international conflicts of interests and arms control.[39]

The essential aspects of this Conservative position were: assessments of high threat levels from the United States (and later China); the need to reinvigorate the institutions and leaders of Soviet society with a Conservative zeal; the rejection of dangerous "fatalistic" doctrines in the Soviet Union; and, last but not least, the furtherance of the military's and Conservatives' and institutional interests.

The Moderates, who have earned the wrath of the Conservatives, include numerous prominent Soviet personalities, including presumably Premier Kosygin. Their arguments are not based on anti-regime or anti-Communist principles. Rather, their positions and arguments seem to derive from a more objective, pragmatic, and prudent assessment of the possibilities, risks, costs, and opportunities facing Soviet political and military policies at present.

For example, in 1965 one of the most prominent Soviet strategists

[38] For details see Kolkowicz, "The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition," Institute for Defense Analyses, RP-383 (Arlington, October 1967).
[39] See R. Kolkowicz and others, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Baltimore 1970), *passim*.

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stated: "In our time there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics; that it is possible to achieve political aims through the use of nuclear power, and at the same time survive; and that it is possible to find acceptable forms of nuclear war."[40]

The Conservatives vigorously attacked this heretical position, maintaining that "an *a priori* rejection of the possibility of victory is harmful" because it leads to a "moral disarmament . . . fatalism and passivity. It is necessary to wage a struggle against such views." They asserted that a nuclear war does not necessarily posit "a threat to the physical survival of nations and states" and that it is very important to impress upon the Soviet people "the possibilities of conducting a victorious nuclear missile war."[41]

Another example of Moderate-Conservative disagreement deals with the concept of strategic superiority: "Superiority has become a concept that has no bearing on war. No superiority can save the aggressor from retaliation. Any efforts of an aggressor to achieve relative nuclear superiority are neutralized in advance by the fact that the other side possess absolute power which guarantees the destruction of the aggressor."[42] Compare that statement with the following: "The stern dialectic of [military] development consists in the fact that the struggle for superiority must be waged incessantly. Any weakening of effort in this field, any excessive self-admiration because of success achieved"[43] can only lead to failure.

On the one hand, Foreign Minister Gromyko maintained that "only ignorant people or simple adventurists fail to realize what an armed conflict between the two social systems would mean. The world long ago reached the stage when the continuation of the arms race became madness."[44] On the other hand, a typical Conservative rejoinder asserts that "we cannot agree with the view that disarmament can be achieved as a result of peaceful negotiations . . . by representatives of opposing social systems." The spokesman maintains that "quite to the contrary, it can be achieved only as a result of active struggle by the revolutionary forces in the imperialist countries" with the support of the socialist

[40] General N. Talenskii, "Reflecting on the Last War," *International Affairs* (Moscow), v (May 1965), 23.

[41] E. Rybkin, "O sushchnosti mirovoi raketno-iadernoi voiny" [On the Nature of Nuclear-Missile War], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, xvii (September 1965), 50-56.

[42] G. Gerasimov, *International Affairs* (Moscow), v (May 1966), 28.

[43] V. Bondarenko, "Military-Technological Superiority—A Most Important Factor in the Reliable Defense of the Country," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, xvii (September 1966).

[44] Speech at the U.N. Assembly, October 3, 1968.

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world. Thus, "any other concept about the path for the achievement of disarmament is an illusion." The Conservative prescription, therefore, is that until such a situation prevails "it is the primary task of the Socialist countries to strengthen their armed forces, increase their capabilities and their readiness."[45]

The Conservative-Moderate dichotomy reflects, therefore, different views of the strategic and political possibilities of the state, and different conclusions about the implications of differing policy alternatives. The Conservatives seem to operate on the "worst-plausible-case" approach to interaction with the West. Their views are strikingly similar to those of the politically conservative and military-oriented groups in the United States. On the other hand, the Moderates approach the current strategic situation with a more prudent and concerned attitude. Their position is roughly like that of the more moderate strategic and political groups in the West. Curiously, the Moderates' position is strikingly similar to that of former Defense Secretary McNamara, in the final phase of his tenure in government. McNamara's position was that "we have both built up our 'second-strike capability' to the point that a 'first-strike capability' on either side has become unattainable"; that neither a Soviet nor an American ABM system would provide an objectively greater measure of security because neither side "can attack the other without being destroyed in retaliation"; and that "there is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all nuclear weaponry. If a system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required."[46]

To return to the questions posed at the outset of this analysis: Do the adversaries read the rules of the game of deterrence in similar manner? The answer might be that similar groupings in the two diverse political systems read them in a similar way, but that formal policies derivative from the readings of these rules of the game will depend on which of the groupings dominates the particular political system. Second, how do perceptions of the adversary influence strategic doctrine and policy? Again, we may answer that this would depend on which group does the assessing, and on how such assessments are related to the evident dangers and limitations of possibilities inherent in a deterrent relationship of "balance of terror." Recent Soviet policy decisions and declaratory policies suggest that a compromise formula, embracing Conservative and Moderate positions, has been arrived at. The elements

[45] E. Rybkin, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, XVIII (September 1968).
[46] *The Washington Post*, September 19, 1967.

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of such a formula probably include: an agreement to allocate adequate resources for defense programs in order to obtain strategic parity with the United States and to enhance general military mobility and flexibility (particularly of naval forces); an agreement to seek some form of stabilization of the arms race, from a position of strategic equality; an agreement to maintain Soviet diplomatic and military pressure in areas of the world where U.S. interests are assumed to be of low priority. This postulated Soviet policy line is based on several considerations:

a. The strategic arms race is expensive and does not add objectively to the security of the Soviet Union once parity is obtained.

b. The political utility of strategic arms increments is insignificant, since, as the Soviets themselves point out, it cannot easily be applied to non-nuclear contexts, i.e., its extra deterrence value is questionable.

c. A stabilization of U.S.-Soviet strategic capabilities at parity levels would still give the Soviet Union a wide range of options for the pursuit of policy objectives by means of conventional forces. Current and foreseeable Soviet policy objectives and commitments depend on the maintenance of stable strategic deterrence and the flexible uses of their conventional capabilities.

Recent Soviet policy seems to support these assumptions. It actively pursues strategic arms limitation talks with the U.S.; Soviet leaders seem eager to avoid provocative measures that would tend to destabilize their relations with the United States. At the same time, they seek to integrate their conciliatory policy moves with a broader range of Soviet policy objectives, in a new kind of Soviet grand design.

This new Soviet grand design may be described as a "hold-and-explore" policy line: *hold on to*, and stabilize, the Western flank (and thus also gain necessary freedom and broader options for dealing with the Chinese challenge), and *explore* new policy opportunities in the "soft," and presumably less contested, areas south of Russia. Such a policy line would shift the center of gravity of Soviet strategic and political interests from a predominantly Western orientation into a southern and eastern direction. Such a policy orientation would probably be seen by the Soviets as one of fairly low costs, low risks, and potentially high payoffs, whereas a continued pursuit of former policies would appear to be one of high costs, high risks, and low payoffs.

Soviet diplomatic, political, and military activities of the past two to three years indeed suggest the emergence of such a policy orientation: the leaders have shown strong interest in SALT; they indicate a preference for the stabilization of European security arrangements; they have strengthened their forces in the Far East along the Sino-Soviet

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borders; and they have retained and increased their interests and commitments in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions.

Conclusions

In seeking to understand the evolution of Soviet strategic doctrine and policy in the past two decades, our analysis suggests two kinds of conclusions: those relevant to and derivative from internal Soviet political processes, and several broader observations applicable to the dynamics of international relations in the nuclear context.

A key characteristic of the Soviet political system derives from the absence of legal and orderly provisions for the transfer of political power. Thus, the political process is marked by frequent collisions of the several bureaucracies and institutions, whose spokesmen lay claim to political power and to the shaping of national priorities. After Stalin's death, claimants to power chose, at least for tactical purposes, initially to stress orthodox and conservative views and policies in order to defeat the opposition. Once in power, they sought a gradual reversal of views and policies from the conservative to more pragmatic and moderate directions, in order to retain a workable internal balance of resources and allocations and to conduct the foreign and military policies of the state. However, the conservative attitudes and pressures in the Soviet Union and the United States have generally tended to raise and reinforce their respective "threat-assessments levels" and to provide the driving dynamics for the arms race and for the corollary strategic doctrines and policies. Given the "action-reaction" strategic relations between the two superpowers and the internal "mad momentum" of nuclear technology, it becomes politically chancy, and at times difficult, for political leaders to halt the institutional pressures for the escalation of military arms programs. Thus, recent Soviet strategic and foreign policies reflect the political, institutional, and "perceptual" tensions within the system that result in a precarious equilibrium of competing ideas and personalities.

In a broader sense, the analysis suggests a certain failure of earlier beliefs—indeed, verities—about the relation between modern technology and the traditional political processes. These earlier beliefs stressed the great advantages that accrue from the possession of vast nuclear arsenals; the ability to translate such military power precisely into corresponding political advantage and influence; the ability to apply this power usefully and predictably to any part of the world. It becomes more and more clear that the teleology of the nuclear arms race

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points to madness and oblivion; that political leadership fails to subjugate and control this vast military power for discernible political purposes. And, thus, a mad momentum of technology continues unabated, propelled by traditional political interests and cultural and psychological insecurities, creating an action-reaction spiral.

The analysis also suggests that modern war technology is an autonomous, transnational, trans-ideological phenomenon that creates and imposes its own imperatives on the fabric of politics. As the progressive symmetry between Soviet and United States strategic doctrines and policies indicates, politics and strategies of various and diverse political systems are increasingly following technology, rather than the other way around. The implications of war technology seem to have a levelling effect on diverse political, military, and ideological doctrines, creating a gradual convergence of strategic concepts and policies derivative from this new iron law of nuclear technology.

And, finally, the momentum of war technology seems to have a logic of its own that transcends traditional concepts of politics and war, that escapes effective harnessing into rational political process for prudent political objectives, and that aggravates the idiosyncrasies and antagonisms in the international arena.

The evolution of strategic doctrines and policies in the past two decades suggests a lagging of political and intellectual innovational ideas behind the driving imperatives of technology. This lag, however, is not attributable wholly to political obtuseness. The problem lies in certain asymmetries between politics and technology: Politics is essentially conservative, intuitive, present-oriented; technology is innovative, autonomous, and future-oriented. The mating of the two in the nuclear context creates a tense and unstable union.

The superpowers are caught in a dilemma: how to insure their vital interests without endangering their survival. The continuing unfolding of nuclear technology, without corresponding adjustments of the international political processes, is likely to threaten both objectives.

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COMPARISON OF WEIGHTED VOTING FORMULAS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

By HANNA NEWCOMBE, JAMES WERT, and ALAN NEWCOMBE

Introduction

IF the United Nations is ever to assume the greater powers needed for effective peace-keeping and peace-making, the General Assembly and/or the Security Council will need an improved system of representation and voting. The present system of giving each country one vote in the General Assembly, regardless of the country's size, and of giving a veto in the Security Council to five big powers, is unrealistic and imperfect for many reasons, which need not be detailed here.

A voting and representation reform is of course not the only reform required to make the United Nations effective; it is only one part of an overall "package," which includes provisions for disarmament and its inspection, a permanent peace-keeping force, an impartial objective system of distributing international economic aid, and a judicial and mediation system for conflict resolution, among other things. However, a voting reform may be the key to all the others. For example, peace-keeping has run into trouble in the past, because some nations would not entrust control of peace-keeping forces to the General Assembly as it is presently constituted. Only a world body that has the confidence of as many member-nations as possible, East and West, rich and poor, large and small, will be able to obtain the powers it needs.

The "balancing" needed to gain the confidence of member-states is a difficult matter. Precisely this balancing is the purpose of any weighted-voting scheme. Many have been suggested (reviewed recently by Barrett and Newcombe[1]), and they differ in the basic principles on which each is based. It is impossible at this stage to say which is "right," until criteria are developed for evaluating them and, even more important, until the preferences of national leaders, and the tenacity with which they hold them, are ascertained. In other words, the main criterion in evaluating a weighted-voting formula is *acceptability*, not either abstract justice or theoretical reasoning.

Design of this study

In this study, we select twenty weighted-voting formulas, calculate the votes each would give to 171 individual nations and territories, and

[1] Carol Barrett and Hanna Newcombe, "Weighted Voting in International Organizations," *Peace Research Reviews*, II, 2 (April 1968).

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then cumulate these into the voting blocs into which some of these nations formed themselves in four different periods of U.N. voting. (Only some of the 171 nations and territories are included in the blocs; only U.N. members in Section I, U.N. members plus a few of the larger nonmembers in Section II.)

If the voting blocs are considered as the equivalent, in embryonic form, of world political parties in an embryonic world parliament, then what we are doing is determining the party line-ups, like the "nose-counts" politicians make in parliaments or in conventions.

Finally, we propose three criteria for scoring the relative merits of the formulas. Readers may disagree with our criteria; in this case, it is quite easy for anyone to apply his own criteria to our data, and perhaps select a different "best" formula.

U.N. VOTING BLOCS

The bloc structure of voting in the U.N. General Assembly was determined by Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe. [2, 3] These authors also review briefly other studies of this structure—for example, those of Alker and Russett.[4] Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe apply factor analysis to the U.N. roll-call votes from 1946 to 1963, to find the nation-blocs (voting alignments). This time is divided into four periods: 1946-1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1959, and 1960-1963. Results should soon be available for the fifth period, 1965-1968. (There was no voting in the General Assembly in 1964 because of the dispute over Article 19 and the payment of peace-keeping expenses.)

A brief overview of the blocs found in the four periods is given in Table I.

TABLE I

1946-50	West	Latin Amer. 1 2	Afro-Asian	Soviet		
1951-55	West	Latin Amer.	Afro-Asian	Soviet	Scand.	Greece-Taiwan
1956-59	West + Lat. Amer.		Afro-Asian	Soviet	Scand.	Imper. / Pro-West neutral
1960-63	West + Lat. Amer.		Afro-Asian + Soviet		Scand.	Imper. / PWN

[2] Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe, "United Nations Voting Patterns," *International Organization*, XXIV (Winter 1969-70).

[3] Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe, "United Nations Voting Patterns," *IPRA Studies in Peace Research*, Proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Peace Research Association (Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, September 1969, publ. 1971).

[4] Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven and London 1965).

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The bloc structure thus changes over the years: not only do some blocs appear late (Scandinavian, Imperial) and some disappear (Latin American), but it must also be borne in mind (although this does not show in Table I) that the bloc membership (countries belonging to each bloc) changes. For example, the PWN (pro-West neutral) bloc has almost entirely different membership in the two periods in which it exists.

The nations belonging to each bloc in each period are listed in Appendix 1. Nations whose factor loading in the factor analysis was almost equal (within 0.05 units) on two different blocs are counted as half in each bloc, and in Appendix 1 are listed as "split." The "non-U.N." listing refers to nations that are not members of the U.N. (China, East and West Germany, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, Switzerland, Mongolia, and Mauritania) and whose bloc alignment represents a guess by the authors.

A pictorial representation of the bloc alignments in different periods and changes in it is given in Figure 1, in which the widths represent the numbers of nations in each bloc, and in Figures 2 and 3, in which the widths represent the total population and the total GNP in each bloc.

THE WEIGHTED VOTING FORMULAS

A list of the twenty weighted voting formulas used, with comments and references to the Barrett and Newcombe review,[1] is given in Table II.

VOTING WEIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONS

The voting weights of 171 nations and territories were calculated according to the twenty formulas. The results are given in Appendix 2, in three parts: (a) for nations who are U.N. members up to 1963; (b) a few of the larger nonmembers included in Section II of this study; (c) for other nations and territories not yet in the U.N. All of these are very small and some are not independent, but we list them here for possible future use.

The voting weights listed in Appendix 2 are not normalized, and comparisons among different formulas are therefore not directly possible.

I. Applying the Voting Formulas to U.N. Members

COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM

According to Barrett and Newcombe, the principle of justice would require voting weighted either according to population (democratic

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TABLE II. LIST OF 20 WEIGHTED VOTING FORMULAS

Formula No.	*Brief Description*	*Author(s)*	*Page in Barrett & Newcombe*	*Ref. to Original*
1.	1-nation, 1-vote	Present U.N. system	—	—
2.	Proportional to population	—	—	—
3.	Proportional to U.N. assessment	Manno	Using Table 5 on pp. 30-31	fn. 9
4.	Proportional to GNP	—	—	—
5.	Clark & Sohn 1	Clark & Sohn	Table 4, p. 27 Also p. 14	fn. 7
6.	Clark & Sohn 2	Clark & Sohn	Formula p. 26, 14	fn. 7
7.	Square root of population	Millard, Penrose, Riker & Shapley	p. 27, 7-8	fns. 6, 8
8.	Cube root of population	Millard	p. 27	fn. 8
9.	"Arithmetic" function of U.N. assessment $ax + 3$ (x = assess.)	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
10.	"Arithmetic" function of U.N. assessment $ax + 5$ (x = assess.)	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
11.	"Geometric" function of U.N. assessment $c \log x + 3$	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
12.	"Geometric" function of U.N. assessment $c \log x + 5$	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
13.	Square root of U.N. assessment	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
14.	Cube root of U.N. assessment	Manno	Table 7, pp. 35-36	fn. 9
15.	Population + U.N. assessment	Dulles, Newfang, Wilcox & Marcy, Manno, Adams	p. 61, modified to use Manno's Table on pp. 30-31	fns. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
16.	Population + GNP	Sohn, modified	pp. 45-46	fn. 15
17.	log population + log GNP	World Service Federation, modified	pp. 58-59	fn. 16
18.	Population + energy consumption	Betchov	—	fn. 17
19.	Population + GNP per capita Coeffs. detd. by multiple regression analysis	Silbert & Newcombe	Table 13, pp. 47-48	fn. 18
20.	"Product formula" population × sq. rt. of GNP/cap. (same as sq. rt. pop × sq. rt. GNP)	Alcock	—	Private Communication

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principle) or according to U.N. assessment (the shareholders'-meeting principle). The principle of power would require voting weighted according to some measure of power, perhaps GNP (cf. Alcock and Newcombe[5]). Our aim, acceptability, consists of some compromise between the principles of justice and power (right and might). See Barrett and Newcombe for a more complete discussion of these principles.

We therefore first compare formulas based only on population, only on assessment, and only on GNP (in each case directly proportional), with each other and with the present (one-nation, one-vote) system; then we compare various modifications of pure population formulas with each other (square or cube roots or logarithms), and do the same for assessment-based formulas; and finally we test two-factor formulas (population and some other factor), in an attempt to reach the compromise mentioned in the previous paragraph.

All bloc voting weights are normalized so that the sum for all blocs in each period is 1000.

The first comparison is shown in Table III.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE III

In the present system (one-nation, one-vote), it is interesting that the West + Latin America had an absolute majority in 1956-1959 and almost so in 1960-1963. The West or West + Latin America was usually the strongest bloc, except in 1951-1955, when the Afro-Asians were stronger. The close approach to a two-party system (bipolarization) in 1960-1963 is apparent, with the mergers of the West and Latin America on one side and the Afro-Asians and Soviets on the other.

In voting according to a population formula (No. 2), the Afro-Asians would have an obvious advantage. It should be noted that in 1946-1950, China is still counted in with the Afro-Asians, because up to 1949 China was united and a U.N. member, and did vote with this bloc. This gives the population total an impressive boost. China is not counted in the subsequent periods, "China's" vote in the U.N. being ascribed to Taiwan, and Taiwan's population and GNP figures being associated with it. (However, the U.N. assessment Taiwan paid was that for all China, and is counted as such.) Even without China, the large population of India gives the Afro-Asians a great weight under this formula.

The voting weights assigned to the blocs under the assessment and

[5] Norman Z. Alcock, and Alan G. Newcombe, "The Perception of National Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIV, 3 (September 1970), 335-43.

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TABLE III. COMPARISON OF POPULATION, ASSESSMENT, AND GNP FORMULAS WITH PRESENT SYSTEM

		No. 1 *1-nation, 1-vote*	*No. 2* *Population*	*No. 3* *Assessment*	*No. 4* *GNP*
1946-50	West	311	186	630	652
	Afro-Asian	284	610	95	146
	Soviet	104	122	226	149
	Lat. Am. 1	215	62	37	41
	Lat. Am. 2	86	20	12	12
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	250	234	647	695
	Afro-Asian	384	526	78	98
	Soviet	83	152	231	157
	Lat. Amer.	233	75	32	38
	Scand.	17	3	10	8
	Greece-Taiwan	33	10	2	4
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + Lat. Amer.	537	438	613	694
	Afro-Asian	207	353	41	57
	Soviet	110	147	221	157
	Scand.	61	11	30	24
	Imper.	55	38	90	63
	Pro-West Neutrals	30	13	5	5
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + Lat. Amer.	470	461	709	762
	Af.-As. + Sov.	330	439	158	143
	Soviet	40	70	109	77
	Scand.	25	6	16	13
	Imper.	5	2	1	1
	Pro-West Neutrals	130	22	7	4
		1000	1000	1000	1000

GNP formulas (Nos. 3 and 4), correlate quite highly (by visual comparison), as we would expect since U.N. assessment is based mainly on GNP with a few other considerations added. In both formulas, the rich West has an overwhelming advantage, and it is our judgment that any such voting formula would be completely unacceptable to the small poor nations.

COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON POPULATION

The population formula (No. 2) gives reasonable balance between the blocs, but, as we shall see later, this is tipped too much one way by

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the inclusion of China. A better balance might be obtained, using formulas based on population alone, if we moderate the effect of population differences between states by using some function of the population, such as the square root, cube root, or logarithm, that depresses the relative weight of the more populous nations. (Square-root formulas have been suggested many times.[6] See Barrett and Newcombe[1] for references and partial explanations of underlying theory.) Another way to achieve this is to use arbitrary ceilings along with arbitrary brackets, as is done most notably by Clark and Sohn.[7]

With this in mind, we now compare the following formulas: population as in Table III (No. 2), two versions of the Clark and Sohn scheme (Nos. 5 and 6), square root of population (No. 7) and cube root of population (No. 8). Details on how the voting weights were calculated follow.

The first Clark and Sohn formula gives thirty votes each to the four largest nations, fifteen each to the next eight largest, six each to the next twenty largest, four each to the next thirty largest, two each to the next thirty-four, and one each to the rest.

The second Clark and Sohn formula gives thirty votes to nations over 140 million in population, sixteen to nations with population from 40 to 140 million, eight to nations from 20 to 40 million, five to nations from 5 to 20 million, three to 1.5 to 5 million, and so on.

Following Everett Lee Millard,[8] weighted votes were calculated as the square root of the number of millions of people. (Like all other formulas, this was then normalized to give a "total House" of 1000.) (Cf. Barrett and Newcombe,[1] p. 27.) The cube root formula was similarly calculated as the cube root of the number of millions of people. The results for different modifications of population formulas are given in Table IV.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE IV

All four modified population formulas (Nos. 5-8) have the effect of increasing the voting strength of the West and decreasing that of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs, compared to the proportional population formula (No. 2). They also increase the voting strength of the blocs of

[6] L. S. Penrose, "Equitable Voting in the United Nations," *Proceedings of the Medical Association for the Prevention of War*, II (July 1966) 12-19; "Some Statistical Problems of Majority Voting," *New Scientist*, IX (1961), 546-47; William H. Riker, and Lloyd S. Shapley, "Weighted Voting: A Mathematical Analysis for Instrumental Judgments," *RAND Report P-3318* (Santa Monica, March 1966).

[7] Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958).

[8] Everett Lee Millard, *Freedom in a Federal World* (Oceana, New York 1966).

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TABLE IV. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON POPULATION

		No. 2 Population Proportional as in Table III	*No. 5 Clark & Sohn #1*	*No. 6 Clark & Sohn #2*	*No. 7 Square rt. pop.*	*No. 8 Cube rt. pop.*
1946-50	West	186	332	313	282	314
	Afro-Asian	610	363	368	406	371
	Soviet	122	133	118	115	99
	Lat. Am. 1	62	133	152	145	156
	Lat. Am. 2	20	39	49	52	60
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	234	307	322	258	272
	Afro-Asian	526	411	336	458	444
	Soviet	152	120	125	103	78
	Lat. Am.	75	129	176	144	164
	Scand.	3	9	12	11	14
	Gr.-Taiwan	10	24	29	26	28
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + Lat. Am.	438	521	531	509	522
	Afro-Asian	353	238	239	257	236
	Soviet	147	129	117	117	106
	Scand.	11	28	33	37	49
	Imper.	38	67	60	57	60
	Pro-West Neutrals	13	17	20	23	27
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + Lat. Am.	461	530	521	509	499
	Af.-As. + Sov.	439	343	342	358	348
	Soviet	70	59	50	51	43
	Scand.	6	13	15	17	24
	Imper.	2	4	4	5	5
	Pro-West Neutrals	22	51	68	60	81
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

smaller nations, e.g., the Latin Americans, Scandinavians, and Pro-West Neutrals. The cube-root formula is of course more effective than the square-root formula in doing all this, and Clark and Sohn formulas are even more effective in this direction. Whether this direction promotes a more favorable balance is questionable, since equality of the main blocs is sometimes greater and sometimes smaller as a result. We shall postpone consideration of this question of balance until we develop some criteria for evaluating it, in a later section.

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COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON U.N. ASSESSMENT

Next, we shall compare some formulas based on U.N. assessment. This comparison involves the following formulas: the straight (proportional) assessment formula (No. 3) as in Table III, two "linear" or "arithmetic" functions of assessment proposed by Catherine Manno (Nos. 9 and 10), two formulas involving the logarithm of the assessment, which Manno calls "geometric" formulas (Nos. 11 and 12), and the square root and cube root of the assessment (Nos. 13 and 14).[9]

As we noted in the discussion of Table III, the straight assessment formula favors the West, or the large and rich nations, in a way that would most likely be unacceptable to nations not in this class. The effect of using other functions of the assessment, as the other formulas in this section do, is again (as it was with population formulas in the previous section) to "tone down" this bias and approach a more acceptable balance. Table V shows the extent to which these formulas achieve this.

It is unnecessary to test similar formulas involving GNP, since, as we noted above, assessment and GNP correlate quite highly.

If we designate the assessment as x, then the "arithmetic" functions of Manno are of the form $ax+b$, where a and b are constants. She chooses the constants to give a total of 1000 for the sum of all the voting weights and a desired value of the minimum voting weight. The two variants of this type of formula tested here have different minimum values (3 and 5, respectively).

The "geometric" formulas of Manno are of the form $c \log x + d$, where c and d are constants. Again the total number of votes is 1000 and the minima are chosen as 3 and 5 in the two variants of this type of formula.

The square root and cube root of assessment form the basis of the last two formulas of Manno. The values of the voting weights of nations under these six formulas were not calculated by the present writers, but taken from Manno's table (fn. 9, pp. 253-54, reproduced in Barrett and Newcombe,[1] pp. 35-37).

We have again normalized the voting weights for the blocs given in Table V to add up to 1000.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE V

All the formulas using assessment in other than the purely proportional form (Nos. 9-14) achieve the desired effect of moderating the

[9] Catherine Senf Manno, *Weighted Voting in the U.N. General Assembly: Feasibility and Methods* (Ph.D. diss., American University, Washington 1964).

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predominance of the rich nation-blocs, but they do it to varying extents. Generally, the order of decreasing effectiveness is: the log formula with minimum 5 (No. 12), then either the log formula with minimum 3 (No. 11) or the cube-root formula (No. 14), then the square-root formula (No. 13), the arithmetic formula with minimum 5 (No. 10), and finally the arithmetic formula with minimum 3 (No. 9).

Modifying the assessment formula, as is done in the last six columns (Nos. 9-14), decreases the voting weight of the West and Soviet blocs

TABLE V. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON U.N. ASSESSMENT

		No. 3 Assess. from T.III	*No. 9* $ax + 3$	*No. 10* $ax + 5$	*No. 11* $c \log x + 3$	*No. 12* $c \log x + 5$	*No. 13* *sq. rt. x*	*No. 14* *cube rt. x*
1946-50	West	630	570	505	425	392	474	420
	Af.-As.	95	132	172	206	228	183	213
	Soviet	226	198	175	169	148	186	161
	L. A. 1	37	73	107	145	165	114	148
	L. A. 2	12	27	41	55	67	43	58
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	647	560	477	367	334	446	373
	Af.-As.	78	144	209	285	314	226	282
	Soviet	231	198	168	148	126	176	145
	L. A.	32	75	117	146	172	114	154
	Scand.	10	12	13	24	22	20	21
	Gr.-T.	2	11	16	30	32	18	25
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + L. A.	613	596	582	524	535	542	537
	Af.-As.	41	79	115	136	151	112	141
	Soviet	221	193	168	160	144	178	155
	Scand.	30	39	45	80	74	62	67
	Imper.	90	82	73	81	73	89	79
	Pro-West Neutrals	5	11	17	19	23	17	21
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + L. A.	709	641	582	578	544	599	554
	Af.-As. + Sov.	158	207	249	262	281	241	271
	Soviet	109	89	73	73	61	81	67
	Scand.	16	19	21	34	35	31	31
	Imper.	1	2	3	5	5	3	4
	Pro-West Neutrals	7	42	72	48	74	45	73
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

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(since these pay the largest share of the U.N. assessment), increases the voting weight of the Afro-Asians, Latin Americans, Scandinavians, and Pro-West Neutrals; and leaves the Imperial bloc almost unchanged (it consists of small but rich nations). The most dramatic increase is that of the PWN in 1960-1963, from 7 to 74; these are the French-speaking African nations, all of which pay only the minimum possible assessment to the U.N.

COMPARISON OF TWO-FACTOR FORMULAS

Our next task is to test some formulas that use two factors: population and some other factor, this second one related to wealth and power. The use of two factors is of course another way to balance the biases involved in using population or a wealth factor (assessment or GNP) alone; this is possible since these biases are opposite in direction.

We consider the following formulas:

No. 15. A formula using a linear combination of population and U.N. assessment. The original suggestion along these lines was a proposal for dual voting, counting the votes cast once according to a population formula and a second time according to an assessment formula. Dulles[10] and Newfang[11] proposed dual voting schemes using one-nation, one-vote and a weighted formula; Wilcox and Marcy[12] use a population formula and an assessment formula. Manno[13] in a proposal different from the one dealt with in the previous section suggests using voting according to the one-nation, one-vote plan on some issues, according to population on other issues, and according to U.N. assessment on still other (financial) issues. Ware Adams[14] recommended a similar system. For our test here, we used an adaptation of the Wilcox and Marcy scheme, illustrated on pp. 60-61 of Barrett and Newcombe. This scheme uses arbitrary brackets for population and for assessment. We modified the assessment part, to use Manno's assessment figures, which are more complete for all nations.

No. 16. A formula using a linear combination of population and

[10] John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York 1957); F. Wilcox, "Revision of the United Nations Charter," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 523-24, 127.

[11] Oscar Newfang, *World Government* (New York 1942).

[12] F. Wilcox, and C. Marcy, *Proposals for Change in the U.N.* (Brookings Institution, Washington 1963).

[13] Catherine Senf Manno, "Selective Weighted Voting in the U.N. General Assembly," *International Organization,* XX (Winter 1966), 37-62.

[14] Ware Adams, "An Idea on U.N. Voting," *War/Peace Report,* VIII (February 1968), (letter to editor).

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GNP. This is a modification of a suggestion by Sohn,[15] in which he proposed a formula based on population, production, and trade, weighting these factors as 2:1:1. The scheme uses arbitrary brackets for each factor. We used population and GNP (only two factors), weighting them 1:1, using Sohn's brackets with some further modifications.

No. 17. A formula using a linear combination of the logarithm of the population and the logarithm of GNP. This is a modification of a scheme suggested in a pamphlet of the World Service Federation, Chicago.[16] It uses the two factors in a 1:1 ratio, assigning one vote per million people and one vote per million U.S. dollars. See Barrett and Newcombe, p. 59.

No. 18. A formula using a linear combination of population and energy consumption, according to a scheme proposed by Betchov.[17] The voting weight attached to each factor (population or energy consumption) is proportional to that factor, i.e., this scheme does not use arbitrary brackets. The ratio is 1:1. Betchov claims for this scheme the advantage of more complete and accurate data for all countries.

No. 19. A formula using a linear combination of population and GNP per capita. The formula used here (by Silbert and Newcombe[18]) was of the form $ax+by$, where x and y are the two factors and a and b are constants. The values of the constants were determined by performing a multiple regression analysis against the past voting record of the U.N. General Assembly, trying to approximate as closely as possible the actual voting outcomes obtained under the present voting system (one-nation, one vote). The values of the constants so obtained were 1 and 1.26. Silbert's voting weights were used straight from Table XIII, pp. 47-48 in Barrett and Newcombe. There are missing data for some of the nations, e.g., the new African nations who joined in 1960, and for China. Therefore, the columns for formula No. 19 for periods 1946-1950 and 1960-1963 had to be left blank in Table VI.

No. 20. All the above formulas use a *sum* of the two factors. This last one uses the *product* of the two factors, raised to different powers. This was suggested to us by Norman Alcock. The formula is: pop. $\times$

[15] Louis B. Sohn, "Weighting of Votes in an International Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, XXXVIII (December 1944), 1192-1203.

[16] Society for a World Service Federation, *The Case for a World Service Federation* (Chicago 1967), 13.

[17] Robert Betchov, *The Next U.N.* (Notre Dame 1969), mimeo.

[18] Michael Silbert and Hanna Newcombe, "Mathematical Studies of Weighted Voting at the United Nations," in Arnold Simoni, ed., *Weighted Voting: A Needed Concept for International Security* (Don Mills, Ontario 1967).

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square root of GNP/cap (which is identical with square root of pop. × square root of GNP).

The comparison of these six formulas is shown in Table VI.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE VI

The gaps in formula 4 are due to the fact that the data from the multiple regression analysis are not complete for all nations; China is missing in the 1946-1950 period, and the new African nations in the 1960-1963 period.

TABLE VI. COMPARISON OF FORMULAS BASED ON POPULATION AND ANOTHER FACTOR

		No. 15 *Pop. + Assess.*	*No. 16* *Pop. + GNP*	*No. 17* *log pop. + log GNP*	*No. 18* *Pop. + Energy*	*No. 19* *Pop. + GNP/cap*	*No. 20* *Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap*
1946-50	West	361	353	334	400	—	403
	Af.-As.	279	287	295	338	—	359
	Soviet	105	102	89	167	—	145
	L. A. 1	184	186	202	68	—	71
	L. A. 2	71	72	80	27	—	23
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000
1951-55	West	299	291	276	436	439	462
	Af.-As.	377	402	393	288	268	288
	Soviet	86	75	67	181	130	161
	L. A.	187	179	212	76	120	75
	Scand.	18	18	17	7	24	5
	Gr.-T.	33	35	35	12	19	9
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + L. A.	546	530	547	545	568	576
	Af.-As.	190	207	206	185	124	189
	Soviet	109	105	101	179	138	156
	Scand.	62	63	63	28	77	15
	Imper.	68	68	62	49	79	52
	Pro-West	25	27	21	14	14	12
	Neutrals						
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + L. A.	532	534	501	568	—	617
	Af.-As. + Sov.	306	315	325	305	—	283
	Soviet	44	44	38	84	—	75
	Scand.	27	30	26	13	—	8
	Imper.	6	6	5	3	—	1
	Pro-West	85	71	105	37	—	16
	Neutrals						
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000

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The formulas fall into two groups, as far as the similarity of results is concerned. Comparing the first group (Nos. 15, 16, 17) with the second group (Nos. 18, 19, 20), we see that in the first group the voting weight of the West and the Soviet bloc is lower than in the second group, the voting weight of the Latin Americans and Scandinavians is higher, and that of the Imperial bloc is about the same. These trends for the Afro-Asians differ from one period to another. These trends are less pronounced for the 1956-1959 period than for other periods.

In each case, the balance is better (bias is less) than in formulas proportional to only the population or only assessment or GNP (Table III). Further balance comparison will be made with a more quantitative criterion.

Criteria for Evaluating the Formulas

Three criteria are used: (1) balance, (2) additivity, (3) future representation by population.

Balance criteria. At the end of the introduction, we noted that our main criterion is acceptability. We have not canvassed the opinions of world leaders. However, it may be assumed that all world leaders would ask the sort of question that was asked by the U.S. State Department when they did a study of U.N. weighted voting[19] (this study was classified "confidential"; only a summary was published), namely, "Which formula would have been best for the U.S.—that is, which one would have enabled the U.S. to win most of the votes?"

Every leader would wish his nation and his bloc to do as well as possible, to win the maximum number of votes, and would prefer the formula that best achieves this. Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy the leaders of all the nations, or even all the blocs, simultaneously. The most acceptable compromise would seem to be the achievement of a "balance," in which none of the major blocs is placed in a permanent minority—that is, in which there is an approximate equality in voting strength among the main blocs.

To operationalize this definition of "balance," we need to know which are the "main blocs," and how to judge "approximate equality." Two different schemes are tried here.

Scheme I. In each period, we add the voting strength of the "pro-Western" blocs and those of the "anti-Western" blocs. We include *all*

[19] U.S. Department of State, *Weighted Voting in the United Nations* (Washington 1963), mimeo.

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blocs on one side or the other. For each formula, we obtain the difference between the voting strengths on the two sides. The formula with the least difference (regardless of sign) is "the best" from this standpoint; the second-best and third-best are similarly selected.

For example, in period 1946-1950, the pro-Western group comprises West, Latin America 1, and Latin America 2; the anti-Western group the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs. For the one-nation, one-vote formula (column 1 in Table III), the pro-West voting strength is 612, the anti-West is 388. (These two numbers always add up to 1000, since all blocs are included.) The difference is 224; the sign is diregarded, since we are interested only in an approximation to equality, not in which group is larger. If we repeat this for all twenty formulas in the 1946-1950 period, (Tables III, IV, V, and VI), we find that the minimum difference, 7, is for the last formula of Table VI, "pop. X sq.rt. GNP/cap"; the second-smallest difference, 8, is for the second formula of Table IV, "Clark & Sohn 1"; and the third-smallest difference, 10, is for the third formula in Table VI, "pop. and energy."

The pro-West and anti-West groups in the different periods are summarized below:

TABLE VII

	Pro-West	*Anti-West*
1946-50	West Lat. Am. 1 Lat. Am. 2	Af.-As. Soviet
1951-55	West Lat. Am. Scand. Greece-Taiwan	Af.-As. Soviet
1956-59	West + Lat. Am. Scand. Imper. Pro-West Neutrals	Af.-As. Soviet
1960-63	West + Lat. Am. Scand. Imper. Pro-West Neutrals	Af.-As. + Soviet Soviet

Some of these assignments, e.g., that of the PWN bloc, might be questioned, but the small size of the questionable blocs makes this relatively unimportant.

The results obtained according to Scheme I are given in Table VIII.

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TABLE VIII. APPLICATION OF BALANCE CRITERION, SCHEME I, TO 20 VOTING FORMULAS IN 4 PERIODS

No.	*1946-50*	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-63*
1. 1-nation, 1-vote	224	† 66	366	260
2. Population	364	356	‡ 0***	‡ 18***
3. Assessment (x)	358	382	476	466
4. GNP	410	490	472	560
5. Clark & Sohn 1	‡ 8**	† 60*	166**	196*
6. Clark & Sohn 2	‡ 28	† 78	288	216
7. Sq. rt. pop.	† 42	122	252*	182**
8. Cube rt. pop.	† 60	‡ 44***	316	218
9. $ax + 3$	340	316	456	408
10. $ax + 5$	306	246	434	556
11. $c \log x + 3$	250	134	408	330
12. $c \log x + 5$	248	120	410	316
13. Sq. rt. x	262	196	420	356
14. Cube rt. x	252	146	408	324
15. Pop. & assess.	232	† 74	402	300
16. Pop. & GNP	222	‡ 46**	376	282
17. log pop. & log GNP	232	† 80	386	274
18. Pop. & energy	‡ 10*	† 62	272	232
19. Pop. & GNP/cap	—	204	476	—
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	‡ 7***	102	310	284

In each column, *** denotes best formula, ** second best, * third best.

† Denotes that number is less than 20% of the largest number in column, ‡ less than 10%.

Scheme II. This is an alternative balance criterion. Here we consider the three main blocs, West, Afro-Asian, and Soviet, and calculate the three differences between their voting strengths. The minor blocs are not included. The three differences are then added (ignoring the signs). The resultant number is equal to twice the difference between the two extreme voting weights and is taken as characterizing the "balance" (tripolar) for that formula in that period.

For example, in 1946-1950, according to the one-nation, one-vote formula (column 1, Table III), the voting strengths of the three main blocs are 311, 284, 104. The differences are 27, 180, 207. Their sum is 414 (which is twice 207, the difference between the extremes).

In periods 1946-1950 and 1951-1955, the three main blocs are as indicated. In 1956-1959, West + Latin America is used instead of the West. In 1960-1963, the tripolar balance is converted to a bipolar one, since the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs merge. In this period, only the difference between the two main blocs, West + Latin America and Afro-Asia + Soviet + the separate Soviet bloc, is calculated and then doubled. The minor blocs are again not included. For example, in

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1960-1963, according to the population formula (column 2, Table III), the voting weights are 461 on one side and (439+70=509) on the other. The difference is 48, doubled is 96.

The results obtained by this method are given in Table IX; again the best formula is the one with the least difference, and the second- and third-best are similarly chosen.

Obviously, other balance criteria might be used: We might mention a multipolar balance with each bloc considered separately and all differences calculated (but this would be unrealistic because some of the blocs are so small); or a separate "West-versus-East" and "North-versus-South" alignment. However, we calculate only the two criteria described.

TABLE IX. APPLICATION OF BALANCE CRITERION, SCHEME II, TO 20 VOTING FORMULAS IN 4 PERIODS

No.	*1946-50*	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-63*
1. 1-nation, 1-vote	414***	602	854	† 200*+
2. Population	976	748	582***	† 96***
3. Assessment (x)	1070	1138	1144	884
4. GNP	1012	1194	1274	1084
5. Clark & Sohn 1	460**	592	784	256
6. Clark & Sohn 2	500	422*	828	258
7. Sq. rt. pop.	582	710	784	† 200*+
8. Cube rt. pop.	544	732	832	† 216
9. $ax + 3$	876	832	1034	690
10. $ax + 5$	666	618	934	520
11. $c \log x + 3$	512	† 238***	776*	486
12. $c \log x + 5$	488	416**	782	404
13. Sq. rt. x	582	540	860	554
14. Cube rt. x	518	456	792	432
15. Pop. & assess.	512	582	874	364
16. Pop. & GNP	502	654	850	350
17. log pop. & log GNP	490	652	892	276
18. Pop. & energy	466*	510	732**	358
19. Pop. & GNP/cap	—	618	888	—
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	516	602	840	518

In each column, *** denotes best formula, ** second best, * third best, *+ tied for second best.

† Denotes number lies below 20% of the highest number in column, ‡ below 10%.

DISCUSSION OF TABLES VIII AND IX

Two methods are used to select formulas that "pass the test" of the balance criteria: (1) Selecting the best three in each column. (2) Selecting all formulas whose numbers in Tables VIII and IX are less than

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a preset limiting value—10 percent and 20 percent of the largest number in the column are used.

The advantage of the first method is that it always selects three formulas from the twenty in the column. The disadvantage is that sometimes a formula nearly as good as the third-best exists and must be discarded. The advantage of the second method is that it selects formulas in a given interval, but the disadvantage is that it selects sometimes too many and sometimes too few (or none at all).

We shall give "balance merit points" to formulas selected in either way.

BALANCE MERIT POINTS

In the final evaluation of the formulas by all three criteria, balance counts for only one part, but we must decide how the results in Tables VIII and IX will be scored. Let us give:

3 points to best formula in each column (***)
2 points to second best formula in column (**)
1 point to third best formula in column (*)
1 point to each formula whose number in the column is less than 20 percent of largest number (†)
2 points to each formula whose number in the column is less than 10 percent of largest number (‡).

A formula can earn merit points both by * and †, so that it can receive a maximum of five points if it passes both tests at the highest level. The population formula does this in 1956-1959 and 1960-1963 when judged by Scheme I (bipolar).

A formula can receive a maximum of five points in Scheme I and five points in Scheme II, or a total of ten, which no formula achieves.

The balance merit points are not tabulated separately, but only together with points for the additivity and "future representation by population" criteria, in Table X.

Additivity criterion. It is an advantage in a weighted voting formula if the division of a country into several parts (such as the USSR, Ukraine, and Byelorussia) or the combination of two countries (such as Egypt and Syria, or Malaya and Singapore, or Tanganyika and Zanzibar) does not affect overall voting strength. This is obviously not true for the one-nation, one-vote formula, in which the USSR,

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Ukraine, and Byelorussia have three votes separately but only one when combined; it is true for the population formula, the GNP formula, and for the population and GNP formula, for example.

The importance of this criterion was emphasized by Betchov.[17] Obviously one should not give nations an incentive either to split or to combine in order to gain voting strength. It also facilitates adjustments required when such splits or combinations occur for other causes.

In Table X, each formula that satisfies the additivity criterion receives five merit points.

TABLE X. MERIT POINTS BY 3 CRITERIA FOR 20 FORMULAS

	Balance merit points (summed for 4 periods)								
	Scheme I (bipolar)			*Scheme II (tripolar)*			*Addi-*	*Rep. by*	
No.	*	†	*Subtotal*	*	†	*Subtotal*	*tivity*	*pop.*	*Total*
1. 1 nation, 1 vote	0	1	1	4.5	1	5.5	0	0	6.5
2. Population	6	4	10	6	1	7	5	5	27
3. Assessment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
4. GNP	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	10
5. Clark & Sohn 1	6	3	9	2	0	2	0	0	11
6. Clark & Sohn 2	0	3	3	1	0	1	0	0	4
7. Sq. rt. pop.	3	1	4	1.5	1	2.5	0	0	6.5
8. Cube rt. pop.	3	3	6	0	1	1	0	0	7
9. $ax + 3$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. $ax + 5$	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
11. $c \log x + 3$	0	0	0	4	1	5	0	0	5
12. $c \log x + 5$	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2
13. Sq. rt. x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. Cube rt. x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Pop. & assess.	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	6
16. Pop. & GNP	2	2	4	0	0	0	5	5	14
17. log pop. + log GNP	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
18. Pop. & energy	1	3	4	3	0	3	5	5	17
19. Pop. & GNP/cap	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	5	8

Future representation by population criterion. Democratic principles demand equal representation for each individual person in the world. This is satisfied only by a formula proportional to population (No. 2). However, by our criterion, we require only that this "pure representation by population" be realized at a future date, at which (it is hoped) the standard of living (GNP/cap, energy consumption, etc.) will be equalized all over the world. U.N. assessment would then presumably become proportional to the population, just like the GNP. The formu-

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las based on population, assessment, and GNP (Nos. 2, 3, and 4) satisfy this criterion; the one-nation, one-vote formula does not.

In Table X, each formula that satisfies this criterion receives five merit points.

Few formulas satisfy both the additivity and future representation by population criteria: only population and GNP (Nos. 2 and 4) do.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE X

According to the scoring system adopted, the best overall formula is straight population (No. 2); the next-best are population and energy (No. 18) and population and GNP (No. 16); these are followed closely by Clark & Sohn 1 (No. 5) and straight GNP (No. 4). However, straight GNP earns all its points on the last two criteria and none at all on balance, a fact that we think would exclude it from consideration. The square root and cube root of population formulas (Nos. 7 and 8) do fairly well on the balance criterion, but of course do not gain any points on the additivity and future representation by population criteria.

Although the population formula (No. 2) is "the winner" by far, this changes when we consider the inclusion of nations not at present in the U.N., especially China.

II. Applying the Voting Formulas to All Nations

Since the primary reason for undertaking this study is to provide a guide for policy-makers when they are ready to consider the introduction of a weighted-voting scheme into the U.N., we thought that they might wish to take into consideration how a truly universal world assembly would have voted. We therefore also include the "votes" of some nations that were not U.N. members. Our guesses, based on general political information, as to how they would have voted, are listed in Table XI. They are also apparent from Appendix 1.

Our comparison of formulas in this chapter follows the same plan as that in Section I. Thus we first compare the one-nation, one-vote, population, assessment, and GNP formulas. The results are given in Table XII, which corresponds to Table III, and should be compared with it.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE XII

In 1946-1950, there is little difference between Table III and Table XII, since China was included as a U.N. member in Table III, and Germany and the other divided countries are not yet included in Table

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TABLE XI. ESTIMATES OF VOTES OF NONMEMBERS OF THE U.N.

	1946-50	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-63*
China	Afro-Asian *	Soviet **	Soviet **	Afro-Asian **
East Germany	nonexistent	Soviet	Soviet	Af.-As. + Sov. and Soviet
West Germany	nonexistent	West	West + L. A.	West + L. A.
North Korea	nonexistent	Soviet	Soviet	Af.-As. + Sov. and Soviet
South Korea	nonexistent	West	West + L. A.	West + L. A.
Mauritania	nonexistent	nonexistent	nonexistent	Af.-As. + Sov.
Mongolia	Soviet	Soviet	Soviet	Af.-As. + Sov. and Soviet
Puerto Rico	West	West	West + L. A.	West + L. A.
Switzerland	West	West	West + L. A.	West + L. A.
North Vietnam	nonexistent	nonexistent	Soviet	Af.-As. + Sov. and Soviet
South Vietnam	nonexistent	nonexistent	West + L. A.	West + L. A.

* Actual vote of united China before the revolution.
** Following Albania.

XII in this period. Thus the only difference in this period between Tables III and XII is due to the addition of Puerto Rico and Switzerland to the West. In the GNP formula, this does not even show.

The differences are much more pronounced in the three later periods, especially in the population formula, in which China greatly strengthens the bloc it belongs to. The other three formulas are not as much affected, even in these three later periods. In the assessment and GNP formulas, West Germany adds as much to the voting strength of the West as China does to the Soviet or Afro-Asian blocs.

From the standpoint of balance, the population formula is no longer well balanced, as it was in Table III. This was expected. It will be quantified when we apply our balance criteria later.

Table XIII below should be compared with Table IV.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE XIII

Since all these formulas are based on population, the effect of China makes itself felt throughout by increasing the voting strength of the blocs to which China has been assigned, and correspondingly by decreasing the relative voting strengths of the other blocs, except that the voting strength of the West increases in 1951-1955, probably because of the contribution of West Germany.

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TABLE XII. COMPARISON OF POPULATION, ASSESSMENT, AND GNP FORMULAS WITH PRESENT SYSTEM

(U.N. nonmembers included)

		No. 1 1-nation, 1-vote	*No. 2 Population*	*No. 3 Assessment*	*No. 4 GNP*
1946-50	West	328	190	633	652
	Afro-Asian	270	607	93	146
	Soviet	115	122	225	149
	Lat. Am. 1	205	61	37	41
	Lat. Am. 2	82	20	12	12
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	280	232	632	673
	Afro-Asian	339	431	67	86
	Soviet	130	465	263	194
	Lat. Am.	206	61	28	36
	Scand.	15	2	9	7
	Gr. T.	30	9	1	4
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + Lat. Am.	544	322	604	677
	Afro-Asian	178	258	36	51
	Soviet	155	374	250	191
	Scand.	56	8	26	21
	Imper.	39	28	79	56
	Pro-West Neutrals	28	10	5	4
		1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + Lat. Am.	468	364	689	737
	Af.-As. + Soviet	333	557	187	173
	Soviet	54	58	102	75
	Scand.	23	4	14	11
	Imper.	5	1	1	1
	Pro-West Neutrals	117	16	7	3
		1000	1000	1000	1000

Balance considerations will be dealt with quantitatively later. Table XIV should be compared with Table V.

DISCUSSION OF TABLE XIV

The same trends as before are revealed in comparing Table XIV to Table V, but the changes are less pronounced than in the previous comparison of Tables XIII and IV.

Table XV below is to be compared with Table VI.

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TABLE XIII. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON POPULATION
(U.N. nonmembers included)

		No. 2 *Population*	*No. 5* *Clark & Sohn 1*	*No. 6* *Clark & Sohn 2*	*No. 7* *Sq. rt. pop.*	*No. 8* *Cube rt. pop.*
1946-50	West	190	339	325	289	329
	Af.-As.	607	357	358	400	360
	Soviet	122	135	120	116	100
	L. A. 1	61	131	149	143	152
	L. A. 2	20	38	48	52	59
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	232	319	342	266	291
	Af.-As.	431	344	278	379	376
	Soviet	465	202	202	206	158
	L. A.	61	107	145	119	139
	Scand.	2	8	9	9	12
	Gr.-T.	9	20	24	21	24
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + L. A.	322	502	519	480	500
	Af.-As.	258	201	205	216	209
	Soviet	374	202	179	205	174
	Scand.	8	23	28	31	42
	Imper.	28	57	52	48	52
	Pro-West Neutrals	10	15	17	20	23
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + L. A.	364	484	486	459	465
	Af.-As. + Sov.	557	347	342	371	349
	Soviet	58	114	100	100	94
	Scand.	4	11	12	13	20
	Imper.	1	3	4	3	4
	Pro-West Neutrals	16	41	56	54	68
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

DISCUSSION OF TABLE XV

The pop + GNP/cap formula (No. 19) cannot be applied here, because regression analysis results are not available for nonmembers of the U.N.

Comparison with Table VI shows that, as with the formulas of Tables XIII and XIV, the inclusion of China and the other nonmembers of the U.N. raises the voting weights of the blocs to which China be-

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TABLE XIV. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS FORMULAS BASED ON U.N. ASSESSMENT
(U.N. nonmembers included)

		No. 3 Assess. x	*No. 9 ax + 3*	*No. 10 ax + 5*	*No. 11 c log x + 3*	*No. 12 c log x + 5*	*No. 13 sq. rt.x*	*No. 14 cube rt. x*
1946-50	West	633	572	507	438	407	482	430
	Af.-As.	93	130	169	200	220	179	207
	Soviet	225	200	179	168	151	186	163
	L. A. 1	37	72	105	140	158	111	144
	L. A. 2	12	26	40	54	64	42	56
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1951-55	West	632	558	483	389	359	455	394
	Af.-As.	67	126	183	247	274	194	244
	Soviet	263	231	206	191	173	220	190
	Lat. Am.	28	66	102	127	149	98	133
	Scand.	9	10	12	21	19	17	18
	Gr.-T.	1	9	14	25	26	16	21
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1956-59	West + L.A.	604	590	574	525	533	538	535
	Af.-As.	36	70	102	120	134	98	124
	Soviet	250	224	204	196	182	217	195
	Scand.	26	34	40	71	66	55	59
	Imper.	79	72	65	71	65	78	69
	Pro-West Neutrals	5	10	15	17	20	14	18
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1960-63	West + L. A.	689	627	576	569	539	588	548
	Af.-As. + Sov.	187	229	266	272	290	259	282
	Soviet	102	89	72	79	70	84	74
	Scand.	14	16	19	35	31	27	28
	Imper.	1	2	3	4	4	3	3
	Pro-West Neutrals	7	37	64	41	66	39	65
		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000

longs, and usually depresses those of the other blocs, except sometimes that of the West. This effect is more pronounced than in Table XIV, but less so than in Table XIII.

APPLICATION OF CRITERIA TO EVALUATE THE FORMULAS

The criteria developed and discussed in Section I are applied to the results obtained with these formulas when nonmembers of the U.N. are included.

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TABLE XV. COMPARISON OF FORMULAS BASED ON POPULATION AND ANOTHER FACTOR
(U.N. nonmembers included)

		No. 15 Pop. + assess.	*No. 16 Pop. + GNP*	*No. 17 log pop. + log GNP*	*No. 18 Pop. + energy*	*No. 19 Pop. + GNP/ cap*	*No. 20 Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/ cap*
1946-50	West	378	368	354	405	—	405
	Af.-As.	269	283	283	334	—	358
	Soviet	107	101	93	167	—	144
	L. A. 1	178	179	194	67	—	70
	L. A. 2	68	69	76	27	—	23
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000
1951-55	West	260	256	246	316	—	319
	Af.-As.	262	279	277	181	—	174
	Soviet	311	305	291	443	—	454
	L. A.	130	124	150	48	—	45
	Scand.	14	12	12	5	—	3
	Gr.-T.	23	24	24	7	—	5
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000
1956-59	West + L. A.	542	529	545	490	—	506
	Af.-As.	168	182	183	150	—	151
	Soviet	153	150	143	287	—	280
	Scand.	55	56	55	22	—	12
	Imper.	60	60	55	40	—	42
	Pro-West Neutrals	22	23	19	11	—	9
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000
1960-63	West + L. A.	527	532	500	506	—	541
	Af.-As. + Sov.	312	316	327	374	—	372
	Soviet	56	58	50	78	—	66
	Scand.	24	26	24	10	—	7
	Imper.	5	5	4	2	—	1
	Pro-West Neutrals	76	63	95	30	—	13
		1000	1000	1000	1000		1000

The results are set out in Tables XVI and XVII below, which should be compared with Tables VIII and IX.

Comparison with Tables VIII and IX shows that the population formula (No. 2) is no longer as well balanced when China and the other nonmember nations are included; both Clark and Sohn formulas (Nos. 5 and 6) stand up very well, as do square and cube root of population (Nos. 7 and 8), and population and energy (No. 18). The failure

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TABLE XVI. APPLICATION OF BALANCE CRITERION, SCHEME I, TO 20 VOTING FORMULAS IN 4 PERIODS
(U.N. nonmembers included)

No.	*1946-50*	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-63*
1. 1-nation, 1-vote	230	† 62**	334	226
2. Population	458	592	264	230
3. Assessment	364	340	428	422
4. GNP	410	440	516	504
5. Clark & Sohn 1	‡ 16*	† 92	194	† 78**
6. Clark & Sohn 2	‡ 44	‡ 40***	232	116
7. Sq. rt. pop.	‡ 32	170	158*	† 58***
8. Cube rt. pop.	† 80	† 68*	234	114
9. $ax + 3$	340	286	412	364
10. $ax + 5$	304	222	388	324
11. $c \log x + 3$	264	124	368	298
12. $c \log x + 5$	258	†106	368	280
13. Sq. rt. of x	270	172	370	314
14. Cube rt. of x	260	132	362	288
15. Pop. + assess.	248	146	358	264
16. Pop. + GNP	232	168	336	252
17. log pop. + log GNP	248	136	348	246
18. Pop. + energy	‡ 2***	248	126***	† 96*
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	‡ 4**	256	138**	124

TABLE XVII. APPLICATION OF BALANCE CRITERION, SCHEME II, TO 20 VOTING FORMULAS IN 4 PERIODS
(U.N. nonmembers included)

No.	*1946-50*	*1951-55*	*1956-59*	*1960-63*
1. 1-nation, 1-vote	426***	418	778	†162
2. Population	970	466	† 232***	502
3. Assessment	1080	1130	1136	800
4. GNP	1012	1174	1252	978
5. Clark & Sohn 1	444**	284	602*	‡ 46*
6. Clark & Sohn 2	476+	280	680	‡ 88
7. Sq. rt. pop.	568	346	550**	‡ 24***
8. Cube rt. pop.	520	436	652	‡ 44**
9. $ax + 3$	884	864	1040	618
10. $ax + 5$	676	600	944	476
11. $c \log x + 3$	540	396	810	436
12. $c \log x + 5$	512	372	798	358
13. Sq. rt. of x	606	522	880	490
14. Cube rt. of x	534	408	822	384
15. Pop. + assess.	542	‡ 102*	778	318
16. Pop. + GNP	534	‡ 98**	758	316
17. log pop. + log GNP	522	‡ 90***	604	246
18. Pop. + energy	476+	524	680	†108
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	522	560	710	206

In each column of Tables XVI and XVII, *** denotes the best formula, ** second-best, * third-best, + tied for third-best.

† denotes that number is less than 20% of the largest number in column, ‡ less than 10%.

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of all the Manno assessment-based formulas (Nos. 9 to 14) to achieve balance is quite evident.

We shall now again score merit points for the formulas according to the method outlined in Section I. The results are given in Table XVIII, which should be compared with Table X.

TABLE XVIII. MERIT POINTS BY CRITERIA FOR 20 FORMULAS
(Nonmembers included)

	Balance merit points (summed for 4 periods)								
	Scheme I (bipolar)			*Scheme II (tripolar)*				*Rep. by*	
No.	*	†	*subtotal*	*	†	*subtotal*	*Additivity*	*pop.*	*Total*
1. 1-nation, 1-vote	2	1	3	3	1	4	0	0	7
2. Population	0	0	0	3	1	4	5	5	14
3. Assessment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
4. GNP	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	10
5. Clark & Sohn 1	3	4	7	4	2	6	0	0	13
6. Clark & Sohn 2	3	4	7	0.5	2	2.5	0	0	9.5
7. Sq. rt. pop.	4	3	7	5	2	7	0	0	14
8. Cube rt. pop.	1	2	3	2	2	4	0	0	7
9. $ax + 3$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. $ax + 5$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. $c \log x + 3$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12. $c \log x + 5$	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
13. Sq. rt. x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. Cube rt. x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Pop. & assess.	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	5	8
16. Pop. + GNP	0	0	0	2	2	4	5	5	14
17. log pop. + log GNP	0	0	0	3	2	5	0	0	5
18. Pop. + energy	7	3	10	0.5	1	1.5	5	5	21.5
19. Pop. + GNP/cap	not evaluated								
20. Pop. × sq. rt. GNP/cap	4	2	6	0	0	0	0	5	11

DISCUSSION OF TABLE XVIII

The best overall formula now is population and energy (No. 18). Tied for second-best are population (No. 2), population and GNP (No. 16), and square root of population (No. 7). However, No. 2 and No. 16 owe most of their points to nonbalance criteria, and No. 7 owes all of its points to balance criteria, as does the sole contender for third place, Clark and Sohn 1 (No. 5).

CONCLUSION

Using our criteria, the best formula is Betchov's population and energy formula. However, others may well prefer other criteria for judging these formulas. If this is the case, our tables provide the data to which these criteria may be applied.

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APPENDIX 1. LIST OF NATIONS

1946-50, West

In West only— Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S.
17

Split— Chile, Panama (also in Lat. Am. 2)
1

Non-U.N.— Puerto Rico, Switzerland.
2

1951-55, West

In West only— Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Turkey, U.K., U.S.
13

Split— Colombia, Peru (also in Latin America)
Norway, Sweden (also in Scand.)
2

Non-U.N.— West Germany, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Switzerland.
4

1956-59, West + Lat. Am.

In West only— Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican R., Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela.
42

Split— Australia, Luxembourg, South Africa (also in Imp.)
Mexico (also in Pro-West Neutrals)
2

Non-U.N.— West Germany, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Switzerland, South Vietnam.
5

1960-63, West + Lat. Am.

In West only— Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela.
44

Split— Denmark, Norway, Sweden (also in Scand.)
Israel, Laos (also in Pro-West Neutrals)
Portugal (also in Imp.)
3

Non-U.N.— West Germany, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Switzerland, South Vietnam.
5

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1946-50, Afro-Asian

Afghanistan, Burma, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.
16

Split— Cuba (also in Lat. Am. 1)
1/2

1951-55, Afro-Asian

Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
23

Split— None

1956-59, Afro-Asian

Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
15

Temporarily non-existent (counted separately)—Syria (merged with Egypt).

Split— Iraq, Libya (also in Pro-West Neutrals)
1

1960-63, Afro-Asian

Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
29

Split— Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Ukraine.
4

(Split too) Non-U.N.—East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam
2

(Full) Non-U.N.—China, Mauritania
2

1946-50, Soviet

Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
6

Non-U.N.— Mongolia
1

1951-55, Soviet

Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union, Ukraine.
5

Non-U.N.— China, East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia.
4

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1956-59, Soviet

Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Ukraine.
9

Non-U.N.— China, East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam.
5

1960-63, Soviet

Full members— None

Split— (with Afro-Asian) Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Ukraine.
4

(Split too) Non-U.N.—East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam
2

1946-50, Lat. Am.—1

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican R., Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela.
11

Split— Cuba (also in Af.-As.)
Costa Rica, Honduras (also in Lat. Am. 2)
1.5

1946-50, Lat. Am.—2

Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay.
3

Split— Costa Rica, Honduras (also in Lat. Am. 1)
Chile, Panama (also in West)
2

1951-55, Lat. Am.

Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican R., Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Venezuela.
13

Split— Colombia, Peru (also in West)
1

1951-55, Scand.

Full members— None

Split— Norway, Sweden (also in West)
1

1956-59, Scand.

Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden.
5

1960-63, Scand.

Finland
1

Split— Denmark, Norway, Sweden (also in West)
1.5

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1956-59, Imp.

Belgium, France, Portugal.
3

Split— Australia, Luxembourg, South Africa.
1.5

1960-63, Imp.

Full members— None

Split— Portugal
1/2

1956-59, Pro-West Neutrals

Full— Tunisia
1

Split— Iraq, Libya, (also in Af.-As.), Mexico (also in West)
1.5

1960-63, Pro-West Neutrals—French Africans

Cameroon, Central African R., Chad, Congo-B, Congo-L, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta.
12

Split— Israel, Laos.
1

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APPENDIX 2

Part (a) U.N. members

Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Afghanistan	1	7	0.5	1	4	5	4	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	4	12	6	2	5	4
Albania	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	2	1
Argentina	1	10	10	10	6	8	4	3	10	9	17	14	15	14	8	18	7	4	12	10
Australia	1	5	16	13	4	5	3	2	14	12	19	16	20	17	7	16	8	4	18	10
Austria	1	3	4	5	4	5	3	2	6	7	14	12	10	11	6	14	6	2	10	5
Belgium	1	4	12	11	4	5	3	2	11	10	18	15	17	15	7	16	7	3	17	6
Bolivia	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	2	1
Brazil	1	36	10	18	15	16	9	4	10	9	17	14	16	14	8	20	8	7	24	36
Bulgaria	1	4	2	3	4	5	3	2	4	6	10	10	7	8	5	13	6	2	7	4
Burma	1	10	0.5	1	6	8	5	3	3	5	5	6	4	6	5	15	7	3	6	5
Byelorussia	1	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6	7	15	12	11	11	1	—	—	—	—	—
Cambodia	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	5	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	8	5	2	3	1
Cameroon	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	8	5	1	—	1
Canada	1	9	31	32	6	5	4	3	24	19	23	18	27	21	7	18	8	8	28	18
Central African Rep.	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	3	5	1	—	1
Ceylon	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	7	7	5	6	4	13	7	2	4	3
Chad	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	1	—	1
Chile	1	3	3	3	4	5	3	2	5	6	11	11	8	9	5	13	6	2	7	3
Colombia	1	7	3	3	4	5	4	2	5	6	11	11	8	9	5	16	7	3	7	7
Congo B.	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Congo L.	1	7	0.5	1	4	5	4	2	3	5	5	6	4	6	4	14	7	2	—	4
Costa Rica	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	1	4	1
Cuba	1	3	2	3	4	5	3	2	4	6	11	10	7	9	5	13	6	2	8	3
Cyprus	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	3	4	1	—	1
Czechoslovakia	1	6	10	9	4	5	4	2	10	10	17	14	16	14	7	17	7	5	12	9

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Formula	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Country																				
Dahomey	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	—	1
Denmark	1	2	6	5	2	3	2	2	7	7	15	13	12	12	5	13	6	2	14	3
Dominican Rep.	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	8	5	1	4	1
Ecuador	1	2	0.5	1	2	3	2	2	3	5	5	6	4	6	3	10	5	1	3	1
Egypt	1	13	2	3	6	8	5	3	4	6	11	10	8	9	6	16	7	3	9	7
El Salvador	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	3	1
Ethiopia	1	11	0.5	1	6	8	5	3	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	14	7	3	7	6
Finland	1	2	4	3	2	3	2	2	5	7	13	12	9	10	4	13	6	2	11	3
France	1	22	59	42	15	16	7	4	44	32	25	19	37	26	8	20	8	10	25	33
Gabon	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	—	1	3	1
Gambia	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Ghana	1	3	1	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	7	7	5	6	4	6	5	2	3	2
Greece	1	4	2	3	4	5	3	2	4	6	11	10	7	9	5	13	6	2	7	4
Guatemala	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	2	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	9	5	1	4	1
Guinea	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	1	1
Haiti	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	8	5	1	2	1
Honduras	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	3	1
Hungary	1	5	5	5	4	5	3	2	6	7	14	12	11	11	6	15	7	3	9	5
Iceland	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	12	1
India	1	221	20	29	30	30	21	8	17	14	21	16	22	18	9	20	9	35	13	111
Indonesia	1	47	6	11	15	16	10	5	6	7	14	12	10	11	7	19	8	8	30	24
Iran	1	10	2	2	6	8	4	3	4	6	10	10	7	8	6	16	7	3	7	5
Iraq	1	3	1	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	7	7	5	6	4	11	6	2	4	2
Ireland	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	4	5	9	9	6	7	4	10	6	2	8	1
Israel	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	4	6	9	9	6	7	4	9	6	2	9	2
Italy	1	24	22	25	15	16	7	4	18	15	21	17	23	18	8	20	8	8	21	24
Ivory Coast	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	—	1
Japan	1	47	23	28	15	16	10	5	18	15	21	17	23	19	8	20	8	14	31	47

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Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Jordan	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	2	1
Laos	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	4	1	5	1
Lebanon	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	7	5	1	5	1
Liberia	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	2	1
Libya	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	3	4	1	1	1
Luxembourg	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	4	4	1	18	2
Malagasy	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	5	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	8	5	2	—	1
Malaysia	1	3	1	2	4	5	3	2	4	5	8	8	6	7	3	13	6	2	1	3
Mali	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	—	1
Mexico	1	18	7	8	6	8	6	3	8	8	16	14	13	13	7	19	7	6	13	18
Morocco	1	6	1	1	4	5	3	2	4	5	9	9	6	7	5	14	7	2	5	3
Nepal	1	4	0.5	0.5	4	5	3	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	10	5	2	3	2
Netherlands	1	5	10	9	4	5	3	2	10	9	17	14	15	14	7	17	7	4	13	8
New Zealand	1	1	4	3	2	3	1	1	6	7	13	12	10	10	5	10	6	2	16	2
Nicaragua	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	2	1
Niger	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	1	—	1
Nigeria	1	17	2	3	6	8	6	3	4	6	10	10	7	8	6	16	7	5	—	9
Norway	1	1	4	4	2	3	2	2	6	7	14	12	10	11	5	12	6	2	15	2
Pakistan	1	47	4	6	15	16	10	5	6	7	14	12	10	11	7	18	7	8	28	24
Panama	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	4	1
Paraguay	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	1	2	1
Peru	1	5	1	2	4	5	3	2	3	5	7	8	5	7	4	13	7	2	5	3
Philippines	1	14	4	5	6	8	5	3	6	7	13	12	10	10	6	17	7	3	10	7
Poland	1	15	13	13	6	8	5	3	12	11	18	15	17	15	8	19	8	7	14	15
Portugal	1	4	2	2	4	5	3	2	4	6	9	9	6	7	5	14	6	2	5	2
Romania	1	9	3	7	6	5	4	3	5	6	12	11	9	10	5	17	7	4	10	9
Saudi Arabia	1	3	0.5	1	2	5	2	2	3	5	5	6	4	6	4	11	6	2	4	2
Senegal	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	9	4	1	—	1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Somalia	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	—	1
South Africa	1	8	5	6	6	5	4	3	7	7	15	13	11	11	6	16	7	4	9	8
Soviet Union	1	109	149	122	30	30	15	6	106	73	30	22	59	35	10	20	10	49	68	109
Spain	1	15	9	9	6	8	6	3	9	9	17	14	14	13	8	18	7	4	12	15
Sudan	1	6	0.5	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	5	6	4	6	4	12	6	2	4	3
Sweden	1	3	13	11	4	5	3	2	12	11	19	15	17	15	7	15	7	3	19	6
Syria	1	2	0.5	1	2	3	2	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	10	5	2	3	1
Taiwan	1	5	1	2	4	5	3	2	4	5	9	9	6	7	5	13	7	2	7	3
Thailand	1	13	2	2	6	8	5	3	4	6	9	9	6	7	6	16	7	3	9	7
Togo	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	3	4	1	—	1
Tunisia	1	2	0.5	1	2	3	2	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	10	5	1	3	1
Turkey	1	14	4	6	6	8	5	3	6	7	13	12	10	10	6	17	7	4	11	14
Ukraine	1	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	16	13	20	16	21	18	—	—	—	—	—	—
U.K.	1	26	75	61	15	16	7	4	55	40	26	20	42	28	8	20	8	15	30	39
U.S.	1	91	319	443	30	30	13	6	223	150	33	25	86	45	10	20	10	84	83	230
Upper Volta	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	—	1
Uruguay	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	7	8	5	7	4	10	6	1	7	1
Venezuela	1	3	5	4	4	5	3	2	6	7	15	12	11	11	6	14	6	2	9	5
Yemen	1	2	0.5	0.5	2	5	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	2	1
Yugoslavia	1	9	4	5	6	5	4	3	5	7	13	12	9	10	5	17	7	3	9	9
Part (b). Those nonmembers of the U.N. added in Section II																				
China	13	47	46	46	30	30	26	9	34	26	24	19	33	23	9	20	9	59	—	174
E. Germany	1	8	11	10	6	5	4	3	11	10	18	15	17	15	7	17	7	6	—	8
W. Germany	1	27	60	50	15	16	7	4	44	32	25	19	37	26	8	20	8	15	—	42
N. Korea	1	4	0.5	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	4	12	5	2	—	2
S. Korea	1	12	3	3	6	8	5	3	5	6	12	11	9	10	6	16	7	3	—	6
Mauritania	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	3	4	1	—	1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Mongolia	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	3	3	1	—	1
Puerto Rico	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	9	6	2	—	1
Switzerland	1	2	5	7	2	5	2	2	7	7	15	13	11	11	6	14	6	2	—	4
N. Vietnam	1	8	0.5	1	6	5	4	3	3	5	5	6	4	6	4	13	6	2	—	4
S. Vietnam	1	7	1	1	6	5	4	2	3	5	7	7	5	6	4	13	6	2	—	4
Part (c). Nonmembers of the U.N. not included in this study																				
Aden	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	3	4	1	—	1
Algeria	1	5	1	2	4	5	3	2	3	5	7	8	5	7	4	13	7	2	—	3
Angola	1	2	1.5	0.5	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	7	5	1	—	1
Bahamas	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Bahrein	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Barbados	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Bermuda	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	1	1	—	1
Bhutan	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Botswana	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Brit. Honduras	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Brunei	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Burundi	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	2	5	1	—	1
Cape Verde	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Channel Islands	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Fiji	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Gaza	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Guadeloupe	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Guyana	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	4	4	1	—	1
Hong Kong	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	8	5	1	—	1
Ifni	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Jamaica	1	1	0.5	1	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	—	1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Kenya	1	4	0.5	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	4	6	4	5	4	11	5	2	—	2
Kuwait	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	3	5	4	6	4	5	2	5	4	1	—	3
Leeward Islands	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Lesotho	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Macao	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Malawi	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	—	1
Maldives	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Malta	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	4	1	—	1
Martinique	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Mauritius	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	4	1	—	1
Mozambique	1	3	0.5	0.5	2	5	3	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	9	5	2	—	2
Muscat & Oman	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Namibia	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Neth. Antilles	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
New Guinea	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	2	5	1	—	1
Papua	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Port. Guinea	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Reunion	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Rhodesia	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	8	5	1	—	1
Rwanda	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	—	1
Ryukyu	**1**	**1**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**3**	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Salomon	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Samoa	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Sarawak	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Sierra Leone	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	4	5	1	—	1
Sikkim	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Singapore	1	1	0.5	1	1	3	1	1	3	5	4	6	4	5	3	6	5	1	—	1
S. Yemen	**1**	**1**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**3**	5	3	5	3	5	3	2	5	1	—	1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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Formula	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*
Country																				
Surinam	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Swaziland	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Tanzania	1	4	0.5	1	4	5	3	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	11	5	2	—	2
Timor	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Trinidad	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	4	4	1	—	1
Trucial Oman	*1*	*1*	*0.5*	*0.5*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*3*	*5*	*3*	*5*	*3*	*5*	*2*	*2*	*3*	*1*	—	*1*
Uganda	1	3	0.5	0.5	4	5	2	2	3	5	3	5	3	5	4	9	5	2	—	2
Virgin Islands	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	2	1	—	1
Windward Islands	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	2	2	3	1	—	1
Zambia	1	1	0.5	0.5	2	3	2	1	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	6	5	1	—	1

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FIGURE 1

Factor Analysis of Nation-Blocs in United Nations Voting

Time Changes in Nation-Bloc Alignments: Based on Numbers of Nations



1. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania join UN & SOV
2. Yugoslavia, SOV to A-A
2' Albania, SOV to A-A
3. SOV (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, BSSR, UKSSR, USSR) loads equally on SOV & A-A, so half of weight is credited to each
3' Indonesia joins UN & A-A
4. Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Morocco, Nepal, Sudan, ½ Libya join UN & A-A
5. Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo join UN & A-A
6. Haiti, ½ Cuba, A-A to LA
7. China, A-A to nonmember
8. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Iran, Thailand, Uruguay, ½ Mexico, A-A to WEST + LA
9. ½ Iraq, ½ Mexico, A-A to PWN
10. Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, LA II to A-A
11. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, LA I to A-A
12. ½ Costa Rica, ½ Honduras, ½ Panama, ½ Chile, LA II to LA
13. Tunisia, ½ Iraq, ½ Libya, PWN to A-A
14. ½ Colombia, ½ Peru, LA I to WEST
15. Israel joins UN & LA
16. LA & WEST join to form WEST + LA
17. Finland, Ireland join UN & SCAND
18. Tunisia, ½ Libya join UN & PWN
19. ½ Mexico, PWN to WEST + LA
20. Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Congo-B, Congo-L, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta join UN & PWN
21. Thailand, WEST to A-A
22. ½ Chile, ½ Panama, WEST to LA
23. ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
24. Greece, WEST to NO-BLOC
25. Greece, Taiwan, NO-BLOC to WEST + LA
26. Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
27. Ireland, ½ Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, SCAND to WEST + LA
28. Cuba, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, WEST + LA to A-A
29. ½ Laos, ½ Israel, WEST + LA to PWN
30. Belgium, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, France, ½ S. Africa, WEST to IMP
31. Austria, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Laos, Spain join UN & WEST + LA
32. Cyprus joins UN & WEST + LA
33. Belgium, France, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, ½ Portugal, ½ S. Africa, IMP to WEST + LA
34. Portugal joins UN & IMP

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FIGURE 2

Factor Analysis of Nation-Blocs in United Nations Voting

Time Changes in Nation-Bloc Alignments: Based on Populations



1. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania join UN & SOV
2. Yugoslavia, SOV to A-A
2' Albania, SOV to A-A
3. SOV (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, BSSR, UkSSR, USSR) loads equally on SOV & A-A, so half of weight is credited to each
3' Indonesia joins UN & A-A
4. Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Morocco, Nepal, Sudan, ½ Libya join UN & A-A
5. Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo join UN & A-A
6. Haiti, ½ Cuba, A-A to LA
7. China, A-A to nonmember
8. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Iran, Thailand, Uruguay, ½ Mexico, A-A to WEST + LA
9. ½ Iraq, ½ Mexico, A-A to PWN
10. Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, LA II to A-A
11. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, LA I to A-A
12. ½ Costa Rica, ½ Honduras, ½ Panama, ½ Chile, LA II to LA
13. Tunisia, ½ Iraq, ½ Libya, PWN to A-A
14. ½ Colombia, ½ Peru, LA I to WEST
15. Israel joins UN & LA
16. LA & WEST join to form WEST + LA
17. Finland, Ireland join UN & SCAND
18. Tunisia, ½ Libya join UN & PWN
19. ½ Mexico, PWN to WEST + LA
20. Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Congo-B, Congo-L, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta join UN & PWN
21. Thailand, WEST to A-A
22. ½ Chile, ½ Panama, WEST to LA
23. ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
24. Greece, WEST to NO-BLOC
25. Greece, Taiwan, NO-BLOC to WEST + LA
26. Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
27. Ireland, ½ Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, SCAND to WEST + LA
28. Cuba, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, WEST + LA to A-A
29. ½ Laos, ½ Israel, WEST + LA to PWN
30. Belgium, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, France, ½ S. Africa, WEST to IMP
31. Austria, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Laos, Spain join UN & WEST + LA
32. Cyprus joins UN & WEST + LA
33. Belgium, France, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, ½ Portugal, ½ S. Africa, IMP to WEST + LA
34. Portugal joins UN & IMP

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FIGURE 3

Factor Analysis of Nation-Blocs in United Nations Voting

Time Changes in Nation-Bloc Alignments: Based on GNP's



1. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania join UN & SOV
2. Yugoslavia, SOV to A-A
2' Albania, SOV to A-A
3. SOV (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, BSSR, UkSSR, USSR) loads equally on SOV & A-A, so half of weight is credited to each
3' Indonesia joins UN & A-A
4. Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Morocco, Nepal, Sudan, ½ Libya join UN & A-A
5. Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo join UN & A-A
6. Haiti, ½ Cuba, A-A to LA
7. China, A-A to nonmember
8. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Iran, Thailand, Uruguay, ½ Mexico, A-A to WEST + LA
9. ½ Iraq, ½ Mexico, A-A to PWN
10. Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, LA II to A-A
11. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, LA I to A-A
12. ½ Costa Rica, ½ Honduras, ½ Panama, ½ Chile, LA II to LA
13. Tunisia, ½ Iraq, ½ Libya, PWN to A-A
14. ½ Colombia, ½ Peru, LA I to WEST
15. Israel joins UN & LA
16. LA & WEST join to form WEST + LA
17. Finland, Ireland join UN & SCAND
18. Tunisia, ½ Libya join UN & PWN
19. ½ Mexico, PWN to WEST + LA
20. Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Congo-B, Congo-L, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta join UN & PWN
21. Thailand, WEST to A-A
22. ½ Chile, ½ Panama, WEST to LA
23. ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
24. Greece, WEST to NO-BLOC
25. Greece, Taiwan, NO-BLOC to WEST + LA
26. Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, WEST to SCAND
27. Ireland, ½ Denmark, ½ Norway, ½ Sweden, SCAND to WEST + LA
28. Cuba, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, WEST + LA to A-A
29. ½ Laos, ½ Israel, WEST + LA to PWN
30. Belgium, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, France, ½ S. Africa, WEST to IMP
31. Austria, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Laos, Spain join UN & WEST + LA
32. Cyprus joins UN & WEST + LA
33. Belgium, France, ½ Australia, ½ Luxembourg, ½ Portugal, ½ S. Africa, IMP to WEST + LA
34. Portugal joins UN & IMP

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Review Articles

ETHNICITY, COMMUNISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

By ANDREW C. JANOS*

Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*. Princeton, Princeton University Press (second paperback ed.), 1965, 244 pp. $2.95.
François Fejtö, *Les juifs et l'antisémitisme dans les pays communistes*, Paris, Libraire Plon, 1960, 273 pp. 10.20NF.
Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*, New York, Doubleday, 1969, 396 pp. $6.95.
Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, 308 pp. $9.50.

I

ETHNICITY is one of the less precise terms in the vocabulary of social science. Most frequently used in reference to language, its meaning is sometimes extended to cover common social, cultural, and physical characteristics transmitted as a matter of inheritance and capable of producing social solidarities based on affect.[1] So defined, ethnicity has both subjective and objective dimensions, for it refers both to perceptible traits and to perception whereby the former assume social relevance.

For the sociologist and the political scientist the phenomenon poses two important analytic problems. For one, there is the elusive relationship between its objective and subjective aspects, and the conditions under which a particular human trait will have an observable effect upon collective attitude and behavior. Another general problem arises when these perceptions appear as "inputs" or "demands" in the political

* I wish to express my thanks to the Center for International Affairs and the Russian Research Center for the support of my work during the academic year 1969-1970. I am also indebted to the members of the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Seminar on Political Development for the many stimulating discussions on the political implications of ethnicity. The views expressed in the article, however, are exclusively mine.

[1] Frequently, as in currently widespread American usage, a boundary line drawn between ethnicity and race is based on distinctions between social and genetic inheritance. In many instances, however, the presence or importance of a physical trait may be only a matter of subjective judgment or imagination. Thus, whatever its analytic utility, the clearcut separation of these categories is difficult, if not impossible.

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process and leave their imprint on "outputs" (policies), political institutions, and the integration of the political system. Each one of these problems raises different questions that have to be answered within different frames of reference.

In the context of communism these problems acquire particular significance, because of the nature of the ideology around which the identity of the movement was initially built. This ideology, as is well known, denied the validity of ethnic solidarities and provided a new reference group to the faithful in the image of the international proletariat, but in doing so it clashed with the persistence of national loyalties in the societies where the parties were functioning and aspiring to seize the helm of government. As a result, the story of the relationship between ethnicity and communism is one of strain, conflict, and adaptation, and raises three inevitable questions: 1) What are the social and cultural factors that explain the rise of disparate universalistic and particularistic political loyalties? 2) What are the dynamics of the process of adaptation? and 3) What is the range of possible outcomes?

Though different in their approaches to the subject matter, each of the four volumes at hand touches upon some aspect of ethnicity in Communist society that invites the attempt to synthesize their findings. Moreover, the books have a common chronological perspective, which makes it possible to compare processes of change in time and space. Therefore, in reviewing these works, the present essay will not merely attempt to examine their contents, but will also seek answers to the questions raised above and will draw some general conclusions concerning the appeals of universalistic and particularistic ideologies, the sources of political change in Communist society, and the different meanings of "national communism" in contemporary Eastern Europe.

II

The first book to be reviewed here, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* by Richard V. Burks, is a pioneering work in its field that, only eight years after its first edition, achieved something of the status of a classic by the competent application of the statistical method in empirical research and by the imaginative use of comparisons and analogies to develop a number of explanatory hypotheses on the anatomy of communism. Today, the volume is available in a second English edition (with an introduction reflecting upon the validity of

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some of its propositions) as well as in a German translation published in 1969.[2]

Professor Burks's study does not merely address itself to the problem of ethnicity but represents a broader attempt to investigate the sources of weaknesses and strength in the history of the East European Communist movement. Specifically, the aims of the study are threefold: 1) to explore the composition of Communist elites and their popular supporters from the early days of the movement to the time when the parties established themselves in power following World War II; 2) to account for motivations underlying political support for the Communist parties; and 3) to account for the variations of this support from country to country. The raw materials the author uses to evolve his themes are impressive in volume and variety. In order to answer the questions that he posits, Burks examines the membership of top Party organs, Communist parliamentary delegations, statistics on rank-and-file Party members, trade unions, and guerrilla armies. Wherever it was feasible and possible (as in the case of Greek prisoners of the civil war) he also conducted extensive interviews. But the bulk of the information comes from the analysis of voting results, which, despite the notoriety of East European countries for electoral corruption (both before and after the advent of communism), show highly consistent and suggestive correlations that can hardly be dismissed as accidental.

As its point of departure the study inquires into the validity of social and economic differentiation as explanatory variables by testing, as a working hypothesis, the standard Marxist-Leninist claim concerning the working-class character of the Communist movements. Not surprisingly, Burks finds these concepts inadequate to explain the appeals of communism in Eastern Europe, for neither the elites nor the bulk of their supporters were apparently recruited from the urban proletariat. Instead, both before and after World War II, the movement thrived on peasant support, whereas for leadership it depended on socially and culturally alienated intellectuals, primarily of "middle-class" parentage. (pp. 20-21). Specifically, the examination of voting patterns in ten major industrial areas of Eastern Europe reveals only three positive correlations between a working-class electorate and the Communist vote (p. 39)—significantly, in areas where the social democratic parties did not compete with the Communists on a separate list.

[2] Richard V. Burks, *Die Dynamik des Kommunismus in Osteuropa* (Hannover 1969).

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Even more striking, however, is Burks's discovery that no significant correlation existed between agricultural poverty and the Communist vote (p. 44). In districts where the distribution of land was most inequitable, and where the agricultural proletariat and "dwarf-holders" were concentrated, Communist candidates apparently made little headway.

If (as we were led to surmise from the beginning) the initial set of questions turns up negative correlations, this fact does not altogether disprove the relevance of socioeconomic variables. Although social-class and economic differentials (the classic components of the Marxian scheme) do not yield meaningful explanations, the categories of more recent sociological analysis appear to do so. Thus when Burks investigates the phenomena of socioeconomic (as well as physical) mobility and marginality, he finds that they provide some clues to his central theme. For one, he finds that sailors (p. 41), refugees (p. 57), members of resettled national groups (p. 58) (such as the Greeks expelled from the Caucasus), together with other categories of displaced persons, have traditionally provided a disproportionate number of Communist activists and cadres, and among the peasants the segment most prone to vote for the Communists was neither capitalist nor subsistence farmers but an economically marginal group of producers who depended on a single crop for their income and thus were particularly vulnerable to incomprehensible fluctuations of the market (pp. 54, 56, 66). The lowest common denominator and explanatory variable in all of these instances is not economic interest but social strain, the breakdown of the cognitive and normative order, and anomie.

Yet although these categories of social analysis can provide some insight into political motivation, they cannot by themselves account for the variability of Communist strength in the countries and regions of Eastern Europe. Reflecting this variability are electoral results ranging from the relatively high Bulgarian (20.4 percent), Yugoslav (12.3 percent), and Czechoslovak (13.2 percent) figures to the more modest 7.9 percent in Poland, the underground weakness of the party in Hungary, and the thoroughly dismal Communist record in Rumania in the interwar period. Similarly, after World War II the 38 percent for Czechoslovakia represents a glaring contrast to the 17 percent garnered by the Hungarian Communist Party.

Professor Burks's most significant contribution is his ability to demonstrate that these variations are the functions of ethnicity and national sentiment. More specifically, he is able to link these variations to three variables: 1) historical-cultural affinity with Russia, the home-

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land of communism; 2) the status of a given ethnic group in the national state—whether a "state people" living in their own national state (as the Rumanians were in Rumania or the Bulgarians in Bulgaria), "junior partners" (as the Croats were in Yugoslavia or the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia), or "oppressed minorities" as the Hungarians were in Rumania and Czechoslovakia or the Ukrainians in Poland —and finally, 3) the policies of the Comintern and the Soviet Union toward the given national state. Accordingly we will find that the Slavic peoples were more attracted to communism than were non-Slavic ones and that oppressed minorities had a higher tendency to vote for Communists than did "state peoples," provided that the official line of the international Communist movement was favorable to their territorial-political aspirations. Naturally, the highest concentrations of Communist vote occurred in instances where these diverse sources of Communist appeal converged—among oppressed minorities of Slavic identity living in national states whose existence was questioned by the Soviet Union. Hence the high percentage of Communist vote in Montenegro (p. 79), Macedonia (p. 93), Carpatho-Ruthenia and the western Ukraine (p. 83). In these regions the Communist vote ranged from 33 to 42 percent in the 1920's. Conversely, the Communist appeal was lowest among peoples, like the Rumanians, who regarded themselves as culturally alien from Slavdom, who lived in their own national state, and whose existence and integrity were threatened by Soviet foreign policy. The configurations of these variables explain the variations of Communist appeal not only from country to country and region to region but also within the same country over time. Thus, in the 1920's, when Soviet policy envisaged the dissolution or federalization of the Czechoslovak state, the Party polled an average of 9.8 percent of the vote among the Czechs, 10.7 percent among the Slovaks, scoring especially high among Hungarians (24 percent) and the Carpatho-Ukrainians (42 percent). But as Soviet policy gradually changed from hostility to friendship toward the Czechoslovak state, the distribution of votes also changed. In 1946 the Communist vote averaged over 40 percent in the Czech regions, but hardly reached 30 percent among the Slovaks, and the Hungarians dropped altogether from the electoral picture (pp. 213-15).

In the main, then, as we have seen, the thesis that emerges from the study is that the principal reason the peoples of Eastern Europe voted for (or otherwise supported) the Communist Party was that it enabled them to assert their ethnic aspirations and identity. Conversely, where they could not cast the Communist Party in a nationalist role, they

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would turn their backs to its candidates. This, however, was only one way in which ethnicity had an impact on political behavior, and the alternative pattern becomes evident when Professor Burks turns his attention to the "rejected peoples" of Eastern Europe, groups without a territorial base or clearcut ethnic identity. In the case of such peoples, Professor Burks explains, communism had an appeal not because it seemed to promote the national interest or helped assert ethnic solidarities, but rather because its universalistic ideology held out the promise of a new supra-ethnic or supranational identity and integration within the body politic. The phenomenon that we deal with, therefore, is one not of positive but of negative identification, a kind of "inverse nationalism," or the rejection of ethnicity as a valid base for political organization.

Professor Burks's major example of a "rejected people" is the Jews of Eastern Europe, an ethnic group whose members have for decades occupied a disproportionate, occasionally preponderant, place among the Party leadership (pp. 158-63). This fact, of course, has been recognized before and was one of the favorite themes of the political Right in its attacks against the Jewish communities as a whole, describing communism as a vehicle of Jewish political and cultural ascendancy. More important than the raw data, therefore, is the question of interpretation, the argument that Jewish participation in the Communist movement represented no drive to promote religious orthodoxy and cultural values, but an attempt to find a new form of "secular orthodoxy" (p. 163). As Burks points out, the Jewish Communists of Eastern Europe were a "brand of assimilationists" who believed "that genuine assimilation would become possible only if and when the existing society underwent some fundamental change" (*ibid.*). In this pursuit they relentlessly fought not only the representatives of religious orthodoxy but the secular protagonists of the cultural heritage as well.

Although on the whole it is easy to go along with the previous argument, it is slightly more difficult to accept the parallel treatment of the Hungarians, whom Professor Burks also regards as a "rejected people." In a certain sense, of course, the Magyars too fit the category, in their cultural and ethnic loneliness among the Indo-Germanic peoples of the European continent. On the other hand they do possess (and have possessed over the centuries) a clearcut national identity and a national state, and therefore they have never experienced the same crisis of identity that some of the Jewish communities experienced in the early and explosive phases of social modernization. Indeed, because of this very identity (as becomes obvious from the text itself) ethnic Hun-

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garians tended to reject communism and, except for the brief revolutionary episode of 1918-1919 (when the Communists appeared briefly as the defenders of the national patrimony), the Party had almost as much difficulty in attracting supporters from the "native" element as it had in Rumania. To be sure, among the Hungarian minorities of Transylvania and Slovakia the picture was different, in that the Communist Party had considerable appeal, though as a vehicle not of assimilation but of ethnic protest. There is, of course, no reason to doubt that some members of these minorities attempted to escape the burdens of ethnic identity and blend into the surrounding society, but a far larger number have tenaciously opposed assimilation. (In recognition of this resistance, after World War II the Magyars of Slovakia were expelled, those of Transylvania granted territorial autonomy, by the Communist regimes.)

The Hungarians, then, do not seem to qualify as one of the "rejected peoples" of Eastern Europe, at least not in terms of ethnic anomie and frustrated assimilation. However, a number of others whom Professor Burks does not include in the relevant chapter (pp. 150-70) may well have been—either because they were, like the Jews, "homeless" or else because they were "marginal" in the sense that they were ambivalent about their ethnic identity. In this context we might well take the *prechani*, the Serbians "across the river" who, though Serbian in language, often shared the cultural values and/or religion of the peoples among whom they lived. Most conspicuous among them were the Serbs of Bosnia, caught between the powerful forces of Islam and Slavic ethnolinguistic nationalism (pp. 125-26, 142-44). Another example is that of the Macedonians (p. 93), who for half a century lived amid conflicting Serbian and Bulgarian demands and claims for their ethnic loyalty. Yet another example is that of the Tosks (pp. 145-48), the Albanians of the south who differ from their co-nationals in religion and dialect and, most significantly, in a cosmopolitan outlook they had acquired by performing for centuries the role of intermediary between the outside world and the Albanian hinterland. In this context we may also re-examine the earlier hypothesis about the Greeks of the Caucasus who embraced communism because of "the nostalgic memories of the Russian homeland" (p. 60) or, to put it in other words, because they found it difficult to identify themselves culturally with the bulk of their co-nationals and became, in fact, a people without an ethnic identity. Burks demonstrates that all of these groups produced

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more than their share of Communist cadres and voters, and implies that they did so as a form of ethnic protest. Yet the analogy with the Jewish case is compelling and suggests that more complex motivations, above all the search for a new supranational identity, may have been at work.

To be sure, as Burks aptly demonstrates in his analysis of the Jewish vote (pp. 158-60 and 189-90) none of these groups turned to communism *in toto* to resolve a crisis of identity. Indeed, it would be erroneous to assume that all of them experienced such a crisis. The problem of marginality, ethnic or otherwise, assumes subjective dimensions only under the impact of social and educational mobility that thrust individuals into the mainstream of national life, and even a perfunctory analysis of the "homeless" and "marginal" peoples of Eastern Europe will reveal that their involvement with the Communist movement has varied with the degree of literacy and higher education among their numbers. In groups where these factors were low or absent (as among the gypsies, one of the best-known of the "homeless" peoples of Eastern Europe) the political response was negligible. The search for a new identity was most prevalent among the middle classes and the intelligentsia, the social segments most dependent on interaction and communication for their existence. The *prechanin* of the backwoods, the Tosk peasant of the villages, the inhabitant of the Jewish *stetl* of Galicia or Ruthenia continued to live in traditional social settings, and their experiences with the outside world were more often productive of withdrawal and alienation than a crisis of identity or anomie.

Whatever their actual extent, the phenomena of mobility, marginality, and anomie (ethnic, social, and cultural) appear to be major explanatory variables for the *ideological* appeals of communism. Thus, although Professor Burks persuasively demonstrates that the majority of Communist followers were "opportunists" who attempted to use the movement as an instrument of parochial interests, he also shows that besides them there existed a "hard core" of true believers who "acted . . . out of an inner necessity" and "depth of conviction" (p. 15) that stemmed from their search for psychological security and may be related to the universalistic tenets of Marxism. This duality of motivations underlying the appeals of communism, it seems to me, is one of Professor Burks's most significant findings and helps us to understand the strains and the "dynamics" of the movement, the debilitating conflicts engendered by the "national question" (pp. 109-15), and the differential patterns of adaptation to the exigencies of ethnic particularism and nationalism.

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III

Like Professor Burks's study, *Les juifs et l'antisémitisme . . .* by François Fejtö focuses attention on the problem of ethnicity in the context of Communist politics, but differs from it in several important respects. For one, Mr. Fejtö's study does not deal with the problem of ethnicity in a broad sweep but examines the position of a single ethnic group in several societies. Second, its emphasis is not on the "dynamics" of popular attitudes and behavior but on the pressures and motivations underlying official policy. Even more significantly, however, the two works differ in their methods of analysis. Whereas Burks's research is rigorous and systematic, and proceeds from a well-defined conceptual framework, Fejtö's study may be described as "journalistic," mixing documentation with impressions and resting on a loose, implicit analytic structure. Yet, at the same time, Fejtö's work demonstrates remarkable intuition and skill in raising the relevant questions, and makes a serious attempt to reach balanced conclusions on a tangled and controversial subject. These qualities not only compensate for its lack of rigor, but make his essay and the accompanying documents an important case study in the changing Communist perceptions of ethnicity.[3]

To understand the roots of the problem, Fejtö suggests, we have to approach it from the point of view of Marxist ideology, which though generally suspicious of ethnic particularism, has tended to be especially hostile toward Judaism, defining it not merely as a form of false consciousness, but as a "form of alienation" (p. 15), an abnormality produced and reinforced by the anomalies of class society. For Marx, as well as for many of his distinguished disciples, Jewish separatism and identity were the functions of contradictions within the feudal and capitalist economy that were to disappear tracelessly with the victory of socialism.

As in so many instances, however, these strictures of the ideology failed to provide specific guidelines for action, a failure that gave rise to two different schools of thought after the establishment of Soviet power. On the one hand, Fejtö tells us, a small and aggressive group of Bolsheviks (many of them, as he maintains, of Jewish origin) emphasized the religious elements of Jewishness, denied that Jews were an ethnic group in the same sense as were the Ukrainians or Byelorus-

[3] Fejtö's study was recently published in German, unfortunately without any attempt to bring it up to date on important developments in the intervening period. See François Fejtö, *Judentum und Kommunismus. Antisemitismus in Osteuropa* (Wien, Frankfurt, and Zürich, 1967).

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sians, and wanted to bring about their quick assimilation into the surrounding nationalities by coercive administrative means. These Bolsheviks were in the forefront of attacks not only on Jewish religious communities but on social and cultural institutions as well. They preached the abolition of the *kehilots*, the Socialist communes of Yiddish-speaking citizens, and led the way in what was to become the first of many campaigns against Jewish "profiteers" and nepmen in the mid-twenties (p. 25). At the same time, however, the majority of the Bolsheviks (among them Lenin and even Stalin) held a more moderate view according to which assimilation, while ultimately desirable, was to be a prolonged and spontaneous process preceded by a stage of cultural autonomy. As this view prevailed, special Jewish sections were set up in the Central Committee and within the Soviet government, a secular culture was allowed to flourish, and, as the ultimate gesture of goodwill, the Jewish autonomous territory of Birobidjan was called into existence in 1928.

But, as Fejtö aptly points out, ideology was soon to be overshadowed by the exigencies of power and the totalitarian *raison d'état* of Stalinism. By 1935 the earlier "heroic" period of the revolution had given way to the "epoch of bureaucracy" (p. 29), bringing in its train the reversal of earlier policies toward the Jewish community. In discussing these changes, Fejtö sees three reasons for the decline of cultural tolerance and autonomy: 1) the rise of a Soviet national particularism that was inherently hostile to Jews, viewing them as a *peuple international*; 2) the need to establish the "nationalistic" credentials of the regime by appealing to recrudescent popular anti-Semitism; and 3) the rise of a new generation of Communist intelligentsia who had to be accommodated within the apparatus of state and party at the expense of Jewish functionaries (pp. 26-31).

Yet, as Fejtö hastens to add, the policy of repression and persecution initiated in the mid-thirties did not reach its planned dimensions because domestic political pressures had to be weighed against the exigencies of foreign policy, the desire of the Soviet leaders not to alienate the international democratic left (1936-1938), the need of forging an anti-fascist alliance (1941-1945), and, after the Second World War, against expectations that the state of Israel might become an instrument of Soviet power in the Middle East. The importance of these considerations temporarily outweighed the pressures for repression and gave rise to the "second emancipation" (p. 32) of Soviet Jews between the years 1941 and 1948. But, as Soviet hopes for controlling Israel were dashed in the aftermath of the Palestine War, Soviet domestic policies were quickly reversed, and Soviet Jews once more became the

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targets of harassment and discrimination, culminating in the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign, the arrest of the Kremlin doctors, and the liquidation of much of the Jewish cultural elite.

Whereas the Stalinist campaign against the Jews came close to downright racism (by its attempts to reduce Jews to the position of helotry and by using them as scapegoats to relieve the inner strains of the regime) the post-Stalin leadership appears to have reverted to earlier policies of assimilation. This goal, as we have seen, is not inconsistent with Marxist teachings and fits easily into the broader ideological framework of the regime. The problem is, however, that the current exigencies of foreign policy (the increasing Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Middle East on the side of the Arab nations) and the prevalence of a "Jewish complex" in Russia (in the form of persistent fears of disloyalty on the part of a strategic segment of the population) tend to counsel measures (such as the maintenance of a separate Jewish identity for passport and identification purposes) that can hardly be regarded as instrumental in translating assimilationist principles into effective public policy. Thus, as in so many other areas of Soviet life, in relation to the Jews there is a wide gap between the conflicting imperatives of ideology and political control, and between long-range objective and short-range solutions, that tends to deprive public policy of coherence and consistency. As in other instances, the leadership attempts to close the gap by *ad hoc* adaptations and petty terror, whose ritual is described by Fejtö in revealing detail (pp. 49-50).

Fejtö's analysis of Soviet developments is incisive, informative, and well documented. These qualities unfortunately are not equally evident in the chapters covering Eastern Europe. Here the author obviously had to contend with the paucity of materials (90 percent of the documents in the appendix relate to the Soviet Union rather than to the lesser Communist states), a circumstance that results in unfortunate attempts to extrapolate generalizations from the Soviet experience. Specifically, Fejtö suggests that the experiences of Eastern Europe followed, "with certain nuances," the developments in the Soviet Union (p. 56). Accordingly, between the years 1945 and 1948 the ascendant Communist parties of the area extended their "benevolent protection" (p. 61) to the surviving Jewish minorities,[4] but after 1948 they followed

[4] According to Fejtö's sources (East Europe, March, 1959, quoted on p. 60), the number of Jews in the countries of East Europe was as follows:

Country	*After the War*	*1957*
Czechoslovakia	45,000	5,000 (?)
Hungary	140,000	80,000
Poland	50,000	25,000
Rumania	400,000	200,000

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the lead of the Soviet Union in repressive, discriminatory policies that included the liquidation of Jewish cultural institutions and elites, as well as of high-ranking Communists of Jewish origin.

On the surface this indeed appears to be a fair summation of developments. But a closer examination of the evidence, including scattered bits of information provided by the author himself, will reveal significant differences in policy not only between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but among the East European countries themselves. Such variations were already evident in 1945, but they became quite conspicuous between 1948 and 1953. Thus, whereas Czechoslovakia, as Fejtö notes (p. 67), led the way in discriminative policies that culminated in the Slansky trial and in the accompanying anti-Semitic agitation, in Rumania and Poland the purges took a more discreet form, while they hardly changed the composition of the predominantly Jewish leadership of the Hungarian party.[5] These differences, I will suggest, were not random, and did not merely reflect the outcome of local power struggles between the "Jewish" and the "native" factions of the parties, but rather showed a close correlation with local conditions, such as 1) the availability and reliability of "native" organizational and technical personnel, 2) the size and structure of minorities, and 3) the manipulability of the resentments, fears, and aspirations of ethnic groups, majorities as well as minorities, among the general population. In Czechoslovakia, where the party could exploit widespread pro-Russian and anti-German sentiments, the numerically inconsequential Jewish minority soon became expendable and could easily be turned into a scapegoat for the failures of the regime, but in the other countries, where the "native" intelligentsia was anti-Russian by tradition and heavily compromised by past associations with conserva-

[5] We may get some idea of these differences by comparing the conduct of the Rajk and the Slansky trials, both of them purportedly (Fejtö, p. 65) designed to purge the country of Jewish Communists. In Hungary 3 out of 8, in Czechoslovakia 11 out of 14, of the principal defendants were Jewish. In the incomplete transcripts of the Czech trial the term "Zionist" appears no less than 47 times, accompanied by references to "Jewish nationalists," "Jewish bourgeoisie," and "Jewish cosmopolitans." In the transcript of the Rajk trial, on the other hand, we find no more than two references to Zionism (both of them in connection with the background of András Szalai, who was made to confess his past membership in such an organization), and the term "Jewish" appears only once in an interesting exchange between the president of the court and Rajk, in the course of which the defendant was made to state that he was *not* Jewish, that he was of Aryan [sic] stock and of Transylvanian German parentage. Corresponding to these "quantitative" differences were the respective propaganda campaigns that surrounded the two trials. Whereas in the Hungarian press the trial was accompanied by at least one vigorous denunciation of anti-Semitism, the Czechoslovak press used the Jewish theme with abandon to whip up popular sentiment against "alien" elements. See Radio Free Europe, Inc. *Transcript of the Slansky Trial* (New York and Munich 1952); *László Rajk and His Accomplices Before the People's Court* (Budapest 1949) esp. pp. 81 and 164.

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tive and Fascist causes, the Soviet political strategists were more inclined to make concessions to Jews, as well as to other ethnic minorities. This inclination was perhaps the greatest in Hungary where (in contrast to Poland) the Jewish minority was still relatively numerous and (in contrast to Rumania) also highly "mobilized," modernized, and urban, representing an indispensable reservoir of skilled manpower in a country where the "native" element among the educated classes was not well disposed toward the Communist party. Accordingly, Soviet policy was consistent, but not uniform. It was guided by the principle of selective discrimination reflecting political pressures and opportunities rather than ethnic sympathies or antipathies, and it applied not only to Jews but was part of a broader scheme of "ethnic management" for political advantage.

In the light of the transparent cynicism of these policies, we are bound to ask to what extent they were successful in harnessing Jews and other ethnic groups to the purposes of communism. Both Burks (p. 169) and Fejtö (p. 93) raise this question, and they agree that communism appealed to a fairly small minority and that even those who succumbed to its blandishments, its promises of security and equity, experienced growing aversion and disillusionment as the manipulative aspects of Soviet policy became evident. Thus when, in the mid-fifties, the opportunity arose, thousands left the parties and their countries as well, to seek refuge outside the Iron Curtain. But flight and withdrawal were not the only responses to the Stalinist manipulation of ethnicity. As Fejtö poignantly reminds us, in their revulsion from the excesses of Stalinism "Jewish intellectuals regained their moral fervor and idealistic cult of justice which is so much part of their heritage" (p. 95) and moved into the forefront of the movement for socialist humanism and genuine internationalism.

The "revisionists" had their days of glory during the Polish and Hungarian Octobers (and later in the Czechoslovak "spring" of 1968) only to be challenged by overwhelming Soviet strength and confronted by a new, post-Stalin phenomenon in East Europe: the rise of a "native" cadre of Communists anxious to accelerate their upward mobility and ready to embrace anti-Semitism, partly as an excuse for eliminating competitors, partly as a political expedient to establish their credentials in the absence of more solid achievements (such as a genuinely independent foreign policy). At the time of Fejtö's writing these tendencies were most evident in Poland, even though the conflict beweeen the liberals (often referred to as the "Yids") and the various factions of neo-Stalinists (the "boors") was yet far from being resolved. Public

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policy reflected the ambiguities of the political situation and the stalemate among these political forces. Thus, although Fejtö is able to report on the growth of Jewish cultural and religious freedom (p. 60), the record also shows repeated and conspicuous attempts between 1953 and 1958 to remove Jewish officials from their positions in the name of re-establishing "ethnic proportionality" in the organs of the state and the Party (pp. 70-72). Since Fejtö's first writing, of course, the conflict has been resolved in the favor of forces whose ascendancy brought in its train the recent purges and an "anti-Zionist" campaign the shrill tones of which were reminiscent of the days of the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia.

There is some reason to believe that the anti-Semitic forces that today seem to dominate the Polish party have counterparts scattered throughout Eastern Europe and might surface in some critical political situation. (Some ominous signs of their existence recently became evident among the post-revisionist leadership of the Czechoslovak party.)[6] Yet once more we must warn against hasty conclusions and inferences drawn from the experiences of one or two other countries, for a number of parties, among them those of Hungary and Rumania (ruling the countries with the most sizable Jewish populations in the area), have refused to follow suit and, each for its own reasons, have moved in the opposite direction in the past few years by guaranteeing a greater degree of cultural and religious freedom and (in the case of Rumania) a discreet choice between integration and emigration. As Fejtö observed a decade ago, both parties appear to adhere to the practice of "ethnic balancing" but, contrary to Fejtö's opinion, such practices cannot be directly ascribed to prejudice or to calculated designs for appealing to latent anti-Semitic sentiments. In general, when evaluating such practices in Communist societies we should avoid using standards that are more rigorous than what we are willing to accept, say, in American politics, where the principle of "ethnic balancing" of tickets has a certain respectability and has rarely been construed as a form of discrimination.

The recurrent attempts to use anti-Semitism as a potential prop for

[6] See, for instance, Paul Hoffman, "Jews in Czechoslovakia Fear Rise of Anti-Semitism in Party," *New York Times*, January 14, 1970, p. 11. This article reports a "surge of anti-Semitism in the Communist party apparatus" triggered by the conviction that "Jewish intellectuals were prominent among the backers of Alexander Dubcek." The article also quotes "well-informed sources" to the effect that recent attacks on Jews had been promoted by a "document circulated among party officials . . . believed to have been compiled by the secret police with the assistance of Soviet security officers . . . [in] an assessment of the alleged role of Jews in the events that led to the invasion of August 1968."

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faltering regimes nevertheless raises some questions about the sources and extent of popular prejudice in Eastern Europe, and in attempting to account for these Fejtö offers cultural and economic explanations. Although he regards prejudice as part of a political tradition, he also recognizes that it is not a static phenomenon but one that varies from time to time and from country to country, kindled by the lack of social opportunity and economic reward. We can easily concur with this proposition (even though we may wish to see some hard evidence to demonstrate the range of variations). At the same time, prejudice, as Mr. Fejtö surely realizes, is an infinitely complex social and psychological problem that invites a number of alternative or complementary explanations. One of these is suggested by more recent studies of discrimination in modern industrial societies, relating the phenomenon not only to the scarcity of economic reward and social opportunity, but to abundance and the rapid expansion of the avenues of social mobility. The latter experience, it seems, may have debilitating psychological effects in that it confronts wide social strata with the prospect not only of advancement but of social failure as well, thus raising the need for rationalizing immobility in ethnic terms. The validity of this explanation, of course, needs to be carefully tested, but the prevailing social conditions in Eastern Europe (the growing equality of opportunity and achievement orientation of social standards), the recent shift of ethnic prejudice from the middle to the lower economic classes, and their widespread resentment of the mobility of ethnic minorities show considerable similarities to the social patterns of prejudice in such countries as the United States and Great Britain, lending the proposition considerable plausibility.

But if these potential sources of prejudice remain, there are, in the balance, also a number of positive elements that may result in the gradual erosion of ethnic hostility and discrimination. One of the encouraging signs that Fejtö discerns is the rise of a new cultural elite, a class of creative intellectuals who have been able to dissociate nationalism from anti-Semitism (p. 96). Another is the changing image of Jewish intellectuals in the light of their conspicuous association with the cause of reform and liberalization. To these we may add the changing and increasingly positive image of Israel as a principal adversary of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. In this respect the Six-Day War had an electrifying effect upon some segments of public opinion. Although some governments showed their chagrin and used the war as an excuse for their clumsy campaigns of anti-Zionism, the war did

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more to wipe out popular anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe (though probably not in the Soviet Union) than has any single event in the history of recent decades and centuries.

IV

Our third volume, Paul Lendvai's *Eagles in Cobwebs*, is a highly readable and vivid account of recent political developments in the Balkans as well as of the cultural and historical background that seems to explain some of the current political ferment. Written by a veteran observer of the area, the book is replete with interesting personal reminiscences and rare glimpses into the thoughts of local political leaders through interviews. The focus of the volume is "nationalism," its thesis being that in the past few years it "has re-emerged as the central underlying theme of political life" (p. 350) and that "despite two decades of professed adherence to the social gospel known as Marxism-Leninism, the quest for national identity has proved more powerful than ideological bonds" (p. ix).

However, like so many other works dealing with Eastern Europe, Lendvai's volume suffers from the tendency to view these developments in a big sweep. In this respect it has something in common with Fejtö's, though unlike Fejtö's its shortcomings are not empirical, stemming from the paucity of materials, but conceptual and at times merely semantic, resulting from a failure to draw clearcut distinctions among different aspects and manifestations of nationalism. Specifically, I will suggest that in referring to "nationalism" Lendvai in fact deals with two distinct phenomena, one being jurisdictional and the other ethnic particularism (meaning, respectively, the search for administrative-political autonomy as opposed to the cultivation of an ethno-linguistic identity) and that in treating the subject he often fails to differentiate between sentiment and policy and between the attitudes of masses and of elites. If we apply these conceptual distinctions to the materials at hand, Lendvai's thesis acquires new meanings, and we will soon discover that, rather than dealing with an overriding pattern of change, we deal with a number of different patterns of development.

Lendvai's central theme appears to have been derived from the experience of Rumania, the country where the turnabout seems to have been most complete. Like most others who write on the subject, Lendvai attempts to trace the origins of this development and finds that the purges of Pauker and Luca in 1952, the consolidation of Dej's personal power in 1957, and the departure of the Soviet troops in 1958

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provided the more important "psychological and political preconditions" (p. 295) for the subsequent phase of nationalist deviation. In listing these developments, however, Lendvai prudently reminds us that they had not been part of a well-thought-out plan, and that the political consequences of changing conditions had not become evident until the Central Committee Meeting of December, 1961. It was only then that, by portraying the entire history of the Party as a battle between "alien" and "native" elements, the Rumanian leaders began to use the nationalist theme consciously in order "to restore a sense of purpose" in their cohorts and "to offer hope to a sullen and demoralized nation" (p. 294). The ensuing campaign of the Party to refurbish its image and to extricate the country from direct Soviet domination were "brilliantly controlled" and "matchlessly executed" (*ibid*). It proceeded step by step, moving from purely symbolic acts of defiance (such as abstaining from inconsequential votes at the United Nations or engaging in "scholarly" debates with Soviet historians) to more substantive forms of deviation, such as resisting Soviet plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe. With each step, the popularity of the regime and its freedom of maneuver increased, resulting in an upward spiral of domestic political stability and national independence.

In tracing these developments it is necessary to emphasize that the move toward greater independence was accompanied by a renewed stress on national identity, in the starkest ethnic and cultural terms, expressed in the conscious cultivation of the Rumanian history and national origins. These themes have reached their highest pitch in some of Ceauşescu's speeches in which he "conjured up the glorious past" or "marked the memory of the great Princes," depicting the "present as the continuation of the heroic past and presenting the Communist leaders as the legitimate inheritors of that past" (p. 268). Beyond this symbolism, however, the rediscovery of ethnic consciousness also found expression in educational policies, in the reform of school curricula, and in policies designed to create an ethnically homogeneous state by the dispersion and assimilation of ethnic minorities (pp. 339-40) under the slogan of Rumania for the Rumanians (p. 341).

To gauge the sources and depth of group identity is not a simple task, but the persistence of these trends and the elevation of national particularism to the level of official doctrine (in the form of theories proclaiming the crucial role of national sovereignty and ethnic solidarity in the process of building socialism) clearly indicate that we deal not merely with the tactical manipulation of national sentiment but

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with a change in the self-image of the Party and in the very principles that sustain its cohesion. The paradox is that the architects of the new course (many of them rather emotionless one-time Stalinist *apparatchiki*) may well have viewed the use of nationalist symbolism as a tactical expedient to drum up support for a politically isolated leadership. But in acting out the role of the defender of the cultural and historical heritage the Party became absorbed by it, providing an excellent example of how behavior may ultimately influence basic attitudes. This should be taken to imply not that the Rumanian party has abandoned Marxism-Leninism in favor of ethnic particularism, but rather that it has incorporated the latter into the former. The *telos*, the ultimate goal that provides a *raison d'être* for the Party, is still the building of socialism and a collectivistic welfare society, but the idea of the constituency that the party is prepared to serve, even in theory, has moved from the broader concept of the international proletariat to the narrower confines of the ethnic community.

It is in this last and significant respect that the Rumanian party differs from many of its Communist counterparts, among them the Albanian party, which Lendvai attempts to portray in similar terms. To be sure, as Lendvai points out, the Albanian leaders follow a staunchly (and even more successfully) independent course of foreign policy than do the Rumanians. It is also beyond doubt that the Albanian leaders take credit for this stance and on its account have been able to establish a degree of rapport with their own population. But in the Albanian case we would look in vain for the emotional cultivation of ethnic sentiment or the "mystique" of the national past that has become part and parcel of the political repertory of the Rumanians. To measure this difference, we might well compare the Liberation Day speeches of Ceauşescu with those of Hoxha and Kapo. Whereas Ceauşescu's, in Lendvai's words, show an "exuberant" and "passionate commitment to the national re-awakening" (p. 268), Hoxha's and Kapo's are couched in Marxist-Leninist terminology, replete with references to international commitments. Nor do Albanian policies toward minorities inside and outside the country's boundaries impart the concern or sense of urgency that one would expect from a truly "nationalist" regime. Indeed, the Albanians have so far refrained from practicing assimilationist policies among the Greeks of Girokaster and Korca, and from a concerted irredentist drive to reclaim the Albanians living in Kossovo-Metohija. And although the Rumanians have elevated the principle of national particularism to the status of official doctrine, the Albanians have maintained a strict adherence to the language of revo-

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lutionary internationalism and have rejected the Rumanian ideological innovation in the most explicit terms. "These ideas," Lendvai quotes them on the Rumanians, "not only surpass the revisionist ideas of Togliatti's polycentrism, but suggest that each party should become a center in itself. In other words this means allowing not only one or two interpretations of our revolutionary theory, but tens if not hundreds" (p. 337).

The diversity of the "nationalist" renaissance in Eastern Europe becomes even more evident if we examine the Bulgarian experience. Although Lendvai goes to some lengths to demonstrate the existence of some sentiment favoring national independence, the bulk of the evidence he provides makes it clear that the current government and Party leadership is quite content to be the "sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union" (p. 210), abdicating many of the economic and political responsibilities of a sovereign state. The Soviet ambassador is still, in fact, a governor general who still "sits on the platform at all important occasions and accompanies the Premier on his tour of the provinces" (p. 206). Lendvai quotes a number of Bulgarian citizens who would prefer to change this state of affairs. Yet, on the other hand, he concedes that the "special relationship between Sofia and Moscow did not start with Dimitrov and Stalin" (p. 209), that "historic memories of loyalty and gratitude to 'Mother Russia' are deep" (*ibid.*), and that as a result the foreign visitor can "nowhere . . . detect overt anti-Soviet feelings" (p. 244). Indeed, it is quite evident that it is the absence of popular pressures, together with the repeated economic failures and internal divisions of the leadership, that relegates Bulgaria to the position of the "last satellite" of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless, Lendvai's statement that the "virulence of deeply entrenched national feelings shimmers through many conversations" (p. 244) appears to have considerable validity. Bulgarian chauvinism, popular and official, apparently does exist, even though its thrust is not in the direction of national independence. Thus while the successive leaders of party and government have been vying with each other in avoiding the burdens of an independent course of foreign policy, they also vie with each other in making aggressive appeals to ethnic particularism and in advocating discriminatory and irredentist policies. As Lendvai observes, "two trends—virulent nationalism and absolute devotion to the Soviet Union—are pushed forward hand in hand" (p. 244) by fostering "pride in the historical past and national dignity" (p. 243), by keeping the "Macedonian issue" alive and by pursuing a policy of "ethnic purification" (to use Burks's terminology). As part

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of the last activity, the majority of the Turks have been expelled from the country over the years, often with considerable brutality, and the Macedonian population of the Pirin region has once more been reclassified as Bulgarian. (The census of 1956 listed 180,000 who spoke that language; in the census of 1965 only 9,000 of them reappeared.) All in all, the Bulgarian pattern of nationalism may be regarded as the exact opposite of the Albanian. Whereas the Albanians shun ethnic particularism but espouse a policy of independence from the Soviet Union, the Bulgarians eschew national autonomy in the favor of ethnic particularism and solidarity.

The chapters on Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria are not without considerable merit, but Lendvai is undoubtedly at his best when dealing with the complex and unresolved problems of the national question in Yugoslavia. This chapter is filled with interesting information and, even though the argument occasionally bogs down in the richness of detail, the main thread of political developments is readily discernible. As Lendvai sees it, and as this reviewer is prepared to concur, these developments have centered on the growing administrative and regional autonomy in the wake of the constitutional reforms of recent years. What is significant here is that these reforms were not by any means designed to accommodate ethnic particularism; indeed, as Lendvai points out, they were accompanied by a concerted attempt to create an ethnically neutral Yugoslav public consciousness. Nevertheless, by their very nature they created an organizational context (in the form of the federal republics and autonomous territories) that is exceedingly difficult to separate from ethnic conflict and sentiment. Thus, although such republican party leaders as Bakarić, Tripalo (the "bright stars" of Croatian politics), or Svabić (the prime minister of Serbia) are still inclined to formulate issues in economic terms ("the heated debates in parliament and other political bodies revolve around money" [p. 146]) and attempt to dissociate themselves from ethnic chauvinists, their bargaining power lies in the fact that they represent constituencies that define themselves almost exclusively in ethnic terms. Under these circumstances there is a perennial prospect "that the power of control over national currents [might] easily slip from the Communist leaders. This happened, for example, in the case of the Croat declaration in the favor of linguistic equality. Bakarić and his associates intended to use the 'pure' Croat nationalists as political tools and discard them once the battle with Ranković for the 'federalizing of the Federation' was won. But the temporary allies got out of hand with frightening ease" (p. 170). Today the administrative (and economic)

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particularism of the leaders and the ethnic particularism of the masses may still be distinguished from one another. But the distinction is a tenuous one, and the regional identity of the republican parties may eventually submerge in the ethnic identity of their constituents. If so, the question will be whether political conflict may be contained in the present institutional framework or whether a new institutional framework will have to be designed to save the country from political *immobilisme* or worse.

In sum, this survey of Balkan nationalism shows not one but several distinct paths of political change, each of which raises different problems of interpretation. If the Albanian case calls for investigating the motivations and conditions for an independent course of foreign policy, the Rumanian case raises questions concerning the dynamics of attitudinal change, and the study of Yugoslavia raises questions concerning both, compounded by the problem of institutionalization and integration. Clearly, these problems call for different analytic frameworks. It is, of course, not Lendvai's purpose to provide these, and the academic reader should not be resentful of the omission. For although Lendvai's study raises more questions than it answers, in doing so it underlines the need and marks out the way for a more systematic inquiry into the complex range of problems that today passes under the convenient label of nationalism.

In his own conclusions Lendvai attempts to synthesize his findings to project the future of Eastern Europe in the Soviet orbit. These projections appear in an Afterword and a Postscript, one written before, the other after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the Afterword Lendvai expresses cautious optimism, arguing that the interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe were primarily strategic and have been rendered obsolete by the "revolution in military technologies, transport, and communication" (p. 352). Naturally, the Postcript, written after the Czech events, is much less optimistic. In it Lendvai gives due weight to the role of ideology in Soviet motivation and, in a telling epilogue on the theme of East European nationalism, concludes that the key to future developments rests in the Kremlin rather than in East Europe itself.

V

The complexity of the Yugoslav experience unfolds in considerably greater detail on the pages of Professor Paul Shoup's competent monographic study, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*. Representing several years of painstaking research, this study addresses

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itself primarily to the evolution of official Communist thinking and Party ideology on the subject, leading the reader in rough chronological order through the history of Yugoslav communism from the end of World War I to the expulsion of Ranković from the League in 1966.

The history of the interwar period, particularly that of the first seventeen years of the Party's existence, was one of factionalism, chaos, and abrupt changes of policy. "During the period 1919-1941, the Yugoslav Communist Party debated the national question almost as fiercely as the non-Communist parties. The factionalism which developed [over the national question] became legendary" (p. 13). But, as Shoup aptly observes, the controversy was "not the product of nationalistic fervor, although this feeling was in evidence in the ranks of the party from time to time. Unlike most of the non-Communist groups, the Communists were not involved in the defense of local interests or intent on defending the national honor; rather their job was to pursue revolutionary aims. . . . Not surprisingly there were strong differences of opinion over how to accomplish the revolutionary goals of the Party" (pp. 13-14). In the course of these disputes, Comintern intervention was frequent and most of the time guided by Soviet desires to weaken the French-sponsored alliance system in Eastern Europe. In accordance with this objective, the Yugoslav party was forced to accept the principle of national self-determination for the peoples of the country as well as that of the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.

A critical turning point in the history of the Party came in 1937 when, in the wake of the Stalinist purges, the old quarrelsome leadership disappeared and was replaced by "a group of able men of all nationalties" (p. 46) committed to a new line of policy. "For the first time since the founding of the CPY, the features of a truly Yugoslav party began to emerge" (*ibid.*). In attempting to account for this development, Shoup seems to imply that it resulted from the slipping control of Moscow over the distant and underground party of Yugoslavia. This undoubtedly was a major and significant element in the situation. No less important, however, were certain fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy within a broader effort to bolster the national states of Eastern Europe in the face of the growing military threat of Germany.

Although in general Shoup does not digress from his account to draw conceptual conclusions, his chapter on the partisan war raises two points with broader theoretical implications. One of these suggests a more careful examination of the hypothesis that links social mobilization with emerging loyalties to a territorial national state

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(p. 97), arguing on the basis of the Yugoslav experience that the uprooting of peasant society may well increase, rather than decrease, localism and parochial loyalties. "The peasant, once he was persuaded to move, or perforce had to march from his locale, acquired new perspectives and developed new loyalties. But his own national [sic] consciousness remained regional in outlook and ethnocentric in quality" (p. 98). The second observation reflects on the difficulties we face when dealing with such a complex category as national "consciousness" or "identity." Such qualities, Shoup points out, are not static and absolute, but dynamic and relative to specific challenges and forms of stress. In his own words, "the direct link between the peasant and the Partisans was not . . . nationalism in the abstract but the desire to escape foreign occupation" (*ibid.*).

Shoup's discussion of the postwar developments focuses on the ideological context in which they have taken place. In the years immediately following the war, "Yugoslav [Communist] behavior did not appear to be inspired by traditional nationalism. The radical character of Yugoslav communism . . . seemed antithetical to national feeling and more apt to emphasize proletarian internationalism and solidarity with the Soviet Union than to stress national interest" (p. 135). Nor did the stress on internationalism disappear after the break with the Soviet Union. Titoism, despite its importance as the first national revolt against Soviet domination of the international movement, was slow to develop a theoretical justification for the national sovereignty of Communist states, and when it did so in 1958, it avoided any implications of ethnic nationalism. The nation that Kardelj envisaged was to be a "Socialist community of a new type in which language and national culture [would] become a secondary factor, . . . in which Socialist relations would soon have more influence . . . than national ones" (p. 203). Indeed, nationalism (meaning here ethnic particularism) was denounced as "one of those reactionary ideological factors which draws people backwards, shuts out Socialist perspectives, and hinders the formation of socialist consciousness" (p. 205). Instead of this "traditional" concept of the national community, Kardelj and Tito envisaged an ethnically neutral Yugoslav consciousness transcending the narrow particularism of earlier years.

Yet, whatever the ideological design, the "relaxation of totalitarian controls led to an increase of national feeling" (p. 189) or, perhaps more correctly, to increasing manifestations of such a feeling, and the decentralization of the economy and the increased autonomy of the republic governments provided a political framework for ethnic rivalry.

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As a result of these developments, hopes for obliterating ethnic particularism began to decline and, despite recurrent campaigns to keep it alive, by 1961 "the idea of Yugoslavism . . . dropped out of view" (p. 211), a development that represented the single most serious personal setback for Tito as a political leader.

Whereas the bulk of the volume is devoted to tracing these changes in ideology and policy, the last chapter of the study sets out to discuss the problem of national integration and the implications of the national question for the stability and quality of the Yugoslav political system. Like so many others, Shoup sees this problem closely intertwined with economic issues, specifically with economic rivalries stemming from the debate on economic reform and the allocation of funds for economic development (p. 227). These rivalries, Shoup points out, do not *per se* have a "nationalist" character but flow from the decentralization of political controls over planning and investment and from the vested interests of "local power elites in the priorities of their own region and in obtaining more funds for investment" (p. 242). However, economic and administrative priorities tend to turn quickly into matters of "national honor" and "equality" (pp. 247-48) as the leaders confront each other and attempt to mobilize their constituencies. In this manner economic and ethnic particularism tend to reinforce each other: economics provides a quantitative measure for national grievances; ethnicity provides a moral component that severely inhibits pragmatism in bargaining and threatens to deadlock the political process.

Perhaps less successful than his treatment of the economic dimension of the conflict is Professor Shoup's attempt to supplement these observations with cultural, political, and sociological explanations. Thus, apart from economics, he feels, "national temperament" and "sensitivities" are significant underlying causes of the "sterile pattern of the national conflict" (pp. 261-62). Alternatively, he suggests that the failure of a more successful national and political integration may stem from the inability of the Party to project a "multinational image" and to tap "pro-Yugoslav [i.e., ethnically neutral] sentiment" by generating a "new pattern of attitudes and relationships on which to anchor its rule" (pp. 263-64). Both propositions may well be valid, but without exploring them in greater depth we may acquire only the vaguest sense as to the weight they represent in determining the present course of events. In any case, Professor Shoup himself has some difficulty in finding the proper balance between his explanations. Thus at one point he describes economic inequalities as *the* single most important

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disintegrative force in Yugoslav society (p. 227) and at another place he assures us that "other reasons . . . were equally important" (p. 263). In general, Professor Shoup's great strength lies in fastidious research and not in providing analytic guidance, perspective, or interpretation—the absence of which not only leaves the reader with somewhat loose and inconsistent findings, but at times also taxes his capacity to follow the many disparate details of the volume, particularly in the earlier chapters. Even so, however, Professor Shoup's work is an important landmark in East European studies and will most likely remain the standard source on the subject for several years to come.

VI

For a number of years the phenomenon of ethnic solidarity has been related by social scientists to processes of social mobilization: the growth of an increasing awareness of the world in the wake of economic development, education, and exposure to mass communications.[7] The foundations of this hypothesis are empirical. In both the European past and the contemporary experiences of non-European countries there is impressive factual evidence that the rise of modern nationalism —the linking of the political community to a common language or cultural heritage—has generally been preceded or accompanied by such patterns of socioeconomic change. Moreover, these empirical correlations appear to be supported by deductive reasoning in that the relationship is explained by a craving for ascriptive and affective relationships in an increasingly impersonal social environment, and by a psychological need to project such value-orientations into the larger social space within which the members of a modernized society interact with one another.[8]

In the light of both reason and factual evidence, the mobilization hypothesis has considerable explanatory power. Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as a genuine theory of ethnicity or nationalism, for it leaves too many questions open to further research or speculation. One of these important questions is posed by the phenomenon of premodern nationalism, i.e., the failure of the theory to explain the historical incidence of ethnic states and solidarities outside the context of social and economic modernization.[9] Another question, more immediately

[7] The first, best-known, and most elaborate formulation of this hypothesis is in Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass. and New York 1953).

[8] For this explanation see, for instance, Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford 1964), 465.

[9] These examples are found throughout history but are perhaps most striking in the instance of the Germanic states of the People's Migration Era. There, ethnicity—i. e., a common language or dialect—not only conferred membership in the political commu-

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relevant to our present inquiry, relates to those instances in which entire societies, or segments of societies, emerge from the experience of modernization without an ethnically defined political identity, or else are able to assume a dual identity, one ascriptive and particularistic, the other rational and universalistic.

Our studies of the Communist movement enable us to answer some of these questions by introducing the variable of ethnic marginality. In brief, these studies suggest that social mobilization by itself does not determine patterns of social identity and solidarity and that the emerging "modern" consciousness of groups and individuals will not be a mechanical function of economic development, literacy, and mass communications, but will depend on complex configurations of attributes—the distribution of ethnic and cultural characteristics—in the mobilized person and in society. To put it in more specific terms, a certain congruity among such components of ethnicity as language, religion, cultural heritage, and physical proximity to other members of the group is likely to yield a particularistic identity and patterns of solidarity. Conversely, in instances where significant incongruities exist in these components, the mobilized individual is likely to experience ethnic anomie, which he may resolve by opting for an ethnically neutral, universalistic political identity.

While the concept of marginality does not account for the phenomenon in all its complexity, it takes us a long way toward explaining the appeals of internationalism in Eastern Europe, the structure and composition of Communist elites, and the militant antinationalism of the early days. At the same time, it may also serve as a useful point of departure for an inquiry into changes in collective attitudes and identity. The logic that we may suggest here is commonsensical: where the attitudes of a group may be related to structural configurations, a change in attitudes may be the result of changing patterns of social mobility and their effect on the composition of the unit. Such indeed was the experience of Communist elites whose composition was diluted by the influx of new cadres at critical junctures in their history: 1) upon the seizure of power, 2) at times of major shifts of policy (such as the initiation of programs of forced draft industrialization), and 3) fol-

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nity but also carried with it a notion of equality. Although contemporary social science often overlooks this historical fact, the political patterns of the Migration Era became a model for many nineteenth-century nationalists who extolled its ascriptive, affective, and particularistic characteristics. In contrast, the legitimacy of the medieval political community in Western Europe was based on the notion of contract, and was, in Weberian terms, rational. It is well to remember, therefore, that nationalism is not unequivocally "modern" either in chronological or in sociological terms.

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lowing major purifications of the parties. In the history of the Soviet Union these "crises" appeared in sequence, but in the case of East European communism they tended to be cumulative, thus accelerating the pace of transformation and the attendant difficulties of absorbing and acculturating the new members of the elite.

If one source of change in the collective consciousness of the revolutionary party is social, another is political, stemming from the exigencies and "imperatives" of power. In the most general sense these exigencies fall into two categories: 1) external, i.e., the need to find allies in the international arena in order to secure the integrity of the state, and 2) domestic, i.e., the need to secure from time to time the cooperation or compliance of strategic segments of the population. In the case of the Communist parties, the latter included the need to respond to continued (indeed, increasing) assertion of ethnic solidarities, which eventually gave rise to the Stalinist model of ethnic pragmatism. The essence of this pragmatism was a ruthless manipulation of ethnic sentiments for tactical advantage by associating individual parties with ethnic symbols and heritage, by identifying the party leadership with certain ethnic groups and by engaging in the persecution of unpopular minorities to enhance the "nationalist" credibility of the regimes. As must be clear from the preceding discussion, the target or "constituency" of these manipulative tactics could be both minorities and majorities, the choice depending on their political tradition, cultural heritage, the degree of their mobilization, and their collective anxieties.

However, such political pragmatism is not without considerable peril and psychological strain for the ruling parties. As for all revolutionaries faced with the pragmatic solution of problems, for the Stalinist party the constant danger was that in acting out their prescribed role over a period of time the cadres found that they could no longer differentiate between their true selves and the roles they were simulating. To cope with this danger the parties resorted to a variety of devices, such as designing alternative symbolic systems for "esoteric" and "exoteric" communications[10] and the cultivation of a supranational image apart from their particularistic appeals. But in the last analysis the conflict between role and identity could be resolved only by maintaining a reign of terror and resorting to periodic purges as an integral aspect of political control. Conversely, this analysis implies that the removal of the purge as an instrument of control opened the way to "role consciousness" and a shift toward a particularistic identity.

[10] For this concept see Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton 1954), 66-98.

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But, as should be obvious, the pressures and demands emanating from society are not constant but variable, producing different forms and degrees of adaptation. For this reason a three-stage model from universalism through pragmatism to particularism should imply not inevitability, but rather one possible course of developments reflecting a specific pattern of social mobilization and the prevalence of certain structural configurations in the underlying society. Indeed, although the major thrust of developments in the post-Stalin period has been toward "traditional nationalism," one should be careful not to exaggerate the generality of the trend. Above all, it will be important to remember that the intrusion of ethnic consciousness was only one way in which the parties (or factions of the parties) responded to the excesses of Stalinism and that, parallel to the rise of ethnic particularism, Eastern Europe has also experienced the revival of ideological universalism and internationalism. This last trend has been represented by such disparate elements as the "liberal" intellectuals of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the militant revolutionaries of Albania, and the revisionists of Yugoslavia. To appreciate the full range of these outcomes, however, we will have to draw new boundaries that mark out differences beyond the conventional distinctions between nationalism and internationalism. More specifically, in examining possible variations we will have to distinguish not only between universalism and particularism but also between jurisdictional and ethnic particularism, as well as between sentiment and policy. Or, to put it more concisely, we deal with three interrelated phenomena: 1) value orientations, 2) with regard to different reference groups, 3) at the level of both attitudinal and behavioral analysis.

To demonstrate the validity of these distinctions and to account for their occurrence one would obviously have to develop sophisticated methods of investigation. Some ways of doing this have been suggested above; others may be added here in conclusion. They would include a careful analysis of symbolic systems with respect to esoteric and exoteric forms of communication, the examination of elaborate signaling devices (such as political trials and the messages they convey to both the elite and the masses), and the calculation of costs involved in a particular policy to separate symbolic and "real" responses to the challenges of the environment. Furthermore, in approaching the subject matter, one should also be alert to empirical difficulties. For one, in addressing ourselves to the parties we deal not with homogeneous and well-integrated entities, but with fragmented and often highly differentiated units in which a whole range of attitudes and solidarities

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exist. Finally, both attitude and behavior are subject to constant changes, so that the attributes of leaders and followers can be seen less frequently in a steady state than in motion from one state to another.

The careful and critical selection of empirical indicators within a broad analytic framework is not an easy task. But it is precisely here that the social scientist can perform his most useful function. This is not to suggest that political problems can or should be approached only with elaborate conceptual equipment or that intuitive analysis is entirely useless. Rather, it implies that the two should complement one another and that a certain division of labor is well justified in our attempts to explore such complex phenomena as ethnicity, nationalism, and political change.

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CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN MODERN TIMES

By SEPEHR ZABIH

Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs*, Foreword by Quincy Wright, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1966, 330 pp., $7.50.

E. A. Bayne, *Persian Kingship in Transition, Conversation With a Monarch Whose Office Is Traditional & Whose Goal is Modernization*, American University Field Staff, Inc., New York, 1968, 288 pp., $7.50.

Bahman Nirumand, *Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes oder Die Diktatur der Freien Welt*, Nacherinnerung von Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, G.m.b.H., Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1967, 156 pp., DM 12; also available in English translation, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1969, 192 pp., $2.75.

THE study of the foreign relations of smaller states is a fairly new undertaking. Significant attention to it corresponds with the advent of the age of decolonization in the post-World War II period. The ascendancy of the third world and the concomitant breakdown of the rigid ideological and political polarization of international politics in the early and mid-sixties further augmented interest in this field.

Though it is a new undertaking, many of the problems associated with this type of inquiry are identical with those of the more conventional studies of major powers' foreign policy as an approach to the understanding of the dynamics of international politics. Most general studies of foreign policy take cognizance of the fundamental issue of methodology. What is the place of this type of inquiry in the whole spectrum of approaches to the study of international politics? Is this an autonomous sub-discipline? If so, what are its boundaries? What is the substance of interstate interaction on which comparison could be made?

The study of smaller states' foreign policy raises additional questions. How are states designated as small? Are all non-Western states internationally minor powers, irrespective of size, population, and potential capabilities? Granted that a consensus could be reached on criteria for this type of assignation, what is the utility of examining their foreign policy when in practice their influence in world politics, dominated as it is by the superpower hegemony, appears to be insignificant? Even if we recognize some form of interaction between major and minor powers, how could we accurately assess its dynamics and influence on world politics? Finally, what criteria for the selection of case studies

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should we use? Are all small states equal in relevance to this kind of analysis or are some more so than others?

Although uniformly accepted responses to these queries are lacking, most of the better known literature in the field has endeavored to cope with them. A voluminous study of foreign policies of major powers and a cross section of smaller states has recognized four basic methods and critically evaluated their contributions.[1] First, the diplomatic, historical method that reconstructs a particular period with accuracy, precision, and due attention to the major events, but fails to formulate general laws and construct conceptual schemes or theories of international behavior. Second, the legalistic approach of a more comprehensive understanding of the world community, of the actual role legal norms play in international relations, and of the problems confronting those who would create a more stable world order; this approach, too, is difficult, because it isolates legal factors from the political and social framework and either underrates or condemns the role of politics, power, and interest in foreign policy considerations. Third, a descriptive approach that occasionally is rigorous and even conceptual but more frequently lacks discipline and coherence. Fourth, an ideological approach that analyzes policy and motivation from a fixed world-outlook that precludes the careful evaluation of a multiplicity of factors and risks subjectivism and sloganeering.

In place of any of these attempts to answer the questions, the authors recommend an analytical approach at whose core lies the recognition of patterns of interests and obligations for all nations. These interests are hierarchically ordered. They are also both competitive and cooperative; hence, their cooperative and competitive potentials, too, should be examined. Further, the capacity of individual states to achieve these interests and the processes through which policies are adopted and implemented within the complex international environment must be analyzed. This analytical scheme is applied to empirical data covering the broad range of the influence of history and geography, natural resources and industrial development, military capacity, population, government, and qualities of leadership.

Others have questioned whether the range of approaches to foreign policy studies is as wide as the above work indicates. Thus, for example, Macridis raises the methodological question in the framework of the ideological-analytical dichotomy.[2] From an ideological point of view,

[1] Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York 1963).

[2] Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964).

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the policy of the state toward the rest of the world is regarded merely as an expression of prevailing political, social, and religious beliefs; the analytical approach postulates that policy rests on multiple determinants, including the state's historical tradition, geographic location, national interest and purposes, and security needs. Regardless of the intentions, philosophies, and religious outlooks of individuals, there are broad strategic interests intimately bound up with the nation's geographic position and international role that must be safeguarded if its independence is to be preserved. Apart from permanent interests, they range themselves in a hierarchy of greater and lesser interests. Hence, the task of foreign policy is above all to determine its own hierarchy of interests and then to examine the scale of interest revealed in the principles or practice of other nations' foreign policies.

The basic assumption of the authors is that foreign policy of all states is susceptible to analysis by means of a checklist of elements that exist and can be identified and that merge and compose the basis of foreign policy. These elements may be thought of in terms of concentric circles. At the center are those more or less material in character. These, in turn, are of two types, those that are more permanent and those that are more responsive to change and human manipulation. The human factors are largely quantitative in the case of population and qualitative as regards national character, social structure, national morale, and an effective tradition of diplomacy. From these elements and the instrumentalities of the policy-making process the substance of foreign policy derives, and the major historic policies and the vital interests of countries emerge. In sum, it is held that the difficulty in studying foreign policy may be resolved by, first, assuming that the range of indeterminacy in our social and political world is great and that to attempt a rigorous scientific understanding and prediction of foreign policy is a hopeless task. Second, we must assume that case studies of individual foreign policy-making processes in terms of descriptive categories are rewarding and may lead us to more fruitful hypotheses by disclosing regularities in the behavior of nations and by developing general propositions through setting forth the conditioning factors that account for different types of behavior. Analytical methods provide a way of thinking about foreign policy of any country and ordering factors that contribute to the conduct of foreign relations. We may attain at least analysis in the face of varying contingencies, if not prediction.[3]

[3] The non-Western states covered in these volumes are: Japan, India, Pakistan, China, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, East African countries, and Mexico.

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The shortcomings of the ideological approach are clear to the authors of both these works. Their disagreement stems from their different conceptions of an effective analytical approach that could be utilized in the study of foreign relations of all states, major and minor alike.

A general framework for such a systematic analysis was more recently proposed by Professor Wilkinson.[4] To analyze this topic fully, he states, we must describe, explain, and project a state's situations and policies in the near past, present, and near future by answering three broad questions: a) What are its foreign relations like? b) Why are they as they are? and c) How are they likely to develop?

In describing the foreign relations of a state, we must probe both the situation that presents a challenge for the goals of a state and the policy viewed as a response to the former. The key elements in a state's international situation are its status, its relative power, and its ongoing conflicts with other states. Apart from examining the content of its policies and its goals and means, the analyst is expected to make broad judgments about its quality, coherence, stability, efficiency, realism, vision, and success.

Next comes the task of explaining the state's policy, which means raising causal questions of what influence, and what main factors must be called into account for the substance of its foreign policy at a given time. What in the present and the past explains why a country does what it does instead of something else? In doing so, we must analyze the effects of 1) its power or capability; 2) conscious planning, decisions, the will of its leaders, and its interplay with the inertia of prescription and historical tradition; 3) its political culture; 4) its political institutions; and 5) its political processes.

Once we have attempted description and explanation, we must tackle the projection of foreign policy of a state. This is a far more difficult task, for we are dealing with the realm of the possible and the probable rather than with the actual and the historical. Nevertheless, I believe that various methods could be applied in projecting future policies of states.

A number of ways could have been used by students of foreign policies of new states. For example, Wilkinson's framework could have been employed in a problem-analysis or a problem-description. Alternatively, it could attempt comparison and explanation of policy, and, finally, a more ambitious effort at forecasting or theoretical debate.

[4] David O. Wilkinson, *Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods* (Belmont, California 1969).

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The books under review represent a varied selection of works, each pertaining to facets and characteristics of Iran's foreign relations in modern times. The diversity of the backgrounds and scholastic training of the authors is as wide as the range of their success in fulfilling the declared objectives of their works. Ramazani's work is distinguished by awareness of and a serious attempt to cope with the methodological issue. Nirumand's is typical of the "ideological" approach to the analysis of recent internal and external evolutions of Iranian politics, with heavy emphasis on economic and foreign-aid policies. Bayne's major contribution lies in his portrayal of the evolving thoughts and deeds of the Shah of Iran, who has been the main architect of Iran's policy for the last two decades.

Ramazani disclaims a "narrow" concept of objectivity that would withhold critical judgment on substance and conduct of policy because this itself amounts to a value judgment, implying satisfaction with a given state of affairs. In his judgmental approach he endeavors to substantiate his critical evaluation of men and policies by empirical data and facts. His analytical scheme includes the normative emphasis of the school of political realism that postulates that a rational foreign policy directed toward good ends is a good foreign policy. As to the value of his study, apart from meagerness of attention to the foreign policy of small states, he asserts that a single case study could provide a basis for generalizations on other developing nations because of similarities of issues and situations.[5] Anglo-Russian rivalry for Iran is analogous to the East-West struggle influencing many newly independent states. Similarly, Iran's experience with modernization and its impact on the substance and process of foreign policy are amenable to broader comparative inquiry.

For him, foreign policy contains the two major elements of objective and action, plus the techniques they utilize and their consequences. "It is a sum total of all the objectives and actions of developing nations vis-à-vis all other states." He rejects other approaches that are not compatible with his conception of rationality in the relations among the above elements. Thus, the decision-making approach is faulty, for it does not regard the policy of the state as irrational if the state selects objectives beyond its means.[6] Instead, he is influenced by such well-

[5] Quoting from Annette Baker Fox, the author attributes the lack of attention to small states to the traditional great-power stereotype of them as helpless pawns, and to the latters' conception of great states as cynical manipulators of power. *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago 1959), 1-2.

[6] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruch, and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-making* (New York 1962), 101.

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known realists as Morgenthau, whose concept of rationality takes into account most of the peculiar characteristics of the non-Western state's foreign policy. Thus, for example, in the analysis of the impact of modernization on the selection of objectives commensurate with the means to their achievement, a researcher is led to establish a correlation between modernization and realism.

Ramazani's concept of "situation" as the major factors and forces that have repeatedly influenced the foreign policy resembles Wilkinson's analytical scheme. He considers both internal and external situations pertaining to the political system, the identity and attitude of foreign policy makers, and the policies of great powers, as well as neighboring states. Because both situations are dynamic, he also examines forces of change and continuity such as the modernization process and historical tradition. Finally, he presents his concept of interaction between external situation and foreign policy, between internal situation and foreign policy, and between internal and external situations and foreign policy as a dynamic triangular interaction that he attempts to apply to empirical historical data within a chronological context.

Applying this method of analysis to nearly four and a half centuries of Iranian history, the author offers a set of generalizations of which the following are the most significant. 1) Geographic and strategic location has been a main determinant constant. 2) Great-power rivalry has been the most significant external force. 3) Ever-present historical glories of the past have produced far-reaching aspirations. 4) National disunity in the absence of social cohesion, compounded by external invasion, and a set of political divisions, such as those between the constitutionalists and the royalists at the turn of the century and the more recent schism between conservatives and progressives or extreme and moderate strands of nationalism, have also been major determinants. 5) Oil as a major national resource becomes an asset as well as a liability, but in either case influences foreign policy. 6) The institution of monarchy remains a fairly continuous source of foreign policy-making. 7) Nationalism, whether expressed through the constitutional movement or in the policies of Reza Shah, is regarded as the most significant factor, overriding some of the above in the 1905-1941 era. Although its extreme manifestation led to adventurous reliance on and friendship with Nazi Germany, its major contribution was to introduce the concept of national interest into Iranian foreign policy.

In both approach and substance, this work is open to criticism. As to his normative bias, the author postulates that a rational policy that maintains a reasonable balance between means and objectives is a good

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policy. He therefore is critical of those techniques used by a small state like Iran that are not compatible with his conception of a balanced means-and-ends relation. He sees a strong element of continuity in discrepancies between foreign policy objectives and available capabilities. It was unrealistic "for the constitutionalists" to strive for "absolute" independence in the face of the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention and the chaotic internal situation following the constitutional revolution of 1905-1906. Nor did Iran's declaration of neutrality during World War I stem from an accurate assessment of her capability in the face of the realities of international and regional politics. A final prime example of the folly of unrealism was Reza Shah's futile attempt to keep out of World War II by refusing to sever his ties with Germany, despite tremendous Anglo-Russian pressure.

When a policy is marked by this type of incompatibility between objectives and capabilities, some of the techniques used for its application become ineffective and even counter-productive. Thus, Ramazani believes the techniques of reliance on a third power, procrastination and playing off one major power against another, when overshadowed by that kind of unrealism, proved disastrous.

Over-reliance on the United States in the wake of the constitutional revolution and again in the early post-World War I years, as an attempt to frustrate Anglo-Russian pressure, and dependence on Nazi Germany in the mid-1930's motivated by the same desire, proved futile. However, the author recognizes that procrastination in ratification of treaties or enforcement of commitments, on the grounds that they had been entered into under duress or by virtue of slowness of institutional procedures, may either succeed or fail. Used to persuade Britain to accede to Iranian demands for the cancellation of capitulation or to secure withdrawal of the Red Army under the 1921 treaty, this tactic was successful. Used to resist Anglo-Russian pressure to oust the German technicians prior to the invasion of Iran in 1941, or in dealing with the Soviet Union in 1945-1946 over the continued occupation of Azarbayjan and the draft treaty of an oil company, it failed. Why? Are there good and bad procrastinations? If there are, the author does not elaborate. Failure and success seem to be his sole criteria.

But more importantly, the author shares with other proponents of "rationality" of foreign policy the weakness that his normative bias tends to equate success with rationality. As pointed out elsewhere, an approach to the study of foreign policy that views rationality as a simple adjustment of means to stable and generally recognized ends is not applicable to unstable and revolutionary periods in which the

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primary struggle concerns the determination of ends.[7] Furthermore, Ramazani often does not make the standard of success or failure clear. Success or failure in terms of whose interest? In the interest of the world status quo, in the interest of a higher morality? Is a policy that fails always irrational and one that succeeds always rational? Is there wrong as well as right rationalism, judged solely by success or failure?

Thus Ramazani is led to criticize Iran's effort to maintain neutrality in World War I and World War II. Because the touchstone of his theory is success, it is obvious that retrospectively he wishes that Iran had sided with the Anglo-Russian allies in both wars. Likewise, he considers the procrastination of Reza Shah in 1941 and then again of the Ghavam government in 1945-1946 irrational and bad foreign policy. Indeed, equating these two examples as evidence of the failure of the technique of procrastination suggests an inconsistency in the use of his own criterion of success or failure. In the latter episode, the admittedly weak Iranian government succeeded in securing Iran's independence from Soviet encroachment mainly by a skillful use of procrastination.[8]

The fundamental problem this type of evaluation of foreign policy raises is that not only are success and rationality equated but that there is also the risk of equating might with right. Thus, Iran should have submitted to the Anglo-Russian ultimatum in 1941, should have accepted in good faith the draft oil agreement with the Soviet Union, and should never have engaged in a nationalistic struggle to rid Iran of the economic and political influence of Great Britain. Why? Because in each case these goals seemed incompatible with the country's available resources.

History abounds with examples of the transcendence of higher moral objectives over a "rational" selection of adequate "means" to less ambitious objectives. Nearly every small power with strategic significance to the requirements of international power politics has faced the dilemma of establishing a hierarchy of national interests. To survive as an independent state or to survive merely physically? To accept under duress an enforced alliance or to risk defeat and occupation? Only if we could agree on the primacy of one over the other, could we evaluate their rationality by inquiry as to whether the means have been successfully adjusted for their achievement.

[7] Stanley H. Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 34-36.

[8] For an analysis of the use of this technique in this episode see my book, *The Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley 1966), 107-22.

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Apart from this theoretical flaw, Ramazani's work suffers from inadequate empirical research, particularly in the crucial post-World War I era. In the early 1920's Iran underwent a significant political transformation with the change in the dynasty and the rise of Reza Shah to power. His account of this era, particularly of the controversy surrounding the cancellation of the d'Arcy concession and Anglo-Iranian relations, is essentially based on published Western sources.[9] He has made little or no use of the voluminous parliamentary records of famous debates among the principal actors in these events, which took place at the 14th session of the Majlis during the customary consideration of deputies' credentials. The testimonies of Seyd Zia, the co-author of the 1921 coup d'état by Reza Shah, and those of Taghi Zadeh, the Shah's finance minister, on the d'Arcy controversy shed much light on these historic events.[10]

Though Ramazani acknowledges the significance of personalities to the conduct of Iran's foreign policy, he does not pay much attention to the late Shah's close associates, whose views and counsel undoubtedly influenced his policies. Again, in the post-World War II period, with the prevalence of unrestrained freedom of the press, many bibliographical accounts of personal associates of the Shah were published.[11] Had he used more indigenous sources the work would have benefited greatly. The recent Soviet accounts of this period have shown a large degree of at least historical meticulousness and thoroughness, if not detached interest. Since at least in both the early period and the dramatic finale of Reza Shah's reign, relations with the Soviet Union were crucial, these works, some of which are available in translation, deserved consultation.[12]

[9] These are: Mostafa Fateh, *Panjah Sal Nafte Iran* [Fifty Years of Persian Oil] (Teheran 1956), L. P. Elwell-Sutton's *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London 1955), Alan W. Ford's *The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952: A Study of the Role of Law in Relations of States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954).

[10] See *Ruznamehe Rasmi Keshvar* [Official Gazette], "14th and 15th Majlis," (Teheran 1943-1945).

[11] One such series of which the author has made only scant use is Ebrahim Khajenouri, *Bazigarane Asre Talai* [The Performers of the Golden Age] (Teheran 1942-1947).

[12] Noteworthy among these are: M. S. Ivanov, *Ocherk istorii Irana* [Sketches of Iran's History] (Moscow 1952); P. Milov, *Iran vo Vremya i Poslie vtoroy Mirovoy voyny* [Iran During and After World War II] (Moscow 1949); M. Pavlovich and S. Irankii, *Persia v Bor'ba za Nezavisimost* [Persia and the Struggle for Independence] (Moscow 1925); Ye. L. Shteynberg, *Sovestsko-Iranskiye otnosheniya i proiski Anglo-Amerikanskogo imperializa v Irane* [Soviet-Iranian Relations and the Intrigues of Anglo-American Imperialism in Iran] (Moscow 1947); and Gurko-Kryazhin, *Kratkaya istoriya Persii* [Short History of Persia] (Moscow 1925).

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Finally, in justifying the case for the study of foreign policy of Iran as a developing nation, the author refers to the potential contribution it could make to the general area of knowledge of similarly developing or strategically located countries. It is a pity that even a brief chapter is not devoted to this matter. A number of regional countries like Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan could have been used to illustrate the validity of an assertion the author rightly but only perfunctorily makes in his introductory remarks.

The post-World War II period of Iran's political development has been truly a turbulent one. In terms of external relations, the period since 1941 may be divided into three phases. First, the immediate post-war years, lasting up to 1953, in which there were continuous efforts by the government to restore its independence and sovereignty. The thrust of the Iranian foreign policy was twofold: first, the liquidation of the consequences of the wartime Anglo-Soviet occupation, which brought the country into direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and hence inevitably drew the United States into the picture; second, the challenge to the British political and economic hegemony, which threatened the Western influence in the country and further involved the United States in Iran's external relations. This phase witnessed a desperate struggle to achieve a negative equilibrium in the East-West rivalry by denying concessions and alignment to the major contestants in the international Cold War, and more specifically in the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry.

The second phase was the period between the early 1950's and early 1960's, when Iranian foreign policy assumed a pronounced pro-Western course. Generally, the failure of the policies of the first phase, particularly regarding the objective of nationalization of oil, promoted this shift to a pro-Western alliance policy. Since the chief architect of this radical shift was the Shah, its justification and its impact are most directly discernible in the ascendancy of the Iranian monarch in the pyramid of the decision-making process.

The final phase is the period since the early 1960's, when a marked change toward disengagement from a rigid pro-Western posture becomes visible. The major characteristic of this period is the acceptance of the logic of non-alignment, so roundly rejected in the second phase. In effect, post-war Iranian foreign policy has completed a full circle, from rejection of an alliance policy in the first phase to its acceptance in the second, and finally to that *de facto* non-alignment within the

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pro-Western alliance that characterizes Iran's contemporary international posture.[13]

Literature on these periods has been uneven in both scope and quality. Some have reviewed the events of these periods primarily from the angle of the international Cold War. Others have dealt exclusively with Iranian relations with one or the other of the major powers,[14] particularly in the last phase.

It is in this sense that the work by Bayne assumes some significance. Though not dealing exclusively with recent Iranian foreign policy, it contributes measurably to the understanding of this period by: 1) analyzing the evolution of the institution of the kingship in Iran, thus providing an insight into the thoughts and actions of the present Shah, and 2) reviewing and evaluating specific events and situations in Iran's foreign policy toward major and a number of regional powers. Since internal and external political developments in Iran, as perhaps in most other small states, are intimately intertwined, this two fold inquiry provides a useful framework for understanding the more recent evolution in Iran's foreign policy.

In a chapter on the strain of foreign policy Bayne refers to the Shah's awakening to his role as a sovereign, once he was reinstated after the fall of Dr. Mossadegh in 1953. The trauma the sovereign experienced, especially in the latter part of Mossadegh's premiership, was largely responsible for convincing him of the necessity of ruling as well as of reigning. This new concept was grounded in the Shah's interpretation of the spirit of the constitution that entrusts him with the responsibility for the defense of the realm. Since defense is classically inseparable from diplomacy, and since the maintenance of a modern army depends heavily on foreign assistance and supply, military and foreign policy became almost identical. Apart from the legal framework, the direct control of foreign policy is also related to the Shah's estimate of his role as a modernizing and progressive ruler.

[13] See my "Iran's International Posture: De facto Nonalignment Within a Pro-Western Alliance," *Middle East Journal*, XXIV (Summer 1970).

[14] These are: George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry* (Ithaca 1962); Dietrich Geyer, *Die Sowjetunion und Iran: Eine Untersuchung zur Aussenpolitik der UdSSR in Nahen Osten, 1917-1954* (Tübingen 1955); Abdolhossein Hamzavi, *Persia and the Powers: An Account of Diplomatic Relations, 1941-1946* (London 1947); Fritz Steppat, *Iran zwischen den Grossmächten, 1941-1948* (Oberursel 1948), Mohammad Ali Manshur, *Siyasate Dowlate Shoravi dar Iran az 1296 ta 1306* [The Soviet Policy in Iran, 1917-1927] (Teheran 1948); and Mehdi Bahar, *Siyasate Amrika dar Khavare Miyaneh* [The U.S. Policy in the Middle East] (Teheran 1961).

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Bayne rightly considers the balance of Iran's relations with Russia and the United States as her most constant foreign policy concern, linked as it is to the very survival of the state. Though the style and conduct of foreign policy has changed, its substance continues to be the same as it was in the nineteenth century—namely, to insure the sovereignty and survival of the realm, to enhance Iran's national dignity, and to obtain international aid for economic and social development.

Bayne's account of Iran's efforts to maintain a workable equilibrium with the major powers reflects the personal conception of Iran's chief policy-maker of the best method by which this could be achieved. A survey of these efforts reveals a number of recurrent themes.

One is the issue of regional and national rivalries with which the superpowers have to cope. Once the groundwork for Iran's alliance with the West was laid, the overall United States policy toward her was influenced as much by Iran's particular conception of the mode of this alliance as it was by the Russian threat. The intense rivalry with Turkey, which had greatly benefited from its close ties with the West in the form of voluminous military and economic aid, to say nothing of the prestige associated with membership in NATO, was an ever-present factor in Iran's negotiation with the United States.

Similarly, after Iran joined the CENTO pact she persisted in a preferential aid policy toward formal allies. Her opposition to the Western offer of aid for building the Aswan dam in the United Arab Republic was at least partly instrumental in the withdrawal of that offer in June, 1956. No doubt the Soviet Union, which since the mid-1960's has become involved in economic and military projects in Iran, must cope with similar national and political rivalries among Iran and those regional states that profess a genuine alliance with Russia.

In sum, in the relations of small states with a major power, as these episodes indicate, their influence could conceivably become effective.

A second theme of recent Iranian policy is the notion of captivity and ineffectiveness of all small states that the Shah has echoed in reviewing United States-Iranian relations at the end of the second postwar phase. Interestingly enough, this sense of impotence is related not so much to ties with the Soviet Union as it is to the exigencies of the American presence in Iran, which was maximized during this phase. While accepting this harsh reality, the Shah has pleaded for a more sympathetic attitude toward the national sensitivities of small nations that would have facilitated an improvement in the country's ties with major powers. Similarly, a more consistent view of Iranian affairs and

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aspirations on the part of the United States would have been more productive (p. 202).

Bayne cites several specific issues to underline some of the difficulties at the end of this phase of United States-Iranian relations. Paramount among these was that America insisted that governmental authority should be decentralized for more efficient economic and social growth, at the same time as she urged the Shah to operate if necessary outside constitutional means in order to control corruption and political opposition of Communist origin. He contends that this ambivalence in American tactical demands has perhaps occasioned more debate between Iranians and Americans than any other topic since World War II. Some Iranians view Russian policy as simpler to deal with. For Russia's interests and means for their fulfilment have remained fairly consistent since the nineteenth century. Also, her proximity lends clarity to the threat she presents. By comparison, the American policy is sometimes viewed as complex, remote, and incomprehensible (p. 204).

Nonetheless, American policy has been credited with undergoing several significant changes in the post-Mossadegh era. For one, the United States became an active participant in an international oil consortium. Military-aid programs assumed more serious forms, largely as a result of a modified Pentagon doctrine, in the wake of the Korean War, concerning the effectiveness of small countries' armies[15] (p. 204).

A third issue is disaffection with the West and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. With close alliance with the United States, especially when by the early 1960's Congress embarked on a policy of reducing financial commitments in foreign aid, came signs of tension and uneasiness. Some Iranians, he reports, were reminded of the nineteenth century, when the country was similarly dependent on external support. As a result of this exclusive dependence on the West, which lasted as long as Cold War tension remained high, the Iranians found their freedom of action curbed. This self-image of captivity, according to Bayne, renders a regime vulnerable to nationalist reaction. In response to this sense of impatience, the quest for a third-power support began in earnest in 1962 when General de Gaulle was viewed as one foreign leader with whom the Shah shared broad views of world affairs, if only in emphasizing an independence from American dominance.

The reasons promoting the new trends in Iran's foreign policy are obviously bound up with the rationale of the previously adopted policy

[15] Since 1950 the U.S. has supplied on grant or purchase basis approximately $1.6 billion of arms and $700 million of economic aid.

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of pro-Western alliance. Bayne quotes the Shah in a series of questions and answers. Why had Iran decided to join CENTO, reversing the so-called go-it-alone nationalism of Dr. Mossadegh? Answer: "Mossadegh was patronizing a negative balance. In the CENTO case the lesson of Azarbayjan was a constant reminder to us that we had to have some kind of protection. We thought by joining the pact we would have it, and that the armed forces of this country will build up, naturally never for aggressive purposes, but to a respectable size" (pp. 210-11).

Here again the Shah's concept of balance was not related exclusively to major powers. His joining of CENTO was motivated also by a desire to use that alliance as a defensive instrument against Nasser. "Our real motive was Nasser's refusal to let Suez bases be reactivated if Russia attacked Iran, whereas he had agreed to do so vis-à-vis Turkey."

The effort to disengage from a pro-Western alliance, which, beginning in the early 1960's, has been described interchangeably as positive or independent nationalism, does not deny the regime's close association with the West, particularly the United States. But it is in effect an acknowledgment that Iran sometimes dreams of neutralism when it speaks of nationalistic independence. However, the Shah recognized the absence of a meaningful alternative to reliance on the West. This lack of an alternative is not the result only of Iran's economic ties with the West but is also related to the ultimate need for protection in any East-West struggle. What is at stake is presumably a strong desire to make this protection as reciprocal and as mutually beneficial as possible.

As to the role of the Soviet Union in influencing the new posture, the author relates the Soviet's interaction with Iran's earlier alliance with the West and her more recent de-emphasis of that alliance. In his two visits to Russia in 1961 and 1965, the Shah succeeded in considerably easing the tension between the two countries, returning with the general impression that the Soviets do not want war but need peace, just as Iran does, in order to develop: during the second visit the Soviet Union made an offer of economic and military assistance and a renewed hint at a nonaggression pact.

Understandably, the rapprochement with the Soviets caused some anxiety in the United States. The Americans pointed out the danger of any larger Russian representation in Iran. The government, for its part, has assured the United States that the purpose of attracting Soviet economic support is purely economic. But nonetheless the potential danger of subversion by the intrusion of Soviet technicians has not

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eluded the government. Elaborate security precautions are in force to make sure that this will not occur.

On several occasions since, the Shah has tried to place a rapprochement with the Soviet Union in an overall context by emphasizing a policy of national independence that will terminate forever the era of subservience to foreign powers.[16] This new outlook is due in no small measure to the experience of the second Kashmir War of 1965 when, according to the Shah, CENTO was put to a rigorous test. Iran's disappointment at the failure of the United States to support Pakistan was so intense that the Shah stated, "we see now what CENTO really is. It is a device to protect the West only. It was interesting that the United States quickly pointed out that it was an associate member."[17] Therefore, though grateful for past valuable assistance from Western countries, the Shah cautioned, in the future Iran would respect their interests to the degree that they respect hers.

The lesson of the Kashmir War was that the United States would not come to Iran's aid if she were attacked. To quote the Shah, "It is no longer 1946; things have changed. I know that it is still a realistic world. Countries will work for their self-interest. Iran too is nationalistic. We would honor our commitments. Therefore, we expect others to do the same" (p. 220). Here again, regional as opposed to bipolar considerations and rivalries became paramount. For Iran, the Persian Gulf and the general issue of Arab-Iranian relations acquired the same significance as did Kashmir for Pakistan. The Soviet threat is now distant and even irrelevant. What compounded the Iranian misgiving was the reluctance of the United States to accede to her every request for sophisticated weapons. Iranian sensitivity was further aroused when she learned that Israel had received defensive missiles to cope with what Iran believed to be purely regional military problems.

The response to these frustrations was an attempt to search for alternative suppliers of arms, and toward the end of 1965 the Soviet Union became available. The Shah's defense of this new concept of diversification of military supplies is most illuminating. Rejecting the twofold American argument against an unnecessary divergence of capital from economic and social development and intensifying the arms race in the Middle East, the Shah stated: "Why does the United States think I am making troubles in this when I have done the things they said they wanted? It seems sometimes that with democracies you have to

[16] See for example his address on the anniversary of Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow in *Keyhan International* (Teheran, August 19, 1965).

[17] *Ibid.*, 219.

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be dramatic in order to convince them that you have a real need for the particular kind of arms stance you are asking for" (p. 222).

When the author reminded him of United States misgivings about potential Soviet use of closer ties with Iran in order to achieve long term objectives, the Shah again touched on a sensitive note. "I could not withdraw [from the purchase agreement] altogether now. It would be the same as saying to them and to the world that I am an American puppet. I am not" (p. 222).

This episode, which was finally resolved by an assurance by the Shah that only nonsensitive equipment would be purchased from the Russians and by the American agreement to supply missiles and phantom jets, leads the author to conclude that when confronted with a determined Shah, backed by a logic of national security, the United States had to accommodate him.[18]

The major flaw in Bayne's book is caused by two handicaps under which the author works. First is an inadequate social-scientific background. Second is a general desire to be sympathetic toward his chief subject. He has no conceptual scheme for evaluating the foreign policy of Iran in the period of its royal stewardship since 1953. Though he claims no expertise in the analytical approach to foreign policy, his account, essentially sympathetic and favorable toward the regime, could have benefited from at least some attempt at conceptualization and critical analysis.

His discussion of the concept of equilibrium in relations with major powers is perfunctory. Nowhere does he make an attempt to put this concept into a historical perspective—as, among others, Ramazani attempts to do for the pre-World War II period. The concept of equilibrium also is related to the estimate of bipolarization of international politics and its more recent depolarization entertained by small states such as Iran. Does the Shah's conception of depolarization correspond with that of the United States, and indeed of the Soviet Union? For if it does, the scope of his effort to chart an independent course toward the superpowers will be wide. If it does not, the limitation that each power would demand in order to accommodate his desire for a wider range of options would become substantial.

Similarly, the concept of inherent rivalry in East-West relations needs critical evaluation. What is the Iranian estimate of big-power rivalry?

[18] Another point of misgiving with the U.S. was the congressional clamor over the Shah's dispatch of a squadron of U.S. made F86 jets to Pakistan at the height of the Kashmir War. See Hearing before Senate Sub-committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Committee of Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, March 14, April 13-20 and 25, June 22, 1967.

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At what level has it to be maintained in order for both superpowers to pay due attention to what a small power will do about siding with one or the other? In other words, if the process of depolarization reaches its logical terminal point, would it not diminish the opportunity of such small but strategically significant states as Iran to exploit big-power rivalry in order to maximize their own interests?

Nor is there in Bayne's book a critical discussion of the regime's concept of national security. Is this security identical with that of the state? What are the risks in and limitations of what the opponents of the regime contend to be a narrowly personal conception of security?[19] On nationalism and its various strands, also, more comprehensive work is in order.[20] The relation of foreign policy objectives and economic and developmental needs, too, deserves more attention.

Institutional processes in making policy even at the top level have not been fully investigated, either. Who are the individuals around the Shah to whom he lends an ear on matters of foreign policy?[21] In his book, Ramazani shows that the ascendancy of the Iranian Majlis on several occasions brought into play new factors in the decision-making process on foreign policy, as was also the case, though intermittently, in the first post-World War II phase. The Iranian parliament became the major focus of the policy-making process at the time that the country was attempting to liquidate Anglo-Russian encroachments on its sovereignty. The efforts of the parliament to regain and consolidate Iran's independence after World War II gave rise to repeated controversies concerning the scope of legislative authority in foreign policy.

Of particular significance is a dispute between the supporters of a 1949 constitutional amendment to enhance the Shah's legislative power as against that of the parliament and its opponents, led by Premier Ahmed Ghavam, who in coping with the Soviet pressure on Azarbayjan and the proposed oil concession in northern Iran in 1945-1947 had successfully utilized the parliamentary requirement for treaty ratification.[22]

[19] For a critical discussion of this see Leonard Binder, *Iran, Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley 1962).

[20] For a comprehensive and sympathetic analysis see Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh 1964).

[21] The late Seyd Zia Tabatabi has been credited for strongly counselling the Shah to proceed on a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Peter Avery, *Modern Iran* (New York 1965).

[22] In an appeal to the sovereign the veteran statesman pleaded against the proposed amendment on the ground that it would undermine the authority of the Majlis, whose treaty-making power has enabled the country to resist pressures from major powers on several critical matters like the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919 and the Irano-Soviet oil agreement that he himself had negotiated with Russia in 1945. *Demokrate Iran* (Iranian Daily, March 1949).

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In sum, despite some attempt at historical analysis and comprehension, Bayne's book remains basically a journalistic account of a very fascinating topic. Its chief value is confined to a reflection of the official views and beliefs of the architect of Iran's modern foreign policy. Though not carrying the stamp of officialdom, it nonetheless suffers from a common weakness that all enterprises of this sort experience.

The contrast between Bayne and Nirumand is most apparent in the ideological bias that pervades the latter's work. Whereas Bayne works under the handicap of pro-regime sympathies, Nirumand views his subject from a standpoint of world politics that perhaps could be best described as New Left or Third World. Though a German-trained student of the philosophy of history, he is ill-equipped with sufficiently sophisticated tools of analysis. His objective plainly is to prove that since 1953 Iran has become a model case where all evils of the rich-poor syndrome, symbolized in American-Iranian relations of donor-recipient, are manifest. He sees her external relations and international posture, therefore, as that of a neo-colonial client-state of the United States.

Nirumand makes few attempts to disguise his ideological bias. In his introductory chapter, entitled "From the Clash of Ideologies to the Alliance of the Rich Against the Poor," he sets out to present his framework of analysis, at the core of which lie several assumptions. (1) The Western powers, as suppliers of aid and senior partners in trade relations with developing countries, engage in a welfare relation with them. (2) The third-world concept is based on the rejection of the old dichotomy of free world versus Communist world, or East versus West, which no longer reveals the reality of a deeper division between wealth and poverty. This third world, united only by its poverty, is in the process of developing a consciousness made up of the ideas of nationalism and the need for social reform. (3) Major powers that seek to force capitalism on the third world want to promote not that world's freedom but rather their own security and interest.

Like Ramazani, Nirumand justifies the case study of Iran by the contribution it could make to the understanding of the developing regions. Fundamental similarity of social structure and political, economic, and psychological situations permit generalizations based on this specific case study. But he too fails to present any comparative analysis, on even a modest scale, to generalize from his broad conclusions.

Citing similarities in the development of capital cities of developing

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countries, the sprawling suburban areas, and the wide gap in income between the upper and lower classes, he contends that it is the elementary contrast between the poor and the rich that separates them into two halves with opposing interests. "One half is intent on preserving the existing social order and relying on modeling its civilization as closely as possible on the Western industrial model. The other yearns to shake off its age old dependence and social oppression" (p. 11).

His picture of the misfortunes of the third world is not totally gloomy. He believes that when Red China threw off the fetters of its dependence on the Soviet Union and developed critical ideas of its own with which oppressed countries of all continents soon began to identify, she gave a tremendous impetus to the third world. The Soviet-American coexistence is a response to this emerging challenge. Dismissing the narrowly legalistic concept of decolonialization as meaningless so long as the economic and political dependence of the decolonized persists, he speaks of another form of colonial heritage. This is an indelible mark on the consciousness of the former colonies that, among other things, equates technical-scientific progress with cultural superiority.

Proceeding from these assumptions, he interprets the main characteristic of Iran's international situation since the discovery of oil in pre-World War I as quasi-colonial. Although occasionally interrupted by such episodes as Dr. Mossadegh's nationalist movement, this situation, he believes, has continued to reflect the realities of Iranian politics ever since. The identity of the major power and the form of control may have changed, but the substance of Iranian quasi-colonial relations with the West has persisted.

His analysis of the American ascendancy in Iranian politics acknowledges the causal relation of this with the Soviet post-war objectives in Iran. What began essentially as a reaction to the Soviet encroachment, he believes, was later entrenched by two new and important factors, the United States military strategy and her economic interest.

Consistent with these two coinciding interests, the United States assumes the role of a major power that at times conflicts with that of Britain but more often than not succeeds in establishing its hegemony. Nirumand presents the struggle for the nationalization of oil in the early 1950's in a manner that would lend credence to this assertion. Thus: in the complicated oil dispute the United States initially supported the rise of Mossadegh and the nationalization of the oil industry until its main objective of eliminating Britain's preferential position in Iran had been achieved and the road opened for United States partic-

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ipation in Iran's oil resources and the incorporation of Iran in the United States sphere of influence. When this was accomplished and an Anglo-American convergence of oil policy and interest became possible, support for Mossadegh was reversed.

The account of the overthrow of Mossadegh adds little that is not already known. What is perhaps interesting is the author's criticism of Dr. Mossadegh for being too democratic toward the opposition and its political freedom. The growing activities of the Tudeh Communist party resulting from this leniency were merely a welcome pretext for the Americans to justify their active role in Mossadegh's overthrow.[23]

Nirumand's criticism of Mossadegh's policies in his last months in power echoes an ambivalence that the New Left everywhere experiences toward conventional Soviet-dominated Communist parties. The Tudeh demand for the proclamation of a Republic in the hectic days of mid-August 1953, he contends, was called for. Dr. Mossadegh's failure to make such a proclamation, as well as the breakdown in communication with the party's central committee in Moscow, allowed this opportunity to be by-passed. On the other hand, Nirumand repeatedly criticizes the Soviet Union and presumably parties loyal to it. Contemporary Russia is a rich nation; it has become ideologically and internationally a status-quo power accommodating the interest and aspirations of the Iranian ruling class, selling the Shah military equipment, and offering him aid and international prestige and recognition.

We may only conjecture that the author would have supported the Tudeh party as long as it reflected a hostile Soviet attitude toward the Iranian regime. When this ceased to be the case in the post-Stalin era, neither the party nor its sponsor state earns his support, except in areas of common interest like victimization of all radical opposition at the hands of the regime.[24]

There is a detailed discussion of economic aid as an instrumentality of the rich nation's policy toward the poor. Nirumand's ideal form of economic foreign policy for Iran is one directed at developing heavy industry and advancing political independence, but, instead, the thrust of the United States' economic aid policy has been to place Iran at the disposition of the former. For example, he cites the selection of projects by, and the import of material from, the donor country and allocation

[23] This is almost identical with Communist literature of this period such as Bozorg Alavi's *Kämpfendes Iran* (Berlin 1959).

[24] Although they are not identified as such, most of his sources in this part are well known Communist literature like *Donia*, the organ of the Tudeh party in exile.

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of aid to further foreign markets, rather than the creation of a self-sufficient economy, as chief marks of this policy.[25] Unfortunately, he offers no comment on the more recent involvement of both rich superpowers in the development of heavy industry in Iran. Does the Soviet technical and financial assistance in building a steel mill in Isfahan, or Western private investment in lesser heavy industrial projects, contradict his thesis?

He sees a direct relation, furthermore, between economic aid and consolidation of the military powers of the regime. His coverage of Irano-Soviet relations in the post-Mossadegh era is slight. The reference to the details of the tripartite diplomatic interplay between Iran and the two superpowers in 1959 is either inadequate or outright inaccurate. He altogether ignores the eventual rapprochement with the Soviet Union occasioned by Iran's pledge in 1962 to deny foreign missile bases on her soil. Had the author fully analyzed the Soviet motivation in seeking a *détente* with Iran, he would have strengthened his portrayal of both superpowers as rich and self-seeking states. He could have shown the transcendence of the Soviet *raison d'état* over ideological or, as he would prefer, humanistic considerations, when Russia's strategic interest necessitated accommodation with Iran. Instead, he is obsessed with the United States, which he condemns for choosing between humaneness and its own interest by, among other things, paying and equipping a national army that successfully controls the people. This is how the free world, he notes sarcastically, puts the principle of liberty into practice. The villain, apart from the government of the United States, is the Western oil interests.

The preceding discussion makes it obvious that although each work contributes something to the understanding of phases and aspects of Iran's foreign policy since the turn of the century, neither collectively nor separately do they do justice to the full range of the topic. The gap is most apparent regarding the post-World War II era. A systematic analysis of this period with full attention to the analytical scheme that Professor Wilkinson recommends remains to be attempted.[26]

Such an analysis must take into account at least five specific points. First, it must resolve the question of methodology by determining the framework of analysis and the level of abstraction and projection it

[25] For a non-Communist analysis of U.S. economic aid to Iran see Jahangir Amuzegar, *Technicial Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran* (New York 1966).

[26] Forthcoming volumes in these series include The Foreign Relations of India, U.A.R., and the Arab Middle East and a number of other non-Western states.

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wishes to undertake. Second, it must pay due attention to the sub-systematic changes that the whole Middle Eastern region is undergoing in relation to the international system. The intensity and scope of interaction between the main international system and the Middle Eastern sub-system, in addition to Iran's role as the chief national actor at least in the non-Arab region of the area, should be probed.

Attention to intraregional foreign relations is the third required emphasis, and it is particularly significant for the contemporary period, when the continuing *détente* in the international system has elevated interest in intraregional relations to a much higher plane. Today, for example, the main focus of Iran's foreign policy relates to the issue of the Persian Gulf and its defense, in the wake of the imminent termination of the British military presence from the area. Here the Arab-Iranian relations and the scope and limitations of Israeli-Iranian cooperation assumes great significance.

Fourth, the politics of oil merit full exploration. Interlocked as oil revenue is with the political stability and financial resources of the regime, the competitive nature of the relations between concessionary powers and the Western states influences many areas of Iran's regional politics. Finally, the conduct of policy, the decision-making process, and attitudes of influential groups should be studied. Although the authoritarian nature of the regime and the personal nature of political leadership does not encourage the full interplay of these influences, nonetheless their mere presence is bound to carry some weight. One of the by-products of modernization has been the emergence of many professional, often foreign-educated groups whose influence and access to the points of decision-making at the level of the day-to-day conduct of policy, and even their contribution to the evolving concept of national interest, must not be lightly dismissed.

The method of survey analysis could also be used to ascertain the attitude, preferences, and priorities of selected representative groups toward foreign policy. Admittedly, adequate academic training, in addition to a thorough familiarity with the country and the region, is a prerequisite for such an undertaking. A recent paper by Professor Leonard Binder represents the first step in this direction.[27] His analytical skill as well as the empirical knowledge displayed in this paper makes him a suitable candidate for attempting a more comprehensive work along the above lines.

[27] *Factors Influencing Iran's International Role*, The RAND Corporation, RM-5668-F.F. (Santa Monica 1969).

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THE FOCUS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION RESEARCH: An Evaluation

By WILLIAM R. SCHONFELD*

David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969, 440 pp. $9.95.

Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1967, 288 pp. $9.75.

Kenneth P. Langton, *Political Socialization*, New York, London, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1969, 215 pp. $2.50.

ONLY in the past decade has the study of political socialization grown into a central concern of political science. Although political philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have been interested in the process by which the child acquires behavior appropriate to the role of a citizen, political scientists had, as of ten years ago, devoted little attention to studying this phenomenon systematically. Then, in 1959, Herbert Hyman wrote a little book called *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*.[1] Hyman's purpose was to sensitize political scientists to what he considered an interesting and important field of inquiry that had been slighted. Arguing that "political behavior" is "patently" "learned behavior,"[2] he set out to summarize the existing fragmentary information about the political dispositions of children and young adults. By combing the literature, he was able to present a series of propositions on participation, party orientation, and democratic or authoritarian tendencies, and to point out areas where further research was needed.

Largely as a result of Hyman's work, political socialization has burgeoned into one of our discipline's major foci of research.[3] According to the 1968 Biographical Directory Survey conducted under the auspices of the American Political Science Association, political socialization

*I wish to express my gratitude to Philip Goldmann, Queens University, for valuable theoretical suggestions made during the preparatory phase of writing this article and to Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, and Joel Barkan, University of California, Irvine, for constructive commentary and criticism on a draft version of it.

[1] New York 1959. [2] *Ibid.*, 9.

[3] I do not wish to imply here that Hyman popularized political socialization research; this role was actually performed by Gabriel Almond. However, Hyman was the "founding father," and his work served as a stimulus to Almond.

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was the thirteenth (out of twenty-seven) most popular field of primary specialization.[4] During the past decade, numerous articles, monographs, dissertations, and books on political socialization have appeared. The new sub-discipline has now also penetrated the pedagogical realm; it is hard today to find an introductory undergraduate course in American government or comparative politics in which the subject is not at least mentioned and discussed briefly.

Furthermore, the study of political socialization does not seem to have reached a limit. More studies are being done now than three or four years ago, and this trend seems likely to continue.[5] In addition, political socialization research has begun to spread into previously virgin terrains —i.e., cultural contexts other than the American.[6]

As is the case in almost all fields of political science, students of political socialization disagree over what empirical phenomena they can most profitably study. Yet, transcending these conflicts and at a higher level of generality, there seems to be a virtual consensus on the proper focus of inquiry. This article states this generally accepted definition of political socialization research and evaluates its fruitfulness for contributing to a systematic and scientific study of politics. In the process, we can examine some of the unstated assumptions of political socialization research and reflect upon the usefulness and strength of its foundation. For reasons of space, we shall concentrate on, although not limit our analysis to, three recent book-length treatments of the subject by David Easton and Jack Dennis, Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, and Kenneth P. Langton.

Centering analysis on these works has three other advantages. First, they are the most recently published empirical studies of the subject and, therefore, presumably represent the most advanced treatments of it. Second, the works examine political socialization from different perspectives, and these differences are as great as any others in the field. Finally, all three studies are characterized by a very high quality of scholarship.

[4] Norman Wengert, "One Swallow Does Not Make a Spring . . . ," *Political Science*, 11 (Summer 1969), 355.

[5] In the recent conventions of the American Political Science Association, political socialization has been one of the general subject areas for panel meetings. This suggests that, at least in the near future, more and more political socialization studies are likely to be published.

[6] Three recent books on political socialization in different world regions are: Stephan A. Douglas, *Political Socialization and Student Activism in Indonesia* (Urbana 1970); Kenneth Prewitt, ed., *Education and Political Values: Essays about East Africa* (Nairobi 1970); and Charles Roig and Françoise Billon-Grand, *La Socialization politique des enfants: Contribution à l'étude de la formation des attitudes politiques en France* (Paris 1968).

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I. Definitions of Political Socialization[7]

There are two ways in which any term or concept may be defined: a "denotative," or descriptive, definition that tells us how the term or concept is conventionally used, or a "connotative" definition that tells us how a term or concept is to be used in a special technical sense. Let us begin by looking at what has been systematically studied under the rubric of political socialization, and then examine its connotative definitions.

A. THE DENOTATIVE DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Empirical research in political socialization has been concerned almost exclusively with the development of children's explicitly political attitudes.[8] This statement implies that there are four basic characteristics of the mainstream of political socialization research. (1) The subjects who are studied are children. The great majority of research has been carried on with elementary- and/or secondary-school pupils, although recently there has been a tendency to extend the scope of studies to include university students.[9] This expansion seems to be closely related to the unprecedented violence in universities and to the spread of political socialization research into the developing nations. (2) Research has concentrated almost exclusively on respondents' attitudes and has paid virtually no attention to their behavior. (3) Attention has been given only to attitudes considered directly political—i.e., orientations and dispositions toward, and images of, institutions, roles, individuals, and issues that are part of or explicitly related to government. (4) Children at various grade-levels have been studied with a view to determining the direction of their attitudinal development. Almost all of these characteristics are present in our three works.

[7] Some of the notions presented in this, as well as in the preceding, section overlap with an interpretation made by Fred I. Greenstein, in "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization': Definitions, Criticisms and Strategies of Inquiry," *Journal of Politics*, XXXII (November 1970). Unfortunately, Greenstein's article was not published, or read by me, until after this review article was written.

[8] It is interesting to note that psychologists and sociologists who have studied socialization have examined children's behavior as well as their attitudes. In fact, their inquiries have often been behaviorally centered. See, for instance, Urie Bronfenbrenner, *Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R.* (New York 1970).

[9] For examples of empirical political socialization studies done with university students, see, for instance, the following three papers presented at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969: Sheldon Appleton, "The Political Socialization of College Students on Taiwan"; Joel D. Barkan, "The Political Socialization of University Students in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda"; and Larry Stern, Monte Palmer, and Nafhat Nasr, "Political Socialization and Student Political Attitudes in Latin America, the United States, and the Middle East."

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Robert Hess and Judith Torney, as the title of their study clearly suggests, were primarily concerned with "the development of [directly] political attitudes in children." Their research findings are drawn from a sample of approximately 12,000 white children in grades two through eight. These respondents came from four different regions of the United States, but all of them were pupils in urban public schools. The purpose of the research was to analyze the "rate of attitude development" (p. 24) in five areas: (1) attachment to the nation, (2) attachment to the government and to governmental figures, (3) compliance with and respect for the law, (4) influencing politics, and (5) participation in elections.

Hess and Torney are concerned largely (if not exclusively) with determining what political attitudes children develop at what "rate"; Kenneth Langton centers his analysis on the effects of certain major socialization agencies on children's political attitudes.[10] His study was based essentially on two distinct groups of respondents: American high-school seniors included in a national survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and a sample of 1,287 Jamaican secondary-school students. Langton analyzed a series of political orientations and dispositions of his respondents—feelings of political efficacy, party identification, extent of politicization, amount of political knowledge, and degree of legitimacy attributed to the system—and tried to determine the roles played by the family, school, and school peer-group in creating these attitudes. Although his inquiry was centered on the relative impacts of these different agencies of socialization, his denotative definition of political socialization is quite similar to Hess and Torney's. The only significant difference is that Langton is not overtly concerned with the rate of attitudinal development.

The conception of political socialization implicit in the study by David Easton and Jack Dennis is based on the same sample as that of the Hess and Torney study. Easton and Dennis explicitly set out to do a type of political socialization study different from those previously done, because they wanted to avoid the built-in bias toward stability that they perceived as characterizing the work of most of their predecessors. In addition, they sought to penetrate to a lower and more basic level of analysis. Thus, their work is centered on the development of "diffuse [positive or negative] support" for the structure of political authority (i.e., the government). More specifically, they examined

[10] In fact, Langton's study is not solely "his." Of the seven chapters in *Political Socialization*, three are previously published articles, two of which he wrote with M. Kent Jennings and one with David A. Karns.

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such phenomena as awareness of and affect for the governmental sector of society, cognition and salience of and affect for various roles in the political authority structure (e.g., mayor, soldier, judge, senator, and, especially, policeman and president), and the ability to differentiate among political roles and the extent to which the individual institutionalizes these separate roles. Although these phenomena are distinct from those analyzed in other political socialization studies, the nature of the analysis remains the same: Easton and Dennis are also looking at children's explicitly political attitudes and dispositions from a developmental point of view.

In sum, these studies, though adopting three distinct foci of inquiry—the development of political attitudes, the impact of various agencies of socialization on the formation of political attitudes, and the development of diffuse support for the government—present very similar conceptions of their subject matter. They all tend to view political socialization as the study of the development of children's explicit political attitudes and dispositions. In this respect, at least, they are representative of the mainstream of political socialization research.

B. THE CONNOTATIVE DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Students of political socialization seem to be strongly divided over what *ought* to be their proper focus of inquiry. Specifically, there is a cleavage between those who view their sub-discipline as being concerned only with studying the process by which individuals acquire political attitudes (including norms, values, and beliefs) and those who conceive of this process as also having an important (or determinant) influence on political behavior. However, proponents of these opposing conceptions do agree that they are interested in a process through which individuals learn (or acquire) attitudes and/or behavior having direct political relevance. Furthermore, the connotative definitions of political socialization they present have certain common characteristics: (1) they are centered on the *end product* of political socialization, which is alternatively conceived of as having simply attitudinal or both attitudinal and behavioral aspects; (2) they do not *explicitly restrict* their research to children; (3) they seek to analyze the process by which an individual arrives at the overtly political stage, but usually without *explicitly limiting* the type of information sought from respondents for this purpose. We are immediately struck by a certain lack of fit between what is and what might be studied: the denotative and connotative conceptions of the subject.

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The earliest definition of political socialization that explicitly limits its end product to a set of attitudes was presented by Gabriel Almond. In his introduction to *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Almond defines political socialization as "the process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes—cognitions, value standards, and feelings—toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents. It also includes knowledge of, values affecting, and feelings toward the inputs of demands and claims into the system, and its authoritative outputs."[11] A similar definition was presented by Lucian Pye, who regards political socialization as the "process . . . through which the individual develops his awareness of his political world and gains his appreciation, judgment, and understanding of political events." Pye goes on to note that through this process the individual "is socialized to his political culture and realizes his political identity."[12]

There have been other purely attitudinal definitions of political socialization, which do not link their subject of inquiry explicitly or solely to political culture. For instance, Lewis Froman says, "The study of political socialization is directly concerned with the 'what' and 'how' of the learning of politically relevant values, beliefs and attitudes."[13] Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt have presented a definition that only partly links political socialization with political culture and that implies that it does not have direct behavioral ramifications. In their words, political socialization must be examined in two "perspectives": "as cultural transmission and as individual learning."[14] In the first perspective, "political socialization shapes and transmits a nation's political culture."[15] In the latter, "political socialization is the developmental process through which the citizen matures politically. The citizen acquires a complex of beliefs, feelings and information which help him comprehend, evaluate, and relate to the political world around him. . . . [It] produces a political self."[16]

Other students of political socialization define their subject matter connotatively as having directly behavioral, as well as attitudinal, ramifications. This is the case for all of the studies explicitly under review

[11] Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 28.

[12] *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962), 45.

[13] "Personality and Political Socialization," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (May 1961), 343.

[14] *Political Socialization* (Boston 1969), 13.

[15] *Ibid.*, 27. [16] *Ibid.*, 13.

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in this article. Kenneth Langton begins by saying, "Political socialization, in the broadest sense, refers to the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation" (p. 4). But then, more specifically, he defines it as "the process, mediated through various agencies of society, by which an individual learns politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behavior patterns" (p. 5). Easton and Dennis simply define political socialization as "*those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behavior*" (p. 7). Hess and Torney's connotative definition of political socialization is less explicitly presented; first they note:

> [Children] develop a view of government, of law and justice, and of the proper role of citizens, and they share some of the excitement of electoral campaigns long before their interest can have any effect upon the political affairs of the country. These early perceptions, images, and concepts are . . . characteristic of a period during which children become oriented toward the values, beliefs, knowledge, and opinions of the political culture, and they provide the basis for later behavior as adult citizens.
>
> This book is concerned with this early learning, which we call political socialization (p. 1).

Then they say, "*Social learning* and *socialization* refer of course to the process whereby a junior or new member of a group or institution is taught its values, attitudes, and other behavior" (p. 6).

There are many other advocates of this view of political socialization. For instance, Roberta Sigel writes that "political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes and behavior accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system."[17] Robert Levine presents a similar definition: "[Political socialization is] the means by which individuals acquire motives, habits, and values relevant to participation in a political system."[18] And Fred Greenstein, in his article on political socialization in the new *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, seems to view his subject matter similarly:

> Narrowly conceived, political socialization is the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally non-political learn-

[17] "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Attitudes," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLXI (September 1965), 2.

[18] "Political Socialization and Culture Change," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York 1963), 280.

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ing that affects political behavior, such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics.[19]

Note then that, despite divergence over whether political socialization is a process through which individuals acquire simply attitudes or both attitudes and behavior relevant to politics, all of the definitions are concerned with the end product of this process, and none, except apparently Hess and Torney, limits the focus of theoretical research to children. Many—e.g., those of Dawson and Prewitt, Easton and Dennis, Hess and Torney, and Sigel—explicitly view the process in developmental, evolutionary terms. And none, with the exceptions of Hess and Torney and Sigel, explicitly restricts the type of information to be sought from hypothetical respondents, i.e., prejudges what inculcates political attitudes and/or behavior.

There is, of course, no outright contradiction between the denotative and the connotative conceptions of political socialization. Rather, the denotative conceptions tend to be narrower versions of the connotative definitions. This in itself is by no means open to criticism. When systematic inquiry is just beginning in any sub-discipline, researchers usually select some limited portion from what they think should be examined. We can, however, ask whether a wise choice was made. Furthermore, even if the selection was justified, we can ask if the time has not come for readjusting the focus of inquiry.

II. An Evaluation of Political Socialization Research

In order to appraise the value of contemporary political socialization research, it is important to have a conception of why political scientists might want to conduct the general type of research suggested by the definitions of political socialization. Only with this as a background will we have a standard against which to compare the actual with the potential.

Almost all empirical work in the field has been done on children. This tendency is a result of the focus in the connotative definitions on learning—a process associated more closely with childhood and adolescence than with adulthood. As a result, one way of developing a standard against which political socialization research could be evaluated would be to seek answers to the question of why political scientists might want to study the child's world.

The first response to this query would emphasize the attempt to

[19] (New York 1968), XIV, 551.

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ascertain whether childhood learning has any effect on adult political behavior. In other words, does the child acquire behavior and/or attitudes that persist in later life and influence (or determine) the nature and style of his relation with the polity? This question is obviously of basic and critical significance: unless there is some linkage between what a child learns and his future political behavior and attitudes, there is little reason for political scientists to study children. Complementing and supplementing an inquiry of this sort would be analyses of the types of childhood attitudes and behavioral patterns that persist, and investigations into the conditions under which they become operative or inoperative in adulthood.

A second reason for political scientists to study children (contingent upon the discovery of linkage between early learning and adult political behavior and attitudes) is a concern with *how* individuals learn to relate to their political systems. In other words, the infant, having no knowledge of the world he lives in, becomes an adult who has a conception of and a relation with a given polity: through what process does he make this transition? This question is quite distinct from the first; it is concerned with how the child learns certain attitudes and behavioral patterns, rather than with describing what he learns.

Third, political scientists might direct their attention to the child's world in an attempt to tap the adult's normative image of politics and government. Such an orientation might lead the investigator to examine conceptions of the political system that are transmitted overtly and covertly to children. This research strategy would be based on the assumption that adults seek (successfully) to transmit an idealized conception of political life.

Finally, heuristic reasons might attract their attention to children. Relations in the child's world that are analogous to political relations might be examined in an attempt to develop hypotheses to explain poorly understood aspects of political life. Such an indirect strategy might be adopted because of the complexity and difficulty of characterizing and explaining certain political phenomena that seem to exist in similar, but simpler, form in the world of childhood.

With these possibilities in mind, we can now evaluate contemporary political socialization research.

Students of political socialization have directed their attention to children neither for the heuristic potentialities of the child's world nor as a means to tap adult political norms. Rather, their studies involve what might be called process and, especially, linkage research.

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The attempts in the empirical literature to determine the effect that various social institutions (family, school, peer-group organization) have on the formation of children's political attitudes is an example of the focus on process. Researchers variously suggest that one or another of these institutions has more influence on the formation of particular types of political attitudes. In a similar vein, they study variations in political attitudes according to, for instance, family characteristics—e.g., parental authoritarianism (Langton, pp. 23 ff.) and dominance by mother or father (Hess and Torney, pp. 99 ff.). Unfortunately, this tack does not really help us understand how—the process by which—children learn political attitudes and behavioral patterns. At most, it suggests that in the sub-samples into which the respondents have been divided, differences occur that could explain the variations observed by the researcher. A genuine enquiry into process would seek to describe and analyze these differences; actual research in political socialization does not.

But with what, precisely, would a study of *how* children learn political attitudes and behavioral patterns be concerned? And is there not at least some intimation of this type of research in the literature? Roberta Sigel, writing in 1966, provides us with a general view of the phenomena upon which a focus on process in political socialization should be centered:

> But what do we mean when we say we should know *how children learn* political orientations? How means two different things: it means, for one, the politically and socially relevant conditions which have a direct impact on the acquisition of political learning, and it means, for another thing, psychological principles which explain why and how people learn —principles which in themselves are not political but which should apply to learning of politics as they apply to any other type of learning. . . . [In trying to determine the how] instead of asking what does the child know about the President, about justice, etc. we would ask ourselves: what are the political stimuli offered to the child at home, in school, in the Boy Scouts? What responses does the child make initially to these stimuli, and do we reward or punish him for these? Do the agents of socialization reinforce each other, i.e., do they reward and punish the same response? What happens when they do reward the same response and when they reward contradictory responses?[20]

[20] "Political Socialization: Some Reactions on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," paper presented at the Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York 1966), 3-4. This paper is an exceptionally good examination of the methodology and theory associated with political socialization. Sigel brilliantly discusses problems and weaknesses of completed research, including her own, and analyzes many issues beyond the scope of this review article.

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Taking Sigel's conception as a standard, we might say that although empirical research is far from helping us understand the *how* of political learning, there has been some movement in this direction. For instance, Langton discovered that the "civics curriculum" was "an important source of political knowledge for Negroes" (p. 101) even though it seemed to have little if any effect on the student population as a whole. To explain this finding, he developed the notion of "redundancy" and suggested that Negroes are more influenced by instruction in civics because they bring with them less information about the substance of what is taught than do white students. Although the concept of "redundancy" is little more than speculation from data, it is a move in the direction of understanding an aspect of the process of political learning. If we were to study a sample of children for a period of time to determine how much redundancy is required before the individual ceases to modify his attitudes or behavior, it would help us to locate the point at which the pre-adult learning process on a variety of issues stops. Such a research project might, for instance, demonstrate that resistance to change as a result of redundancy varies in different domains. In any case, it would illuminate one aspect of the *how* of political socialization. Unfortunately, Langton's work does not go beyond the suggestive stage.

An important theoretical contribution to the process focus has been made by Hess and Torney. They create a four-fold typology of "models" or ways in which political attitudes are acquired, changed, and stabilized.

> *The Accumulation Model* . . . assumes that the acquisition of political role expectations proceeds by the addition of units of knowledge, information, attitudes, and activities. . . . The basic feature of this mode of socialization is that it involves direct teaching, usually by adults, in which the capabilities of the child and the nature of the materials are assumed to be irrelevant. The child's attitudes, involvement, and behavior are seen as an accumulation of the specific and direct learning which has taken place (p. 19).
>
> *Interpersonal Transfer Model.* This model assumes that the child approaches explicit political socialization already possessing a fund of experience in interpersonal relationships and gratifications. By virtue of his experience as a child in the family and as a pupil in the school, he has developed multifaceted relationships to figures of authority. In subsequent relationships with figures of authority, he will establish modes of interaction which are similar to those he has experienced with persons in his early life (p. 20).
>
> *Identification Model.* This model stresses the child's imitation of the behavior of some significant other person—usually a parent, or a teacher

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—when the adult has not attempted to persuade the child of his viewpoint. The transmission is thus inadvertent. The child may adopt either small units of behavior or he may take on more far-reaching identifications. This model has been used most extensively to explain the acquisition of political party preferences by children who adopt their parents' partisan outlook (p. 21).

Cognitive-developmental Model. This model assumes that the capacity to deal with certain kinds of concepts and information sets limits on the understanding that can be acquired of political phenomena. The child's conceptions of the political world are modified by his existing cognitive structure. . . . This model assumes that it may not be possible to teach a given concept to a child who has not reached an appropriate developmental level . . . (p. 21).

In the presentation of their findings, Hess and Torney suggest that these models are operative for different types of learning. Thus, for instance, they argue that the Accumulation Model explains "the growth [with age] in the number of attitudes about the system"; the Interpersonal Transfer Model seems to explain the decrease with age of the "child's attachment to the nation"; the "Identification Model is most appropriate for understanding the acquistion of political party preference"; and growth in the importance of "the conceptions of institutions and processes of government" is best explained by the Cognitive-developmental Model (p. 92). This type of conclusion fits squarely within the stream of what we have referred to as the focus on process. However, Hess and Torney's arguments are not empirically supported; they are simple speculation.

Thus, although there have been some worthwhile and interesting theoretical suggestions as to how children learn political attitudes, there has really been no systematic work on the process of political socialization, as against speculation from more or less appropriate data. Research on the process of political socialization remains, to all intents and purposes, a virgin terrain awaiting exploration.

The great majority of studies of political socialization are concerned primarily, if not solely, with discovering what political attitudes children learn, and frequently seek to relate these attitudes to the political behavior and dispositions of adults in the same society. Apparently, this tack has been adopted as a way of determining whether there is a link between childhood socialization and adult behavior and attitudes. However, the studies tend to assert, rather than demonstrate, that there is in fact a link. The problem is obliquely stated by Easton and Dennis:

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> Unfortunately the major unstated dilemma still confronting students of political socialization lies not in the selection of competing theories but in the decision to work with or without some explicit theoretical design. . . . [E]very political orientation has antecedents of some sort; hence there is no limit to the subjects that may be adopted for research in the area of socialization. We might plunge into a discussion of any subject about children and politics that intuitively appears interesting, especially if we could link it up with adult behavior that has already drawn the continuing attention of students of politics. In this event there need be little theoretical guidance, except for the *assumptions* that topics of interest for the study of adults may be equally relevant for the study of children and that *childhood learning may point forward to adult behavior* (p. 20, italics added).

From the point of view of trying to determine whether there is a linkage, the normal study tends to create an unfalsifiable proposition; it tends toward hypothesis-saving. The researcher studies a sample of children of varying ages. On a particular attitudinal dimension, he discovers an apparent evolution with age, the older children moving closer to the views that are known to exist among adults. On another attitudinal dimension, he finds that the older children resemble the adults less than do the younger ones. In the former situation, the researcher concludes that the socialization process has been virtually completed for that dimension. In the latter case, he suggests that at some age level, beyond the oldest stratum he has studied, the attitudes characteristic of adults in that society are adopted by the youth. Most significantly, throughout this process he *avoids* specifying the conditions under which attitudes will persist, will be subject to transformation, or will actually change.

In the work of Hess and Torney, there are many examples of this problem. They occur whenever the change with age of students' attitudes is compared with the political dispositions of teachers—a limited, but what is often considered a representative, segment of the adult population. For instance, in studying "children's sense of the efficacy of citizen action," they find that "teachers and eighth-graders received similar mean efficacy scores, suggesting that expectations of governmental responsiveness become highly socialized during the elementary-school period" (p. 68). According to the responses received, the "sense of political efficacy" curve (Figure 13, p. 69) is as follows.

However, when they find a curve on which the youngest students look most like the adults, with decreasing resemblance with increasing age, their conclusion of linkage is not impugned. Thus, with the following curve (Figure 14, p. 70) representing the degree of "political inter-

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

FIGURE A. SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

est," they concluded "the discrepancy between eighth-graders and teachers may represent, on the children's part, a low level of interest which will increase in adulthood or, on the teachers' part, a high level of interest relative to that of other adults" (p. 68).

As we have already noted, Easton and Dennis refer to this problem as "the nontheoretical option" (pp. 20-21) and argue for the need of "a political theory of political socialization" in order to guide research. In fact, they present such a theory (see Chapter 3) and try to follow its guidelines in their research. By following their methodology, have they avoided the trap of unfalsifiability? At first glance, it might appear that they have not.

On the basis of their study of diffuse support for the structure of political authority, Easton and Dennis find that "in the American system the child becomes tightly linked to the structure of authority"

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

FIGURE B. DEGREE OF POLITICAL INTEREST

(p. 287). Reacting to this finding, they say, "we are of course not surprised that in the United States the overall tendency of primary socialization should be toward the political stability implied in these processes. For better or worse, this system has been relatively stable over the years, and we would expect children to mirror the behavior and hopes of their parents" (p. 288). Then they try to explain the political activism and challenge to the system that has characterized the behavior of many American adolescents and young adults during the 1960's. How, they ask, has this occurred, in view of the high level of positive diffuse support for the government they found among children?

Easton and Dennis begin their speculations by suggesting that the "increased rate of political activity of young people in the 1960's may indicate that something happens by late adolescence and early adulthood to change substantially the political sentiments of maturing persons." In other words, "the failure of the tendencies so dominant in childhood to persist at least among many young people suggests that we look at postchildhood stages of the life cycle for some assistance in

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understanding how tight bonds to political authority may begin to loosen" (p. 289). More specifically, they seek to understand this change by looking at the socialization experiences of adolescents and young adults (p. 292).

Since their own research was restricted to children, Easton and Dennis turn to the literature to find information on attitudes of diffuse support for institutions and figures of authority among older segments of the population. Unfortunately, there are few data comparable to their own. However, there is some material on the adult view of the police, and it is to this that Easton and Dennis turn. First, they discover that the general adult view of the police is quite similar to that found among their test children (pp. 295-297). But, more interestingly, they find that during the early adult years (from the late teens through the thirties) there is a "trough" in respect for the police. In other words, there seems to be a decline in respect for the police among teenagers which "bottoms[s] out somewhere in the late twenties and early thirties, when it reverses direction and strongly rises again to some high point among the sixty-year-olds" (p. 303). The changes in the percentage of various age-groups having a high degree of respect for the police tends to create the following curve (Figure 14-1, Model C, p. 299):



FIGURE C. HIGH RESPECT FOR POLICE

But why does such a "trough" develop among teenagers and young adults? And why does the curve of respect rise again with increasing age? Easton and Dennis make the following suggestions:

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> The reason for believing that during the early adult years there may be a trough in respect resides in the relationship between age and contact with the police. In the United States the child is apt to see the policeman as something of a model of the "good guy." In cops and robbers, for the children the cops stand on the side of virtue and robbers are the outlaws. But as the child moves into the teens and young adulthood, his experiences with the law begin to change. In the modern age he becomes part of the car culture; and this together with the greater mobility, assertiveness, and exuberance of youth raises the probability of increased conflict with the police over safety and order. . . .
>
> But as the young adult grows older and, we would assume, takes on the responsibilities of job and family and acquires additional stakes in life, he probably also revises his relationship to the immediate enforcement agencies. He comes down somewhat more heavily on the side of law and order, and his previous conceptions may be reawakened. Not that they need to or are likely to stand out as prominently as in the past. Adults may not be so favorably disposed toward the police as are children. But the curve of respect ascends again (pp. 298 and 300).

Then Easton and Dennis take what they call a "speculative leap in the dark" (p. 307) and suggest that for all objects of authority, and not just for the police, there might be a "trough." If this were the case,

> The accessibility of a member of a system for mobilization for or against political authorities could be partly a function of the phase of the life cycle in which one catches him . . . [with] the fifteen to thirty-five age group . . . [being] more susceptible than others to appeals leading toward opposition to political authority and toward a modification in the regime (p. 304). [As a result,] systems with a younger population of this kind (one with a large absolute number and percentage between fifteen and thirty-five) should turn out to be more volatile. Indeed it may be that from these younger ranks are recruited the counterelites. This may help to explain the phenomenon of youth and relatively young adults at the forefront of many changes, revolutionary and otherwise. They are at an age when we can expect them to be least committed to the support of authority and most prepared therefore to challenge tradition (p. 305).

Even if we accept Easton and Dennis' speculative leap, this does not mean that any society with a large absolute number and proportion of young adults will be strongly challenged. Rather, certain other conditions must also exist in order that a movement that seeks to change the society may develop:

> Negative sentiments may not be sufficiently intense to leave members readily available for action against the authorities. Furthermore, even if their attachment has sunk to a very low level, there may be no issues or conditions to make them sufficiently dissatisfied with political life to

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> lend their support for any significant change. Beyond that, even if discontent were rife, there need not always be the institutional and organizational resources and the absolute numbers needed to achieve a "critical mass" for effective protest. Nor need there always be waiting a competent leadership to initiate any plausible effort for change (p. 307).
> Thus even if we had evidence that belief in the legitimacy of the authorities had declined temporarily, it would only describe a significant condition for political transformations. We have no basis for predicting what would in fact occur historically. This would depend upon these other factors—the numbers, resources, leadership, and provocative circumstances. But it is the fact that these other factors *are* present in the United States (and other countries) during the 1960's which makes this combination of circumstances so inflammable (p. 308).

This rather lengthy discussion of the way in which Easton and Dennis try to reconcile their findings of high positive support for the government among children with the challenge to political authority that has characterized American youth in the 1960's has been presented to serve as a basis for the appreciation of their handling of the general hypothesis of linkage. Their argument seems to suffer from the unfalsifiability that has characterized many studies of political socialization. This impression arises because, although the diffuse positive support found among children seems to create a reverse form of behavior among young adults—i.e., challenging political authority—and a congruent behavioral pattern among older people, Easton and Dennis maintain that there is a linkage between the attitudes of children and their behavior and attitudes in later life. In fact, however, Easton and Dennis move in the direction of avoiding the unfalsifiability issue by identifying, unfortunately in a very vague and imprecise fashion, the factors that explain the variations. As we have pointed out, they see the youthful challenge as a result of increased personal contact and conflict with political authority. Then, with increasing age and the growth of familial and vocational responsibilities, the adult perceives himself as having a stake in life as it is and revises his relation with the authorities to conform to his original views.[21] Furthermore, as we

[21] Looking at an aspect of the political behavior of American youth that is not completely analyzed by Easton and Dennis emphasizes the value of specifying these explanatory factors. It has, of course, always been clear that the overt challenge to the system was being made only by particular sub-segments of the youthful population—i.e., blacks and middle- and upper-class college students. It is also clear, especially in the reaction against those who opposed the involvement of United States troops in Cambodia beginning in May, 1970, that other sub-segments—e.g., construction workers and members of the National Guard—do give strong support to the political authority-structure. One criterion that distinguishes between these two groups is the extent to which they have (or think they have) familial and vocational responsibility and a stake in life as it is. We might, I think, plausibly argue that many young blacks do not

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have seen, Easton and Dennis specify broadly the conditions under which youthful discontent will turn to protest.

Although Easton and Dennis' treatment of the hypothesis of linkage is clearly inadequate, their research seems to point in the right direction. What appears to be required for further progress is in-depth study of discrete, politically relevant dispositions at various stages in the life cycle. This work would not only seek to describe the differences among individuals of varying age-segments but, most importantly, would examine and specify precisely the variables that account for the changes. Ideally, such research would be longitudinal in form, but in view of the practical difficulties involved and the virginity of the terrain, even a cross-sectional study of this type would be a most valuable and welcome addition to research in political socialization.

More generally, on the basis of the standard presented for making an overall evaluation of political socialization research, the discipline appears to be in an inchoate state. This finding is both surprising and disturbing in view of the amount of research and thinking on the subject that has been done in the last decade. Political scientists have made no attempt to mine the child's world for heuristic insights into political behavior, or as a means of tapping adults' norms toward the polity. Work that falls within the domain of the focus on process has been quite inadequate, and the examination of the hypothesis of linkage is hardly sophisticated. Given this lamentable state of affairs, it seems appropriate to ask whether empirical research in the field has been aimed in the most profitable direction. More specifically, as the connotative definition of political socialization clearly suggests, should not researchers at least examine children's behavior as well as their attitudes?

At first glance, such a broadening of the operational definition of political socialization research would seem ill-advised. From a practical point of view, the cost in time and effort of examining children's behavior is much greater than that of testing their attitudes. Questionnaires and interviews are the accepted ways to tap attitudes, but to un-

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see themselves as having a stake in life as it is and that many of the more affluent college students do not have responsibilities; it is from these segments that the protesters tend to come. On the other hand, employed youth do seem to have both responsibilities and, apparently, a stake in life as it is; in this sub-section of the population, there are very few protesters but many strong supporters of the present political authority-structure. Thus, the explanatory variables that Easton and Dennis developed, on an intuitive basis, for understanding the "trough" phenomenon, also seem helpful in explaining which sub-segments of the youth will be strongly affected by the trough.

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derstand children's behavior prolonged observation of their activities in a variety of social contexts would be required. When this pragmatic consideration is supplemented by the fact that there is apparent movement within the field, as it is now operationally defined, toward understanding the questions of linkage and process, there seems little justification for arguing that researchers should add to their burden by examining children's behavior.

However, such a conclusion would be based upon two interrelated assumptions: (1) children do have overt political attitudes, and (2) political socialization studies have been tapping these attitudes. Research conducted by Philip Converse strongly suggests that the first, and therefore also the second, assumption may not be tenable.[22]

Converse has found that a large proportion, apparently approaching 50 percent,[23] of respondents in a sequence of national panel studies are individuals "with no real attitudes on the matter in question . . . [who] felt obliged to try a response to the item despite our generous and repeated invitation to disavow any opinion where none was felt."[24] This seems to be explained by the fact that "the attitude questionnaire is approached as though it were an intelligence test, with the 'don't knows' and 'can't decide' confessions of mental incapacity."[25]

One way to avoid the expression of these "non-attitudes" is to choose for investigation "attitude-objects which are 'close to home' for all of the subjects." Thus, Converse notes, "one need not worry greatly about non-attitudes in the sense in which we use the term here when the object of evaluation is 'mother' and the dimensions of evaluation so common (as in the more typical uses of the semantic differential) that they are part of anybody's common judgmental vocabulary."[26]

Given this argument and its supporting evidence, we may seriously wonder about the value of those conclusions drawn in studies of political socialization on the basis of responses to political questions. None of the studies has taken even the largely ineffective precaution against stimulating respondents to express opinions if they do not have any. More significantly, since the political realm is certainly not central to the child, respondents are particularly likely to express "non-attitudes." Furthermore, if, as Converse suggests, the respondent's perception of

[22] Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," revised version of a paper read at the Seventeenth International Congress of Psychology in Washington, D.C., August 1963. Reprinted in Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass. 1970). See also Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964).

[23] "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes," 176.

[24] *Ibid.*, 175. [25] *Ibid.*, 177. [26] *Ibid.*, 178.

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the questionnaire as an intelligence test is one reason for the tendency to give answers to attitude questions even if he does not really have an orientation on the issue, then children are even more likely than Converse's adults to have this perception (and, thereby, equally more likely to express non-attitudes) because they are constantly taking examinations.[27] Thus, Converse's work suggests not only that research on children's overt political attitudes may not be measuring anything significant for later life, but also that it may be unprofitable to try to study children's political attitudes, because most may not have any.

If examining children's overt political attitudes—non-attitudes?—is not an ideal research strategy, what reasons are there for assuming that studying childhood behavioral patterns might be more profitable, and what sorts of behavior would we want to look at? To answer these questions we must determine what *general* types of behavior are political, find out whether these have analogues in the child's world, and present the reasons that suggest that there is some linkage between the two. Given the nature of a review article, we can do little more than offer very tentative and brief answers to these questions. Furthermore, we shall limit our discussion to one type of political behavior, that which occurs between the citizens and the office-holders, excluding from consideration such aspects of political behavior as decision-making and relations among members of the political elite. We have chosen this restricted operational definition because it coincides with the type of political behavior most political socialization studies have tried to explain.

Political behavior so qualified is essentially authority behavior. It refers to the relation between the institutions and figures of political authority and the citizens in the society. More specifically, it refers to such phenomena as attitudes toward and participation in political activity, expected and actual governmental responsiveness to citizens' attempts to influence politics, the degree to which citizens actually comply with governmental directives and value that compliance, the norms and practices associated with issuing political directives, and the citizens' general perceptions and affect for political authority figures and institutions.[28]

Now, it is quite obvious that authority *per se* and these specific as-

[27] This problem of children's approaching the questionnaire as if it were a test is discussed by Roberta Sigel, "Political Socialization," 6-7.

[28] My conception of authority derives from my membership in the Workshop in Comparative Politics, directed by Harry Eckstein and Ted Gurr. The discussion of authority in this article is an oversimplified summary of the Workshop's conception.

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pects of it have direct analogues in the child's attitudinal and behavioral world. Participation, responsiveness, compliance, "directiveness," and affect can easily be identified in the child's relations within his family, school, and social and religious groups. But this in itself does not mean that these childhood experiences will influence the style of political behavior the adult adopts. However, impressionistically, this does seem likely to be the case.

As the child matures, he develops a more stable and consistent pattern of behavior within each of the social units in which he participates. To the extent that his behavior in these different organizations is consistent, he is likely to internalize a single model of an authority relation. To the extent that he is expected to adopt different behavioral patterns in the different organizations, he is apt to suffer strain due to the difficulties of simultaneously trying to play different roles.[29] In the former case, the child will continue his style of behavior in adult social relations. If certain or all adult relations require a different behavioral pattern, the individual will, just as in the case of conflicting role-expectations in childhood, suffer great psychological stress. Finally, in adult life, to avoid cognitive dissonance and strain, the political authority-relations to which an individual is submitted should be similar to the types of social authority-relations he has had. However, in many cases, individuals will confront one of the types of strain we have just mentioned. What happens, then, to the notion of the importance of non-political childhood behavior? Though a satisfactory response to this question would require extensive discussion and original research, we can make some remarks that may be suggestive.

Let us begin with an assumption upon which most can agree: people will try to avoid stress and, if that is not possible, to reduce it. Now, take the case of a child who is expected to participate simultaneously in different types of authority-relations. The easiest way to avoid stress under such conditions would be to retain membership only in social units requiring similar behavioral patterns. However, this option is often not realistic—e.g., when there is a conflict between behavior required in family and school, in societies where education is compulsory. In such a situation, the child has two major alternatives for reducing strain: he may seek to change or opt out of the expected authority-relations in one of the organizations—rebel—or he may consider one

[29] The following discussion on the relation between strain and social and political authority-patterns is drawn partly from Harry Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy" (Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 10, Princeton 1961), reprinted in Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion: A Study of Norway* (Princeton 1966), 253-62.

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of the units more "central" to him and reduce strain by reducing the importance he attributes to his membership in one of the conflicting groups.[30]

Given these choices, by the time the individual becomes an adult, he has adopted or has been socialized into a single preferred behavioral pattern.[31] If a conflict develops in his adult social or political life between expected behavior and the pattern he has adopted, the same alternatives exist that were available in childhood. In the light of this argument, we can see that childhood behavior may strongly influence adult political behavior either in the sense of conforming to or rebelling against the accepted forms, or may make the individual view politics as not central to him. In any of these cases, a study of childhood behavioral patterns would seem to be of a great potential value.

Complementing such a study should be an examination of children's attitudes toward behavior, institutions, and actors that have political analogues. This suggestion may appear unacceptable to those students of political socialization who have argued, for instance, that "father affect" is not a good predictor of "president affect" (Easton and Dennis, p. 366).

There are two reasons why such opposition need not be endorsed. First, following Converse, children's responses to the "president-affect" questions may be, in large part, "non-attitudes" although the "father-affect" responses are attitudes. As a result, questions about the extent to which the latter predict the former are not meaningful. Second, the types of attitudes we would want to measure have, for the most part, not been investigated by students of political socialization. For instance, we have no data on children's views of how much they should or can participate in family decision-making processes or in classroom discussions; similarly, we have no information on their norms of family- and school-centered compliance, responsiveness, and directiveness. In fact, the only data that have been collected are concerned with the image of and affect children have for their parents.[32]

[30] This second possibility follows from one of Converse's arguments in "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes," pp. 180 ff. He argues that cognitive dissonance is low if in the conflict between roles an individual is expected to play, one role is central to him but the other is not.

[31] There is, of course, one general type of exception—the individual who has not learned how to live with or manage strain. We can assume, on an intuitive basis, that a fairly small percentage of the general population falls into this category.

[32] The relation between attitudes and behavior is an important question, which we have not raised in this article. For insights into this issue, as well as a survey of the sociopsychological literature on how children learn, see the brilliant study of Justin Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience: The Socialization of Internalized Control over Behavior* (New York 1968).

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In conclusion, we can raise certain serious questions about the solidity of the foundation upon which political socialization research has been built. Despite a considerable expenditure in time, effort, and thought (not forgetting money) during the past decade, we have not come much closer to gathering the type of information that political socialization research ostensibly sought. This low level of productivity seems to be partly a result of the phenomena studied—i.e., children's overt political attitudes or, probably more correctly, non-attitudes. A possible remedy for this condition might lie in the connotative definitions of political socialization. Specifically, there might be some value in investigating children's politically relevant behavior—i.e., their authority-relations—and their attitudes toward it. This research strategy might bring us more telling information than we now possess. By locating points of psychological strain and stress, and examining the ways in which people react to them, we might gather useful data for explaining the various types of linkages between the childhood world and adult political behavior. In addition, a behavioral focus would certainly provide information on how specific patterns of conduct are internalized, adopted, modified, or rejected. Finally, even at an early stage in this type of research, when we might limit our objectives to describing children's behavioral patterns in a single social unit and trying to explain changes in their conduct, the results could satisfy one of the possible purposes of political socialization research. For although this type of investigation would not be able to provide more than speculative information about linkage and process, it could be used for developing a heuristic model to describe and explain political behavior.[33]

[33] For an example of the politically heuristic use of a study of children's authority practices and norms, see William R. Schonfeld, *Authority in France: A Model of Political Behavior Drawn from Case Studies in Education* (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1970).

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